The author would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Beverly Crawford, Judith Goldstein, Joanne Gowa, Stephan Haggard, Peter Hall, David Lake, Charles Lipson, Mike Mastanduno, John Odell, Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, Peter Van Doren, and four 10 referees.

1. See Krapels, Edward N., Pricing Petroleum Products: Strategies of Eleven Industrial Nations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982).Google Scholar

2. These regulatory policies are described in Kalt, Joseph P., The Economics and Politics of Oil Price Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).Google Scholar

3. Bohi, Douglas R. and Russell, Milton, Limiting Oil Imports: An Economic Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).Google Scholar

4. See, for example, Glasner, David, Politics, Prices and Petroleum: The Political Economy of Energy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985).Google Scholar

5. As a policy area with many and diverse interest groups attempting to influence government decisions, the oil-pricing episode is a “least likely case” for the state-centered interpretation. To the extent that the explanation is persuasive in this case, the confidence in its significance across policy areas rises.

6. For a discussion of the import program, see Barber, William J., “The Eisenhower Energy Policy: Reluctant Intervention,” in Goodwin, Craufurd D., ed., Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 229–61Google Scholar. A more general discussion is Nash, Gerald D., United States Oil Policy, 1890–1964 Business and Government in Twentieth Century America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968).Google Scholar

7. Authorization of this action was found in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91–379, 84 Stat. 796 (1970). On the wage and price control program see Goodwin, Craufurd D., ed., Exhortation and Controls: The Search for a Wage Price Policy 1945–71 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975)Google Scholar; Kosters, M., Controls and inflation: The Economic Stabilization Program in Retrospect (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975)Google Scholar; Pohiman, J., Economics of Wage and Price Controls (Columbus: Grid, 1972)Google Scholar; Haberler, G., Incomes Policy and Inflation (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1971).Google Scholar

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12. Testimony of Zarb, Frank G., in U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on the Presidential Energy Program, pp. 20–21Google Scholar. See also Vietor, Richard H. K., Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 249.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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27. Ibid., p. 118

28. Bohi, and Russell, , Limiting Oil Imports.Google Scholar

29. Oil imports from Arab OPEC members constituted the greatest increase. Department of Energy, 1982 Annual Energy Review (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), p. 57.Google Scholar

30. State of the Union Message, 13 January 1975. The price deregulation proposals made by the administration were contained in S. 594/HR. 2650.

31. Hill, John A., Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. U.S. Senate, Oil Price Decontrol, 4 and 5 September 1975, p. 147.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., pp. 149–50.

33. A report at the time noted: As formulated by Secretary of State Kissinger, Henry A., approved by principal officials of the Administration and accepted by President Ford, the high price concept lies at the heart of the government's foreign policy strategy in the energy field. National Journal, 8 03 1975, p. 357.Google Scholar

34. Congressional Quarterly, Energy Policy, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), pp. 34–35.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., pp. 35–36.

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37. The most complete description of this fascinating bargain is in Putnam, Robert D. and Henning, C. Randall, “The Bonn Summit of 1978: How Does International Economic Policy Coordination Actually Work?”Google Scholar Paper presented at a workshop on “Intergovernmental Consultations and Cooperation about Macroeconomic Policies,” Brookings Institution, 6 April 1985. See also, Menu, George de and Solomon, Anthony M., Economic Summitry (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1983)Google Scholar; Putnam, Robert D. and Bayne, Nicholas, Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

38. Interview, Owen, Henry, 10 August 1985.Google Scholar

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41. Jimmy, Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982), p. 104.Google Scholar

42. An interpretation along these lines was suggested to me by Richard Cooper. Interview, 9 August 1985. The Japanese sherpa to the summit, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs Hiromichi Miyazaki, argues that the issues of economic stimulation and energy were not explicitly linked, and that the Japanese, at least, had no intention of “bartering” over U.S. oil pricing policy. The Japanese did resist engaging in a “locomotive” expansion of American, German and Japanese economies. Nonetheless, a compromise emerged. “The Japanese,” Miyazaki noted in an interview, “would do things that would look like reflation in U.S. eyes.” In essence, Miyazaki's argument is that each side was able to use the other's public statements in the formulation of a domestic rationale for policy they already supported. In this sense, the summit pledges were used to strengthen the domestic position of the various leaders, and they were not, strictly speaking, a bargain built on mutual concessions. Interview with Ambassador Hiromichi Miyazaki, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, 22 July 1985.

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45. Jimmy, Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 103–4.Google Scholar

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50. Interview, Richard, Cooper, 9 August 1985.Google Scholar

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57. Eizenstat, diary, 18 January 1979.Google Scholar

58. Memorandum for the President, 3 January 1979.

59. Schlesinger thought that a “window of opportunity” had been created by the Iranian crisis in the early months of 1979 that would close by summer. Interview, 22 August 1985.

60. Eizenstat, diary, 19 March 1979.Google Scholar

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Martin, Tolchin, “Carter to End Price Controls on U.S. Oil and Urge Congress to Tax any ‘Windfall Profits,’” New York Times, 6 04 1979, p. 1Google Scholar

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