1. For an analysis of the NIEO and commodity debates from a regime perspective, see my “Regime Creation by a Coalition of the Weak,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (Autumn 1984)Google Scholar. This article and “Regime Creation” began as part of a single project on alternative negotiating strategies for the developing countries. They were separated because of length and because the subject matter began to diverge, the ISQ article addressing general issues of regimecreation, the IO article addressing in detail one variable in regime-creation and other negotiations.

2. Two points about implementation are worth noting, although I do not pursue them here. First, since those who negotiate are frequently different from those who will have to implement, important disconnections may arise. For example, negotiators may undervalue the need for consensual knowledge because of the political benefits of maintaining uncertainty (which may facilitate group unity) but simultaneously undermine the stability of any agreement achieved. More work is needed on the different political games involved (national, intragroup, intergroup) at each level. Second, successful negotiation may require only that both sides believe or accept certain knowledge as true; but successful implementation may also require that the consensual knowledge be proved valid.

3. For discussion of knowledge as a supplementary causal variable, see Krasner, Stephen D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 195CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. For more detailed comment, see my The Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1981), pp. 190–92Google Scholar.

5. Many practical and philosophical issues are of course implicit in any discussion of social knowledge, since such knowledge is more than an abstract set of cognitive symbols—it also has important social, political, and economic foundations. Thus change through learning (and unlearning) is also a process of institutional change: changing minds without changing the institutional contexts in which they operate is insufficient. We need to think about both aspects of consensual knowledge: the nature of the knowledge and the process of building consensus. Rather than discuss these issues in the abstract, however, I shall address them only as they arise in context.

6. Both definitions are from Ernst Haas's guidelines for a panel at the APSA meeting in Chicago, September 1983.

7. For example, the consensus in the Group of 77, which is at best partially grounded in theory or empirical observation, that terms of trade have deteriorated for commodity producers, or that price fluctuations always impede development, or that commodity prices must be raised, makes agreement with the developed countries more difficult.

8. On these issues, see Rothstein, , Third World and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 20–42Google Scholar.

9. Economists tend to start with different parts of the problem, depending on where they are situated. In exporting countries they are concerned with price instability and price levels, and the failures of the market in promoting an appropriate international division of labor, in importing countries they are concerned with supply security, market interferences, and inflationary consequences of commodity price increases. UNCTAD adds to the former set of concerns questions about the benefits of central management of international commodity policy. See Harris, Stuart, “The Commodities Problem and the International Economic Order What Rules of What Game?” in Oppenheimer, Peter, ed., Issues in International Economics (Stocksfield, U.K.: Oriel, 1980), p. 200Google Scholar.

10. On this issue, see Etzioni, Amitai, The Active Society: A Theory of Social and Political Processes (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 167Google Scholar.

11. In any case, the leaders of powerful states may prefer to attempt to alter reality rather than to adjust beliefs, if the latter have facilitated past successes. Perhaps only a major crisis or a new generation of leaders would increase the chances for cognitive changes.

12. Wilensky, Harold L., Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967)Google Scholar, has some interesting comments on this issue.

13. I shall forego discussing psychological tendencies that affect knowledge and learning (for example, the tendency to seek knowledge that confirms existing ideas or the tendency toward overconfidence about the quality of one's own judgments). Many psychological propositions imply that the problem is not so much learning as it is the failure to unlearn. See Etheredge, Lloyd S., Government Learning: An Overview (Cambridge: MIT Center for International Studies, 1979)Google Scholar, and Hogarth, Robin, Judgement and Choice: The Psychology of Decision (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley, 1980)Google Scholar.

14. On the two styles of learning, see Deutsch, Karl W., “On the Learning Capacity of Large Political Systems,” in Kochen, Manfred, ed., Information for Action—From Knowledge to Wisdom (New York: Academic, 1975), p. 62Google Scholar.

15. This might seem to imply that the quest for consensual knowledge should shift from the global to the group or subgroup level. Such a shift would probably simplify matters, but it is not clear that the gains in consensus would be worth the loss in coverage: thus agreement among economists does not necessarily lead to a wider consensus. In effect one needs both a technical and a political consensus.

16. See Etheredge, , Government Learning, p. 4Google Scholar.

17. For a similar point on uncertainties about the effect of, or inferences from, new knowledge, see Haas, Ernst B., “Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 242CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18. For a full treatment of the negotiations, see my Global, Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)—the quotations in this paragraph are from pp. 49–50Google Scholar—and Brown, Christopher P., The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control (New York: Praeger, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Brown largely attributes the failure of the negotiations to the UNCTAD leadership and staff. I see them as important but take greater account of the effect of the structure of the bargaining process (the rigidities and demands of the group system) and of other external factors (changes in the political and economic climate, etc.). Put differently, unless one assumes that the UNCTAD staff was completely incompetent—an inaccurate judgment—one needs to ask why UNCTAD supported dubious propositions and what political constraints it confronted.

19. Brown, , Political and Social Economy, p. 80Google Scholar. Brown is a former staff member of UNCTAD's commodities division.

20. The developed countries also responded, at least initially, on the basis of ideology, instinct, and “casual empiricism.”

21. The IPC was obviously only one factor in this deluge. Other factors included OPEC and the energy crisis, the limits to growth debate and consequent fears of resource shortages, and concerns about inflationary impacts of rising commodity prices.

22. See, among many others, Behrman, Jere and Adams, F. Gerard, eds., Econometric Modeling of World Commodity Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978)Google Scholar; Adams, and Klein, Sonia A., eds., Stabilizing World Commodity Markets (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978)Google Scholar; Harris, Stuart, Salmon, Mark, and Smith, Ben, A nalysis of Commodity Markets for Policy Purposes (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1978)Google Scholar; Hallwood, Paul, Stabilization of International Commodity Markets (Greenwich: JAI, 1979)Google Scholar; Labys, Walter C., Market Structure, Bargaining Power and Resource Price Formation (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1981)Google Scholar; Adams, and Behrman, , Commodity Exports and Economic Development (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1982)Google Scholar; and Newbery, David M. G. and Stiglitz, Joseph E., The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization: A Study in the Economics of Risk (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

23. I shall ignore a hidden agenda in the debate here because it had little influence on the technical debate. This agenda included two goals, neither of which was achievable: price “strengthening” (via indexation and supply control) and increased control by producers of the commodity regime. Both goals had some impact on the political debate but very little on the issues the economists were considering, and which concern us here.

24. See Adams, F. Gerard, “Introduction,” in Adams, and Klein, , Stabilizing World Commodity Markets, p. xiiGoogle Scholar.

25. The IPC relied on a combination of buffer stocks and supply restrictions in 8 of the 10 core commodities and buffer stocks alone in only 2.

26. Whether or to what degree this consensus extends to Third World commodity economists is unclear, but they have not contributed greatly to the analytical debate. However, the consensus does seem to include Third World economists in institutions such as the World Bank. In any case, it should be understood that the consensus is far from perfect; a spectrum of opinion remains on many issues. My depiction of a consensus should be interpreted as increased bunching around certain points on a spectrum.

27. See especially Newbery, and Stiglitz, , Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization, pp. 23–46Google Scholar. The book is concerned primarily with agricultural commodities, but the theoretical discussion has a wider dimension.

28. Behrman, Jere R., “International Commodity Agreements: An Evaluation of the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities,” in Adams, and Klein, , Stabilizing World Commodity Markets, p. 310Google Scholar.

29. Some agreement favors UNCTAD's judgments: for example, that there are likely financial benefits from pooling resources in the Common Fund and that price stabilization for the core commodities will not lead to income or revenue destabilization. Behrman, , “International Commodity Agreements,” p. 313Google Scholar, also suggests that the gains to consuming countries from the reduction of inflationary pressures might be greater than the gains to producers or the cost of buffer stock operations. UNCTAD stressed this point to the developed countries, although more in private than in public.

30. I emphasize that all the estimates are challengeable and that the simulations may not be very reliable (especially UNCTAD simulations that ignore likely producer reactions to stabilization). As noted, simulations were necessary because of limited experience with buffer stocks. The key general point is uncertainty and how much each side was willing to risk in the face of it or pay to reduce it. The leaders of UNCTAD and the Group of 77 were reluctant to reduce uncertainty because they feared that clarity might endanger group unity. But such fears should not be allowed to undermine efforts to increase knowledge; doing so permits a tactical goal to dominate the strategic goal of negotiating stable agreements.

31. The technical consensus also seems to have had some effect on UNCTAD's commodity experts: they also moved away from price stabilization and toward other goals. But the UNCTAD political leadership has resisted this movement and still maintains at least rhetorical support for initial demands. Private reports describe some UNCTAD commodity officials seeking cooperative research projects with the World Bank in order to gain leverage against their own leadership.

32. Awareness of this “loss” may not be widespread among developing countries themselves, since many do not have the technical skills to follow the debate closely—and many of those that do, such as India and Brazil, were aware of these matters from the start but supported the group position for other reasons. The subsequent shift by the Group of 77 to the more moderate reforms supported by the developed countries had more to do with the parlous state of their economies and of the world economy than with shifts in knowledge. Nevertheless, the consensus among economists did affect what UNCTAD felt it could justify, it confirmed developed country judgments, and it had some general effect on the climate of the debate.

33. See Turnovsky, Stephen J., “The Distribution of Welfare Gains from Price Stabilization: A Survey of Some Theoretical Issues,” in Adams, and Klein, , Stabilizing World Commodity Markets, p. 143Google Scholar.

34. Adams, , “Introduction,” p. xivGoogle Scholar.

35. Newbery, and Stiglitz, , Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization, p. 17Google Scholar. The model also lacks nuance in that it cannot deal with certain aspects of “irrational” behavior—for example, that governments, whose intervention is becoming more crucial, act or may act differently from multinational corporations (e.g., producing and exporting more at low prices than an MNC would).

36. Ibid., p. 18.

37. An interesting case study with some parallels, especially in emphasizing the effect of the commitment by economists to a particular method and an inappropriate model, can be found in Roberts, Marc J., “The Political Economy of the Clean Water Act of 1972: Why No One Listened to the Economists,” in Berger, Suzanne, ed., The Utilisation of the Social Sciences in Policy Making in the United States (Paris: OECD, 1980), pp. 97–119Google Scholar. Roberts suggests the economists were answering questions the real world was not asking and thus had almost no impact on the bill in question. Such a situation may come to pass in commodities if the analytical focus remains too narrow.

38. See especially Behrman, , “International Commodity Agreements,” pp. 301–3Google Scholar. Also interesting is Harris, , “The Commodities Problem,” p. 217Google Scholar.

39. The other criteria could include, for example, increased equity, stability in commodity producing nations, the avoidance of conflict between producers and consumers, or indirect resource transfers if direct transfers have become increasingly difficult.

40. For U.S. recognition of this point, as well as a moderate statement about the IPC from the U.S. viewpoint, see Michalopoulos, Constantine and Perez, Lorenzo L., “Commodity Trade Policy Initiatives and Issues,” in Adams, and Klein, , Stabilizing World Commodity Markets, pp. 243–69Google Scholar. The difficulty of making policy prescriptions also follows from the theory of the second best (when all market imperfections cannot be removed, removing one or two may lead to unacceptable results), but the United States seems to work with the unlikely assumption that all imperfections will or can be removed.

41. One sees the dangers in the UNCTAD staff, which is forced to seek technical solutions to political problems, largely because of the need to promise something to all members of the Group of 77 and to satisfy multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives.

42. For a case study illustrating the difficulties for economists when certain issues are eliminated from discussion on political grounds, even when such issues are crucial to sensible analysis, see Zysman, John, “Research, Politics and Policy: Regional Planning in America,” in Berger, , Utilisation of the Social Sciences, pp. 121–58Google Scholar. A parallel in the commodity case is agreement not to discuss getting entirely out of a particular commodity (say, jute in Bangladesh) because of potential political dangers.

43. This is not meant as a criticism of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Their choice of studies depends largely on what the other bureaus ask for or what they are willing to support.

44. The comments are based on interviews during the spring of 1983 with ten past or present U.S. State Department officials involved in commodity negotiations. Bear in mind the “law of anticipated reactions” in regard to Congress: implicit notions of what Congress is likely to accept limit the kind of research considered as well as actual policies.

45. The regional bureaus in the State Department occasionally suggested supporting the IPC on development grounds or as a form of “disguised” resource transfer; but the Economics and Business Bureau and others rejected the notion on efficiency or ideological grounds. In any case, the argument for resource transfers was not made as well as it could have been, given the fact that automatic rejection of such efforts as inefficient (resources going to the wrong sectors or countries, etc.) may need to be reconsidered (aid in this form might be additional to other aid since no budgetary appropriations are necessary, it comes “without strings,” no form of aid has been very good at fostering optimal resource allocation, etc.). The case for reconsideration is not good, except for the alternatives.

46. Berger, Suzanne, “Introduction,” in Berger, , Utilisation of the Social Sciences, p. 20Google Scholar.

47. See Weiss, Carol H., ed., Using Social Research in Public Policy Making (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977)Google Scholar; Weiss, and Bucuvalas, Michael J., Social Science Research and Decision-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; and Lindblom, Charles E. and Cohen, David K., Usable Knowledge—Social Science and Social Problem Solving (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979)Google Scholar. One of the key roles for the social science researcher in these circumstances is problem setting, rather than problem solving, which implies getting into an early stage of the policy process. Also, research on the nature of the policy process itself is crucial (a major theme in Rothstein, Global Bargaining).

48. A major problem in this context is the tendency to ignore the fact that not all incremental systems need suffer from the same deficiencies, that some are not beyond reform, and that the solution to the problems raised by incremental policy making is not a jump to romantic and Utopian notions of “global compacts.”

49. It is probably somewhat misleading to suggest a simple dichotomy between increasing and reducing uncertainty. In fact, research frequently does both on different items in such complex issues as commodities. However, there is usually a “more or less” tilt in one direction, as in the IPC case. The key is whether uncertainty increases or decreases about the possibility of, or need for, a particular set of policy initiatives.

50. In practice, of course, the concern for valid knowledge is likely even at the expert level to be joined to a concern for political implications—just as there must also be some concern for the validity of knowledge at the political level. Here I note only tendencies.

51. Integrative bargaining is a pattern discussed in Walton, Richard E. and McKersie, Robert D., A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 129f.Google Scholar It presumes that both sides see the issue at stake as a problem for solution and that they jointly search for mutually beneficial outcomes.

52. It stretches the point somewhat to describe box 7 in Figure 2 as “consensual knowledge” since virtually all knowledge about the IPC at this point came from the UNCTAD staff. Still, there was no technical refutation available, some Western economists were favorable in principle, and most were at least willing to withhold adverse comment until more research was done—in contrast to the policy-making community.

53. I discuss these issues in “Is the North-South Dialogue Worth Saving?” Third World Quarterly 6 (01 1984), pp. 155–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54. On basic needs, see Streeten, Paul, First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; on the open economy debate, a recent summary of some of the evidence is in Krueger, Anne O., “The Effects of Trade Strategies on Growth,” Finance and Development 20 (06 1983), pp. 6–8Google Scholar.

55. For an illustration of some potential problems in the trade case, see Cline, William R., “Can the East Asian Model of Development Be Generalized?” World Development 10 (02 1982), pp. 81–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56. At the beginning of the Common Fund debate UNCTAD experts and UNCTAD arguments dominated. An expert group, had it existed, might have broadened the debate from the start and helped to avoid four years of stalemate. The failure to see the need for an expert group may reflect the tendency to see North-South problems as matters only of “political will”—a dangerous half-truth.

57. How much the expert group should be broadened is unclear. It should not include political figures, who dominate the next stage of bargaining, but it might include policy economists respected by both sides and perhaps even a few experts from other disciplines.

58. These issues include the absence of politically potent opposition, the freezing of policy positions as they become part of the personal identity of various leaders, high turnover rates in key policy positions, the absence of internal incentives to challenge the conventional wisdom, and the presence of psychological and institutional mechanisms that prevent new knowledge from reaching key decision makers. See Etheredge, , Government Learning, pp. 37f.Google Scholar, and Wilensky, , Organizational Intelligence, pp. 41ff.Google Scholar, for more detailed discussion.

59. For evidence on openness to new ideas, see Weiss, and Bucuvalas, , Social Science Research and Decision-Making, pp. 250–51Google Scholar.

60. Weiss, Carol H., “Introduction,” in Weiss, , Using Social Research, p. 16Google Scholar.

61. The limitations of State Department in-house research can be seen in International Commodity Agreements, Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report no. 83 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 05 1981)Google Scholar. It summarizes general difficulties with commodity agreements well but makes no attempt to discuss theoretical issues and empirical magnitudes or to ask whether conditions have changed enough (e.g., loss of control by MNCs, increased government intervention, increased cost projections, etc.) to invalidate some traditional arguments. Nor does it attempt to contrast the costs and benefits of agreements with those of the alternatives. While the answers are unclear, such questions should be asked.

62. It may be true, as Wilson suggested years ago, that it is easier to increase the capacity to generate new proposals within an organization than to increase the capacity to accept them: the former requires new personnel, increased autonomy for subunits, and the like, but the latter requires power, since interests vested in the old ideas will resist. Thus one might increase the power and resources of the planning staff (in the abstract, a major conduit for new ideas) or bring in more professional economists, but in both cases major resistance from threatened bureaus is probable. Wilson suggests only a crisis will permit innovation, but the U.S. State Department is already facing something of a crisis on economic issues, as it is losing power to other departments. Note also the radical reform of the planning staff in 1982, the results of which are still unclear. See Wilson, James Q., “Innovation in Organization,” in Thompson, James D., ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 193–218Google Scholar.

63. As already noted, a new and broader approach might not be feasible on either political or technical grounds and, if feasible, might not produce results more favorable to developing country demands for fundamental changes. Nevertheless, apart from providing better grounds—acceptable to both sides—for moderate reforms and a shift in emphasis to more promising areas of cooperation, a new approach might also facilitate exploration of the ground between UNCTAD demands and what the developed countries have been willing to contemplate.