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Individual autonomy and takings in a liberal theory of property

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2022

David Dana
David Dana*
Affiliation:
Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, USA
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: d-dana@law.northwestern.edu
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Abstract

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Type
Review Symposium
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 229 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Alexander, G et al. (2009) A statement of progressive property. Cornell Law Review 94, 743.Google Scholar
Alexander, GS (2009) The social-obligation norm in American property law. Cornell Law Review 92.Google Scholar
Dagan, H (2021) A Liberal Theory of Property. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dana, DA (2015) Why do we have the parcel-as-a-whole rule? Vermont Law Review 39, 616–645.Google Scholar
Tarlock, AD (2012) Takings, water rights, and climate change. Vermont Law Review 36, 731–758.Google Scholar