In attempts to improve the efficiency of development efforts over the past few decades private sector participation in the delivery of basic services has been promoted to a varying extent. Roughly in tandem with this, there has been movement to increase the accountability of corporations, particularly transnational corporations (TNCs), for human rights violations. Rather than engaging directly in the legal debate about the applicability of human rights standards to corporate activity, this article essentially looks at the issue from the inside out through the collection of empirical evidence. By focusing on the emergent right to water as a case-study, it examines how TNCs engaged in water service delivery in the development context understand and use the language of rights. In doing so, it discusses how current engagement by the TNCs with human rights language may influence proposed corporate human rights accountability frameworks and current attempts to close the globalisation governance gap.

This article explores the influence of economics on the demand for, and deployment of, indicators in the context of the World Bank's investment climate campaign. This campaign is characterised by an emphasis on marketisation, mathematisation and quantification, which are respectively the normative, analytical and empirical approaches of choice in mainstream economics. The article concludes that economics generally, and indicators in particular, have brought a certain discipline and energy to the field of law and development. But this ‘progress’ has often been at the expense of non-economic values and interests, and even of our ability to mourn their loss.

This article explores narrative devices in legal rhetoric, and the use of these devices for asserting the authority to distinguish lawful from unlawful inflictions of bodily harm. The argument made here is that the moral language adopted by judges in criminal appeal judgments on risky sexual and/or violent consensual acts embraces a set of interconnecting narratives otherwise observed in literature, and relating to gender, sexuality and race. I try to show how the reading of these legal cases is enriched by identifying these narratives, locating them as rhetorical strategies and reflecting on their uses in judicial decision-making. In particular, I argue that in the case-law explored here, these interconnected narratives are deployed in order to assert law's dominance over an imagined ‘savage’ other. Through this ongoing repudiation of savagery the distinctions between normative and non-normative, violent and non-violent, lawful and unlawful are constructed.

This article analyses the EU Commission's policy-based approach to regulating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the role of international human rights law as a normative source for the regulatory output in two initiatives launched in 2002 and 2006. The article argues as a starting point that the understanding of CSR as ‘beyond law’ tends to shroud the contributions that international human rights law and legal theory based regulatory technique lend to CSR normativity and regulation, not only outside the EU but also within. The EU experience shows that due to power relations and their impact on multi-stakeholder negotiations and their outcome, this potential does necessarily unfold. It also shows that the procedural design of reflexive multi-stakeholder regulatory processes is significant for bringing forth the normative contributions of international law to CSR in public–private regulation. Finally, the article suggests that within the public policy context in which EU CSR regulation is emerging, the normative role of international human rights law which the Commission suggests for CSR in Europe and the application of the reflexive regulatory technique contribute to a substantive as well as procedural juridification of CSR, especially in the formative stage of defining CSR normativity. The latter adds a significant new perspective to the understanding of CSR and its relation to law, although it need not conflict with the understanding of CSR being ‘voluntary’ in the sense of action beyond direct legal obligations.

Recent surveys in the UK and the Netherlands indicate that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the justice system. But who are these ‘critics’ of the justice system? Most previous studies only produced general statistics, while the persons behind the figures remained invisible. By contrast, this article aims to put a face to these numbers and discusses two ways of analysing the profile of the critics. Based on a review of existing survey data, the article first looks at their ‘demographic profile’. Next, the article also considers a second, alternative, approach. Based on their level of legal awareness and legal identification, it distinguishes four different ‘normative profiles’: legalists, loyalists, cynics and outsiders. Moreover, the article shows how these normative profiles may be applied in future comparative studies on legal mobilisation and legal protest. It is concluded that combining both approaches will help us to look beyond common stereotypes and consider the critics of the justice system as real persons with genuine concerns about the administration of justice in their country.

The current Italian Penal Code is the direct descendant of the 1930 Rocco Code. Originally a hybrid of authoritarian and liberal elements, but revised and reinterpreted in the postwar Republic, the Code was nevertheless introduced under the Fascists and has not been definitively replaced or renamed. Given such roots, this article argues that the Code's legitimacy can be questioned by considering the significance of the Fascist past in terms of the Code's symbolic, contextually narrative and memorial dimensions. On this basis the article develops a concept of tainted law in order to ground and direct analysis of law in relation to the anti-democratic past, arguing that critical engagement with the connections between law and the darker episodes of twentieth-century politico-legal history is vital to the construction and conservation of democratic legal systems today.

After outlining his experience in the world of bioethics, the author draws on his role in the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee to explain the new Universal Declaration of Bioethics, adopted by UNESCO in 2005. He describes it as the first global attempt to reconcile the differing sources of bioethical principles: health-care practice and experience and universal human rights. Whilst collecting, and accepting, some criticism of the text of the Declaration, the author sees its chief values as lying in the wider ethical issues that it reflected of concern to the community, the world and biosphere as well as in the adjustment of health-care approaches for consistency with the growing impact of universal human rights law. Whilst acknowledging the differing social experiences of people in different regions of the world, he invokes Amartya Sen to cast doubt on the notion of specific ‘Asian values’, whether in bioethics or human rights.

This article applies Systemic Functional Grammar and Critical Discourse Analysis to assess the linguistic choices of feminist and masculist reproductive rights rhetoric. It explains these methodologies and provides a discursive history of the reproductive rights movement. Publications of advocacy groups and the mass media are analysed as data of current rhetorical trends. These interpretations conclude that female-affirmative rhetoric offsets contemporary feminist efforts by marginalising men and excluding considerations of paternity. This article suggests that in solely emphasising women's procreative rights, such feminist rhetoric potentially renders women to the role of primary parental agent, reinforces traditional sex-stereotypes, and incites inter-sex antagonism.

In recent years homophobic bullying has received increased attention from NGOs, academics and government sources and concern about the issue crosses traditional moral and political divisions. This article examines this ‘progressive’ development and identifies the ‘conditions of possibility’ that have enabled the issue to become a harm that can be spoken of. In doing so it questions whether the readiness to speak about the issue represents the opposite to prohibitions on speech (such as the notorious Section 28) or whether it is based on more subtle forms of governance. It argues that homophobic bullying is heard through three key discourses (‘child abuse’, ‘the child victim’ and ‘the tragic gay’) and that, while enabling an acknowledgement of certain harms, they simultaneously silence other needs and experiences. It then moves to explore the aspirational and ‘liberatory’ political investments that underlie these seemingly ‘common-sense’ descriptive discourses and concludes with a critique of the quasi-criminal responses that the dominant political agenda of homophobic bullying gives rise to. The article draws on, and endeavours to develop a conversation between, critical engagements with the contemporary politics of both childhood and sexuality.

This article explores the connection between human rights and tobacco control, and in particular, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). We address rights-based arguments used by the tobacco industry to argue against tobacco regulation. We demonstrate the weakness of these arguments, and that tobacco control and human rights are, in fact, not in conflict, but are mutually reinforcing. We also offer counter-arguments in favour of tobacco regulation based on international human rights obligations. Moreover, we argue that international human rights law and human rights bodies can provide tobacco control advocates with avenues for international monitoring and enforceability, which are lacking in the FCTC.

In this article I draw on the South African legal context to critique the argument that same-sex marriage would provide ‘equal recognition’ for same-sex relationships. I highlight the ways in which, despite strong equality provisions in the South African Constitution and an apparent commitment to substantive rather than merely formal equality, both customary marriage and same-sex marriage continue to be subordinate to heterosexual civil marriage. I then broaden my analysis to consider the extent to which this would also be the case in other jurisdictions, particularly the UK. Drawing on the Butler/Fraser debate on recognition and redistribution, I argue that there is a connection between misrecognition and material disadvantage that goes unacknowledged in ‘symbolic recognition’ claims for same-sex marriage. The critiques of ‘marriage equality’ should sound a warning not only to same-sex marriage advocates but also more generally to those who would seek ‘equal recognition’ through law reform.

The three books reviewed here all address the question of the efficacy of international law and advance concerns about its future trajectory, albeit in contrasting ways. As has been well documented, the role of international law – specifically in the regulation of the use of force – has undergone significant scrutiny in the post-Cold War era. To a much greater extent than during the Cold War, contemporary conflicts and crises are invariably discussed with reference to international law, and the legality of a particular use of force has become a significant factor in assessing its legitimacy; one need only think of the importance placed on the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This increase in prominence suggests that international law has become more important, and unsurprisingly those used to the discipline's previous role as exotic curio have welcomed this sudden promotion (Robertson, 2000).

I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria offered for essential contestation. I buttress this claim with the explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it would yield a greater understanding of uses of the concept to which it is applied. I then show that, even if law meets some basic criteria of essential contestation, applying the appellation does not helpfully illuminate the most general concept of law and therefore it should not be used, while allowing that it might be more useful for the related concept of the rule of law.

Existing policies on HIV testing were developed decades ago when HIV infection led nearly inevitably to AIDS and death. Since then rapid clinical progress has occurred. HIV infected people with access to life-preserving care and treatment no longer experience an existential threat to their life and wellbeing. HIV infection today, at least in North America and Western Europe, represents a chronic but manageable illness. Moreover, with treatment most infected people are rendered, to all intents and purposes, non-infectious. In this paper, we discuss the ethical, policy and legal implications of the changing clinical picture of HIV/AIDS. In particular, we propose significant changes to existing HIV testing policies as well as to policies pertaining to the criminalisation of infected people's sexual behaviour in North America and Western Europe.

As part of the ‘War on Terror’ declared in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, countries introduced legislation to bolster national security, often at the expense of personal freedoms and long-established legal principles. Like the Cold War, the ‘War on Terror’ is cast as a global struggle of good against evil. New Zealand defied Cold War logic with its anti-nuclear policy. Examining the difficulties of upholding personal freedoms and the rule of law while bolstering national security, this article analyses New Zealand's anti-terrorism legislation and shows that it has steadily moved away from its initial measured approach. It argues that New Zealand could and should develop an anti-terrorism model appropriate to low-risk societies, and that, like its anti-nuclear stance during the Cold War, such an independent approach would be a valuable contribution to the world community.

This article argues there is value in exploring the resonance between the regulation of international agricultural trade as a specific topic and the general notion of international trade regulation in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It explores particular problems to illuminate more general concerns. In this ascendant way of looking at things, certain aspects of agricultural trade regulation have direct resonance for other areas covered by the WTO agreements. We might see these additional dimensions as addressing a different series of questions: the nature of agreement and the different ways in which agreement can manifest itself. The two dimensions are the nature of international agricultural trade as a polycentric problem and the way accepted concepts and categories influence how we see problems in international agricultural trade. Polycentrism goes to the nature of the stability of the Agreement on Agriculture, whereas the question of concepts and categories concerns the way in which we represent the problem as coherent to ourselves.

Should the law support union recognition by employers? If so, what form should this legal support take? These are the questions that Alan Bogg addresses in his excellent monograph, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition. His focus is New Labour's 1999 statutory recognition procedure for trade unions, which he situates within the historical context of the United Kingdom's distinctive approach to the relationship between labour law and the social practice of collective bargaining – aptly (and famously) named collective laissez-faire by Otto Kahn-Freund (1972). Combining political philosophy and legal analysis, Bogg argues for robust legal support for trade union recognition that preserves the autonomy of trade unions to determine their own constituency and recognises their distinctive power to strike. Inspired by the idea of deliberative democracy and an ethical commitment to freedom as non-domination, he argues that civic republicanism provides the best normative basis for trade union recognition procedures. He contrasts this normative framework with the rights-based individualism and state neutrality characteristic of the liberal approach, which, he argues, is embodied in the United States and Canadian versions of industrial pluralism. Bogg also demonstrates the ‘yawning chasm between New Labour's civic rhetoric and New Labour's liberal legal reform agenda’ (pp. 118–19) when it comes to trade union recognition procedures. He concludes by offering a series of proposals that would enhance union recognition and further the values of freedom as non-domination, democratic participation through deliberative democracy, and community.

This article reviews approaches to the needs of disabled people in Asia and the Pacific, the only part of the world currently lacking regional human rights machinery. The article examines some of the social policy choices involved in prioritising different possible approaches to meeting the needs of disabled people in the region, with a focus on a proposed regional disability rights tribunal (DR-TAP). It is argued that this is not the top priority for immediate action; rather it is contended that capacity building and culturally appropriate attitudinal and other change strategies should instead be pursued over the medium-term horizon.

Traditional doctrinal scholarship provides an important service to practising lawyers by analysing legal rules and decisions, clarifying ambiguities within rules, structuring them in a logical and coherent manner and describing their interrelationship (Chynoweth, 2008). The systematisation and formulation of the law in terms of doctrine creates a conceptual basis for constructing a legal context that helps to determine which rules should be applied in a particular situation. In this sense, doctrinal studies emerge out of the study of legal texts (or black-letter law), which are generated by legislature, courts and other legal authorities, and feed back in to legal practice once they are used in deciding cases. The method of doctrinal research, being functional to legal practice, dominates academic law and legal education. Notwithstanding its role in supporting legal practice, the doctrinal approach is criticised for conveying a normatively closed image of law (Cotterrell, 1995, pp. 50–53), for constructing the legal context narrowly, for presenting the legal system as a body of rules which can be studied in isolation from the broader societal context of the legal system by the exegesis of authoritative texts (Bradney, 1998, p. 76; Vick, 2004), for ‘not being self-conscious about its assumptions’ (Twining, 1999, p. 44) and for cultivating what Geoffrey Samuel (2009) calls the ‘authority paradigm’. Internally, i.e. from the standpoint of the legal system and its functionaries, this paradigm (or legal context) is produced by way of self-reference and normative closure, continually reaffirming the authority of legal sources such as legal texts, previous legal decisions and/or legislation, and prioritising definitions and methods based on what William Twining called the ‘practical insider attitudes’ (Twining, 2000, p. 129; for a discussion, see Banakar, 2003, p. 8). Externally, i.e. from the standpoint of policy-makers and citizenry, it is upheld through the threat of violence against non-compliance, backed by the authority of the modern state. The authority paradigm's normative closure and its dependency on coercion encourage ‘rigidity and introspection rather than an open-minded attitude to academic methods and pursuits’ (Samuel, 2009, p. 432). It fosters an understanding of the law as a system, which exists independently of societal forces. In order to escape the intellectual constraints of the authority paradigm, many academic lawyers turn to social theory and social sciences, which in contrast to law are based on the ‘perspective of enquiry’ (Samuel, 2009; see also Banakar, 2009b). These scholars place the law in the broader sociocultural context of the legal system and study legal phenomena in relation to societal forces, which are the prerequisite for the existence of the legal system and the production of the narrow legal context of the law. However, such an evasive strategy often comes at a price.