¹ Woodward, E. L., Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford, 1935 and Frank Cass, 1964).Google Scholar

² Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H. W. V. (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War. Eleven volumes were published between 1924 and 1937. In this case the relevant volume is x, ii, published in 1937.Google Scholar

³ Grey to Goschen, 8 Aug. 1913, F.O.371/1377/32560/12, B.D. x, ii, 451. The German Ambassador remarked that ‘the thing was to create a thoroughly good and healthy atmosphere between the two countries and then they would see that it was perfectly absurd to continue this competitive race in defensive arms ‘.

⁴ The argument had ceased to be real by the date of Churchill's speech-18 March-though the British Government did not yet know this. On that day Bethmann telegraphed to Metternich rejecting as ‘worthless to our purpose’ the formula which the Cabinet had just agreed. It was the closest that the British Government would go to neutrality and represented a very real concession: but it was rejected out of hand. Bethmann to Metternich, 18 Mar. 1912, G.P. xxx, 188. For more details of this, see my article in the forthcoming Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey.

⁵ The German Government had given Lord Haldane a copy of their projected new naval law, which he sent to the Admiralty on his return to London. It was much more expansionist than had been expected and caused genuine shock in the Admiralty. Grey to Goschen, 24 Feb. 1912, Admiralty memorandum enclosed, F.O.C.P. 10575, 72. Cabinet Memorandum by Churchill, 14 Feb. 1912, and Admiralty Memorandum by Churchill, 15 Feb. 1912; Churchill, R. S., Churchill, Winston S., Companion Volume III (Heinemann, 1969), pp. 1515–8.Google Scholar

⁶ Hansard, , Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. XXXIV, cols. 1340- 1, and vol. xxxv, col. 35.Google Scholar

⁷ E.g. Churchill. See The World Crisis (London, 1923).Google Scholar

⁸ See Steinberg, J., Yesterday's Deterrent (London, 1964).Google Scholar

⁹ Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis, 1911–1918 (London, 1968), I, 80.Google Scholar

¹⁰ The German programme was based upon German needs and ‘it does not matter what counter measures England takes …’ G.P. XXXI, 194.

¹¹ Grey to Goschen, 10 Apr. 1912, F.O.371/1373/15371/12, B.D. VI, 573.

¹² Granville to Nicolson, 18 Oct. 1912, Carnock MSS, Vol. 11/12, B.D. IX, II, 47.

¹³ Article in Nord und Süd, June and July 1912. When Balfour was sent papers by Churchill on the naval question in March 1912, he replied: ‘A war entered upon for no other object than to restore the Germanic Empire of Charlemagne in a modern form, appears to me at once so wicked and so stupid as to be almost incredible. And yet it is almost impossible to make sense of modern German policy without crediting it with this intention.’ Balfour to Churchill, 22 Mar. 1912, Churchill, R. S., op. cit. pp. 1530–1.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Such formulae were designed to exchange a political agreement of some sort, as a concession from England, reductions or retardation of the German naval programme. Although such discussions alarmed the Foreign Office, they were unreal, as the Germans only wanted unconditional neutrality, which even a Liberal Cabinet could not give. Nevertheless, through 1912, Nicolson exchanged worries with his predecessor, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Viceroy of India: ‘Discussions with Germany as to the formula, have, I am glad to say, been removed from that ground, which I thought a dangerous and delicate one, as I much feared that we should entangle ourselves in … engagements … which might cause umbrage and possibly suspicion to Russia and especially to France.’ Hardinge Papers, 92, ii, 232, 18 Feb. 1912. In June he was still fearing ‘a strenuous time on the subject’, Hardinge Papers, 92, ii, 245, 3 June 1912, and in July he wrote ‘… there is no doubt that the naval agreement has now passed out of practical politics, and my whole efforts are now directed in preventing any understanding being arrived a t …” Hardinge Papers, 92, i, 287, 18 July 1912.

¹⁵ Minute by Crowe on Grey to Goschen, 10 Feb. 1913, F.O.371/1649/7482/13.

¹⁶ In the previous month, Goschen had reported a friendly article in the Deutsche Revue. The reaction to it in the Foreign Office was an accurate forecast of the reception that Tirpitz was to get. ‘The article is only “friendly”’, minuted Crowe, ‘in the sense that its avowed object is to promote the rapprochement between England and Germany. But it also makes it plain that the one way to attain this object is to part England from France and Russia, and this is of course, the real German policy, and pursued so openly that the whole world is watching these persistent German efforts with either hope or anxiety.’ Nicolson followed him: ‘The aim of the article is clear—efforts are being renewed to detach us from our friends—the object is obvious—we should from every point of view be in a most parlous position and so would international peace, were such efforts to be successful.’ Goschen to Grey, 2 Jan. 1913, F.O.371/1647/140/13.

¹⁷ The capital ships offered by the Colonies referred to a proposal from Canada, for which see Woodward, op. cit., and the speech of Mr Churchill's referred to was that of 18 Mar. 1912, in which he first raised the possibility of a ‘naval holiday’ and spoke of the ratio 16:10. Goschen to Grey, 10 Feb. 1913, F.O.371/1649/7482/6209/13. B.D. x, ii, 457.

¹⁸ Grey to Goschen, 15 Feb. 1913, Grey Papers, F.O.800/23. B.D. x, ii, 459.

¹⁹ Goschen to Nicolson, 22 Feb. 1913, Carnock MSS, vol. II, 1913. B.D. x, ii, 463.

²⁰ Grey to Goschen, 5 Mar. 1913, Grey Papers, F.O.800/23. B.D. x, ii, 465.

²¹ Hansard, , Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. I, cols. 1749–91.Google Scholar

²² Confirmed almost at once: ‘Herr v. Jagow admitted that Mr. Churchill's words as regards Germany had certainly been of the friendliest description; what he regretted … was that, owing to the quiet and restrained manner in which the German naval estimates had been treated by Admiral v. Tirpitz, the question of naval construction, so long as a source of controversy between the two countries, had ceased … to occupy a large place in public attention. Now he was afraid that public interest would again be revived and that newspapers on both sides would begin to show the heat that had always characterised their discussions of this thorny subject …’ Goschen to Grey, 29 Mar. 1913. F.O.371/1647/14456/13. B.D. x, ii, 469.

²³ G.P. XXXIX, 35–6.

²⁴ G.P. XXXIX, 39–46.

²⁵ Tirpitz, , My Memoirs (London, 1919)Google Scholar, Hopman to Müller, 11 June 1913, i, 395–7.

²⁶ G.P. xxxix, 48n.

²⁷ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series (House of Commons), vol. LIII, cols. 1043–4.Google ScholarThe Daily News on the following day, 6 June, carried an article stating that it was not clear whether Mr Churchill intended to build three ships in lieu of the Canadian ships. Both the statement and the newspaper article elicited protest from the German Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor. Goschen to Nicolson, 7 June 1913; Carnock MSS, vol. VI (1913), B.D. x, ii, 479.

²⁸ Minute by Mr Churchill, 8 July 1913. Grey Papers, F.O.800/48. B.D. x, ii, 481.

²⁹ Minute by Lord Morley on above paper. Later in the year, a new naval attaché, Henderson, at the British Embassy, reported more detailed reasons for avoiding a repetition of the proposal. Goschen to Grey, F.O.371/5208/1653/13.D.414, 4 Nov. 1913. He concluded that while the Government might like to take advantage of the proposal, to help pay for a new insurance scheme, influential agitation in favour of the navy was too strong for them, and that the German people had been convinced of the need for a German navy of a specific size by a statutory date. ‘To go back on any of these points is practically a constitutional impossibility in Germany … and the worst of it is that this inability of the German government to meet the proposal half way is all in favour of the “forwards” (policy). Any future renewal of the “holiday” proposal would therefore only be playing into the hands of the “forwards” and would enable them to succeed in the very object for which the holiday was designed as an antidote.’

³⁰ G.P. XXXIX, 51–2.

³¹ Goschen to Grey, 22 Oct. 1913, F.O.371/1653/48702/13. B.D. x, ii, 485.

³² The Times, 8 Oct. 1913, p. 10.

³³ Goschen to Nicolson, 24 Oct. 1913, Carnock MSS, vol. x, 1913. B.D. x, ii, 486.

³⁴ The Times, 5 Feb. 1914, p. 8. See also G.P. XXXIX, 75n.

³⁵ Grey to Goschen, 5 Feb. 1914. F.O.37/1987/5472/14. B.D. x, ii, 498.

³⁶ More on this has emerged through the publication of R. S. Churchill, op. cit. and vol. 11

³⁷ Grey, , Speeches on Foreign Affairs, 1904–1914 (London, 1931), p. 225.Google Scholar

³⁸ Goschen to Grey, 6 Feb. 1914, F.O.371/1987/5534/14, B.D. x, ii, 499. Crowe offered another opinion on Tirpitz three days later: ‘Adm. v. Tirpitz described the improved Anglo-German relations as due to the fact that the German Navy Law has definitely provided for the creation of the German Fleet; in other words, that English friendliness is due to fear,’ 10 Feb. 1914. Minute on Goschen to Grey, 7 Feb. 1914, F.O.371/1987/5818/14. Some weeks later came one of the first examples of a formidable junction of view: ‘Germans are being assured that better relations with England are due to the growth of the German Fleet,’ R. G. V. 3 Mar. ‘But that is the belief of every German from the Emperor downward to the stable boy,’ E.A.C., 4 Mar. Minutes by Vansittart and Crowe on Goschen to Grey, 27 Feb. 1914, F.O.371/1987/9014/14.

³⁹ Goschen to Nicolson, 6 Feb. 1914, Carnock MSS, vol. 1, 1914. B.D. x, ii, 500. It is of interest that at this time Professor Schiemann wrote an article advocating an Anglo-German alliance, reported by Goschen on 15 Feb., F.O.371/1487/7300/14.D.66. Crowe had an explanation for this ‘effusion’: ‘Professor Schiemann is the intimate and mouthpiece of the German Emperor. He has been the instigator of the worst attacks and press campaigns against England, when these suited the (naval) policy of the German government. The present tack of the German govt. is to try by every means in their power to drive a wedge between England on one side and France and Russia on the other, and meanwhile to hurry on every possible strengthening of Germany's power of attack. It is in this connection that Prof. Schiemann's effusion shld. be read and considered. It is a rather clumsy “feeler”.’

⁴⁰ Goschen to Grey, 10 Feb. 1914, reed, II, F.O.371/1987/6310/14, B.D. x, ii, 501.

⁴¹ Goschen to Grey, 18 May 1914, Grey Papers, F.O.800/23. B.D. x, ii, 501.

⁴² Memorandum by Mr Churchill, 20 May 1914, Grey Papers, F.O.800/49. Addressed to Grey and Asquith. B.D. x, ii, 511.

⁴³ Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey, 25 May 1914, Grey Papers, F.O.800/55. B.D. x, ii, 512.

⁴⁴ Minute by Churchill, 26 May 1914, Grey Papers, F.O.800/49, B.D. x, ii, 513.

⁴⁵ Woodward, , op. cit. ch. XXII.Google Scholar