There is a widespread belief in this country that while England and the other common law countries have an adversarial system of civil procedure, continental countries use the inquisitorial system. The fact is, however, that the only kind of situation in which a truly inquisitorial procedure can be envisaged is exemplified when a policeman who, arriving at the scene of a fracas, opens the proceedings with the time honoured formula, ‘What's going on here?’ Short of that, there is nothing to which an inquisitorial judge can direct his inquiry unless and until a complaint of some kind is addressed to him. Even writers on French administrative law, whose procedure is claimed to be inquisitorial, find it difficult to avoid language that might be thought more appropriate to an adversary system. So for example, it is said that notice of the complaint must be given to all those whom the claimant indicates as his opponents.

This comment discusses three recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of McElhinney v Ireland, Al-Adsani v UK, and Fogarty v UK. All three applications concerned the dismissal by the courts of the respondent States of claims against a third State on the ground of that State's immunity from suit. They thus raised important questions about the relation the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—especially the right to a fair trial and access to court enshrined in Arcticle 6(1)—and the law of State immunity.

The subject of this article is public participation in the NAAEC. It will be analysed against the background of certain other international conventions that make provision, in one way or another, for public participation in relation to environmental protection, in particular, the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the ‘Aarhus Convention’) and the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Environment between Denmark, Finland and Sweden (the ‘Nordic Convention’). The 1950 European Convention of Human Rights will also be referred to in so far as it secures public participation and from the point of view of its effectiveness in assisting in the enforcement of national environmental law. Reference to these instruments will, however, be limited to that which is relevant to the present essay.

This article documents and discusses recent developments in English law towards polygamy. It begins by introducing the question of the legal treatment of polygamy in the Afro-Asian context, and discussing the consequences that colonial and post-colonial developments may have had on the character (or visibility) of English case law on the subject. The article then turns to the examination of English developments in response to different phases of non-European immigration

An injunction to restrain foreign proceedings is probably the most powerful remedy available in an English court for dealing with a jurisdictional dispute. It is certainly the most controversial because the court is interfering with proceedings in another jurisdiction and no comparable remedy exists in civil law systems. The influence of European Community law has intensified the controversy because it has become increasingly doubtful whether the remedy is compatible with the scheme for allocating jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention (or its successor, the Brussels I Regulation) The House of Lord's decision in Turner v Grovit is an important development because their Lordships have made a reference to the European Court of Justice asking, ‘Is it consistent with the Brussels Convention for the courts of the United Kingdom to grant restraining orders against defendants who are threatening to commence or continue legal proceedings in another Convention country when those defendants are acting in bad faith with the intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly before the English courts?’ (The issue is probably identical to that which would arise under the Brussels I Regulation and references herein to the Convention are generally equally applicable to the Regulation).

After the debacle in Seattle in December 1999, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of WTO members took place successfully under tight security in the capital city, Doha, of the small Arabian state of Qatar in November 2001. The Doha conference did not adopt any new treaty or protocoll to add to the network of WTO agreements already in place. It did, however, approve a ‘broad and balance ’ work programme in the form of two declarations—a main declaration and one on trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and public health, plus a decision on implementation designed to alleviate the difficulties of developing countries in implementing the existing WTO agreements. In other words, the Doha conference agreed on the nature and scope of the next round of trade negttiations, named as the ‘Development Round’. Although some least-developed countries had argued that ‘no new round should be started until there has been full implementation of the agreements concluded in the last Round, and an evaluation of their effects done’, the Doha Conference decided to start a new round of trade negotiations. How development oriented is the agenda of the new round of trade negotiations? What is going to be negotiated during th e negotiations? Is it indeed going to be a ‘Development Round’ in more than name? The object of this article is to analyse the background to the Doha conference, to assess the nature of negotiations at the conference and to evaluate its outcome.

Several crimes recognized in international criminal law are intimately linked to the horrors of the holocaust. Persecution, extermination, and genocide are historically intertwined notions that in all minds refer to the ordeal of the Jewish people before and during the Second World War. This is particularly so with genocide. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the ‘Genocide Convention’) is a legal answer to the holocaust. Yet, as any legal notion, genocide goes beyond the characterisation of a specific historical tragedy. It is fated to evolve through legal interpretation, which operates pursuant to certain rules and principles that only subsidiarily rely on the drafting history.

The Procedural guarantees laid down in Article 6, European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the fairness and expedition of legal proceedings would be meaningless if the Convention did not protect the right of access to the courts which is a precondition to the enjoyment of those guarantees. As a result, the European Court of Human Rights has laid down the principle that Article 6(1) secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court. The right of access to the courts is not absolute. The Strasbourg case law acknowledges that it may be subject to limitations. Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in this regard. However, national courts must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Moreover a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6(1) if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.

In July 2001, 40 years after the entry into force of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) decided to establish a Permanent Secretariat to the Treaty. This latest development within what has been described as ‘an evolving international institutional structure’ will undoubtedly serve to strengthen the Treaty, as well as provide support for the wider Antarctic system, in particular, the 1991 Environmental Protocol. Its impact within the wider environmental institutional context will depend to an extent upon the grant of legal personality to the secretariat, and the definition of its functions, rights and privileges. Described as an historic and landmark decision, the establishment of a permanent secretariat has the potential indirectly to provide an additional line of defence in the fight to preserve and protect the Antarctic environment. The purpose of this article is to consider the future impact of, and issues relating to, this significant institutional development.

Whilst the political aspects of Cyprus's membership to the European Union have become the main focus of academic analysis over the years, its trade relations with the Member States have raised issues just as interesting from a legal point of view. This has been illustrated quite recently by the Anastasiou II judgment delivered by the European Court of Justice in 2000. The article aims at highlighting some of these issues. It is structured in three parts: the first part outlines the provisions of the EC–Cyprus Association Agreement governing trade between the parties; the second part analyses the Court's first ruling on imports of certain produce from the northern part of Cyprus;1 the third part examines the recent judgment of the Court on imports of produce which, whilst originating in the northern part of Cyprus, are being accompanied by phytosanitary certificates issued by the Turkish authorities.

In 2001 the European Commission (‘the Commission’) published a long-expected White Paper entitled ‘European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide’1 where it set out its vision for the transport industry for the immediate future. In the section dealing with the enlarged Europe and the globalisation of transport the Commission noted that:

The worldwide repercussions of the Enron collapse have placed the effectiveness of the EC's system of securities and investment services market regulation, particularly with respect to disclosure, market transparency, and auditor independence, under a harsh spotlight.1 But the regime was already undergoing a sea change that may have longstanding repercussions for how EC securities and investment services markets are regulated. In particular, sweeping changes have been made to the way in which EC securities and investment services measures are adopted. These changes have set the stage for a dramatic change in the detail, regulatory sophistication, and degree of intervention in Member States' system of the EC securities and investment services regime. They have not, however, required a Treaty revision but are based on the comitology process for delegated law making.

Few decisions of the European Court of Justice have received as much attention as the 1999 judgement in Centros.1 This decision provided private international lawyers with an opportunity to examine choice of law in relation to companies against the background of European law. It also caused company lawyers to re-examine their national legislation in the light of foreign rules.

Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of Judgments in Civil Commercial Matters1 replaced the 1968 Brussels Convention on 1 March 2002 for Member States of the European union Except Denmark.2 This has given the European Community exclusive competence in matters relating to jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. As a result individual Member States can no longer freely ratify conventions which, in relation to specific matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments.3 This is reflected in the deletion of ‘or will be’ from the text of Article 71(1) of the Regulation,4 a phrase which previously found in the equivalent provision in the Brussels Convention.5