¹ Mondale, Walter, in a speech before the Senate reprinted in Hastings Center Report 1.1 (June, 1971), pp. 1–2Google Scholar.

² By the term the “new biology” I mean the biology that came into being with the discovery of Watson and Crick in 1953 of the key to the genetic code inscribed in the molecules of deoxyribonuleic acid (DNA) and its significance for enabling us to understand and to develop technologies intended to control life processes. For popular books describing this new biology see, for example, Leach, G., The Biocrats (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971)Google Scholar.

³ Here the observations of Roger L. Shinn are pertinent: “the word ‘human’ has both an empirical and a normative sense, and the gap between the two is immense. In the empirical sense, anything that men do is human. Human behavior is a mixed bag, containing all that the newspapers report or suppress, all that priests and psychiatrists hear in clerical or secular confessionals, all that people think or do. In this sense humanization is unnecessary. Men are already humanized. … In the normative sense, the human is assumed to be good.” In Shinn's, Man: The New Humanism (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968), p. 165Google Scholar.

⁴ Bourke, Vernon, History of Ethics (New York: Doubleday Image, 1968), I, p. 10Google Scholar.

⁵ McCabe, Herbert, What Is Ethics All About? (Washington: Corpus, 1969), pp. 91–92Google Scholar.

⁶ Macquarrie, John, Three Issues in Ethics (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 115Google Scholar.

⁷ Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan stress the inquiring character of human existence, as did Augustine long ago. Rahner puts it this way: “man is an indefinability come to consciousness of itself” (“On the Theology of the Incarnation,” in Theological Investigations (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), pp. 4, 107Google Scholar.

⁸ An illuminating work on this subject is Adler's, MortimerThe Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes (New York: Meridian, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁹ The dignity, nay the sanctity, of every human being as an image of God was a theme central to the Greek Fathers and has been reflected through Christian history. It is a sanctity explicitly acknowledged at Vatican II; see in particular the Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae).

¹⁰ See the brilliant paper by Wertheimer, , “Philosophy on Humanity,” to be published in a symposium on abortion by the University of Notre DameGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ On man's difference from other animals see the work of Adler noted above.

¹² Gilby, Thomas, Between Community and Society (London: Longmans, 1953), p. 201Google Scholar.

¹³ See Wertheimer's paper noted above and my essay commenting on his paper, “On Human Beings and Being Human.”

¹⁴ McCormick, Richard A., “Genetic Medicine: Notes on the Moral Literature,” Theological Studies 33.3 (September, 1972), pp. 531-552, at 531CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the classification given by McCormick and its similarities to the general classifications of Frankena, see Frankena, William, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), chapters 2 and 3Google Scholar.

¹⁵ New York: Doubleday, 1974. In the “Author's Note” before the text Fletcher says “I have tried throughout and conscientiously to avoid loaded language.” His success on this score is minimal, as the subtitle reflects: “Ending Reproductive Roulette.” Typical of the work is the following: “Pregnancy when wanted is a healthy process; pregnancy when not wanted is a disease,—in fact, a venereal disease” (p. 142, emphasis in original). Throughout he does not name Ramsey in the text but refers to him as a “champion of CG (coital generation)” (p. 89), a “religious moralist” (p. 95) and refers to Kass as a “cohort” of this champion of CG.

¹⁶ Fletcher, Joseph, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965), pp. 95–99Google Scholar.

¹⁷ E.g., Frankena, , Ethics, pp. 42ffGoogle Scholar; see also Frankena's, essay, “Love and Principle in Christian Ethics,” in Faith and Philosophy, ed. by Plantinga, Alvin (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1964), p. 212Google Scholar; the very best study of Fletcher's thought is provided by Walter, James, “An Internal Criticism of Joseph Fletcher's Notion of Situation Ethics” (Louvain: University of Louvain unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1974)Google Scholar. Among others who have stressed the consequentialism and utilitarianism of Fletcher are Ramsey, Paul, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), chapter 7Google Scholar; Grisez, Germain, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments (New York: Corpus, 1970), chapter 6Google Scholar. Actually the humanistic utilitarian thrust of Fletcher's thought, discernible in his Situation Ethics comes into the foreground in his latest work, The Ethics of Genetic Control, for there he frankly asserts that his position is a “humanistic” one and that there are only two ways of making moral judgments, an apriori, legalistic, nonverifiable manner and a rational, pragmatic, calculation of consequences (cf. pp. 30, 34, 88, 99).

¹⁸ On this see The Ethics of Genetic Control, pp. 30, 34, 88, 99.

¹⁹ Among the better critiques of Fletcher's consequentialism (in addition to the works cited in note 17) are McCabe's What Is Ethics All About? chapter 1 and the brilliant essay on “Aslan and the New Morality” by Hauerwas, Stanley, included in his Vision and Virtue (South Bend, Ind.: Fides, 1974)Google Scholar.

²⁰ See, on this, Fletcher, Joseph and Wassmer, Thomas, Hello Lovers! An Invitation to Situation Ethics, ed. by May, William E. (New York: Corpus, 1970), pp. 44ffGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Although Fletcher occasionally uses the term “verify” to refer to the justification of moral judgments, his preferred terms are “validate” and “vindicate” and in his latest work, The Ethics of Genetic Control the noncognitivist character of his approach is explicitly acknowledged, cf. pp. 8, 25, 47. See, on this, the doctoral study of Walter noted in note 17.

²² Fletcher, Joseph, “Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls,” New England Journal of Medicine 285 (1971), pp. 776–783, at 779CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

²³ Fletcher, , The Ethics of Genetic Control, p. 15Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 145.

²⁵ Fletcher, , “Ethical Aspects of Genetic Controls,” pp. 781–782Google Scholar.

²⁶ Francoeur, Robert, “We Can—We Must: Reflections on the Technological Imperative,” Theological Studies 33.3 (September, 1972), pp. 428–439, at 438CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ Crotty, Nicholas, “The Technological Imperative: Reflections on Reflections,” Theological Studies 33.3 (September, 1972), pp. 441–447, at 443CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ Aquinas, St. Thomas, In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Romae: Marrietti, 1955)Google Scholar, proeemium. I am grateful to Germain Grisez for calling this passage to my attention.

²⁹ On this topic see also Rozsak, Theodore, Where the Wasteland Ends (New York: Doubleday, 1972), chapter 7 and appendix to chapter 7Google Scholar.

³⁰ Ramsey, Paul, Fabricated Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 33Google Scholar.

³¹ Frankena, , Ethics, p. 14Google Scholar.

³² The “Notes on Moral Theology” in Theological Studies during the 1950's illustrate the problem, as does der Marck's, William VanFertility and Control (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965)Google Scholar and Cornelius van der Poel's essay on the principle of twofold effect in Curran, Charles, ed., Absolutes in Moral Theology (Washington: Corpus, 1968)Google Scholar.

³³ In his Situation Ethics Fletcher argued that there are three possible ways of doing ethics (a legalistic, an antinomian, and a situational), whereas in his latest Ethics of Genetic Control he maintains that there are only two: the aprioristic legalistic manner and his own “rational” pragmatic, consequentialist manner.

³⁴ On this see, for instance, Grisez, Germain, Contraception and the Natural Law (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1964), chapter 3Google Scholar; the essays by McCormick, Richard and Häring, Bernard in Outka, Gene and Ramsey, Paul, eds., Norm and Context in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968)Google Scholar, and Murray's, John CourtneyWe Hold These Truths (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), chapter 13Google Scholar.

³⁵ Frankena, , Ethics, p. 14Google Scholar.

³⁶ I do not include Charles Curran in this survey. Although McCormick includes him among those who advocate a “mediating approach,” and although I believe that in many ways his thought can be located in this general category, his notion of a “theology of compromise” is a complicating factor. Gustafson and McCormick, at any rate, adequately serve for purposes of illustrating the mediating approach.

³⁷ Gustafson, James, “Basic Ethical Issues in the Bio-Medical Fields,” Soundings 53 (1970), pp. 151–180, at 151-152Google Scholar. This essay has been reprinted in Gustafson's, Theology and Christian Ethics 9philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 179.

³⁹ McCormick, , “Genetic Medicine: Notes on the Moral Literature,” pp. 548–549Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ The distinction has been worked out, as indicated earlier in this paper, by writers such as Thomas Gilby and Jacques Maritain. These authors write in the Thomist tradition of natural law, a tradition that is “deontological” and, in my view, relational as well. In a recent essay, “Conscience, the Natural Law, and Developmental Psychology,” Communio 2.1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 3–32Google Scholar, I have attempted to develop this tradition of natural law.

⁴¹ For the political implications see Maritain, , Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958)Google Scholar and his Person and the Common Good (New York: Scribner's, 1947)Google Scholar, and Murray's We hold These Truths, Chapter 13.

⁴² I prefer the term beings of moral worth to person to indicate the inherent dignity and sanctity of human beings. The term person is a philosophical notion, and usually it includes the elements of self-consciousness and ability to communicate. A neonate and an infant are incapable of communicating with others, nor do they have an awareness of themselves as selves. We have empirical evidence to show that some members of the human community, the so-called feral or wolf children, who have been separated from the human community very early in life, have never been able to reach self-consciousness. Such humans are indeed members of the human species and are, as such, images of God and beings of moral worth, but they would not fit the philosophical criteria for personhood.

⁴³ It is reflected in the works of Maguire, Daniel, Death by Choice (New York: Doubleday, 1974)Google ScholarPubMed, der Poel, Cornelius Van, In Search for Human Values (New York: Paulist, 1972)Google Scholar and in der Marck, William Van, Toward a Christian Ethics (New York: Newman, 1968)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Here it is important to call attention to a forthcoming work, jointly authored by McCormick, Paul Ramsey, Germain Grisez and others devoted to a critical examination of the position developed by McCormick.

⁴⁵ McCormick explicitly acknowledges his debt to Schüller in his various “Notes on Moral Theology,” in particular those for March 1972 and March 1975, in Theological Studies.

⁴⁶ Janssens develops his position in an important essay, “Ontic Evil and Moral Evil,” Louvain Studies (Fall, 1972), and McCormick comments on this essay in his March, 1972 “Notes on Moral Theology” in Theological Studies.

⁴⁷ McCormick, Richard A., Ambiguity in Moral Choice (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973), p. 45Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ McCormick, , “Notes on Moral Theology,” Theological Studies 33.1 (March, 1972), pp. 68–119, at 74–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ McCormick, Richard A., “To Save or Let Die,” published simultaneously in Journal of the American Medical Association 229 (1974), pp. 172–176CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed and America 130 (1974), pp. 6–10Google Scholar, and noted in his “Notes on Moral Theology,” Theological Studies 36.1 (March, 1975), pp. 77–129, at 121-123CrossRefGoogle Scholar. My citations will be taken from the article as it appeared in America.

⁵⁰ McCormick, , “To Save or Let Die,” America 130 (1974), pp. 8ffGoogle Scholar. See his March 1975 “Notes on Moral Theology,” at p. 121.

⁵¹ McCormick, , “To Save or Let Die,” p. 8Google Scholar.

⁵² Ibid. See his March 1975 “Notes on Moral Theology,” at pp. 121-122.

⁵³ “To Save or Let Die,” p. 8.

⁵⁴ See his Ambiguity in Moral Choice, pp. 50-53.

⁵⁵ See, for instance, his March 1975 “Notes on Moral Theology,” pp. 96-97.

⁵⁶ Ramsey's, position is articulated in his Fabricated Man (New Haven: Yale, 1970)Google Scholar, his Patient as Person (New Haven: Yale, 1970)Google Scholar, his “Abortion: A Review Article,” The Thomist 37.1 (January, 1973), pp. 174–226CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and most recently in his The Ethics of Fetal Research (New Haven: Yale, 1975)Google Scholar. The position of Kass is luminously offered in his brilliant essay, “The New Biology: What Price Relieving the Human Estate?” Science (November 19, 1972). Grisez's position is worked out in most detail in his Abortion: The Myths, the Realities and the Arguments (New York: Corpus, 1970)Google Scholar, chapter 6 and in his “Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence (the old Natural Law Forum) 15 (1970)Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Here it is specially important to note that for both Grisez and Ramsey (and by implication Kass too) insist that “any killing of man by man must be ‘indirect’” (the phrasing is Ramsey's, , in his “Abortion: A Review Article,” p. 220Google Scholar), but it is precisely the point developed by Grisez in his studies. On this matter see my “Euthanasia, Benemortasia, and the Care of the Dying,” Linacre Quarterly 41.2 (May, 1974), pp. 114–123Google Scholar.