He is co-author of Analyzing Global Independence, with Lincoln Bloomfield and Nazli Choucri, available from the Center for International Studies, M.I.T. His current work is on dependency, alternative world modeling approaches and global security systems.

¹ Relevant reviews in the present context are Alker, Bloomfield, Choucri, as well as working papers from the M.I.T. project by Richard Kugler, Fabio Basagni, Lily Gardner and Ann Alker; Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, “International Interdependence and Integration,” in Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, Nelson eds., Handbook of Political Science (Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1975)Google Scholar, and Morse, Edward, “Interdependence in World Affairs,” mimeo, n.d. Earlier discussions of the subject may be found in Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).Google Scholar

² See for example, McDougall, M. et al. , Studies in World Public Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960)Google Scholar and Lasswell, Harold, A Preview of the Policy Sciences (American Elsevier, New York, 1971)Google Scholar. Because a major cleavage in interdependence literatures has been between those taking a “national” perspective versus those, like Keohane and Nye, emphasizing “transnational” or “transgovernmental” phenomena, I use the intermediate, internationally inclusive phrase “cross-state actors” in order not to prejudge the choice of actors appropriate for a particular piece of research. Otherwise, I follow the terminology of Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S., “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, Vol. 27 (10 1974): 39–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ The hypothetical language about possible interactions is necessary to cover cases of avoidance, such as the avoidance of thermonuclear or tariff wars.

⁴ This is not a facetious example. For more details on differences in scientific traditions treating arms race phenomena see Alker, H.R. Jr, “Research Paradigms and Mathematical Politics,” forthcoming in the Yearbook for Political Science Research, edited by Deutsch, Karl and Wildenmann, Rudolf.Google Scholar

⁵ A close approximation to this notion of a regime is due to Easton, David. In A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965)Google Scholar, he says that “the regime represents relatively stable expectations, depending on the system and its state of change, with regard to the range of [valued] matters that can be handled politically, the rules or norms governing the way these matters are processed, and the position of those through whom binding action may be taken on these matters” (p. 192). Somewhat less systematic, but related treatments of regimes may be found in Keohane and Nye, and the recent special issue of this journal edited by Ernst Haas and John Ruggie. The “rules structure” orientation is most fully developed from a social action perspective in Harré, R. and Secord, P.F., The Explanation of Social Behavior (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972)Google Scholar, except that their approach leaves out too many contextual influences on intentions, in my opinion.

⁶ The reader may find it helpful methodologically to consult various recent papers by Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns, such as Baumgartner, T., Burns, T., Meeker, D. and Wild, B., “Open Systems and Multilevel Processes: Implications for Social Research,” Working Paper No. 28, Institute of Sociology, University of Oslo, 1975.Google Scholar

⁷ At this point, further definitions could be made distinguishing independence and dependence as extreme cases of asymmetric interdependence relationships–whether anarchies, quasi-regimes or world governments. Thus the problematique rightly emphasizes that interdependence strategies might use or avoid, revise or maintain, ignore or assume regime-like structures. I hope to develop such distinctions more rigorously in later work. This task may require, however, certain modifications or augmentations of the problematique and conceptualizations so far presented. Not the least of these are the needs to elaborate a separable dependency problematique, and epistemologically to clarify the causal nature of the relations of “structural determination,” so often discussed by theorists of dependency, underdevelopment, and unequal exchange. To what extent must dependence be overcome before interdependence can be meaningfully planned for? See de Araujo Castro, J.A., “The United Nations and the Freezing of the International Power Structure,” International Organization, Vol. 26 (1972): 158–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a provocative Brazilian answer.

⁸ Simon, H.A., The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

⁹ Ibid., p. 79 ff. and in the last chapter, suggestively entitled “The Architecture of Complexity.” This chapter contains one of Simon's most brilliant statements of his commitment to an “empty world” hypothesis that social relations, rather than reflecting a dependency of everything on everything else, to a good approximation are “nearly decomposable” into more highly connected subsystems. Some advocates of a multi-layered systems approach would dispute this fundamental epistemological postulate, at least in its disciplinary implications.

¹⁰ A relevant discussion of this point is Althusser, L. and Balibar, E., Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970)Google Scholar, particularly the introductory chapter. More mathematically explicit is Maarek, Gérard, Introduction au Capital de Karl Marx (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1975)Google Scholar. Neither Maarek nor many other Marxian economists now feel the labor theory of value is an adequate operational approach to equity questions, despite its conceptual relevance and formal power. (Of the ten Samuelsonian references on Marxian economics in the 1967–1974 period cited by Maarek, the most recent is: “Karl Marx as a Mathematical Economist” Festschrift, Lloyd Metzler, in Horwich, G. and Samuelson, P.A. eds., Trade, Stability and Macroeconomics (New York: Academic Press, 1974)Google Scholar. An interdependence relevant exception to this view and an excellent Marxist critique of liberal trade theory as well as Emmanuel, Arghiri, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).Google Scholar

¹¹ Thurow, Lester, “The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 85, No. 2 (05 1971): 327–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The classic reference is Samuelson, Paul, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (11 1954): 387–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A key maxim of liberal theory is restricted but not totally denied by Thurow's approach: liberals ought to model choice processes in ways that are essentially voluntaristic, with ordinal measurements that avoid making interpersonal comparisons. The objection that political-economic practices regularly do make such comparisons which cannot realistically be avoided strikes me as valid. A related discussion of justice as fairness may be reviewed by first reading Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar and Barry, Brian, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1973).Google Scholar

¹² Relevant research on Prisoner's Dilemmas of representational significance is contained in Burns, T. and Meeker, L.B., “Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” in Rapoport, A. ed., Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution (Dorecht-Holland: Reidel, 1974)Google Scholar. Before accepting the traditionalist answers that old or new state monopolies of legitimate violence will peacefully resolve such dilemmas, it is worth recalling integrationist findings on pluralistic security regimes, somewhat overstated by Lijphart'spithy, Arend phrase: “Anarchy is a better road to peace than social contract,” in his “The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (03 1974): 41–74 at p. 64Google Scholar.

¹³ Except for his anti-social-science bias, I find Lakatos' late Popperian critical realism impressive on this and many related philosophical questions. See his “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, A., eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91–195CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Methodologically, I often also find myself in agreement with Davis Bobrow's constructive critique of the World Order Models Project headed by Saul Mendlovitz. See Bobrow's“Transitions to Preferred World Futures: Some Design Considerations,” 1974, unpublished. A somewhat similar alternative is William D. Coplin and Michael O'Leary's more state-centric “A Policy Analysis Framework for Research, Education, and Policy-Making in International Relations,” unpublished. Certain methodological similarities with the Keohane-Nye post-functionalist orientation should also be acknowledged at this point.

¹⁴ See Thomas Kuhn's introductory paper in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.

¹⁵ Forrester, J.W., World Dynamics (Cambridge: Wright-Allen Press, 1971)Google Scholar; Meadows, Donella H. et al. , The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972)Google Scholar. A more complete review and bibliography, relevant to the above discussion is J.A. Alker and H.R. Alker, Jr., “Controversies Raised by The Limits to Growth.” Proceedings of the Society for General Systems Research: Systems Thinking and the Quality of Life (forthcoming). An earlier, related analysis of functional interdependence at the organizational level is March, J. and Simon, H., Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1955)Google Scholar, especially at page 159: “The greater the specialization by functional subprograms… the greater the interdependence among organizational sub-units”. A particularly vivid discussion of integrative/disintegrative functional inter-dependencies is Schmitter, P.C., “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration,” International Organization, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1970): 836–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ See Hunter, Douglas E., “Some Aspects of a Decision-Making Model in Nuclear Deterrence Theory,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1972): 209–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ John Harsanyi, “A Simple Probabilistic Model of Nuclear Multi-polarity”; Selten, Reihard and Tietz, Reinhard, “Security Equilibria,” in The Future of the International Strategic System, Rosecrance, Richard ed., (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972)Google Scholar. The opposite approach to environmental regulation is suggested by Ashby, W. Ross and Conant, Roger C., “Every Good Regulator of a System Must be a Model of that System,” International Journal of System Science, Vol. 1 (1971): 189 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ One should hope such an excuse was relevant in his own work. In fact, earlier Alker-Christensen-Greenberg simulation models of the United Nations Collective Security quasi-regime did use structure-maintaining, probabilistic Baysian models of external environments. But, following too closely the pluralistic tradition of integration studies, these authors never modeled the causal dynamics of where their conflicts came from, nor did their early papers allow for the regionalization of Collective Security practices noted above. The most relevant reference on this point is Alker, H.R. Jr and Christensen, Cheryl, “From Causal Modelling to Artificial Intelligence: The Evolution of a UN Peace-Making Simulation,” in Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science, LaPonce, Jean and Smoker, Paul eds., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972)Google Scholar. The Bloomfield-Leiss-Beattie CASCON system suffers from similar deficiencies. See Bloomfield, Lincoln P. and Beattie, Robert, “Computers and Policy-Making: The Cascon Experiment”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15 (1971): 33–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A Marxist: analysis would surely try to find the relevant environmental class conflicts; transnationalists would at least study relevant agenda processes.

¹⁹ These self-critical assessments are based on research methods that I have used. See Alker, Hayward R. Jr and Puchala, Donald, “Trends in Atlantic Partnership, 1928–1963,” in Quantitative International Politics, Singer, J. David ed., (New York: Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar and Alker, Hayward R. Jr, “Supranationalism in the United Nations,” reprinted in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, Rosenau, James N. ed., (New York: Free Press, 1969).Google Scholar

²⁰ Choucri, Nazli and North, Robert, Nations in Conflict (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1974)Google Scholar. Although not yet accomplished, it is worth noting that Mesarovic-Pestel world model design goes beyond both the World Dynamics and Leontieff's efforts in meeting both parts of the injunctional Maxim 4. See Mesarovic, Mihajlo and Pestel, Edward, “A Goal-Seeking and Regionalized Model for Analyses of Critical World Relationships: The Conceptual Foundation,” Kybernetes, Vol.1 (1972): 79–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hughes, Barry, “Current Status of the Mesarovic-Pestel World Model Project,” (Cleveland: Systems Research Center, Case Western Reserve University, 1974, unpublished).Google Scholar

²¹ Wassily Leontieff, Nobel lecture, Stockholm, 1973. The lecture introduces a larger UN-based project.

²² Important steps in this direction have been taken by Krause and Linnemann, among others. See Krause, Lawrence, European Economic Integration and the United States (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968)Google Scholar; and Linnemann, Hans, An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1966)Google Scholar. See also Quasi-Experimental Approaches: Testing Theory and Evaluating Policy, Caporaso, J. and Roos, L. eds., (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).Google Scholar

²³ Delphi methods rely on repeated panels of expert judgments or forecasts to build a kind of technocratic consensus. For a recent application, see Roberts', Fred contribution in The Structure of Decision, Axelrod, Robert ed., (Princeton: Princeton University PressGoogle Scholar, forth coming); and the extensive RAND literature. Summarizing a critical review of governmental “Models, Simulations, Games (MSGs),” Garry Brewer notes that over two-thirds of such activity is all-machine technical or force structure analysis. Half of 132 MSGs had not been subjected to external review, 35 percent could not easily be transferred and replicated elsewhere, most professionals felt competent reviews would be “harmful.” “Summary Report of a Survey of Models, Simulations, and Games,” (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1974). especially p. 12. Tendencies to hide their inner logics of research and design are thus certainly not limited to power-conscious politicians!

²⁴ Recent relevant summaries and critiques are: Azar, Edward, Brody, Richard, and McClelland, Charles, International Events Interaction Analysis: Some Research Considerations (Beverly Hills: A Sage Professional Paper, 1972)Google Scholar, Vol. 1.02–001; and Burgess, Philip and Lawton, Raymond, Indicators of International Behavior: An Assessment of Events Data Research (Beverly Hills: A Sage Professional Paper, 1972)Google Scholar, Vol. 1.02–010. One particularly good piece of work of direct relevance here, going beyond the limitations of particular coding techniques, is Azar's, “Analyses of International Events,” Peace Research Reviews, Vol. 4 (11 1970)Google Scholar, which links events data to the rise and fall of Egyptian-Syrian integration. The CREON studies currently in progress at Ohio State also show considerable structure-sensitivity in their research design, but have not yet been fully reported. A system using an events-data type coding of certain message flows is PARA: Process, Problems and Potential (Ann Arbor: Social science Department, Bendix Aerospace Systems Division, 06 1972)Google Scholar, Chapter 2. This system was proposed for implementation in the State Department, but has since apparently (largely) been discontinued.

²⁵ Choucri and North, Nations in Conflict, Part IV, Also important is a statistical study by Codoni, R., Fritsch, B. et al. , World Trade Flows, Integrational Structure and Conditional Forecasts, 2 vols. (Zürich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, AG., 1971)Google Scholar. Contingent forecasts by Fritsch project increasing North-South inequalities in export earnings as LDC GNPs increase.

²⁶ The two best summary volumes, The Structure of Decision, Robert Axelrod ed., and another volume edited by Mathew Bonham and Michael Shapiro should soon be available. And the next generation of cognitive process models is already on the horizon. See Abelson, Robert, “The Structure of Belief Systems,” in Computer Models of Thought and Language, Schank, Robert and Colby, Kenneth eds., (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1974).Google Scholar

²⁷ Shapiro, Michael J. and Bonham, G. Matthew, “Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (06 1973): 147–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ Hart's relevant paper is in the Axelrod volume. A more explicit statistical study using public international organization roll calls and speeches is Friedheim, Robert and Kadane, Joseph, “Ocean Science and the UN Political Arena,” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 3 (04 1972): 473–502.Google Scholar

²⁹ Riker, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar . From a multi-level perspective one might be more inclined to focus on contextual requirements for power balancing rule following, such as aristocratic self-restraint, slow changes in technological advantages, etc.

³⁰ See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and William Greenberg, “Analyzing Collective Security Regime Alternatives,” to appear in the Bonham-Shapiro volume. Capabilities in this case were assessed in terms of batting averages (or integrals) taken over hypothetical conflict environments. A more powerful version of this methodology, going more deeply into the modern cybernetics literature, is Alker, Hayward R. Jr, “Political Capabilities in a Schedule Sense: Measuring Power, Integration and Development,” in Mathematical Approaches to Politics, Alker, Hayward R. Jr, Deutsch, Karl and Stoetzel, Antoine eds., (New York: Elsevier, 1973).Google Scholar

³¹ The most recent experimentation in professional-level all-human political games (POLEX) at M.I.T. made explicit a number of analytical features including the historical and processual models supplied via use of experienced game participants. See Lincoln Bloomfield, P. and Gearin, Cornelius J., “Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age,” Orbis, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter 1973), particularly p. 1028.Google Scholar

³² See Deutsch, Karl W., The Analysis of International Relations (Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1968Google Scholar) for relevant concepts of war and peace thresholds, defined in terms of interest interdependence and transaction salience.

³³ See Brewer's study cited in note 23.

³⁴ Vernon, Raymond, The Operations of Multinational United States Enterprises in Developing, Countries: Their Role in Trade and Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1972), pp. 6 and 26Google Scholar. See also his impressively thorough but often judgmental “Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries: An Analysis of National Goals and National Policies,” draft prepared for United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1974.

³⁵ This maxim is also in part responsive to work by William Coplin and Michael O'Leary, and others at Syracuse University, who argue the increased relevance to foreign policy analysis of judgmental techniques. For several reasons I agree, but would supplement such judgments as indicated.

³⁶ Arghiri Emmanuel, op. cit.

³⁷ In addition to previously cited sources, see Ruggie, John G., “The Future of International Collaboration,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (09 1972): 874–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; a dialogue with William Loehr is in the same Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (December 1973): 1327–30. Also relevant is Loehr, William, “Collective Goods and International Cooperation: Comments,” International Organization, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 1973): 421–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, a comment on relevant papers by Russett and Sullivan, plus Olson.