I would like to thank Professer David Cox of the Department of Politics at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario for his helpful advice. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1980 annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Montreal, P.Q.

¹ An international producer cartel is an agreement among raw materials suppliers located in different countries to raise the price of a specific commodity by restricting exports and fixing prices. In a producer association, producer-exporters of the same commodity formally cooperate to achieve common objectives. Producer associations have been formed to stabilize production or eliminate excessive price fluctuations, or both, hold market prices above production costs, counterbalance the power of private multinational corporations, secure a strong bargaining position from which to negotiate with consumers, and disseminate information among members in political, economic, and technical matters. In striving for these objectives a producer association stops short of price-fixing.

² Shortly thereafter Jim Harding, special advisor to the California Energy Resources Conservation and Developing Commission, received copies of the documents from his former colleagues at Friends of the Earth in Australia. Harding then released copies to the United States Justice Department and Congress. In November 1976 a House of Representatives subcommittee held hearings on the subject: United States, Congress, House, International Uranium Supply and Demand, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., 4 November 1976 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977)Google Scholar. Hereinafter referred to as Hearing 1976.

³ Uranium from foreign sources could still be enriched in the United States and American utilities could buy and stockpile uranium, but it could not be used in domestic reactors.

⁴ Letter dated 8 September 1972, from Jackson, Roy D. Jr, former Gulf Oil Corporation counsel, to N. M. Ediger, general manager of Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd., quoted in United States, Congress, House, International Uranium Cartel, volume 2, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 1st sess., 8 December 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 195Google Scholar. Hereinafter referred to as Hearings 2.

⁵ Canada, House of Commons, Debates volume 11, 3rd sess., 26th Parliament, 3 June 1965 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), pp. 1948–1949Google Scholar.

⁶ Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Press Release (14 October 1977), p. 2. Further, a Canadian delegation expressed its concern over the American policy in June 1969 to the GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: “Canadians Accuse U.S. of Doing the Price-Fixing in Uranium,” Nuclear Fuel, 15 November 1976, p. 12. A similar representation was made at the thirteenth meeting of the Joint Canada-United States Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held on 23–24 November 1970. See International Canada 1, 1 (11 1970), p. 229Google Scholar.

⁷ Memorandum dated 1 May 1972 from Runnalls, O. J. C.re meeting of international uranium producers in Paris, 20–21 04 1972Google Scholar; quoted in United States, Congress, House, International Uranium Cartel, volume 1, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 1st sess., 2 May; 10, 16, and 17 June; and 15 08 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 476Google Scholar. Hereinafter referred to as Hearings 1.

⁸ Gulf File Note–Canadian uranium producers' meeting, Ottawa, 15 February 1972. Written by N. M. Ediger, manager of Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd., quoted in Hearings 1, p. 458. The reduction in exploration activity in Canada may be explained not only by the low price for uranium but also by ownership restrictions in the uranium industry proposed by the federal government, and the prevalent climate of economic nationalism.

⁹ 2/9/72 memo, M. C. Compton to F. C. Love re “Foreign Uranium Market Discussions Held in Paris,” quoted in volume 2, Attachment to Westinghouse Electric Corporation's Request for Admissions to the Defaulting Defendants (MDL 342), U.S. District Court, Chicago, Illinois. This arrangement was intended to reduce pressure on the American balance of payments caused by the stationing of its NATO troops in West Germany.

¹⁰ In 1970, Mr. Green, minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, visited Japan and asked for a consumer-producer arrangement that would help the deteriorating situation in Canada. This appealwas repeated in 1971 but the Japanese were not responsive in either case. In October 1971 Jack Austin of Energy, Mines and Resources visited France to discuss the problem, while a Canadian delegation approached the West German government at approximately the same time. See “Summary of Testimony of O. J. C. Runnalls,” Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry, Phase V of Formal Hearings Summary no. 5 (26 08 1977), pp. 4–5Google Scholar. This sequence of events is supported by MacNabb, G. M., Department of Energy, Mines and Resources and president, Uranium Canada Ltd. in “Nuclear and Uranium Policies,” address to the Canadian Nuclear Association annual convention, Ottawa, 06 1975, p. 24Google Scholar.

¹¹ Specifically, the corporations from Canada were Rio Algom Ltd.; Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd. (GMCL), the Canadian subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation; Uranerz Canada Ltd. (UCL), a West German company involved in a joint venture development with GMCL at Rabbit Lake, Saskatchewan; Denison Mines Ltd.; and Eldorado Nuclear and Uranium Canada, both Crown Corporations. France was represented by Uranex, which acts as a marketing agency for French uranium companies, while South Africa voiced its opinions through the Nuclear Fuels Corporation, its marketing body. While not present at the initial Paris meetings, companies from Australia would later include Queensland Mines Ltd., Pancontinental Mining Ltd., Peko-Wallsend Ltd., Electrolytic Zinc, and Ranger Mining Ltd. Government officials from Britain and West Germany did not attend these exploratory meetings but were kept informed of developments.

¹² Gulf Oil Corporation File Note–Canadian uranium producers' meeting, Ottawa, 15 February 1972. Written by Ediger, N. M., manager of GMCL, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 459Google Scholar. This opinion was given as a statement of fact by Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources and President of Uranium Canada Jack Austin. These discussions were initiated by the Canadian government.

¹³ Draft report dated 10 July 1972 re Uranium Research Organization, prepared by Mr. O'Hara of Gulf Oil Company, quoted in Hearings 2, p. 73.

¹⁴ “Basic Chronology and Document Summary,” Hearings 1, p. 176. A similar theory suggests that the French Atomic Energy Commission under pressure from RTZ invited the world uranium producers to Paris. See Confidential Report of Irwin J. Landes, chairman, Corporations, Authorities and Commissions Committee, from Haddad, William F., director of the Office of Legislative Oversight and Analysis, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 654Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Hearings 2, p. 1.

¹⁶ Stannard, Bruce, “How the Uranium Club Began,” National Times, 16–21 08 1976Google Scholar, quoted in Hearing 1976, p. 340. The theory that RTZ instigated the cartel is more credible in light of the fact that it was believed that NUFCOR, Rio Tinto Zinc, and Uranex had their ownorganization prior to the government initiatives to meet in Paris. See OLA No. 58a Draft Report dated 10 July 1972 re Uranium Marketing Research Organization, prepared by MrO'Hara, of Gulf Oil Company, Hearings 2, p. 73Google Scholar.

¹⁷ 2/29/72 memo, N. E. Carey to D. Hunter regarding “South African/Canadian/French/ Australian Uranium Discussion, Internal Gulf Memo,” quoted in volume 2, Attachment A to Westinghouse Electric Corporation's Request for Admissions to the Defaulting Defendants (MDL 342), Chicago. The exact details of the agreement the French were searching for are unknown, although they may have related to the French desire to build an enrichment plant based on gaseous diffusion technology, which requires large amounts of electricity to operate. Presumably the French were interested in exchanging capital and technology for an assured long-term supply of uranium from Canada and the right to build an enrichment plant near cheap sources of Canadian hydroelectricity. See Willrich, Mason and Marston, Philip M., “Prospects for A Uranium Cartel,” Orbis 19, 1 (Spring 1975), p. 180Google Scholar.

¹⁸ In addition to the presidents of the major uranium companies involved in the cartel, two representatives of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and one from the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs were present. Notably, the Department of External Affairs did not have a representative present at this, nor any subsequent, meeting. Gulf File Note—Canadian uranium producers' meeting, Ottawa; 15 February 1972, written by Ediger, N. M., manager of GMCL, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 455Google Scholar.

¹⁹ In discussions with Australian representatives in December 1971 to agree on a world floor price decided upon by both consumers and producers of uranium, Canadian officials indicated that operating costs, a reasonable rate of return, and incentive to exploration would necessitate a price of a least $6.00 per pound of U3O,. Memorandum (draft) dated 17 February 1972 from Gregg, L. T. to Hoffman, H. E.re summary of developments in international uranium meetings, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 462Google Scholar.

²⁰ Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd., File Note—Canadian uranium producers' meeting, Ottawa, 10 April 1972, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 469.

²¹ Memorandum dated 1 May 1972 from Runnalls, O. J. C.re meeting of international uranium producers in Paris, 20–21 04 1972Google Scholar, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 509.

²² Memorandum dated 15 June 1972 from Runnalls, O. J. C. to Austin, J.re meeting of the Canadian uranium producers in Johannesburg, 28 05 1972Google Scholar, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 552.

²³ Each member contributed to the Secretariat's total budget by paying dues on a quarterly basis in relation to its average market quota between 1972 and 1980. Canada contributed 27% of the budget. Letter from L. C. Mazel to H. F. Melouney re Uranium Marketing Research Organization with notes of the 2 June 1972 Johannesburg meeting attached, quoted in Hearing 1976, p. 184. In dollar terms Canada paid approximately $20,000 annually. See Probyn, Stephen and Anthony, Michael, “The Cartel that Ottawa Built,” Canadian Business 50, 11 (11 1977), p. 38Google Scholar.

²⁴ Memorandum dated 26 September 1972 from Runnalls, O. J. C. to Albino, Kostuik, Gilchrist, Ediger, Kegel, MacNabb re attached minutes of Canadian Uranium Producers' meeting held in Ottawa on 5 09 1972, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 594Google Scholar.

²⁵ These meetings were held in Sydney, 2–3 October 1972; Toronto, 17 November 1972; London, 8–9 January 1973; Johannesburg, March 1973; Paris, 9–11 April 1973; and Johannesburg, 2–3 August 1973.

²⁶ Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Plaintiff U.S. Rio Algom Limited et al. , Defendants No. 76 63830 Answers and Objections of Westinghouse Electric Corporation to defendant Englehard's first set of interrogatories to plaintiff (MDL 235), U.S. District Court, Chicago, Illinois, p. 165Google Scholar. Hereinafter referred to as Westinghouse-Englehard.

²⁷ Testimony of Gregg, Laurence T., former manager of Uranium Marketing, GMCL, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 266Google Scholar.

²⁸ Picton, John, “Ontario Hydro Called Victim of Uranium Pricing,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 1 12 1977, p. 1Google Scholar. Even though the Australian government had withdrawn from the market Australian companies continued to participate in the arrangement in anticipation of a change in government policy. These companies did not enter into any export contracts.

²⁹ This allegation was most commonly made by Westinghouse; it has no basis in fact. Indeed, the U.S. Justice Department has cleared the Uranium Institute of any accusations that it represents a cartel. See Fishlock, David, “Uranium Institute Cleared by U.S.,” London Financial Times, 24 01 1979Google Scholar. The Uranium Institute was formally established on 12 June 1975 as a nonprofit British corporation based in London, consisting of both consumers and producers. 6/12/75 Press Release re formation of the Uranium Institute.

³⁰ “Westinghouse Plans to Break Some Pacts on Uranium Deliveries Due to Price Rise,” Wall Street Journal, 9 September 1975, p. 5.

³¹ “Utilities Rap Westinghouse Cancellations of Uranium Deliveries, Weigh Responses,” Wall Street Journal, 9 September 1975, p. 8.

³² “Westinghouse Says Cartel Rigged U.S. Uranium Market,0 Electric Light and Power, 1 November 1976, p. 1.

³³ “Uranium Cartel,” Government Executive 8, 12 (12 1976), p. 16Google Scholar. Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Rio Algom, no. 76C3830 (Northern District, Illinois, filed 15 October 1976). Known as the “Chicago 29,” the defendants in the suit are Rio Algom Ltd., Rio Algom Corp., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. Ltd., RTZ Services Ltd., Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd., Pancontinental Mining Ltd., Queensland Mines Ltd., Nuclear Fuel Corp. Mines Ltd., Denison Mines (US) Inc., Noranda Mines Ltd., Gulf Oil Corp., Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd., Kerr-McGee Corp., The Anaconda Co., Getty Oil Co., Utah International Inc., Phelps Dodge Corp., Western Nuclear Inc., Homestake Mining Co., Atlas Corp., Reserve Oil and Minerals Corp., United Nuclear Corp., Federal Resources Corp., Pioneer Nuclear Inc., Anglo-American Corp. of South Africa Ltd., Englehard Minerals and Chemicals Corp., and Denison Mines Ltd. For a detailed account of Westinghouse's current legal problems see Wood, Jeffery L. and Carrera, Victor M., “The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation and Legal Implications,” Texas International Law Journal 14, 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 59–114Google Scholar. It appears that much of this litigation willbe settled out of court; see Cheeseright, Paul, “Westinghouse Settles Uranium Litigation with Rio Tinto-Zinc,” London Financial Times, 18 03 1981, p. 40Google Scholar.

³⁴ Testimony, of White, George, quoted in Hearing 1976, p. 7Google Scholar.

³⁵ This argument is based on the thesis that a series of events, unrelated to the existence of the uranium cartel and occurring between 1972 and mid 1975, sharply increased uranium prices and overtook the pricing policies of the cartel. For details see Nuclear Exchange Corporation, “Significant Events in the Uranium Market 1969–1976,” quoted in Nuclear News 19, 15 (12 1976)Google Scholar. In stark contrast to this interpretation, others such as Westinghouse Electric Corporation argue that the cartel was the major factor in pushing prices higher.

³⁶ One might assume that because of its large nuclear program West Germany would have opposed the cartel. This was not the case. Even though the West German government would not allow Uranerz to participate, it indicated to Canadian officials that it was interested in “establishing security of supply and an orderly long-term price structure.” Memorandum (draft dated 17 February 1972) from Gregg, L. T. to Hoffman, H. E.re summary of developments in international uranium meetings, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 629Google Scholar.

³⁷ Testimony of O. J. C. Runnalls before the Select Committee on Hydro Affairs (1 February 1978), n.p.

³⁸ This point was made by Sinclair Stevens in his testimony before the Select Committee on Ontario Hydro Affairs (9 February 1978), H–26.

³⁹ Proposed Post-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Behalf of Plaintiffs. In Re: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation (MDL 235), United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia Richmond Division, quoted in Reply Brief of Defendant Appellant Kerr-McGee Corp., Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Kerr-McGee Corporation, Defendant-Appellant No. 78–1544 U.S. District Court, Chicago filed 8 June 1978).

⁴⁰ Picton, John, “Suggestions of Cheating Almost Spark Fist Fight,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 12 11 1977, p. 2Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Canada Gazette Part 2, vol. 110, no. 9 SOR/ 76–644 23 September 1976 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1976), p. 2747Google Scholar. The regulation was passed two days after American Justice Department sources leaked information on the cartel inquiry to the Financial Times. Cook, Peter, “How the Uranium Cartel Was Formed,” Financial Times (Canada), 20 09 1976, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁴² Canada Gazette Part 2, vol. Ill, no. 20 SOR/ 77–836 14 October 1977 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1977), p. 4619Google Scholar. King, John, “Ottawa Eases Order-in-council; Now It's All Right to Talk of Government's Cartel Role,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 15 10 1977, p. 1Google Scholar. The regulation was vociferously criticized by, among other groups, the Canadian Federation of Civil Liberties and Human Rights Association. See “Information Ban on Uranium Pact is Condemned,” Globe and Mail, 28 September 1977, p. Bl.

⁴³ Re Clark and Attorney General of Canada, 81 D.L.R. 3d 33 (Ontario 1978), pp. 38–66Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Letter from Coleman, Richard T., attorney for Gulf Corporation, to Moss, John E.re “Uranium Documents of Gulf Oil Corporation Subpoenaed from Westinghouse Electric Corporation,” 10 May 1977, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 92Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 122.

⁴⁶ “The notion that Canadian participation in the marketing arrangement was undertaken in secret is quite simply, untrue,” quoted in Press Release of the Honourable Gillespie, Alastair, News Release, 14 10 1977, p. 3Google Scholar. But the government only mentioned in a very obscure manner that discussions were occurring at an international level concerning uranium. A typical example is this statement given by D. S. MacDonald to the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works: “the Government of Canada has taken steps for holding of discussions at an international level regarding the state of the uranium industry and the development of a nuclear program. We firmly believe that the unduly depressed prices for uranium which are prevailing, act as a major disincentive to the active exploration of a very considerable geological potential in Canada.” Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on National Resources and Public Works, 28th Parliament, 4th sess., 28 March 1972 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972), p. 1:12Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Letter from Mazel, L. C. of RTZ Services to Melouney, H. F., Melbourne Office, dated 24 July 1972, quoted in Hearing 1976, p. 102Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Letter from Mazel, L. C. to Melouney, H. F. dated 2 May 1972 quoted in Hearing 1976, p. 176Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Deposition of Gregg, L. T., quoted in Westinghouse-Englehard, p. 91Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ For instance, George White, president of the Nuclear Exchange Corporation, commented that “we do not think that it came as a surprise to anyone in the industry to have the Canadian Government's confirmation that it [the cartel] existed,” quoted in Hearing 1976, p. 4. It was also charged that Canadian investors knew of the cartel as early as May 1972, which was four months before the arrangement was scheduled officially to begin. See Picton, John, “Investors Got Early Chance to Profit in ‘Secret’ Uranium Cartel, Court Told,” TorontoGlobe and Mail, 12 11 1977, p. B2Google Scholar. Tennessee Valley Authority executives, for example, knew of the existence of the cartel in 1972 but discounted its effectiveness. Hearings 1, p. 352.

⁵¹ Picton, John, “Canada Taking Part in Secret Uranium Talks,” TorontoGlobe and Mail, 4 02 1972, p. BlGoogle Scholar;Ryan, Leo, “Meeting Viewed as Possible Step to International Uranium Pact,” Globe and Mail, 8 02 1972, p. BlGoogle Scholar; “Uranium Market Discussed by Four Producer Nations,” Wall Street Journal, 8 February 1972, p. 8; and “Uranium Producer' Talks,” Mining Journal, 11 February 1972, p. 120.

⁵² LeCraw, D. J., “The Uranium Cartel: An Interim Report,” The Business Quarterly 42, 4 (Winter 1977), p. 76Google Scholar.

⁵¹ 5/10/73 Letter from N. M. Ediger to J. Austin, Attachment 21, quoted in volume A to Westinghouse Electric Corporation's Request for Admissions to the Defaulting Defendants (MDL 342). In retrospect, however, it is plain that the European Commission knew about the cartel's activities from 1972. See Black, Alexander C., “Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act,” Cornell International Law Journal 11, 2 (Summer 1978), p. 336Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada also refused Gulf's request to release the documents on the grounds that it would be against the national interest and would permit the violation of Canadian sovereignty by the extraterritorial application of American antitrust law; see “Top Court Rejects Gulf Document Plea,” TorontoGlobe and Mail, 19 03 1980, p. 3Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Letter from Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Warren Almand to Roy M. Davidson, acting director of Bureau of Competition Policy, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 30 September 1977, re The Commencement of an Inquiry into the Canadian Uranium Industry Pursuant to Section 8(c) of the Combines Investigation Act, quoted in News Release, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs NR-77–60, Uranium Marketing Investigation.

⁵⁶ Denison Mines Limited, The “Uranium Cartel” Myth: A Reply by Denison Mines Limited, 19 October 1977; “Major Uranium Producer Calls Cartel Inquiry a Foolish, Costly and Disruptive Procedure,” TorontoGlobe and Mail, 20 10 1977, p. B5Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Memorandum from Gregg, L. T. of Gulf General Atomic to Hoffman dated 17 February 1972, re summary of developments in international uranium meetings, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 462Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ File memorandum dated 2 June 1971 of Jackson, Roy D. Jr, re world wide uranium marketing organization, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 541Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Testimony of Jerry McAfee, chairman of the board and chief executive officer, Gulf Oil Corporation, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 135Google Scholar. American companies based abroad that have fixed prices or restricted the supply of a product under the direction of a foreign state, or both, are not considered in violation of American antitrust laws, even if it can be proven that such actions detrimentally affected the American market.

⁶⁰ Officials in Ottawa held that they directed the two Crown Corporations, Uranium Canada and Eldorado Nuclear, to join but only “encouraged” the private companies.

⁶¹ Testimony of S. A. Zagnoli, executive vice-president, Gulf Minerals Resources Company, and former president, GMCL, Hearings 1, p. 210Google Scholar.

⁶² Memorandum dated 28 April 1972 from Jackson, Roy D. Jr to Coleman, I. W.re proposed uranium cartel, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 489Google Scholar.

⁶³ OLOA no. 66. Letter dated 11 October 1972 from Jackson, Roy D., Oil Insurance Ltd., to O'Hara, F. R., Gulf Oil Corporation re main points discussed at 5 October meeting in Hamilton, Bermuda, quoted in Hearings 2, p. 108Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Hearings 1, p. 241.

⁶⁵ Canada Gazette Part 2, vol. 106, no. 16, SOR/ 72–301, 2 August 1972 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972), p. 1465Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ “Canada Acts to Bar U.S. from Acquiring Data about Uranium Price-Fixing Group,” Wall Street Journal, 23 September 1976, p. 24.

⁶⁷ Letter from Ediger, N. M. to Zagnoli, S. A. dated 8 March 1974 re Proposal for Uranium Supply to Ontario Hydro, quoted in Hearings 2, p. 168Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ The Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, The Select Committee on Hydro Affairs, Report on Proposed Uranium Contracts, 31st Parliament, 2d sess. (03 1978)Google Scholar, Appendix F: Motion and Supporting Arguments of the Committee Members Representing The Progressive Conservative Party, pp. 133–34.

⁶⁹ 10/15/73 memo, F. R. O'Hara to files re “SERU,” Attachment 35, quoted in volume 2, Attachment to Westinghouse Electric Corporation's Request for Admissions to the Defaulting Defendants (MDL 342), U.S. District Court, Chicago, Illinois.

⁷⁰ See Stanford, J. S., “The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A View From Abroad,” Cornell International Law Journal 11, 2 (1978), pp. 195–214Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Letter from Mark Green, director of Congress Watch and Richard P. Pollock, director of Critical Mass Energy Project to Griffin B. Bell, United States attorney general, dated 16 March 1979, received from U.S. Justice Department. In August 1977 before the American Bar Association Griffin Bell took a tough stand against foreign producer cartels, claiming that the United States was obligated to prosecute such actions. Three months later after meetings with Canadian leaders no action had been taken with respect to the uranium cartel. Congressional criticism over the handling of the case came from Metzenbaum against Shenefield. See Cowan, Edward, “Uranium Price Trial Ruled Out,” New York Times, 26 03 1979, p. DlGoogle Scholar; “Performance of Anti-trust Official Sharply Questioned by Senators,” New York Times, 8 December 1979, p. 31; “The Biter Bit,” Economist, 15 December 1979, p. 73.

⁷¹ The dispute between the antitrust division of the Justice Department and the State Department is very briefly discussed by Kohlmeier, Louis, “The Uranium Affair,” Journal of International Law and Economics 13, 1 (1978), p. 149Google Scholar.

⁷³ It was reported that Canadian officials went so far as to threaten to halt the construction of the northern natural gas pipeline: “The Big (Dumb) Fix,” MacLean's Magazine 90, 14 (11 07 1977), p. 48Google Scholar. A similar conclusion was drawn in Confidential Report to Irwin J. Landes, chairman, Corporations, Authorities and Commissions Committee, from William F. Haddad, director, Office of Legislative Oversight and Analysis, 20 May 1977; revised, quoted in Hearings 1, p. 651. Further evidence that Canadian overtures to the Carter administration hampered the Justice Department investigation are found in an article entitled “Data Show That U.S. Rejected Uranium-Cartel Felony Charges,” New York Times, 4 December 1979, p. D. 11.

⁷⁴ Indyk, Martin, “Australian Uranium and the Non-Proliferation Regime,” Australian Quarterly 49, 4 (12 1977), p. 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “More U.S. Pressure on a Uranium Cartel,” Business Week, no. 2498, 29 08 1977, p. p28Google Scholar; “Department Testifies on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Export Policies,” Department of State Bulletin 76, no. 1979, 30 05 1977, p. 560Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ The possibility of U.S. support for a nuclear exporters’ cartel was also evident; if supported by President Carter the U.S. would have been a major member. For more details of this proposal see Baker, Stephen J., “Monopoly or Cartel?” Foreign Policy, no. 23 (Summer 1976): 202–220CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ribicoff, Abraham A., “Trading in Doom,” New York Times, 26 03 1976, p. 35Google Scholar; Mandelbaum, Michael, “A Nuclear Exporters' Cartel,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 33, 1 (01 1977), pp. 42–50; United States Anti-trust Law Implications of an International Scheme of Market-Sharing of Nuclear Enrichment or Reprocessing Equipment. Hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., on S. 1439; 19, 20, 29, and 30 January and 9 March 1976, pp. 1356–1395CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁷⁷ Furness, Richard, “Washington Favours Quiet Role: Enders,” TorontoGlobe and Mail, 1 10 1977, p. 2Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ This thesis is advanced by Kaiser, Karl, “Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process,” International Organization 25 (1971), p. 706CrossRefGoogle Scholar.