1. At the height of the fires, the smoke pall reached parts of Thailand, the Philippines and even northern Australia. Forest and brush fires also occurred within Malaysian and Bnmeian territories. However, the scale of the Indonesian fires dwarfed all others in the region.

2. The Indonesian authorities conceded that more than 80% of the land and forest fires were caused by controlled burning to clear land for plantations and settlements “Jakarta Under Pressure to Solve Fire Problems”, Straits Tuna, 11 09 1997Google Scholar; “Indonesia Admits Forest Fires Are Man-Made”, Straits Times, 10 1997.Google Scholar Fires have apparently been used by large corporations in land disputes to drive out small-tune farmers; see “Many Forests Set on Fire over Land Disputes, Says Research Centre”, Straits Times, 23 10 1997.Google ScholarSee also Joko, Waluyo, “Smoking Gun”, Inside Indonesia, No.53 (01–03 1998), Indonesian Resources and Information Programme, Australia, Internet website at www.insideindonesia.org.Google Scholar

3. For a critique of the way Singapore authorities handled the situation, see Dominic, Nathan, “Diary of a Disaster People Kept in the Haze for Far too Long”, Sunday Review, Sunday Times, 12 10 1997.Google Scholar

4. Of these, 50% were agriculture/plantation lands, 20% forests and 30% unproductive land; see study by WWF/EEPSEA, infra n.5. The same study estimates that 70 million people were affected throughout the region. Waluyo, op. cit. supra n.2., estimates that out of the 1.7 million hectares lost up to Sept. 1997 in Kalimantan alone, nearly 1.4 million hectares were burned by plantation companies and production forest operators. The estimates by both Waluyo and WWF/EEPSEA demonstrate that the fires were caused primarily by plantation and timber companies.

5. This was assessed in May 1998 by the Singapore-based Economy and Environment Programme for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF); see EEPSEA/WWF, The Indonesian Fires and Haze of 1997: The Economic Toll (1998).Google Scholar Details can be found on the Internet at www.idrc.org.sg/eepsea/htm. Direct fire-related losses amounted to $3.1 billion (borne by Indonesia alone), while haze-related damage came to $1.4 billion ($1 billion losses for Indonesia and $400 million for the injured neighbouring States). Thus, nearly 10% of the total damage was occasioned to neighbouring States. Whatever the uncertainties surrounding the extent of damage needed before State responsibility can be engaged, this article assumes that the damage occasioned to the injured States exceeds any minimum threshold required to establish responsibility, infra n.101.

6. For a comprehensive description of the legal, institutional and administrative capacities for environmental regulation in Indonesia, see Tan, , “Land/Forest Fires: Indonesian Environmental Legislation and Its Implementation”, in Johnston, and Lim, (Eds), Southeast Asian Land/Forest Fires: Science and Policy (1999).Google Scholar

7. ILC 1998 Report, G.A.O.R., 53rd Sess., Supp.10 (A/53/10 and Corr.1).

8. See Chorzow Factory case (Merits) (1928) P.C.I.J. Ser.A, No.17, at p.47.Google Scholar

9. Art.1, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ILC 1996 Report, G.A.O.R., 51st Sess., Supp.10 (A/51/10), p.125.Google Scholar The Draft Articles on State Responsibility are widely considered to be reflective of customary international law. The Draft Articles were provisionally adopted on first reading by the ILC at its 48th session in 1996. At its 50th session in 1998, Arts.1 to 15 of Part One were referred to the Drafting Committee; see ILC 1998 Report, G.A.O.R., 53rd Sess., Supp.10 (A/53/10), available on the Internet at www.un.org/law/ilc. No substantive change is expected in the wording of the Draft Articles, save that a few articles (Arts.2, 6 and 11–14) have been proposed to be deleted. These deletions, together with other minor changes, are meant only to streamline the text of the Draft Articles, to excise formulations phrased in the negative and to subsume unnecessary provisions within other articles.

10. ILC Draft Articles, idem, Art.3.

11. See generally Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility (1970) II Y.B.I.L.C. 177, 189Google Scholar, UN Doc.A/CN.4/233 and Smith, State Responsibility and the Marine Environment: The Rules of Decision (1988), p.22.Google Scholar

12. Art.5, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9.

13. See e, g, the Caire Claim (France v. Mexico) (1929) 5 R.I.A.A. 516Google Scholar (acts of soldiers); Yeager v. Iran (US v. Iran) (1987) 17 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 92 (acts of revolutionaries)Google Scholar; and more recently the Rainbow Warrior Case (1987) 26 I.L.M. 1346Google Scholar (acts of secret service agents). See also ILC Draft Articles, idem, Art.10 (on ultra vires acts).

14. See Yeager v. Iran, ibid, where the Tribunal stated at para.42: “attributability of acts to the State is not limited to acts of organs formally recognised under internal law”. The Tribunal added that if the position were otherwise “a State could avoid responsibility under international law merely by invoking its internal law”. See also the comments of the ILC in relation to the reference to “internal law” in ILC Draft Articles idem Art.5 ILC 1998 Report, supra n.7, at paras.369 and 402.

15. ILC, Report to the General Assembly, 26th Sess. (1974) II Y.B.I.L.C. 269, 282Google Scholar, UN Doc.A/CN.4/Ser., cited in Smith, op. cit. supra n.11. at p.28.Google Scholar

16. See also Art.8, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9, which attributes to the State the conduct of a person or group of persons if such person or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of the State, or was in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified the exercise of those elements of authority (emphases added).

17. To the extent that some of these farmers belonged to government-organised farmers' co-operatives, a question of attribution to the State may possibly arise.

18. Undang-undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945 (1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia), Art.33(3).Google Scholar

19. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the activities concerned involved the clearing of land for agriculture and settlement, which is entirely pursuant to the Indonesian government's official “transmigrasi” or transmigration policy of resettling citizens from the more densely-populated islands to outlying, less populous ones. This is to be contrasted with, say, the operation of a private industrial factory not unlike the Trail Smelter, infra n.33, where it would be more tenuous to suggest that the private entity is effectively functioning on behalf of the State.

20. ILC Report, supra n.15 at p.282.Google Scholar

21. Art.8, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9. See also Yeager v. Iran, supra n.13, at paras.42–43.

22. Even military and police competences can be assigned to private operations—in some countries, private armies and police forces are not altogether unknown.

23. See ILC Report, supra n.15.

24. The ILC, in it latest discussions in 1998 on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, noted the concern of a number of governments that the basis of attribution should be broad enough to ensure that States could not escape responsibility based on formal definitions of their constitutive organs, particularly in view of recent developments concerning the increasing delegation of public functions to the private sector. It was noted that no government had so far argued that the conditions for attribution should be more restrictively defined, see ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ILC 1998 Report, supra n.7, at paras.363 and 390.

25. This is not to suggest categorically that whenever a profit element is involved, there can be no attribution to the State of private conduct. Rather, the profit motive should merely be an important factor in assessing the “public functions” character of any devolved activity in the context of the whole spectrum of possible degrees of devolution.

26. Vattel, , Le Droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle (trans. Fenwick, 1916), p.136Google Scholar, cited in Smith, , op. cit. supra n.11, at p.35.Google Scholar

27. See generally Art.15 bis, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9.

28. (US v. Mexico) (1926) 4 R.I.A.A. 82.Google ScholarSee also the judgment of the ICJ in US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) I.C.J. Rep. 1980Google Scholar, and de Arechaga, Jiménez, “International Responsibility”, in Sørensen, (ed.). Manual of Public International Law (1968), p.560.Google Scholar

29. Smith, op. cit. supra n.11, at p.37.Google Scholar

30. These would be the nationality and territoriality bases of jurisdiction respectively. See generally “Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School: Jurisdiction with respect to Crime (pt II)” (1935) 29 A.J.I.L. 435.Google Scholar

31. Art. 3, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9.

32. See supra nn.14–16 and accompanying text.

33. (1941) 3 R.I.A.A. 1907. This was an arbitration between the US and Canada arising from the undisputed damage caused to US territory from sulphur dioxide fumes emanating from a private smelting operation on the Canadian side of the two countries' border.Google Scholar

34. Idem, p.1965.

35. U N Doc.A/Conf.48/14 and Corr.I.

36. Reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 874.Google Scholar

37. Principle 2 differs slightly in two respects: it provides for States to have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources (Principle 21 having referred to natural resources) pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies (Principle 21 having referred only to environmental policies). The reference to developmental policies was in explicit recognition of the growing importance attached to economic development, especially by the developing countries, by the time the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was convened in Rio de Janeiro.

38. UN Doc.A/Conf.62/122, reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 1261.Google Scholar

39. (UK v. Albania) I.C.J. Rep. 1949, 4, 22.Google Scholar

40. (Australia v. France) I.C.J. Rep. 1974, 253Google Scholar (Judgment) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Castro), at p.389. The majority did not address this issue.Google Scholar

41. I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 15.Google Scholar

42. (France v. Spain) (1957) 12 R.I.A.A. 281.Google Scholar

43. See Bernhardt, (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol.II (1992) p.653Google Scholar; the Report of the Agent of the US, reprinted in (1965) 4 I.L.M. 473Google Scholarand the Agreement establishing the Tribunal, reprinted in (1965) 4 I.L.M. 468.Google Scholar

44. See generally Lammers, , Pollution of International Watercourses (1984), pp.346–347, 374–376.Google Scholar

45. I.C.J. Pleadings 1978, Vol.I, p.14Google Scholar(Australia v. France); Vol.II, p.8(New Zealand v. France).Google Scholar

46. Whiteman, (1908) 6 Dig. Int. L. 256–257Google Scholar, cited in Smith, , op. cit. supra n.11. at p.75.Google Scholar

47. International Law Association, Report of the 58th Conference (1978) pp.398–399.Google Scholar

48. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl incident, several affected States, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the UK, reserved their right to claim compensation from the USSR; see Sands, , Chernobyl Law and Communication (1988), pp.26–28.Google Scholar

49. ILC, Draft Articles on International Liability, General Commentary, in op. cit. supra n.7. The obligation to prevent harm is also reiterated by authoritative sources like UN General Assembly Resolution 2995 (XXVII) of 15 12 1972 on co-operation between States in the field of the environment, G.A.O.R., 27th Sess., Supp.30 (A/27/30), p.42Google Scholar; the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development — see Munro, and Lammers, (Eds), Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (1987), p.7Google Scholar; and the 1978 UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilisation of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, G.A.O.R., 33rd Sess. Supp.25 (A/33/25), annex I, reprinted in (1978) 17 I.L.M. 1098.Google Scholar

50. See Goldie, , “A General View of International Environmental Law — A Survey of Capabilities, Trends and Limits”, in Colloque La Haye (1973) pp.66–69Google Scholar; Kirgis, , “Technological Challenge of the Shared Environment: US Practice” 1974 66 A.J.I.L. 291Google Scholar; and Sands, , Principles of International Environmental Law, Vol.I (1995), p.194.Google Scholar In relation to transboundary air pollution specifically, see Arts.3(1) and 4, 1982 Montreal Draft Rules on Transboundary Pollution, International Law Association 60th Report (1982)Google Scholar; Art.2, Institut de Droit International (IDI) Resolution on Transboundary Air Pollution, 62 Ann. I.D.I., II (1987)Google Scholar; and the 1979 ECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, reprinted in (1979) 18 I.L.M. 1442.Google Scholar

51. See Jenks, , “Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities in International Law” (1966–I) 117 Hag. Rec. 99Google Scholar; Smith, , op. cit. supra n.11, at pp.40–41 and 119–121Google Scholar; and Handl, , “International Liability of States for Marine Pollution” (1983), 21 Can. Y.B.I.L. 101.Google Scholar See infra n.63 and accompanying text.

52. See e.g. Alabama case (US v. UK) (1872)Google Scholar, in Moore, J. B., History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a party, Vol. I, pp.572–573Google Scholar; Neer case (U.S. v. Mexico) (1926) 4 R.I.A.A. 60Google Scholar; Montijo case (U.S v. Colombia) (1874), in Moore, idem, Vol. II, p.1421.Google Scholar

53. Garcia-Amador, , Draft Articles on the Responsibility of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens, reprinted in Garda-Amador, , Sohn, and Baxter, (Eds), Recent Codification of the Law of State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens, Vol.1 (1974), p.130.Google Scholar

54. US Diplomatic and Consular Staff, supra n.28, at p.33.Google Scholar

55. Supra n.36.

56. See generally Smith, , op. cit. supra n.11. at p.40.Google Scholar

57. See e.g. Art.94(1), 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra n.38; Arts.I, II and VII(2), 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, reprinted in (1972) 11 I.L.M. 1294Google Scholar; Art.2. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, reprinted in (1987) 26 I.L.M. 1529Google Scholar; Art.2, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, reprinted in (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1312.Google Scholar

58. See e.g. Principle 21, World Charter for Nature, General Assembly Res.37/7 of 28 10 1982Google Scholar; OECD, Report by the Environment Committee, Responsibility and Liability of Stales in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution (1984), p.4.Google Scholar

59. See e.g. the 1986 dispute between Germany and Switzerland relating to the pollution of the Rhine by Sandoz, a Swiss pharmaceutical industry.

60. See e.g. Alabama case, supra n.52.

61. See generally Sands, , op. cit. supra n.50, at p.638.Google Scholar

62. ILC, Draft Articles on International Liability, Art.3 and commentary thereto, in op. cit. supra n.7.

63. See the works cited supra n.51. The classic examples of ultra-hazardous activities include space operations, nuclear activities and pollution of the seas by oil or hazardous substances. Strict responsibility for these activities is generally prescribed in multilateral conventions.

64. See generally Sands, , op. cit. supra n.50, at p.596.Google Scholar

65. See the works cited supra n.51.

66. See generally Arts. 16, 20, 23 and 26, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9.

67. In fairness to Indonesia, clearing land by the use of fire is commonly practised throughout South-East Asia, indeed in many countries around the world. The problem of anthropogenic (human-caused) fires has long been recognised by ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) multilateral co-operation efforts. The 1995 ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution, reprinted in Koh, ASEAN Documents Relating to the Environment (1996)Google Scholar, established broad policy measures to combat the problem through regional co-operation, but has evidently been of little practical effect in relation to the Indonesian fires.

68. “Indonesia Ignored Fire-Fighting Plans”, Straits Times, 23 03 1998.Google Scholar

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. See e.g. “‘Connections’ Won't Protect Fire Starters, Says Jakarta”, Straits Times, 7 10 1997.Google Scholar

72. “Indonesia Admits Forest Fires Are Man-Made”, supra n.2.

73. “Jakarta Under Pressure to Solve Fire Problems”, supra n.2. See also Waluyo and EEPSEA/WWF, op. cit. supra nn.2, 5.

74. In late Sept. 1997, the statement of the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare to this effect provoked controversy in the neighbouring States; see e.g. “What a Mockery of Suharto Apology, Says DAP Leader”, Straits Times, 30 09 1997.Google Scholar

75. In an apparent response to official Indonesian assertions that the fires were a natural phenomenon, The Straits Times of Singapore, in its front-page report of 30 09 1997Google Scholar, published satellite pictures which revealed that many fires were being ignited deliberately in timber and oil palm plantations.

76. “Suharto Bans Land Clearing by Burning”, Straits Times, 10 09 1997.Google Scholar

77. Decree of the Minister for Forestry and Plantations No.260/KEP II/1995 on Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of Forest Fires; Decree of the Minister for Forestry and Plantations No.188/KEP II/1995 on the Establishment of a National Forest Fire Management Centre; Decree of the Minister of State for the Environment No.18/MENLH/3/1995 on the Establishment of the National Coordination Team on Land Fire Management; Decree of the Director General of Estate Corps No.38/KB110/DJBUN/5/1995 on Technical Guidelines for Land Clearance Without Burning to Develop Plantations; Circular Letter of the Directorate General of the Environment and Settlement No.SE256/PL/1995 on Land Preparation in fiscal year 1995/1996.

78. Act No.23 of 1997 Concerning the Management of the Living Environment (EMA).

79. However, the Clarification to Art.3 of the EMA does provide generally that “the state prohibits activities involving the exploitation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction which causes loss to the territorial jurisdiction of other states, as well as protects the state against the impact of activities conducted outside the state territory” (trans, by present author).

80. Act No.4 of 1982 on Environmental Management.

81. For an analysis of the EMA provisions, see Tan, op. cit. supra n.6.

82. See Arts.41–46, EMA. Note that where corporations are convicted, fines are increased by a third. In addition, the individuals behind the corporation's operations may also be convicted.

83. The “blacklist” of culprits appeared in several Indonesian newspapers on 16 09 1997.Google Scholarand was reproduced in Singapore's Straits Times, 17 09 1997.Google Scholar

84. What, Exactly, Has Jakarta Done to Beat the Haze?”, Straits Times, 8 10 1997.Google Scholar It is not clear if these firms have been allowed to resume operations.

85. “Indonesia Gathering Evidence Against 29 Forestry Firms”, ibid. The author has not been able to ascertain if these firms have been prosecuted, or whether the four firms prosecuted in 1997, infra n.86, or the five firms to be prosecuted in 1998, infra n.87, are among the original 29 which were blacklisted.

86. Straits Times, 12 12 1997.Google Scholar

87. “5 Finns to be Sued over Fires”, Straus Times, 25 04 1998.Google Scholar It appeared that these firms were to be charged and punished under the 1997 EMA.

88. Kompas (an Indonesian daily), 19 09 1998, as reported by AFP, 19 09 1998.Google Scholar

89. WALHI had initially demanded a two trillion rupiah (US$250 million) collective compensation fine from all the defendants, ibid. The court did not accede to this.

90. Jan, Michiel Otto, “Implementation of Environmental Law in Indonesia: Some Administrative and Judicial Challenges” (1996) II(1) Indonesian Law and Administrative Rev. 32. See also Tan, op. cit. supra n.6.Google Scholar

91. Otto, ibid. Otto also describes the problems associated with access to justice in the courts.

92. See Art.4, ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra n.9.

93. The financial crisis had by the end of 1997 crippled the Indonesian economy.

94. “Indonesian Fires Bad for Region's Ecosystem”, Straits Times, 18 09 1997.Google Scholar

95. Assistance for putting outfiresand preventing future ones came from, among others, the Asian Development Bank, the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination group, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) (which financed more than 1,000 unemployed volunteers to fight blazing fires in East Kalimantan in Mar. 1998), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the US-sponsored South East Asian Environment Initiative, the Integrated Forest Fire Management team (a German-Indonesian collaboration working in Samarinda, East Kalimantan) and a host of bilateral assistance offers from several countries.

96. See the works cited supra n.51.

97. Supra n.7.

98. Responsibility of course, denoted “wrongfulness”. Since that which is “wrongful” must not occur, among the consequences of “responsibility” is prohibition.

99. The Report, supra n.9, was introduced by the chairman of the working group at the 2,465th and 2,471st meetings of the ILC on 19 and 25 07 1996.Google ScholarThe decision to split the issues of prevention and liability had been made as early as the ILC's 44th session in 1992.Google Scholar

100. 2,560th to 2,563rd meetings, 12–13 08 1998, supra n.7.Google Scholar

101. “Risk of causing significant transboundary harm” is defined in Art.2 of the Draft Articles on International Liability to encompass “a low probability of causing disastrous harm and a high probability of causing other significant harm”. On damage generally, see the definition of “air pollution” in Art.1(a), 1979 ECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra n.50 and Sands, op. cit. supra n.50, at pp.632–634.Google Scholar

102. Art.4, Draft Articles on International Liability.

103. Idem, Art.5.

104. Idem, Arts.7 and 8.

105. Idem, Art.9 The “public likely to be affected” includes that of the injuring State as well as of other affected States; see Commentary to Art.9.

106. Idem, Art.10.

107. Idem, Arts.11 and 12.

108. Idem, Art.14.

109. Idem, Art.16.

110. Idem, Art.17.

111. Supra n.7.

112. Supra n.9.

113. Ibid. The Report cites the following: Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration (States encouraged to co-operate in developing international law on liability and compensation for environmental damage), treaties with established liability regimes (e.g. treaties on oil transportation, oil pollution and nuclear energy material), judicial and arbitral decisions (Trail Smelter, Lac Lanoux, Nuclear Test cases), and State practice (inter alia, US compensation for Japanese fishermen and Marshall Islanders following nuclear tests at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls respectively in the 1950s; the 1971 grounding of the Libcrian tanker Juliana in Japanese waters and the Liberian Government's payment of compensation to Japanese interests; and the Cherry Point oil spill in the US with the resultant damage to Canadian beaches and the Canadian government's subsequent invocation of the Trail Smelter principle).

114. Chapter III is without prejudice to any other arrangements which the parties may have agreed upon, or to the due exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts of the States where the injury occurred.

115. Art.20, supra n.9.

116. These criteria are (a), the extent to which the State of origin has complied with its obligations of prevention; (b) the extent to which it has exercised due diligence in preventing or minimising the damage; (c) the extent of its knowing or means of knowing that an activity referred to was being or was about to be carried out in its territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction or control; (d) the extent to which it benefits from the activity, (e) the extent to which the affected State shares in the benefit of the activity; (f) the extent to which assistance to either State is available from or has been provided by third States or international organisations; (g) the extent to which compensation is reasonably available to or has been provided to injured persons, whether through proceedings in the courts of the State of origin or otherwise; (h) the extent to which the law of the injured State provides for compensation or other relief for the same harm; (i) the standards of protection applied in relation to a comparable activity by the affected State and in regional and international practice; and (j) the extent to which the State of origin has taken measures to assist the affected State in minimising harm. Note that Art.22 does not bar negotiations between the State of origin and private injured parties or negotiations between the injured parties and the operator of the activity causing the significant transboundary harm.

117. The jurisdiction of the injured States would be established on the basis of the nationality of the perpetrator, see supra n.30.

118. It must be reiterated that the preceding analyses of Art.5 and the provisions of chapter III have been based upon the conclusions of the 1996 working group on the issue of liability, supra n.9. Further work on this matter remains to be done in future ILC sessions. That being said, there is every reason to believe that the principles enshrined in Art.5 and chapter III reflect general law and are likely to remain substantially unaltered by future ILC deliberations on the matter.

119. Contrast this to the affected States which reserved their position as to the international obligations of the USSR in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, supra n.48. Even though the payment of compensation was recognised to be unlikely, the injured States have at least reserved their position that the USSR owed certain international obligations relating to its activities. N o such position seems to have been taken by the injured States in the 1997 forest fire disaster.