¹ Historical Journal, XIV (1971) 165–200 (esp. pp. 198–200).Google Scholar

² London, 1969 - subsequently cited as Baldwin.

³ In his review he writes that Middlemas and Barnes ‘have not succeeded in acquitting Baldwin of the charge of failing to rearm in 1933–7’, Among the reasons why Baldwin ‘failed to take action as he should have done’ was his feeling ‘that opinion in the country was so hostile that any attempt to force the issue would only lead to electoral disaster. On (his last point, Messrs. Middlemas and Barnes seek to marshal the evidence of the by-elections, and maintain that Baldwin's retrospective self-justification was thoroughly justified. Mr C. T. Stannage's article … has shown their treatment of this subject to be misleading and inaccurate’ (Historical Journal, XV (1972) 184).Google Scholar

⁴ I once overheard a very eminent historian remark (sotto voce during a paper on 1931) that he was not prepared to listen to evidence in MacDonald's favour.

⁶ Thorne, Christopher, The limits of Foreign Policy (1972), esp. pp. 240–3, 267–8, 324;Google ScholarHoward, Michael, The Continental Commitment (1972), p. 101 (subsequently cited as Howard).Google Scholar

⁷ See e.g. President Roosevelt's ‘Appeal to the Nations of the World for Peace by Disarmament and for the End of Economic Chaos, May 16, 1933’, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, II (New York, 1938), no. 56;Google Scholar also his résumés (in the Second Fireside Chat - mo. 50 - and Nineteenth Press Conference - no. 52) of his discussions with MacDonald and other foreign politicians.

⁸ Eden, Anthony, Memoirs, I (1962) chs. 4–6 (subsequently cited as Eden).Google Scholar Hermann Rauschning claims Hitler said at the time that ‘he would conclude any pact that would allow Germany an army of four hundred thousand men, or even three hundred and sixty thousand. Then at last he would be … able to form the core of his future mass army openly, prepared to take the next step without risk on the first politically favourable opportunity’ (Hitler speaks (1939), pp. 156–7).Google Scholar

⁹ For which, see Medlicott, W. N., Britain and Germany: the search for agreement (1969),Google Scholar and Appeasers and Warmongers (Oulu, Finland, 1972.)

¹⁰ Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (1947) p. 251 - subsequently cited as Feiling.Google Scholar

¹¹ Baldwin, chs. 27–8; Howard, esp. pp. 104–10; Thorne, , The Limits of Foreign Policy, pp. 314–6, 319, 394–9;Google ScholarAnnual Register (1934), pp. 67–70;Google ScholarParliamentary Debates, 5th series CCXCII, cols. 1274–5, 07 1934.Google Scholar

¹² Annual Register (1934), pp. 96–7;Google Scholar (1935), pp. 23–7, 29, 47–9; Parliamentary Papers (1934–1935), XIII, 805–6;Google ScholarBaldwin, pp. 812–21.

¹³ Article cited, pp. 198–9.

¹⁴ Part. Deb., 5th series, cccv, cols. 45–6, 151–2, 22 Oct. 1935.

¹⁵ There was a similar ambiguity in the 1930s usage of the term ‘pacifism’. See Ceadel's, M. discussion in By-Elections in British Politics, ed. Cooke, C. and Ramsden, J. (1973), pp. 133–4.Google Scholar Likewise in the 1920s the ambivalence of the concept of ‘Dominion Home Rule’ had been of great importance in the Irish and Indian contexts.

¹⁶ Though in considering actual operations against Italy in 1935–6, they were extremely anxious for French support.

¹⁷ Chamberlain's scheme was, however, more precise, and did not necessarily involve the League - he wanted a convention of mutual guarantee by the major European states, towards which each signatory agreed to contribute ‘a limited specified force’.

¹⁸ Parl. Deb., 5th series, CCXCII, col. 2345, 30 07 1934;Google Scholar and CCCIX esp. cols. 1843–4, 1847, 1851, 9 Mar. 1936.

¹⁹ Ibid. cccv cols. 265, 23 Oct 1935. A mandate, it will be remembered, is a loose term, meaning only that the issue has been placed before the electorate, not that it has been the sole issue at an election.

²⁰ He had discussed the idea with Montagu Norman; and he mentioned it to Dawson (in May 1935) in the context of drawing moderate Labour leaders over into his new administration. Baldwin thought also ‘that such expenditure would be highly popular, that it would provide a great deal of employment next winter, and that it would serve the essential purpose of keeping our skilled artificers in being’ (Wrench, J. E., Geoffrey Dawson and our Times (1935), pp. 321–2)Google Scholar. These expectations seem over-optimistic; and, if Baldwin came to realize this, it may account for his cooling towards the project.

²¹ According to the calculations of David Butler, the 1935 by-elections suggest a 4% Conservative lead over Labour (The Electoral System in Great Britain (Oxford, 1963 ed.), pp. 173, 185)Google Scholar; sec also Stannage's, E. T. article, and By-Elections in British Politics, pp. 109–115.Google Scholar

²² Feiling, pp. 266, 268–9; Macleod, I., Neville Chamberlain (1961), pp. 182–5.Google Scholar

²³ The Annual Register's précis of Attlee's speech—(1935), p. 109.

²⁴ Inept diplomacy probably led Hoare to give away more than he need, and also hampered cabinet appraisal of the result. But this was not so far out of line with the earlier British position as to be unacceptable to the government.

²⁵ Parl. Deb., 5th series, CCCIII, cols. 1521–2, 1 07 1935;Google Scholar cccv, cols. 31–2, 150, 215–8, 223, 22–3 Oct.; CCCVII, cols. 59–60, 342–3, 2034–5, Dec; Annual Register (1935), p. 165;Google Scholar Eden, pp. 264–5, 286–7. 306.

²⁶ In June 1935 Mussolini had told Eden that he would be content with the cession of the non- Amharic three-quarters of Abyssinia plus a more indirect control over the Amharic central plateau; but, if war broke out, he would take the lot. On Eden's return journey, Laval suggested an Italian protectorate over the whole Empire, on the analogy of the French position in Morocco (Eden, ch. XII and p. 273).

²⁷ For the discussion of territorial solutions, see Eden chs. 12–16; for the military side of the crisis, see Arthur Marder, ‘The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935–36’, American Historical Review, LXXV (06 1970, pp. 1327–56Google Scholar (subsequently cited as Marder); for a general assessment (published after this article was written), see Parker, R. A. C., ‘Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian crisis, 1935–1936’, English Historical Review, LXXXIX (1974), 293–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ There is some justification for two Conservative jibes of the time - ‘Our policy is defence without defiance, their policy defiance without defence’, and ‘Palmerston pales into insignificance besides the peevish truculence of the right honourable gentleman’ (Attlee).

²⁹ Feiling, p. 269; Parl. Deb., 5th series, CCCXVII, col. 1145, 12 11. 1936.Google Scholar Of course Baldwin's choice of election dates was not entirely free. For the very important Government of India Act only became law in July 1935.

³⁰ Baldwin, p. 853; Marder, p. 1342. (This and the next paragraph are largely based on Marder's account).

³¹ Both French and German intelligence anticipated that fighting would last for three years (Robertson, E. M., Hitler's Pre-war policy and Military Plans 1933–1939 (1963) pp. 63–4;Google ScholarParker, R. A. C., E.H.R. 1974, p. 326).Google Scholar

³² See Eden, esp. p. 288. One reason for the delay in permitting Abyssinian arms purchases was the fear that these might provoke a sudden Italian reaction before the British naval build-up was complete.

³³ Notably a shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition, etc., and the difficulties of keeping the fleet at battle-readiness for a long period without formal mobilization (which was ruled out as too provocative).

³⁴ Though Eden was still instructed to vote for them on 2 Mar. (Marder, p. 1343n.).

³⁵ In the event of hostilities - though, given the mildness of the French as well as the British reactions to the crisis, these were surely unlikely - two capital ships would have had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean to deal with the German pocket battleships (Marder, p. 1352).

³⁶ Howard, p. 119.

³⁷ P.P., 1935–6 xvi; significantly the White Paper stressed that the expansion of the army would be limited to four battalions and explained these in terms of imperial police duties (p. 848).

³⁸ For this and the two subsequent paragraphs, see: the Public Record Office, Cab. 4/24 and 16/123 series; Howard, pp. 113–5; Baldwin, pp. 900–4, 908–11; Middlemas, K., The Diplomacy of Illusion (1972), pp. 35–6 (subsequently cited as Middlemas)Google Scholar; Annual Register, 1936, pp. 14–18.Google Scholar

³⁹ Medlicott, W. N., Britain and Germany: The Search for Agreement 1930–1937, pp. 27, 31.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Until 1937 ‘there was sufficient slack in the economy for shortages to be avoided… In the first half of 1937, rearmament reinforced an inflationary boom [and balance of payments deficit], but the onset of recession provided the opportunity for it to compensate for the decline in private business activity. It was not until 1939 that defence spending again boosted inflationary tendencies’; but by then ‘it was obvious the programme could not be carried out without interfering with activity in the private sector’ (Richardson, H. W., Economic Recovery in Britain 1932–39, esp. pp. 55, 233, 284–5).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Feiling, pp. 292, 314. See also Coghlan, F.. ‘Armaments, Economic Policy and Appeasement’, History, LVII (1972), 205–16,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Macdonald, C. A., ‘Economic Appeasement and the German “Moderates”, 1937–1939’, Past and Present, no. 46 (1972), esp. pp. 108, 111–13, 124.Google Scholar

⁴² Though one can appreciate ministers’ concern at the high level of ‘maintenance’ spending to which expanded armaments would commit them for (as Baldwin put it) ‘a generation’.

⁴³ In November 1939 Chamberlain still naïvely hoped that the Germans would recognize that they could not win and would therefore ditch Hider and come to terms - Macleod, I., Neville Chamberlain, p. 281.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Howard, pp. 135–6; Middlemas, p. 127; Macleod, p. 272.

⁴⁵ Hancock, W. K. and Gowing, M. M., British War Economy (1949), pp. 115–6;Google ScholarMedlicott, W. N., Contemporary England (1967), pp. 448, 475, 477 - figures are in American billions, converted where appropriate at the official exchange rate of $4.03 to the £.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Middlemas, pp. 57 (Dec. 1935) and 90 (Apr. 1937).

⁴⁷ The services were not, of course, pressing for safety margins of this (or indeed of any) magnitude. But they were resorting to the usual expedients to by-pass treasury reservations. For the army's manipulation of programmes to counteract cuts, and for its stretching (occasionally even disregarding) instructions, see Postan, M. M., British War Production (1952), pp. 33–4, 44, 47 - subsequently cited as Postan.Google Scholar For the Admiralty's ambiguous course in 1936–7, see ibid. p. 26, and p. 600 below. (The air ministry, too, over-provided factory space and plant - Postan, p. 19.)

⁴⁸ Howard, pp. 114–5; Baldwin, pp. 1025–8.

⁴⁹ Annual Register (1937), pp. 11–14;Google ScholarBaldwin, pp. 1026, 1029–30.

⁵⁰ In 1936 the admiralty had been permitted to accelerate the Defence Requirements Committee programme to complete within three years all that the industry could manage without interference with civilian construction. Under cover of this ‘accelerated programme’, the admiralty was ‘in fact working up to the “two-power” standard’; but by 1938 the two programmes were bound to diverge - hence the formal request for an increase (Postan, p. 26). Admittedly the D.R.C. programme had been an interim one, pending a more definite elaboration of a ‘new standard’ in 1939.

⁵¹ For Eden's complaints, see his Memoirs, vol. 1, chapter on ‘Delays in Rearmament’.

⁵² Middlemas, pp. 116–25; Postan, pp. 25–7, 31.

⁵³ Middlemas, pp. 182–3, 216–21; Postan, pp. 17–22, 87, and chap, III passim.

⁵⁴ Middlemas, pp. 216, 221; Postan, pp. 26–7, 47–51, 58–9.

⁵⁵ Middlemas, esp. pp. 124–5.

⁵⁶ Howard, pp. 117–8; Middlemas, pp. 117, 123–4; Eden pp. 487–8, 497–8.

⁵⁷ France was reluctant to do this because it might jeopardize the prospect of securing British military aid.

⁵⁸ P.R.O., Cab. 24/274 and 283; Middlemas, pp. 423–5.

⁵⁹ The direct quotations are from General Pownall's Diary, cited in Middlemas, pp. 426–8; see also Howard, pp. 126–8, 167–8; Postan, pp. 70–1; and MacDonald, C. A., Past and Present, no. 46, p. 122.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ It seems to be agreed that, in the absence of a direct French invasion of Germany (for which there were no serious plans), Czechoslovakia would eventually have been beaten - in about eight days according to Hitler, three weeks according to his generals’ more pessimistic calculations, and something over three months according to David Vital (Vital, D., The Survival of Small States (1971), pp. 26–33;Google ScholarRobertson, E. M., Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, ch. XIII; Middlemas, esp. p. 219).Google Scholar Admittedly the German army would have suffered severe casualties in the process.

⁶¹ Middlemas, p. 428; Howard, pp. 128–30, 132–3.

⁶² Postan, esp. pp. 78, 89–90, 99–100.

⁶³ This was a task more suited to Baldwin's conciliatory disposition and better personal relationships. But it only cropped up at the very end of his political career, when even Mr Middlemas concedes that he may have been past his best.

⁶⁴ Annual Register (1939), p. 43;Google Scholar Postan, pp. 99–100.

⁶⁵ Had Hitler attacked in the way he originally planned in Jan. 1940, it seems (at least on paper) likely that he would have been repulsed. In which case the reputations of Daladier and Chamberlain would today stand far higher.

⁶⁶ As distinct from infantry support tanks - see Stolfi, R. H. S., ‘Equipment for Victory in France in 1940’, History, LV (1970),Google Scholar and Chapman, G. P., Why France Collapsed (1968).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Total British tank production slightly exceeded German in the first nine months of the war, but the German tanks were distinctly heavier (Postan, pp. 109–10).

⁶⁸ Later still it was the shortage of landing craft that became the chief limiting factor on Allied strategy.

⁶⁹ Thorne, , The Limits of Foreign Policy, pp. 394–5;Google Scholar Howard, pp. 137–42, 169–70; A. Iriye, ‘Japanese Imperialism and Aggression: Reconsiderations’ and ‘Japan's Foreign Policies between World Wars: Sources and Interpretations’, in Robertson, E. M. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (1971).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Webster, C. and Frankland, N., The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1959–15, I (1961), 75–7;Google Scholar Middlemas, p. 422; Collier, Basil, The Defence of the United Kingdom (1957), pp. 36–40;Google Scholar Howard, pp. 117, 123.

⁷¹ Churchill, W. S., The Second World War, II (1949), 36–38, 45, 54.Google Scholar

⁷² In 1934 Chamberlain suggested that ‘our best defence would be the existence of a deterrent force so powerful as to render success in attack too doubtful to be worthwhile. I submit that this is most likely to be attained by the establishment of an Air Force … of a size and efficiency calculated to inspire respect in the mind of a possible enemy’ (Howard, p. 109); cf. also Baldwin, p. 796.

⁷³ Medlicott, , Contemporary England, p. 337,Google ScholarTaylor, A. J. P., English History, 1914–45 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 437–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Howard, pp. 111–12, 123; Slessor, Sir John, The Central Blue (1956), pp. 204–6;Google ScholarWebster, and Frankland, , op. cit., pp. 90–126.Google Scholar In mitigation of these oversights, it may be pleaded that the pace of R.A.F. expansion (aimed largely at securing ‘parity’ with and ‘deterrence’ of Germany) was too fast for immediate operational efficiency; that false economies severely restricted exercises and bombing experiments; and that the acquisition of bombing ranges was very long delayed, not only by inertia, but also by the opposition of amenity interests within the U.K. and by the unco-operativeness of Mackenzie King's Canada.

⁷⁵ Eden, A., Memoirs, II (1965), 302–3;Google ScholarMacartney, C. A. and Palmer, A. W., Independent Eastern Europe (1962), esp. pp. 434–5.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Italy, of course, was deterred from entering the war until she believed it to be as good as won. And Japan did not in fact attack British possessions until the U.K. was heavily involved elsewhere; but it was American, not British, power that Japan really feared.

⁷⁷ Though here, too, they were often pessimistic, over-estimating the French capacity for mounting an immediate offensive.

⁷⁸ O'Neill, R. J., The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–9 (1966), esp. pp. 152–60, 167–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Milward, A. S., The German Economy at War, esp. ch. 1 and pp. 43–5.Google Scholar Only in the case of a war fought directly against Britain, as distinct from a war to present her with a fait accompli on the continent, did Hitler think in other terms - such a war (he said in May 1939) might take 10–15 years; but then he would be able to cut back on the bottomless pit of the army in favour of the navy and air force (Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–45, series D, VI (1956), 574–80).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ O'Neill, , op. cit., pp. 132–4;Google ScholarBullock, A., Hitler, a study in tyranny (Penguin edn.), pp. 507–9;Google ScholarDocuments on German Foreign Policy, series D, II, 671–3, VI, 574–80, VII, 200–6.Google Scholar