¹ For an overview of the ESDP, see TC Salmon and AJK Shepherd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO, 2003); RA Wessel, ‘The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 265; N Gnesotto (ed), EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004) (EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004); R Keane, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: From Cologne to Sarajevo’ (2005) 19 Global Society 89; S Graf von Kielmansegg, Die Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union: Eine Rechtliche Analyse (Boorberg, Stuttgart, 2005); M Trybus and N White (eds), European Security Law (OUP, Oxford, 2007).

² These include the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. See E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 129–33.

³ See F Naert, ‘ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious EU Security and Defence Operations’ in Trybus and White (n 1) 61; N Tsagourias, ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’ in ibid 102.

⁴ Council Joint Actions 2003/92/CFSP of 27 Jan 2003 [2003] OJ L34/26 (Concordia); 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 [2003] OJ L143/50 (Artemis); 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 [2004] OJ L252/10 (Althea); 2006/319/CFSP of 27 Apr 2006 [ 2006] OJ L116/98 (EUFOR RD Congo); 2007/677/CFSP of 15 Oct 2007 [2007] OJ L279/21 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA).

⁵ SC Res 1484, 30 May 2003 (Artemis); SC Res 1575, 22 Nov 2004 (EUFOR Althea); SC Res 1671, 25 Apr 2006 (EUFOR RD Congo); SC Res 1778, 25 Sept 2007 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA).

⁶ Council Joint Actions 2002/210/CFSP of 11 Mar 2002 [2002] OJ L70/1 (EUPM); 2003/681/CFSP of 29 Sept 2003 [2003] OJ L249/66 (Proxima); 2004/847/CFSP of 9 Dec 2004 [2004] OJ L367/30 (EUPOL Kinshasa); 2005/797/CFSP of 14 Nov 2005 [2005] OJ L300/65 (EU COPPS); 2005/826/CFSP of 24 Nov 2005 [2005] OJ L307/61 (EUPAT); 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 [2007] OJ L139/33 (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN); 2007/405/CFSP of 12 June 2007 [2007] OJ L151/46 (EUPOL RD Congo).

⁷ Council Joint Actions 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 [2004] OJ L228/21 (EUJUST Themis); 2005/190/CFSP of 7 Mar 2005 [2005] OJ L62/37 (EUJUST Lex).

⁸ Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 Sept 2005 [2005] OJ L234/13 (AMM).

⁹ Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 [2005] OJ L112/20 (EUSEC RD Congo).

¹⁰ Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 Dec 2005 [2005] OJ L327/28 (EU BAM Rafah).

¹¹ Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005 [2005] OJ L188/46 (EU Civilian–Military Supporting Action to AMIS II).

¹² EU–FRY, 25 Apr 2001 [2001] OJ L125/2; EU–FYROM, 31 Aug 2001 [2001] OJ L241/2. Subsequently, a similar agreement was also concluded with Albania: EU–Albania, 28 Mar 2003 [2003] OJ L93/50.

¹³ Council Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP of 22 Dec 2000 [2000] OJ L328/53, as extended and amended.

¹⁴ Art 2 TEU.

¹⁵ P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP, Oxford, 2005) 159.

¹⁶ For other works on this subject, see G de Kerchove and S Marquardt, ‘Les accords internationaux conclus per l'Union européenne’ (2004) 50 Annuaire Français de Droit International 803; D Thym, ‘Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europäischen Union’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV 863; RA Wessel, ‘The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences? Mixed Responsibilities?’, forthcoming in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds), The Law and Practice of EU External Relations—Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (CUP, Cambridge, 2008).

¹⁷ For the UN's practice in this field, see RCR Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1991); M Bothe and T Dörschel, ‘The UN Peacekeeping Experience’ in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (OUP, Oxford, 2001) 487.

¹⁸ DW Bowett, ‘Military Forces Abroad’ (1997) 3 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 388. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Fleck (n 17).

¹⁹ EU–BiH, 4 Oct 2002 [2002] OJ L293/2 (EUPM); EU–FYROM, 21 Mar 2003 [2003] OJ L82/46 (Concordia); EU–FYROM, 11 Dec 2003 [2004] OJ L16/66 (Proxima); EU–Georgia, 3 Dec 2004 [2004] OJ L389/42 (EUJUST Themis); EU–DRC, 1 Sept 2005 [2005] OJ L256/58 (EUPOL Kinshasa); EU–Indonesia, 9 Sept 2005 [2005] OJ L288/60 (AMM); extended by EU–Indonesia, 28 Feb 2006 [2006] OJ L71/55 and EU–Indonesia, 15 Sept 2006 [2006] OJ L273/9; EU–Gabon, 16 June 2006 [2006] OJ L187/43 (EUFOR RD Congo). In the case of two operations, the EU and the host States concerned agreed to extend the application of earlier status agreements to the operations in question: see recital (11) of Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP (n 9) (EUSEC RD Congo) and Art 11(1) of Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP (n 6) (EUPAT).

²⁰ See n 84.

²¹ eg SC Res 1671 of 25 Apr 2006 provided that the agreement governing the status of the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) of 4 May 2000 (on file with the author) shall apply to EUFOR RD Congo, the EU's most recent military operation in the DRC.

²² The operation in question was operation Artemis in the DRC.

²³ 18 Apr 1961, 500 UNTS 95.

²⁴ For details, see A Sari, ‘Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: The EU's Evolving Practice’, forthcoming in (2008) 19 EJIL.

²⁵ Annex 1 to Annex IV (Presidency Report on the ESDP) to Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 11 and 12 Dec 1999, 25.

²⁶ EU–Albania, 7 Mar 2005 [2005] OJ L65/35 (Althea).

²⁷ EU–Argentina, 9 June 2005 [2005] OJ L156/22 (Althea).

²⁸ EU–Bulgaria, 9 Jan 2003 [2003] OJ L239/41 (EUPM).

²⁹ EU–Chile, 25 July 2005 [2005] OJ L202/40 (Althea).

³⁰ EU–Croatia, 4 Oct 2007 [2007] OJ L270/28.

³¹ EU–Cyprus, 10 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/2 (EUPM); EU–Cyprus, 1 Oct 2003 [2003] OJ L253/23 (Artemis).

³² EU–Czech Republic, 11 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/8 (EUPM); EU–Czech Republic, 23 June 2003 [2003] OJ L229/39 (Concordia).

³³ EU–Estonia, 18 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/26 (EUPM); EU–Estonia, 28 July 2003 [2003] OJ L216/61 (Concordia).

³⁴ EU–FYROM, 30 June 2006 [2006] OJ L188/10 (Althea).

³⁵ EU–Hungary, 13 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/20 (EUPM).

³⁶ EU–Iceland, 10 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/5 (EUPM).

³⁷ EU–Latvia, 12 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/17 (EUPM); EU–Latvia, 14 Oct 2003 [2003] OJ L313/79 (Concordia).

³⁸ EU–Lithuania, 11 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/11 (EUPM); EU–Lithuania, 9 Sept 2003 [2003] OJ L234/19 (Concordia).

³⁹ EU–Switzerland, 11 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/14 (EUPM); EU–Switzerland, 14 July 2004 [2004] OJ L354/78 (Proxima); EU–Switzerland, 22 Dec 2004 [2005] OJ L20/42 (Althea); EU–Switzerland, 22 Dec 2005 [2005] OJ L349/31 (AMM); EU–Switzerland, 10 Aug 2006 [2006] OJ L276/111 (EUFOR RD Congo).

⁴⁰ EU–Morocco, 1 Feb 2005 [2005] OJ L34/47 (Althea).

⁴¹ EU–NZ, 4 May 2005 [2005] OJ L127/28 (Althea); EU–NZ, 3 Oct 2007 [2007] OJ L274/18 (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN).

⁴² EU–Norway, 19 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/32 (EUPM); EU–Norway, 9 Sept 2004 [2004] OJ L354/86 (Proxima).

⁴³ EU–Poland, 24 Feb 2003 [2003] OJ L64/37 (EUPM); EU–Poland, 15 Oct 2003 [2003] OJ L285/44 (Concordia).

⁴⁴ EU–Romania, 16 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/23 (EUPM); EU–Romania, 7 Nov 2003 [2003] OJ L120/6 (Concordia).

⁴⁵ EU–Russia, 24 July 2003 [2003] OJ L197/37 (EUPM).

⁴⁶ EU–Slovakia, 31 July 2003 [2003] OJ L239/44 (EUPM); EU–Slovakia, 19 Dec 2003 [2004] OJ L12/54 (Concordia).

⁴⁷ EU–Slovenia, 18 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/29 (EUPM).

⁴⁸ EU–Turkey, 20 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/35 (EUPM); EU–Turkey, 4 Sept 2003 [2003] OJ L234/23 (Concordia); EU–Turkey, 10 Sept 2004 [2004] OJ L354/90 (Proxima).

⁴⁹ EU–Ukraine, 23 Dec 2002 [2003] OJ L239/38 (EUPM); EU–Ukraine, 8 July 2004 [2004] OJ L354/82 (Proxima).

⁵⁰ Pursuant to Art 13(1)(f) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, international agreements concluded under Art 24 TEU shall be published in the Official Journal, subject to the exceptions laid down in Arts 4 and 9 of the Regulation. See also Art 17(1)(h) of Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 Mar 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure [2004] OJ L106/22, as amended.

⁵¹ See Council doc 11550/03, List of ‘A’ Items for 2522nd meeting of the Council (General Affairs and External Relations), 18 July 2003, 3; Council Doc 12321/05, Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, 4 Oct 2005.

⁵² By contrast, the UN does conclude such agreements with its Member States: see UN Doc A/46/185, Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, 23 May 1991.

⁵³ Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 Mar 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations [2001] OJ L101/1, as amended.

⁵⁴ Sec. XII, Council Decision 2001/264/EC.

⁵⁵ EU–NATO, 14 Mar 2003 [2003] OJ L80/35.

⁵⁶ EU–BiH, 5 Oct 2004 [2004] OJ L324/16.

⁵⁷ EU–Bulgaria, 25 Apr 2005 [2005] OJ L118/53.

⁵⁸ EU–Croatia, 10 Apr 2006 [2006] OJ L116/74.

⁵⁹ EU–FYROM, 25 Mar 2005 [2005] OJ L94/39.

⁶⁰ EU–Iceland, 12 June 2006 [2006] OJ L184/35.

⁶¹ EU–Norway, 22 Nov 2004 [2004] OJ L362/29.

⁶² EU–Romania, 22 Apr 2005 [2005] OJ L118/48.

⁶³ EU–Ukraine, 13 June 2005 [2005] OJ L172/84.

⁶⁴ EU–ICC, 10 Apr 2006 [2006] OJ L115/50.

⁶⁵ Council Doc 11206/03, Lessons from the planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), 14 July 2003, 8–9.

⁶⁶ Council doc 6040/04, Draft Framework Participation Agreement–Report, 6 Feb 2004, 1.

⁶⁷ EU–Cyprus (Artemis) (n 31).

⁶⁸ 2562nd Council meeting (General Affairs), 23 Feb 2004, v. See Council doc 6040/04 (n 66). The third countries concerned were Bulgaria, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

⁶⁹ EU–Bulgaria, 24 Jan 2005 [2005] OJ L46/50; EU–Canada, 24 Nov 2005 [2005] OJ L315/21; EU–Iceland, 21 Feb 2005 [2005] OJ L67/2; EU–Norway, 3 Dec 2004 [2005] OJ L67/8; EU–Romania, 22 Nov 2004 [2005] L67/14; EU–Turkey, 29 June 2006 [2006] OJ L189/17; EU–Ukraine, 13 June 2005 [2005] OJ L182/29.

⁷⁰ Council Doc 12047/04, Draft model agreement on the participation of a third State in an European Union military crisis management operation, 3 Sept 2004; Council Doc 12050/04, Draft model agreement on the participation of a third State in an European Union civilian crisis management operation, Sept 2004.

⁷¹ 2603rd Council meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 13 Sept 2004, 10.

⁷² Council Doc 8720/05, Draft Model Agreement on the status of the European Union-led forces between the European Union and a Host State, 18 May 2005.

⁷³ Council Doc 10564/05, Draft Model Agreement on the status of the European Union Civilian Crisis Management Mission in a Host State (SOMA), 27 June 2005.

⁷⁴ 2659th Council Meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 23 May 2005, 10; 2674th Council Meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 18 July 2005, 21.

⁷⁵ EU–Switzerland (AMM) (n 39); Council Doc 12321/05 (n 51).

⁷⁶ EU–Indonesia (AMM) (n 19); EU–Gabon (EUFOR RD Congo) (n 19). Further agreements based on the EU Model SOFA shall be negotiated with Chad and the Central African Republic in accordance with Art 12 of Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP (n 4).

⁷⁷ Council doc 11697/05, Confirmatory application made by Mr Aurel Sari (35/c/04/05), 16 Sept 2005, 4–5.

⁷⁸ eg Art 8(6), EU–FYROM (Proxima) (n 19); Art 16, EU–FYROM (Concordia) (n 19); Art 15(6), EU–Gabon (EUFOR RD Congo) (n 19). Such mandatory supplementary arrangements could be classified as pacta de contrahendo, assuming that their parties are the same as those of the original agreement. See U Beyerlin, ‘Pactum de contrahendo und pactum de negotiando im Völkerrecht?’ (1976) 36 ZaöRV 407.

⁷⁹ The EU–BiH (EUPM) (n 19), agreement called for the conclusion of practical arrangements between the contracting parties to the agreement, rather than between the head of mission and the local administrative authorities. Provisions to this effect were also included in the status agreements for the EUMM (see n 12).

⁸⁰ eg Art 6(2), EU–Poland (EUPM) (n 43); Art 6(3), EU–Norway (Proxima) (n 42).

⁸¹ eg Art 6, EU–Chile (Althea) (n 29); Art 19, Annex I, EU–Switzerland (EUFOR RD Congo) (n 39).

⁸² See M Reichard, ‘Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU–NATO Berlin Plus Agreement’ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 37; M Reichard, The EU–NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006) 273–310. The text of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement is classified, but see EU–NATO Declaration on ESDP (2003) 42 ILM 242 and the Appendix to Annex VII to the Presidency Report on the ESDP (Nice), 13 Dec 2000, 58.

⁸³ eg recital (1), Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP of 18 Mar 2003 [2003] OJ L76/43.

⁸⁴ Such exchanges of letters took place concerning EUJUST Lex, EU BAM Rafah and EU COPPS.

⁸⁵ eg recital (13), Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP (Althea) (n 4).

⁸⁶ eg Council doc 14578/06, EUPOL KINSHASA: exchange of letters between the EU and the Republic of Mali, 27 Oct 2006.

⁸⁷ eg Council doc 11247/06, Release of Operation EUFOR RD Congo related EUCI–Exchange of letters between the EU and the Republic of Turkey, 4 July 2006.

⁸⁸ Recital (15), Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP (EU Supporting Action to AMIS II) (n 11).

⁸⁹ EU–FYROM (Concordia) (n 19) 50.

⁹⁰ See C Lipson, ‘Why are Some International Agreements Informal?’ (1999) 45 International Organization 495.

⁹¹ The Political and Security Committee forms part of the Council structure and is responsible for the day-to-day management of the CFSP and ESDP. In particular, the Committee exercises political control and strategic direction of EU crisis management operations under the authority of the Council in accordance with Art 25 TEU.

⁹² Council doc 15944/03, EUPOL Proxima: legal basis for the contribution of Acceding States, 10 Dec 2003.

⁹³ Council doc 14578/06 (n 86).

⁹⁴ eg Art 9(6) and Art 13(1), Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP (Proxima) (n 6); Art 10(3), Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP (EUFOR RD Congo) (n 4).

⁹⁵ See also de Kerchove and S Marquardt (n 16) 808; Thym (n 16) 871.

⁹⁶ This fact is apparently overlooked by Reichard, who argues that only the Presidency may sign international agreements under Art 24 TEU. See Reichard (2004, n 82), 58–60 and (2006, n 82), 138–41, 298–300, and 348.

⁹⁷ See F Münch, ‘Non-binding Agreements’ (1969) 29 ZaöRV 1; FS Hamzeh, ‘Agreements in Simplified Form–Modern Perspective’ (1968–1969) 43 BYIL 179; M Rotter, ‘Die Abgrenzung zwischen völkerrechtlichem Vertrag und ausserrechtlicher zwischenstaatlicher Abmachung: Zu Art. 2(1)a der Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ in R Marcic et al (eds), Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross zum 80. Geburtstag (Fink, München, 1971) 413; O Schachter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’ (1977) 71 AJIL 296; A Aust, ‘The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments’ (1986) 35 ICLQ 787, especially 800–4; M Nash (Leich), ‘International Acts not Constituting Agreements’ (1994) 88 AJIL 515; R Jennings and A Watts, Oppenheim's International Law (Longman, London and New York, 1996) 1199–203. cf Opinion 1/75, OECD Local Cost Standard [1975] ECR 1355, 1356. See also K Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’ (2005) 99 AJIL 581.

⁹⁸ Art 26 TEU.

⁹⁹ For a different view, see Reichard (n 96).

¹⁰⁰ Council doc 11247/06 (n 87) 3.

¹⁰¹ In fact, Council doc 11247/06 (n 87) states that the High Representative acted on the instructions of the Council.

¹⁰² On the difficulties involved in construing the intentions of the parties to an informal international instrument, see J Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 1996) 65–95; C Chinkin, ‘A Mirage in the Sand? Distinguishing Binding and Non-Binding Relations Between States’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 223.

¹⁰³ However, the simultaneous use of terminology normally found in treaties and in non-binding agreements in one and the same instrument could also indicate that the contracting parties hold divergent views as to whether or not the instrument in question is legally binding. For an example of such a disagreement, see JH McNeill, ‘International Agreements: Recent US–UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of Understanding’ (1994) 88 AJIL 821.

¹⁰⁴ See Schachter (n 97) 301; Aust (n 97) 807–12; H Hillgenberg, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’ (1999) 10 EJIL 499. For a critical assessment of this position, see Klabbers (n 102), esp 97–119.

¹⁰⁵ eg Letter from the Vice Prime Minister of Israel addressed to the High Representative of the CFSP concerning EU BAM Rafah, 23 Nov 2005 (on file with the author).

¹⁰⁶ Art 15(6), EU–Gabon (EUFOR RD Congo) (n 19).

¹⁰⁷ UN docs S/2004/915 and S/2004/916 of 19 Nov 2004.

¹⁰⁸ See Jennings and Watts (n 97) 1187–96.

¹⁰⁹ eg Letter from the Prime Minister of Iraq addressed to High Representative of the CFSP concerning EUJUST Lex, 26 May 2005 (on file with the author); exchange of letters between the High Representative and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo during the second half of 2006 concerning the extension of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to the EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) (on file with the author).

¹¹⁰ Council doc 9627/07, EUPOL KINSHASA: Exchange of letters between the EU and Canada, 14 May 2007; Council doc 9628/07, EUPOL KINSHASA: Exchange of letters between the EU and Turkey, 14 May 2007.

¹¹¹ See S Marquardt, ‘The Conclusion of International Agreements under Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union’ in V Kronenberger (ed), The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (TMC Asser, The Hague, 2001) 333, 339. It has been suggested that Art 24(3) TEU lays down a special rule entitling the Council to conclude administrative arrangements: HCH Hofmann, ‘Agreements in EU Law’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 800, 811. However, this view is mistaken in as much as Art 24 TEU as a whole applies to ‘international agreements’ as the term is understood in public international law, without distinguishing between different types of agreements, while Art 24(3) TEU simply deals with a procedural question of internal decision-making.

¹¹² Case C-327/91, France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641. See N Burrows, ‘No General External Relations Competence for the Commission’ (1995) 20 European Law Review 210; AJ Riley, ‘The Jellyfish Nailed? The Annulment of the EC/US Competition Cooperation Agreement’ (1995) 16 European Competition Law Review 185.

¹¹³ 21 Mar 1986 (1986) 25 ILM 543.

¹¹⁴ Case C–327/91 (n 112) paras 18–39; cf Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro [1994] ECR I-3641, paras 18–27.

¹¹⁵ Case C–327/91 (n 112) paras 32–7.

¹¹⁶ Even though Art 7 of the EC Treaty does not apply to the Council's activities under the CFSP, the international law principle of attributed or conferred powers imposes similar restrictions on the Council in this policy area as Art 7 does under the EC Treaty. See J Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2002) 60–81.

¹¹⁷ See E Osieke, ‘The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations’ (1983) 77 AJIL 239, 243–7.

¹¹⁸ Case C–327/91 (n 112) para 36.

¹¹⁹ cf Denza (n 2) 1–32; R Gosalbo Bono, ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’ (2006) 43 CMLRev 337, 366–79. The Court of First Instance has recently affirmed that the CFSP and Community law constitute two ‘separate legal orders’, see Case T–306/01, Ali Yusuf v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533, para 156; and Case T–315/01, Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, para 120.

¹²⁰ 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

¹²¹ Nevertheless, it has been suggested, wrongly, that the VCLT should not play ‘any role’ in the interpretation of the TEU. See U Everling, ‘Reflections on the Structure of the European Union’ (1992) 29 CMLRev 1053, 1064.

¹²² On the notion of subsequent practice, see A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge, 2000) 194–5.

¹²³ Cf H Neuhold, ‘Organs Competent to Conclude Treaties for International Organizations and the Internal Procedure Leading to the Decision to be Bound by a Treaty’, in K Zemanek (ed), Agreements of International Organizations and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer, New York, 1971) 195, 266; S Engel, ‘“Living” International Constitutions and the World Court’ (1967) 16 ICLQ 865, 909–10. In addition, a teleological interpretation could be made to similar effect along the lines of the Separate Opinion of Judge Spender, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (1962) ICJ Rep 182.

¹²⁴ I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (OUP, Oxford, 2003) 57; Jennings and Watts (n 97) 119–20.

¹²⁵ On the development of the notion of the international legal personality of international organizations, see B Faßbender, ‘Die Völkerrechtssubjektivität internationaler Organisationen’ (1986) 37 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 17; DJ Bederman, ‘The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel’ (1995–6) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 275.

¹²⁶ See HG Schermers and NM Blokker, International Institutional Law (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1995) 976–82; P Sands and P Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001) 470–5; Klabbers (n 116) 52–7; CF Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) 77–86; ND White, The Law of International Organisations (MUP, Manchester, 2005) 68–9; D Akande, ‘International Organizations’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law (OUP, Oxford, 2006) 277, 282. This also applies to the theory of objective or inherent legal personality advanced by F Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organisations: Do Their Capacities Really Depend upon Their Constitutions? (Krohns Bogtrykkeri, Copenhagen, 1963). Essentially, for Seyersted the key question is whether an international organization, in the sense that he defines the concept, has in fact been established by its creators.

¹²⁷ Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, paras 13–14, eg D McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (Longman, London and New York, 1997) 29; DR Verwey, The European Community, the European Union and the International Law of Treaties (TMC Asser, The Hague, 2004) 19; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 8–9; but see I MacLeod, ID Hendry, and S Hyett, The External Relations of the European Communities (OUP, Oxford, 1996) 29–36.

¹²⁸ Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 29 Oct 2004 [2004] OJ C310/1. This provision too is understood to refer to legal personality under international law. See M Cremona, ‘The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action’ (2003) 40 CMLRev 1347, 1350; M Martin and I Lirola, ‘External Action of the European Union After the Constitutional Setback’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 358. See also European Convention doc CONV 305/02, Final Report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, 1 Oct 2002.

¹²⁹ Art 1(55), Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 Dec 2007 [2007] OJ C306/1. The Treaty of Lisbon was formally signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the EU on 13 Dec 2007 at Lisbon. The Treaty has not yet entered into force.

¹³⁰ Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174. See M Rama-Montaldo, ‘International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations’ (1970) 44 BYIL 111.

¹³¹ ibid 179.

¹³² ibid 182.

¹³³ Cf Brownlie (n 124) 649. Whereas in the Reparation case the ICJ referred to the exercise of functions and the enjoyment of rights, rather than legal capacities (see n 131), it is clear from the context of the relevant passage that the Court was referring to rights enjoyed by the UN as a result of the exercise of its treaty-making capacity. Effectively, it is the existence of such legal capacities which serves as proof of the conferral of legal personality, rather than the specific treaty rights and obligations arising out of the exercise of those capacities.

¹³⁴ Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1.

¹³⁵ Art J.1(1), Maastricht Treaty. Apparently, this distinction between the Union and its Member States was meant to underline the intergovernmental character of the CFSP, see F Fink-Hooijer, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’ (1994) 5 EJIL 173, 177.

¹³⁶ Art J.1(3), Maastricht Treaty.

¹³⁷ Art J.2 and Art J.3, Maastricht Treaty.

¹³⁸ Under the Maastricht Treaty, the concept of a ‘joint action’ continued to refer to collective action taken by the Member States, just as it did in Art 30 of the Single European Act (SEA) [1987] OJ L169/1. This is illustrated by the fact that early Council instruments adopting joint actions were labelled ‘Council decisions concerning joint action’, where the term ‘Council decision’ referred the binding legal act and the envisaged ‘joint action’ merely constituted to the subject of the decision, eg Council Decision 94/790/CFSP of 12 Dec 1994 concerning the joint action on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar [1994] OJ L326/2.

¹³⁹ Cf Reparation for Injuries (n 131) 178–9.

¹⁴⁰ Art J.1(2) and Art J.1(4), Maastricht Treaty.

¹⁴¹ Maastricht-Urteil (1993) BVerfGE 89, 155, 195; (1994) 33 ILM 388, 428–9; [1994] 1 CMLRev 57, 94–5. See SC Monaghan, ‘European Union Legal Personality Disorder: The Union's Legal Nature Through the Prism of the German Federal Constitutional Court's Maastricht Decision’ (1998) 12 Emory International Law Review 1443, especially 1486–92.

¹⁴² eg G Ress, ‘Ist die Europäische Union eine juristische Person? (1995) 30 Europarecht (Beiheft 2) 27; O Dörr, ‘Zur Rechtsnatur der Europäischen Union’ (1995) 30 Europarecht 334; A von Bogdandy and M Nettesheim, ‘Ex Pluribus Unum: Fusion of the European Communities into the European Union’ (1996) 2 European Law Journal 267, 284–6; RA Wessel, ‘The International Legal Status of the European Union’ (1997) 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 109; J Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’ in M Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) 231; C Busse, Die völkerrechtliche Einordnung der Europäischen Union (Heymanns, Köln, 1999) (arguing that the CFSP, rather than the EU itself, constitutes an international legal person).

¹⁴³ eg Everling (n 121) 1061; D Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 CMLRev 17, 27; H Kirschner, ‘The Framework of the European Union under the Treaty of Maastricht’ (1993–1994) 13 Journal of Law and Commerce 233, 242; Fink-Hooijer (n 135) 177; MR Eaton, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in D O'Keeffe and PM Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery, London, 1994) 215, 224; T Heukels and J de Zwaan, ‘The Configuration of the European Union: Community Dimensions of Institutional Interaction’ in D Curtin and T Heukels (eds) Institutional Dynamics of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, vol II (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994) 195, 202–4; T Jürgens, Die Gemeinsame Europäische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Heymanns, Köln, 1994) 329–31; M Pechstein, ‘Rechtssubjektivität für die Europäische Union?’ (1996) 31 Europarecht 137; E Paasivirta, ‘The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?’ (1997) 2 Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium 37, 45–54; MacLeod, Hendry, and Hyett (n 127), 25; Gosalbo Bono (n 119) 345–7. International relations scholarship has also struggled to come to terms with the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor, see RH Ginsberg, ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’ (1999) 37 Journal of Common Market Studies. 429.

¹⁴⁴ Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 Oct 1997 [1997] OJ C340/1.

¹⁴⁵ Arts 11(2), 14, 15, 23, 26, Amsterdam TEU (consolidated) [1997] OJ C340/145.

¹⁴⁶ While Art J.2(1) of the Maastricht Treaty called upon the Member States to inform and consult one another so that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action, Art 16 of the Amsterdam Treaty modified this provision to refer to the Union's influence. This suggests that the Union's foreign and security policy stands for joint action by the Member States. The possibility cannot be discounted, however, that this change was intended to serve merely rhetorical aims, see F Dehousse, ‘The IGC Process and Results’ in D O'Keeffe and P Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 93, 98–9.

¹⁴⁷ eg J Monar, ‘The European Union's Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of Amsterdam: A “Strengthened Capacity for External Action”?’ (1997) 2 European Foreign Affairs Review 413, 427; Paasivirta (n 143) 57–9; M Cremona, ‘The European Union as an International Actor: The Issues of Flexibility and Linkage’ (1998) 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 67, 70; NAEM Neuwahl, ‘A Partner With a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam’ (1998) 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 177, 185–6; D Vignes, ‘L'absence de personnalité juridique de l'Union européenne: Amsterdam persiste et signe’ in G Hafner et al (eds), Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) 757, 760; JW de Zwaan, ‘The Legal Personality of the European Communities and the European Union’ (1999) 30 NYIL 75, 100–5; K Lenaerts and E de Smijter, ‘The European Union as an Actor under International Law’ (1999–2000) 19 Yearbook of European Law 95, 130; M Pechstein and C Koenig, Die Europäische Union (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2000) 151–2; D Mahncke, ‘Reform of the CFSP: From Maastricht to Amsterdam’ in J Monar and W Wessels (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (Continuum, London and New York, 2001) 227, 244; E Regelsberger and U Schmalz, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Amsterdam Treaty: Towards an Improved EU Identity on the International Scene?’ in ibid 249, 252–3; Denza (n 2) 176; cf DM Curtin and IF Dekker, ‘The EU as a “Layered” International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford, 1999) 83, 111. See also DT Murphy, ‘The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: It is Not Far From Maastricht to Amsterdam’ (1998) 31 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 871, 911–2; A Aust, Handbook of International Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) 480.

¹⁴⁸ eg NM Blokker and T Heukels, ‘The European Union: Historical Origins and Institutional Challenges’ in T Heukels, N Blokker, and M Brus (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) 9, 27–38; B de Witte, ‘The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?’, in ibid 51, 63–4; S Langrish, ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: Selected Highlights’ (1998) 23 European Law Review 3, 13–14; A Tizzano, ‘La personnalité internationale de l'Union européenne’ (1998) Revue du Marché Unique Européen 11, 25–8; JC Wichard, ‘Wer ist Herr im europäischen Haus?’ (1999) 34 Europarecht 170, 174; RA Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’ (2000) 5 European Foreign Affairs Review 507, 527–31; G Hafner, ‘The Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty-Making Power of the European Union: Some Critical Comments’ in Hafner et al (n 147) 257, 270–2; Marquardt (n 111; MM Pachinger, Die Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit der Europäischen Union (Peter Lang, Frankfurt aM, 2003) 92–103; TM Gütt, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und ihre Bedeutung für die Europäische Union: Rechtspersönlichkeit und Rechtsnatur der EU (Herbert Utz, München, 2003) 125–35; T Georgopoulos, ‘What Kind of Treaty Making Power for the EU? Constitutional Problems Related to the Conclusion of the EU–US Agreements on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 190, 193; R Leal-Arcas, ‘EU Legal Personality in Foreign Policy?’ (2007) 24 Boston University International Law Journal 165.

¹⁴⁹ Art 11(1) Amsterdam TEU.

¹⁵⁰ Declaration on Arts J.I4 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union, Final Act [1997] OJ C340/131.

¹⁵¹ Cf E Cannizzaro, ‘Fragmented Sovereignty? The European Union and its Member States in the International Arena’ (2003) 13 Italian Yearbook of International Law 35, 38–9. See also D Sarooshi, ‘Conferrals by States of Powers on International Organizations: The Case of Agency’ (2003) 74 BYIL 291. Some have argued that the declaration was really aimed at preventing the so-called ERTA effect: Tizanno (n 148) 28. However, since the CFSP does not form part of Community law, the reasoning in the ERTA case (n 127, paras 15–8) does not apply to Art 24 TEU. cf Thym (n 16) 900–5; Wessel (n 16).

¹⁵² Tizanno (n 148) 25.

¹⁵³ Council docs CONF 3850/96, A strengthened external action capability, 24 May 1996, at 10; CONF 3860/96, Progress Report on the Intergovernmental Conference, 12 June 1996, at 36–7; CONF 3860/1/96 ADD1, Draft texts, 13 June 1996, 18–20. The much-quoted Dublin II proposal by the Irish Presidency subsequently dropped the third option in favour of the first two, while noting the lack of unanimity on the subject. See Council doc CONF 2500/96, The European Union Today and Tomorrow, 5 Dec 1996, 88–90.

¹⁵⁴ Blokker and Heukels (n 148) 36–7.

¹⁵⁵ Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries (1966) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 177, 220.

¹⁵⁶ Recourse to the travaux préparatoires is itself fraught with ambiguities and is frequently considered controversial. See M Ris, ‘Treaty Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards a Proposed Amendment of Arts 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (1991) 14 Boston College International Law and Comparative Law Review 111; J Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?’ (2003) 50 Netherlands International Law Review 267; U Linderfalk, ‘Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation’ (2007) 54 Netherlands International Law Review 133. There can be no doubt, however, that Art 24 TEU presents a prime example of a provision from which no clear and unequivocal meaning can be derived by applying the general rule of interpretation under Art 31 VCLT.

¹⁵⁷ Council doc CONF 3850/96 (n 153) 10.

¹⁵⁸ Cf McGoldrick (n 127) 38.

¹⁵⁹ In particular, one cannot admit that several Member States resisted the attribution of international legal personality to the EU during the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty, yet at the same time propose that they somehow still granted that status to the Union through Art 24 TEU by implication: eg Hafner (n 148) 283. This makes a mockery of the principle of State consent to be bound by a treaty; cf Separate Opinion of Judge Spender (n 123) 196.

¹⁶⁰ eg Written Statement Presented by the Government of the United Kingdom (1949) ICJ Pleadings 23, 26–31.

¹⁶¹ Marquardt (n 111) 341–2.

¹⁶² eg it has been argued that the EU possesses the legal capacity, pursuant to the ‘implied powers doctrine’, to conclude international agreements on its on behalf without, however, enjoying international legal personality: Georgopoulos (n 148) 191–4.

¹⁶³ Art J.5(1) TEU (Maastricht); Art 18(1) TEU (Amsterdam/Nice).

¹⁶⁴ Memorandum of Understanding on the European Union Administration of Mostar, 5 July 1994 (on file with the author).

¹⁶⁵ Treaty of Nice, 26 Feb 2001 [2001] OJ C80/1.

¹⁶⁶ Marquardt (n 111) 344–5. See also Pachinger (n 148) 107–8; Gütt (n 148) 133.

¹⁶⁷ Cf A Mignolli ‘Sul treaty-making power nel secondo e nel terzo pilastro dell'Unione europea’ (2001) 84 Rivista di diritto internazionale 978, 983–9.

¹⁶⁸ Art 25(2) VCLT 1969; Art 25(2) VCLT 1986. See MA Rogoff and BE Gauditz, ‘The Provisional Application of International Agreements’ (1987) 39 Maine Law Review 29; R Lefeber, ‘The Provisional Application of Treaties’ in J Klabbers and R Lefeber (eds), Essays on the Law of Treaties: A Collection of Essays in Honour of Bert Vierdag (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998) 81; Aust (n 122) 139–41.

¹⁶⁹ Emphasis added.

¹⁷⁰ de Kerchove and S Marquardt (n 16) 813.

¹⁷¹ Council Doc CONFER 4790/00, Progress report on the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform, 3 Nov 2000, 12.

¹⁷² Of course, the provisional application of the agreement in this manner would require the consent of that third party.

¹⁷³ While it seems that there is no subsequent practice on the implementation of Art 24(5) TEU in the area of the CFSP, such practice does exist with regard to agreements concluded under the EU's third pillar. See n 198.

¹⁷⁴ eg A Dashwood, ‘External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 35 CMLRev 1019, 1038–41, reprinted in O'Keeffe and Twomey (n 146) 201, 218–21; P Gautier, ‘The Reparation for Injuries Case Revisited: The Personality of the European Union’ (2000) 4 Max Planck UNYB 331, 347–58; NAEM Neuwahl, ‘Legal Personality of the European Union–International and Institutional Aspects’ in Kronenberger (n 111) 3, 11–20. See also S Peers, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy 1997’ (1997) 17 Yearbook of European Law 539, 561–4; Wessel (n 142) 126; M Gavouneli, ‘International Law Aspects of the European Union’ (2000) 8 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 147, 155–6; L Grard, ‘L'Union Européenne, sujet de droit international’ (2006) 110 Revue générale de droit international public 337, 352.

¹⁷⁵ Editorial Comment, ‘The European Union: A new international actor’ 38 CMLRev (2001) 825; Reichard (n 82) 52; de Kerchove and S Marquardt (n 16) 814; M Kleine, Die Militärischen Komponente der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005) 115–31; Naert (n 3) 101; Tsagourias (n 3) 116–17; Eeckhout (n 15) 159–60; Verwey (n 127) 60–1; Koutrakos (n 127) 409; Thym (n 16) 870–5; Grard (n 174) 352–4; Leal-Arcas (n 148); Wessel (n 16).

¹⁷⁶ eg Council Decision 2004/924/CFSP of 22 Nov 2004 [2004] OJ L389/41.

¹⁷⁷ This may be contrasted with the Memorandum of Understanding on the EU Administration of Mostar (n 164), which named to the ‘Member States of the European Union acting within the framework of the Union’ as the ‘sending party’.

¹⁷⁸ eg Art 3, EU–BiH (n 56). See also Art 2, EU–ICC (n 64).

¹⁷⁹ The preambles of the agreements invoke the objective to strengthen the EU's security in all ways (Art 11 TEU), while Art 6 contrasts the EU with the Council, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission.

¹⁸⁰ This is particularly evident from Art 6, EU–NATO (n 55), which refers to the Council, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission as ‘entities of the Parties’, thereby distinguishing these entities from the EU as a contracting party.

¹⁸¹ Art 5(a), EU–NATO (n 55).

¹⁸² eg Art 2(6), EU–NZ (n 41); Art 3(6), EU–Turkey (n 69).

¹⁸³ Such a distinction between the EU and its Member States is also drawn in certain agreements negotiated in the context of the EU's third pillar using the procedure set out in Art 24 TEU pursuant to Art 38 TEU. Thus, the EU has undertaken to provide for enhanced cooperation between its Member States and the United States in the field of extradition and mutual legal assistance in two treaties drawn up between the EU and the United States: EU–US, 25 June 2003 [2003] OJ L181/27 (extradition); EU–US, 25 June 2003 [2003] OJ L181/34 (mutual legal assistance).

¹⁸⁴ It makes little difference whether the Council's practice is understood as subsequent practice of the Member States within the meaning of Art 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, or as practice of the Council as an organ of the EU. See T Sato, Evolving Constitutions of International Organizations (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 1996).

¹⁸⁵ The term is borrowed from European foreign policy analysis, see RH Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2001) 45ff.

¹⁸⁶ eg Art 14, EU–Georgia (EUJUST Themis) (n 19); Art 16, EU–Romania (n 62); Art 16, EU–Gabon (EUFOR RD Congo) (n 19).

¹⁸⁷ eg Art VIII, Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defence (Brussels Treaty) 17 Mar 1948, 19 UNTS 51; Art 46, UN–Congo (UNOC) 27 Nov 1961, 414 UNTS 230; Arts 53 and 54, UN doc A/46/185 (n 52).

¹⁸⁸ The majority of third country participation agreements and all framework participation agreements contain a clause entitling either party to terminate the agreements should the other party fail to comply with its obligation, eg Art 8, EU–Estonia (Concordia) (n 33); Art 14, EU–Ukraine (n 69).

¹⁸⁹ eg Art 13(2), Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP (Proxima) (n 6); Art 2(4), EU–Morocco (Althea) (n 40); Art 3(4), EU–Iceland (n 69).

¹⁹⁰ Art 40(4), Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 Feb 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications [2004] OJ 63/68, as amended. On the financing of military operations, see D Scannell, ‘Financing ESDP Military Operations’ (2004) 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 529.

¹⁹¹ On this matter generally, see K Schmalenbach, Die Haftung Internationaler Organisationen im Rahmen von friedenssichernden Maßnahmen und Territorialverwaltungen (Peter Lang, Frankfurt aM, 2004); SR Lüder, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit bei Teilnahme an ‘Peacek-keeping’-Missionen der Vereinten Nationen (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2004); M Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005); K Schmalenbach, ‘Third Party Liability of International Organizations: A Study on Claim Settlement in the Course of Military Operations and International Administrations’ (2006) 10 International Peacekeeping 33.

¹⁹² Submissions of this nature were made by certain member States of NATO in proceedings before the ICJ and the European Court of Human Rights relating to NATO's armed intervention in Kosovo and the subsequent international administration of the territory, see Oral Pleadings of Canada, CR/99/27, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v Canada) 27 May 1999, 10; Oral Pleadings of France, CR 2004/12, Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v France) 20 Apr 2004, 23–5; Banković and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States (2007) 44 EHRR SE5, para 30; Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE 10. For a critical analysis of Behrami and Saramati, see Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases’ forthcoming in (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review.

¹⁹³ Cf Reparation for Injuries case (n 131).

¹⁹⁴ See n 17.

¹⁹⁵ This uncertainty is compounded by the lack of clear rules determining how responsibility should be shared in cases where internationally wrongful conduct is attributable to more than one legal subject, as often happens in complex peace support operations, and by the unresolved question as to whether or not States bear concurrent or secondary responsibility for the acts and omissions of international organizations of which they are members. On the second issue, see I Brownlie, ‘The Responsibility of States for the Acts of International Organizations’ in M Ragazzi (ed), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden and Boston, 2005) 355; S Yee, ‘The Responsibility of States Members of an International Organization for Its Conduct as a Result of Membership of Their Normal Conduct associated Membership’ in ibid 435.

¹⁹⁶ Tizanno (n 148) 28 and 40. See also C Tomuschat, ‘The International Responsibility of the European Union’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2002) 181.

¹⁹⁷ Indeed, the debate surrounding the legal personality of the EU and the interpretation of Art 24 TEU will become obsolete with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (n 129), which confers legal personality on the EU in express terms and replaces Art 24 TEU with a provision stating that international agreements are concluded by the Union.

¹⁹⁸ Some of these questions were raised by the two agreements signed between the EU and the United States in 2003 on extradition and mutual legal assistance (n 183), see S Marquardt, ‘La capacité de l'Union européenne de conclure des accords internationaux dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale’ in G de Kerchove and A Weyembergh (eds), Sécurité et justice: enjeu de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne (Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Brussels, 2003) 179. Even though one of the reasons for negotiating the two agreements under Art 24 TEU, rather than on a bilateral basis between the US and each EU Member State, was to expedite their conclusion, the US insisted on inserting a provision into both agreements whereby the EU agreed to ensure that its Member States confirm, in written agreements exchanged between themselves and the US, the undertakings entered into by the EU in the two agreements (Art 3(2)(a) EU–US on extradition, Arts 3(2)(a) and 3(3)(b) EU–US on mutual legal assistance). As noted by Marquardt (ibid 192–3), this appears to call into question the EU's capacity to enter into binding commitments. At the very least, it displays considerable distrust on part of the US as to whether the Member States will comply with agreements concluded under Art 24 TEU. Moreover, it is peculiar that most Member States have submitted the two agreements for parliamentary approval even though they do not consider themselves to be (prospective) parties to them. One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is offered by the relevant German legislation: the German Government considered that the two agreements became binding on Germany as a matter of international law following their signature in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art 24 TEU and therefore sought parliamentary approval for their ‘binding effect’ (Bindung) on Germany, rather than for the agreements as such. See Bundestag Drucksache 16/4377, 23 Feb 2007 <http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/16/043/1604377.pdf>. See also Avis n° 368.976, Conseil d'État (France) 7 May 2003 <http://www.conseil-etat.fr/avisag/368976.pdf>; Rapport n° 252 (2002–3) présenté par M. Pierre Fauchon au nom de la commission des Lois <http://www.senat.fr/rap/l02-252/l02-252.html>; Avis du Conseil d'État (Luxembourg) 25 Sept 2007 <http://www.ce.etat.lu/html/47612.htm>, all accessed on 1 Nov 2007.