¹ M Toral and T Schultz, ‘The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment Arbitration? Some Unorthodox Considerations’, in M Waibel, A Kaushal, K-H Liz Chung, and C Blachin (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2010) 577–602.

² See in particular B Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, Recueil des Cours (1994-VI), vol 250, 217–384; Simma, B, ‘International Human Rights and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis’, 2 Collective Courses of the European Academy of European Law 225 (1994Google Scholar/IV); B Simma, Human Rights Before the International Court of Justice: Community Interest Coming to Life? (forthcoming in Festschrift in honour of Rüdiger Wolfrum).

³ JW Gooch (ed), Encyclopedic Dictionary of Polymers (2^nd edn, Springer, 2010) 265.

⁴ KJ Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ in KP Sauvant and LE Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP, Oxford, 2009) 1–35.

⁵ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note No. 1 (2011) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20113_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2011; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Latest Developments in Investor–State Dispute Settlement’, IIA Issues Note No. 1 (2010) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20103_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2011; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008–June 2009)’, IIA Monitor No. 3 (2009) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2011; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2007–June 2008)’ IIA Monitor No. 2 (2008) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20081_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁶ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The ICSID Caseload—Statistics (Issue 2011–1), <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English11> accessed 14 April 2011.

⁷ See Beattie, A, ‘Concern Grows over Global Trade Regulation’ Financial Times (London England 12 March 2008Google Scholar), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58699264-ef9c-11dc-8a17-0000779fd2ac,s01=1.html#axzz1LHVqkfs8> accessed 3 May 2011.

⁸ Franck, SD, ‘Development and Outcomes in Investment Arbitration’ (2009) 50 Harv Int'l L J 435Google Scholar; SD Franck, ‘Considering Recalibration of International Investment Agreements: Some Empirical Insights’ in JE Alvarez, KP Sauvant, K Gerard Ahmed, G Vizcaino (eds), The Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (OUP, Oxford, 2011).

⁹ Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia [2005] ICSID Case No ARB/02/3, Jurisdiction, 20 ICSID Rev Foreign Investment LJ 450.

¹⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims’, IIA Issues Note No. 2 (December 2010) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf> accessed 3 May 2011.

¹¹ MH Mourra, ‘The Conflicts and Controversies in Latin American Treaty-Based Disputes’ in MH Mourra and TE Carbonneau (eds), Latin American Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Controversies and Conflicts (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2008) 16; Briones, J and Tagvoryan, A, ‘Is International Arbitration in Latin America in Danger?’ (2010) 16 Law & Bus Rev of the Americas 131Google Scholar, 132.

¹² F Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment Law’ in P-M Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Arbitration (OUP, Oxford, 2009); quote taken from abstract of original article published in (2009) 20 EJIL 3, 729–747.

¹³ See Simma, B, ‘Self-contained Regimes’ (1985) 16 Neth Ybk Intl L 111–136CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Simma, B and Pulkowski, D, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 3, 483–529CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Tobin, J and Rose-Ackerman, S, ‘When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties’ (2006) 6 The Review of International Organizations 1–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ For differing views on the effect of neo-liberal thinking on the international investment regime, see Vandevelde, KJ, ‘Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime’ [1997–1998] 19 Mich J Int'l L 373Google Scholar; M Sornarajah, ‘Toward Normlessness: the Ravage and Retreat of Neo-liberalism in International Investment Law’ in KP Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy (OUP, Oxford, 2010) Part 2, no.16.

¹⁶ See among others M Jacob, ‘International Investment Agreements and Human Rights’, INEF Research Paper Series, on Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development 03/2010. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, <http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf> accessed 15 April 2011; Jarrod Hepburn and V Kuuya, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment Treaties’ in M-C Cordonier Segger, MW Gehring, and A Newcombe (eds), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer 2010) 585–610.

¹⁷ For recent literature on the subject, see N Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ‘Transparency and Amicus Curiae in ICSID Arbitrations’ in Segger, Gehring and Newcombe (n 16) 189–208; JE Viñuales and F Grisel, ‘Amicus Intervention in Investor-State Arbitration: A Contemporary Reappraisal’, American Arbitration Association and International Centre for Dispute Resolution, Handbook on International Arbitration and ADR (American Arbitration Association, 2^nd edn, October 2010) ch 34; Levine, E, ‘Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation’ (2011) 29 Berkeley J Int'l L 1, 200–224Google Scholar; J Harrison, ‘Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?’ in Dupuy, Francioni, and Petersmann (n 12) 396–420.

¹⁸ See S Woolcock and J Kleinheisterkamp (Jan 2010) The EU approach to international investment policy after the Lisbon Treaty. EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2009–01/Lot7/07-08-09. European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium; Nikos Lavranos, New Developments in the Interaction between International Investment Law and EU Law, (2010) 9 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 409–441.

¹⁹ P-M Dupuy, ‘Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law’ in Dupuy, Francioni & Petersmann (n 12) 45–62.

²⁰ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Selected Recent Developments in IIA Arbitration and Human Rights’, IIA Monitor No. 2 (2009) International Investment Agreements, at p. 3 (‘In practice, however, human rights issues have been relatively slow to arise in the IIA arbitration context. Indeed, IIAs themselves are generally silent with respect to human rights matters, and do not expressly reference human rights-related obligations of States, much less seek to introduce any new human rights duties or obligations for governments or investors. For their part, governments have rarely articulated clear views as to the relationship between IIAs and human rights … ’) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20097_en.pdf> accessed 3 May 2011; C Reiner and C Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration’ in Dupuy, Francioni & Petersmann (n 12) 82–96.

²¹ See H Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities, (International Institute for Sustainable Development, February 2008), 25–29. For relevant arbitral case law see Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/99/2, Award of October 11, 2002, para. 144; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, Award of May 29, 2003, at paras 116–122; Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of July 14, 2006, paras. 311–312; Methanex v United States of America, (NAFTA/UNCITRAL) Final Award of 3 August 2005; CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of May 12, 2005, paras 114–121.

²² LE Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the role of human rights law within investor-state arbitration (Rights & Democracy, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2009) 25 <http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.pdf> accessed 3 May 2011.

²³ On the broad impact of international investment arbitration on international governance, administrative networks, and international relations, see Salacuse, JW, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’ (2010) 51 Harvard J Int'l L 2, 427–473Google Scholar; van Harten, G and Loughlin, M, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’, (2006) 17 EJIL 1, 121–150CrossRefGoogle Scholar; S Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 3–18.

²⁴ In the present era of foreign investment which is increasingly being linked to more comprehensive regional and multilateral trade umbrellas, this problem of ‘moving targets’ between investment protection and compliance with economic and social rights does not appear solely in the traditional North-South binary of ‘capital-exporting’ developed States and ‘capital-importing’ developing States, but also to South-South and North-North trade cooperative structures and investment relationships. For a description of these trends in investment treaty rulemaking, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (2007), 3–9 <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf> accessed 4 May 2011; S Rose-Ackerman, ‘The Global BITs Regime and the Domestic Environment for Investment’ in Sauvant and Sachs (n 4) 311–321. In the past decade, developing economies have also become sources of foreign investment for the least developed countries (LDCs). See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Foreign Investment in LDCs: Lessons Learned from the Decade 2001–2010 and the Way Forward (2011) 10 <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia2011d1_en.pdf> accessed 4 May 2011.

²⁵ Remedies include arbitration (institutional and ad hoc), which is automatically enforced by national courts of States parties to either the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (otherwise known as the ICSID Convention) and the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (for UNCITRAL and other non-ICSID arbitrations). Other dispute settlement mechanisms include conciliation, mediation, fact-finding boards, and direct negotiations. For an analysis of the policy considerations and substantive features of these various mechanisms, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration (2010) 10–64 <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf> accessed 4 May 2011; R Doak Bishop, J Crawford, and WM Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2005) 317–490.

²⁶ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims’, IIA Issues Note No. 2 (December 2010) <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf> accessed 3 May 2011.

²⁷ See J Salacuse and N Sullivan, P, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of BITs and their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harv J Int'l L 67Google Scholar.

²⁸ As we are reminded in the 2009 arbitral award in Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, investment protection ‘should not be granted to investments made in violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights … ’. Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/06/5, April 15, 2009, para 78.

²⁹ See S Kroll, ‘The Renegotiation and Adaptation of Investment Contracts’ in Norbert Horn and Stefan Kroll (eds), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2004) 425–470.

³⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (2007) 71 <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf> accessed 4 May 2011.

³¹ See similar or identical language in ICSID Convention art 42(1); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) art 1131; Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), art 26(6); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment Agreement, art 40(1); Japan-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, art 84(1). Model BITs also contain similarly broad language. See 2004 Canada Model BIT, art 40(1); 2007 Colombia Model BIT art XI; 2008 Germany Model BIT art 7(1); 2003 India Model BIT art 12(1); 2004 US Model BIT arts 30(1) and (2); IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, art 48(1).

³² See 2004 Canada Model BIT, art 11 (Health, Safety and Environmental Measures); 2004 US Model BIT, art 12 [Investment and Environment] and art 13 [Investment and Labor].

³³ B Simma and T Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps Towards a Methodology’ in C Binder, U Kriebaum, A Reinisch, S Wittich (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP, Oxford, 2009) 678–707.

³⁴ See 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, art V(2)(b); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art 36; Pierre Lalive, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’ ICCA Congress Series No. 3 Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (TMC Asser Instituut, ICCA, 1987); C Kessedjian, ‘Transnational Public Policy’ ICCA Montreal 2006, ICCA Proceedings (2006); World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (2006), paras 138–141; Plama v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 27 August 2008, paras 143–144; Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 Arbitration International 2 (2004) 249–264; Mann, FA, ‘The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons’ (1959) 35 Brit YB Int'l L 34Google Scholar, 50. A Sheppard, ‘Interim ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ 19 Arbitration International 2 (2003) 220, noting that ‘‘[i]nternational public policy’ (rather than, simply, ‘public policy’) is increasingly referred to in legislation and court judgments. For example, in France, one of the limited grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award is if it is contrary to ‘ordre public international.’ Portugal has a similar provision. The Court of Appeal of Milan has held that the public policy referred to in Article V.2(b) of the New York Convention is international public policy.' See also E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 1999), paras 1645–1662 (‘The international public policy to which [the New French Code of Civil Procedure] refers can only mean the French conception of international public policy or, in other words, the set of values a breach of which could not be tolerated by the French legal order, even in international cases.’); Mistelis, L, ‘Keeping the Unruly Horse in Control, or Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of (Foreign) Arbitral Awards’ (2000) 2 Int'l L F D Int'l 248, 252–253Google Scholar (‘The public policy referred to in the New York Convention is the public policy of the enforcing state. However, in applying their own public policy, state courts should give an international rather than a domestic dimension.’)

³⁵ The literature is rife with observations about the potential for abuse of the ‘public policy’ ground for denial of recognition and enforcement in art V(2)(b) of the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. See e.g, J Paulsson, ‘The New York Convention in International Practice: Problems of Assimilation’ in M Blessing (ed), The New York Convention of 1958: A collection of reports and materials delivered at the ASA conference held in Zurich on 2 February 1996 (Swiss Arbitration Association, 1996), at 108 (noting that it is art V which ‘is most prone to misinterpretation and most open to abuse by national courts, displaying skepticism of non-national sources of law and bias against foreigners who wish to enforce awards in their territories’). In Russia, the public policy exception is a ‘major issue,’ due to a lack of uniform interpretation of the term: Nacimiento, Patricia, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Russia’ (2010) 4 Journal of International Arbitration 294Google Scholar.

³⁶ Kasiliki/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045 (Declaration of Judge Rosalyn Higgins, para 2).

³⁷ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 28–30, paras 45–49.

³⁸ See G Ress, Interpretation, in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2002) 13–32; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) (Judgment) [1978] ICJ Rep 3; Case concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Judgment, [2009] ICJ Rep <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15321.pdf> accessed on 15 April 2011.

³⁹ European Court of Human Rights, SE Golder v United Kingdom case (Appl. No. 4451/70), Report of the Commission (adopted on 1 June 1973), CE doc. D-60-355, Strasbourg, 1973, p 25, and Judgment of 21 February 1975, pp 9–12, paras 29–36. See Bernhardt, Rudolf, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 14Google Scholar; Mowbray, Alastair, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 1, 57–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2001) 396–397.

⁴⁰ Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections) [1957] ICJ Rep 142; Corfu Channel case (Judgment) [1949] ICJ Rep 24; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co case (Jurisdiction) Judgment of July 22 1952, [1952] ICJ Rep 104; Lauterpacht, H, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949) 26 Brit Yb Int'l L 67Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) Judgment, [2003] ICJ Rep paras 73–78.

⁴² Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) Judgment [2003] ICJ Rep para 41.

⁴³ See M McDougal, HD Lasswell and JC Miller, The Interpretation of International Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, reprint 1994) 433–442.

⁴⁴ This term was coined by ILC member (now ICJ Judge) Xue Hanqin during a more recent Commission debate on the significance of art 31(3)(c). ILC, Final Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, para 420, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) (prepared by Martti Koskenniemi).

⁴⁵ See (n 33) 695–707.

⁴⁶ Piero Foresti and others v The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award 4 August 2010, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1651_En&caseId=C90> accessed 3 May 2011.

⁴⁷ For the status of CERD ratifications, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (last visited 29 June 2011).

⁴⁸ Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties: Implications for Development and Human Rights, IISD Occasional Papers No. 26 (November 2006), at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf (last visited 29 June 2011).

⁴⁹ Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

⁵⁰ See further discussion in Simma and Kill (n 33) 701–702.

⁵¹ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm> accessed 30 April 2011. The Covenant [hereafter ‘ICESCR’] has been ratified or acceded to by 160 States Parties. <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 30 April 2011. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195 <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html> accessed 3 May 2011. CERD has 174 Parties. <http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 3 May 2011.

⁵² Under conditions discussed in Simma and Kill (n 33).

⁵³ See Alston, P and Quinn, G, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights' (1987) 9 Hum Rts Q 156, 166–171CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No. 3, The nature of States parties obligations (art 2, para 1), 14 December 1990, available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opendocument> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁵⁵ ibid para 9.

⁵⁶ For a compilation of the relevant instruments and general comments, see General Comment Nos. 1–21 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm> accessed 3 May 2011. See also P Alston and J Heenan, Economic, social, and cultural rights: a bibliography (Brill, Leiden, 2008); S Leckie and A Gallagher, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Legal Resource Guide (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006).

⁵⁷ See M Schmidt, ‘Follow-up Activities by UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council’ in A de Zayas, Bertrand G Ramcharan, Jo Grimheden, Gudmundur Alfredsson (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (Brill 2^nd ed. 2009); Alston, Philip, ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Hum Rts Q 335CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in A Eide, C Krause, A Rosas (eds), Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2001).

⁵⁸ See C Puta-Chekwe and N Flood, ‘From Division to Integration: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as Basic Human Rights’ I Merali and V Oosterveld (eds), Giving Meaning to Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) 39–51. For a detailed analysis of the historical and conceptual evolution of the tripartite typology of obligations under the Covenant, see M Sépulveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Mortsel, 2003) 157–248.

⁵⁹ General Comment No. 14 (2000), The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 50 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/439/34/PDF/G0043934.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁶⁰ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (2007) 76.

⁶¹ See (n 59) para 51.

⁶² General Comment No. 15 (2002), The right to water (arts 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/402/29/PDF/G0340229.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁶³ ibid para 44(b)(ii).

⁶⁴ Methanex v United States, UNCITRAL Case No. ARB/98/3 (2005), at Part IV, Chapter D, p 7; Sedco Inc v Iran, 9 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports; Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003; Feldman v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award on the Merits, 16 December 2002. See also MTD Equity Sdn Bhd & MTD Chile SA Chile v Chile, ICSID Case NoARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment of the ad hoc committee, 21 March 2007; Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (Saluka case), PCA, UNCITRAL, Partial Award 17 March 2006; Metalclad v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award on the Merits, 16 December 2002; Tecmed SA v Mexico, supra; Compania de Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award on the Merits, 17 February 2000, para. 72.

⁶⁵ See U Kriebaum, ‘Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative to Investor-State Arbitration?’ in Dupuy, Francioni & Petersmann (n 12) 219–245; Kriebaum, U, ‘Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State’ (2007) 8 Journal of World Investment & Trade 717–744CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ronald Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award, 3 September 2001, para 292; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2, Final Award, 11 October 2002, at para 116; European Convention of Human Rights, Article 1 of Protocol I (‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. No one should be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by the law and by the general principles of international law. The proceeding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’); Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Bermuda) v PT (Gersero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, 14(12) Mealey's International Arbitration Report A-1 (1990) A-50.

⁶⁶ Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/99/2, Award of October 11, 2002, para 144.

⁶⁷ See (n 54) para 10.

⁶⁸ ibid paras 10 and 12.

⁶⁹ See interpretative controversies in LG&E Energy Corp v Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 (3 October 2006); LG&E Energy Corp v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1 (July 25, 2007); Cont'l Cas Co v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Sept 5, 2008; Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Request for Annulment of the Award, 29 June 2010; Enron v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Request for Annulment of the Award, 30 July 2010; Desierto, DA, ‘Necessity and ‘Supplementary Means of Interpretation of Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2010) 31 Un Pa J Int'l L 3, 827–934Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ See (n 62) para 44(c)(vii).

⁷¹ Mihaly International Corporation v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/00/2 (1999); Zhinvali Development Limited v Georgia, ICSID Case No ARB/00/1, unpublished. See also Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/96/3 (1998), which involved promissory notes; Cesoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/4 (1999), which involved a financing loan extended as part of a government's privatization program; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award of 6 August 2004, at paras 49–50; Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Kingdom of Morocco, Jurisdiction, (2001) 6 ICSID Rep 398.

⁷² Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human rights, trade and investment, E/CN/4/Sub.2/2003/9, 2 July 2003, para 24 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/148/47/PDF/G0314847.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁷³ Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC770_En&caseId=C67> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁷⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (2007) 26. See SGS Societé Générale de Surveillance SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, International Arbitration Report, Vol 18, # 9, September 2003, in contrast to SGS Societé Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, January 29, 2004.

⁷⁵ See Leader, S, ‘Human Rights, Risks, and New Strategies for Global Investment’ (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁶ ‘Legitimate expectations of investors’ are a crucial element in determining a host State's breach or compliance with the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard in international investment treaties. Tecmed v Mexico introduced the concept of ‘basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the investment’, as part of the calculus of elements to determine breach or compliance with the FET standard. (Tecmed v Mexico (n 64) para 154.) The arbitral tribunal in CMS Gas accepted the Tecmed v Mexico characterization of investor expectations as a requirement involving regulatory consistency and transparency: ‘[t]he foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments.’ CMS Gas (n 21) paras 273–277. For the most part, this element has been treated as an open-textured phrase left to the subjective determination of arbitrators according to the circumstances of each case. The FET clause in NAFTA Article 1105 has accepted some innovations into the determination of investor expectations through the NAFTA Commission's 31 July 2001 Note of Interpretation, which dissociates the FET clause from the 1920s Neer claims standard requiring prior proof of a State's bad faith, before it may be deemed to have violated the international minimum standard in the treatment of aliens within its territory. Note of Interpretation of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 31 July 2001, <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx?lang=en> accessed 4 May 2011; Neer Claim, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1926), IV, p 60–61. Accordingly, the tribunal in GAMI Investments Inc v Mexico held that ‘[a] claim of maladministration would likely violate [NAFTA] Article 1105 if it amounted to an ‘outright and unjustified repudiation’ of the relevant regulations.' GAMI Investments Inc v Mexico, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 November 2004, para 103.

⁷⁷ Tecmed award (n 64) para 154.

⁷⁸ Stabilization clauses may take the form of intangibility clauses (which state that the contract can only be modified with the consent of the parties); freezing clauses (which provide that the applicable domestic law for the contract is frozen in time as the law in force at the date of the conclusion of the contract, and which cannot be affected by subsequent legislation inconsistent with that initial body of law); consistency clauses (which apply future domestic legislation of the host State only if it is consistent with the investment contract); fiscal or tariff stabilisation clauses (which fix the host State's tax or tariff regimes affecting the investment); and economic equilibrium clauses (which link the alteration of the terms of the contract to the possibility of periodic contractual renegotiation, to restore, as closely as possible, the original economic guarantees of the contract). These clauses are meant to cure the information asymmetry between foreign investors and host States. See L Cotula, ‘Foreign Investment Contracts’ (August 2007) International Institute for Environment and Development Briefing Paper No. 4.

⁷⁹ See Canada 2004 Model BIT, art 19.

⁸⁰ S Walker, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade-Related Policies’, in MW Gehring and M Claire Cordonier-Segger, Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2005) 217–256.

⁸¹ Murray v The Charming Betsy 6 US (2 Cranch 64) (1804): ‘It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains...’

⁸² See sample standard stabilization clauses in production sharing agreements and concession contracts in Bishop, Crawford, & Reisman (n 25) 286–307.

⁸³ See 2003 Japan-Vietnam BIT, art 6.

⁸⁴ See Chile-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Chapter on Investment, art 10.9.

⁸⁵ On the conceptual and empirical assessment of political or regulatory risk, see WJ Henisz, Politics and International Investment: Measuring Risks and Protecting Profits (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Kent, 2002) 5–27; P Harms, International Investment, Political Risk, and Growth (Kluwer Law, The Hague, 2000) 57–114.

⁸⁶ See the July 2006 Equator Principles <http://www.equator-principles.com> accessed 15 April 2011.

⁸⁷ See ‘Chapter 2: Petroleum Agreements and Bidding’ in F Jahn, M Cook, M Graham (eds), Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production (Elsevier Science, 2011).

⁸⁸ Cotula (n 78). See also Cotula, L, ‘Reconciling regulatory stability and evolution of environmental standards in investment contracts: Towards a rethink of stabilization clauses’ (2008) 1 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 2, 158–179CrossRefGoogle Scholar.