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Finding a satisfactory voting formula for an international organization of “sovereign” states, such as the Security Council of the United Nations, is a different task from establishing rules of voting for a national legislative body. In an international body both the character of the work to be done and the composition of the body are governing factors. If the body has to make decisions involving the use of force, full respect for sovereignty by requiring unanimity permits the exercise of a liberum veto that blocks action. Simple rules of “democratic” usage by which the members are assumed to be equal in strength, though in fact they are not, cannot be applied, for this might pit weak numerical majorities against preponderantly powerful minorities. On the other hand, frankly to acknowledge the overweening might of a few and to establish a “dictatorship” by giving the most powerful members exclusive voting privileges is politically unacceptable and probably impracticable in our times. Therefore, some compromise has to be found, with reference to the duties and responsibilities of the organization and its composition, that will strike a workable balance between the inequalities of the members and a decent respect for the views and interests of the less powerful.
1 See Schuman, Frederick L., “The Dilemna of the Peace-Seekers,” American Political Science Review, XXXIX (February, 1945), p. 12–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a criticism of the assumptions underlying sovereign-state international organization; and Louis B. John, “Weighting of Votes in an International Assembly,” Ibid., XXXVIII (December, 1944), p. 1192–1203, for an interesting proposal for weighting of votes in an international organization.
2 For excellent discussions of the ways in which the Security Council works to maintain peace, see Goodrich, Leland M., “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, American Political Science Review, XXXIX (October, 1945), p. 956–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and William T. R. Fox, “Collective Enforcement of Peace and Security”, Ibid., p. 970–81.
3 The Charter (Article 24, paragraph 1) states that in conferring upon the Security Council its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security” the United Nations “agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”
4 Cf. Briggs, Herbert W., “Power Politics and International Organization”, American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (October, 1945), p. 670–71.Google Scholar
5 Cf. Fox, William T. R., “The Super Powers at San Francisco”, Review of Politics, VIII (January, 1946), p. 119.Google Scholar
6 For a brief reference to Dumbarton Oaks deliberations by a participant, see the statement of the Delegate of the United Kingdom Cadogan, Sir Alexander), in United Nations Conference on International Organization (hereafter UNCIO), Documents (London and New York: United Nations Information Organisation, 1945), XI, p. 320–21.Google Scholar
7 It is interesting to note that a committee of which Manley O. Hudson was chairman proposed in the summer of 1944 an organization with a council of eleven in which certain decisions were to be taken by a two-thirds majority including the permanent members. See International Conciliation, no. 402, August, 1944, p. 528–30.
8 Cf. Reston, James B., “Chinese Accept Dumbarton Draft”, New York Times, October 6, 1944Google Scholar; and Arthur Krock, “In the Nation”, Ibid., October 24, 1944.
9 For an excellent summary of Soviet opinion on international organization, see Prince, Charles, “Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organization of Security”, American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (July, 1945), p. 450–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially p. 457–60. Cf. Stalin's speech of November 6, 1944, International Conciliation, no. 406, December, 1944, p. 814; and Molotovat San Francisco, UNCIO, Documents.
10 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., “I Have Faith for World Peace”, Readers' Digest, September, 1946, p. 110.Google Scholar
11 For the exact wording, see Charter, Article 27.
12 See Statements by Secretary of State Stettinius in the press releases of March 5, Department of State, Bulletin, XII (March 11, 1945), p. 395–97; and by Acting Secretary Grew in a press release of March 24, Ibid., XII (March 25, 1945), p. 479.
13 See UNCIO, Documents, III, p. 665, for an index to amendments and comments contained in the same volume; and Ibid., XI, p. 693–98, for the amendments formally brought before Committee III/1 where voting in the Security Council was debated.
14 Cf. Vera, Micheles Dean, “The San Francisco Conference”, Foreign Policy Reports, XXI (July 15, 1945)Google Scholar, III; W. T. R. Fox, “The Super-Powers at San Francisco”, loc. cit., VIII, 124–26.
15 For the debate, see UNCIO, Documents, XI, p. 313–62, p. 430–539. See also the reports of the Rapporteur and the remarks in the Commission III meeting, Ibid., XI, p. 117–79. For the best summary of the deliberations over voting at the San Francisco conference, see Wilcox, Francis O., “The Yalta Voting Formula”, American Political Science Review, XXXIX (October, 1945), p. 943–56Google Scholar; and for summaries and texts of the most important documents, see Goodrich, Leland M. and Edvard, Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), p. 125–34.Google Scholar
16 UNCIO, Documents, XI, p. 699–714; and Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit., p. 126–30. Cf. Stettinius, “I Have Faith for World Peace” loc. cit., 111.
17 Charter (Article 35, paragraph 1) permitting any state to bring a dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or a dispute before the General Assembly or the Security Council.
18 For a clear explanation of the operation of the veto in such cases, see Leland M. Goodrich, “ Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, loc. cit., XXXIX, p. 963.
19 He was referring to the Statement by the Delegate from the United Kingdom, UNCIO, Documents, XI, p. 320–25.
20 Ibid., XI, p. 438–40.
