I begin by confessing a general fascination with the concept of time. I puzzle endlessly over the relationship between time and matter, and the insistence of scientists that before the Big Bang time did not exist. I grapple with the relationship between time and speed, and the fact that if we could travel at the speed of light time would not move. I seek to grasp Stephen Hawking's recent conversion to the view that, in the physical world, time may yet run in reverse. I am intrigued that our concepts of time came to Australia only with the First Fleet, for aboriginal time was cyclical rather than linear. Events could recur, dead people could live again. I find exhilarating the idea that we see at this moment, through our telescopes, stars that no longer exist. I love the objective reality of the equator and the total artificiality of the meridian, and the intention that this felicitous fiction is the place for us to see in the “real beginning” of the next century.

To allow Court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the orders of the Court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn. Daily, thousands of Canadians resort to our Courts for relief against the wrongful acts of others. If the remedies that Courts grant to correct those wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left but for each person to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction of our society. [O'Leary J, in Canada Metal Co. Ltd v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1975) 48 DLR 3d 641, 669 (High Court of Ontario)]

The British press has lately been awash with stories of libel actions commenced by MPs against newspapers which have published critical accounts of their behaviour. Rupert Allason has been the most assiduous litigator,1 but he has not ploughed a lone furrow. David Ashby's ill-fated action against the Sunday Times and Neil Hamilton's aborted case against the Guardian are the most memorable cases,2 but others come quickly to mind. Jonathan Aitken is pursuing actions against the Guardian which led to his resignation from the Cabinet in 1994, while Peter Bottomley recovered some £40,000 against the Sunday Express for an article accusing him of “fraternising” with Sinn Fein.3 Paddy Ashdown acted promptly against a local paper which aired ludicrous allegations about his personal life.4 Labour's Keith Vaz announced he would sue both the Sun and the Guardian for alleging that he favoured segregationist housing policies, and his colleague George Howarth accepted damages from the Guardian over an article falsely accusing him of drunkenness.5

It is now a decade since the United Kingdom, along with Germany and Belgium, followed the policy of traditional countries of immigration, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, and introduced legislation which provides for the imposition of fines on carriers for bringing in passengers with incorrect papers.1 The Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 1987 (“the Act”)2 imposed fines on carriers of £1,000 for each illegal entrant brought to the United Kingdom. This fine was doubled in August 1991 and two years later extended to cover passengers without transit visas where these were required.3

This note addresses the possible correlation between “democracy” and “development”, and the implications, if any, of such a correlation for the World Bank. This calls, first, for providing a definition of the two concepts as they are used here. To clarify the matter further, a distinction is made from the beginning between “development” in the broad sense and the concept of “economic growth” in the strict sense.

Many, if not most, matters regulated by international law tend now to bring into issue obligations under treaties. Yet even if a dispute centres on interpretation of a particular treaty provision, the text of the treaty will not necessarily be the sole consideration. More often than not tribunals look to preparatory work of a treaty, sometimes almost as a first resort rather than as a subsidiary means of interpretation; and both formal and less formal instruments associated with a treaty—declarations, reservations and a whole range of possible materials—may be relevant to the particular matter. All these are described here as “treaty materials” and it is the present purpose to explore the scope and role of such materials.

Five years ago we surveyed the early years of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment1. At that time there was already a good deal of information available regarding the modus operandi of the Committee which was established but comparatively little regarding the manner in which the Committee was translating its mandate2 into practice. Today the picture has changed considerably. The manner in which the Committee conducts its work is essentially unchanged but from the large corpus of published reports it is possible now to map out the principal standards promulgated by the Committee and through which it seeks to fulfil its functions3. The purpose of this article is to highlight these developments.

Although these last two years have been relatively quiet in terms of institutional developments, a number of important inter-institutional agreements have been negotiated in order to facilitate the working of some of the powers granted by the Maastricht Treaty, while some other powers were used for the first time: the European Ombudsman has issued his first report, the European Parliament has set up two Committees of Inquiry. Lastly, the European Court of Justice delivered an important opinion as regards the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. From “Sunday trading” to Keck and Mithouard

These Current Developments surveys have consistently been driven to consideration of the Court's attempts to fix the outer limits of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, beyond which national authorities remain exclusively competent to regulate their markets without fear of legal challenge based on Community rules governing the free movement of goods. The high-water mark of judicial interventionism came in the so-called “Sunday trading” cases where the United Kingdom was required to justify against standards recognised by Community law rules governing shop opening hours despite the fact that such rules, although inhibitive of commercial freedom, posed no demonstrable obstacle to the construction of an integrated marketing strategy for the whole territory of the Community.1 In Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard2 the Court sought to curtail the reach of Article 30. A French rule prohibiting resale at a loss was held unaffected by Article 30. The Court overruled previous decisions, probably including the pair dealing with Sunday trading, although the Court was not explicit. Its intention to refocus the law of the free movement of goods on measures hostile to market integration, rather than those merely oppressive of commercial freedom, was reflected in the formula:

The period since the last note on this subject has been eventful.1 There have been some important legislative measures, and a good deal of significant case law. However, contradictory messages are being conveyed. The volume of legislation marks the Community's recognition of the economic value of intellectual property rights in international trade. Its broad aim is, as always, to achieve a level playing-field for competition, and to integrate the market by removing restrictions on the free movement of goods. Yet the unwavering adherence to the principle of free movement is being challenged in several areas, precisely because of its effect on competition, notably in the pharmaceuticals market.

In the past 18 months developments which have been most relevant to the transport industry as a whole involve the control of State aids and external relations. In addition, at the end of 1995, the Commission published a Green Paper entitled “Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport”,1 the aim of which was to initiate a debate on how best to allocate the true costs of transport among those who generate them, in the fairest manner. The argument of the paper is that each form of transport should bear the external costs for which it is responsible. This position has been hotly disputed.