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2. As Waltz puts it, the “state defines for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them.” See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 96Google Scholar.

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13. Our goal here is to clarify how informal empires are structured and work rather than to specify the conditions under which their parties will engage in particular behaviors; we are thus interested in “how” rather than “why” questions. On this distinction see Cross, Charles, “Explanation and the Theory of Questions,” Erkenntnis 34 (03 1991), pp. 237–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an earlier version of our substantive argument see Wendt, Alexander and Barnett, Michael, “Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization,” Review of International Studies 19 (10 1993), pp. 321–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Scholarship on informal empire is divided between that which focuses on political authority and that more concerned with economic control. Much of the latter has roots in an article by Gallagher, John and Robinson, Ronald, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review 6 (02 1953), pp. 1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a sampling of recent work along these lines, see Mommsen, Wolfgang and Osterhammel, Jiirgen, eds., Imperialism and After (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986)Google Scholar. Our concern is with structures of political authority, which may or may not be tied to structures of economic dominance.

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18. On this basis Watson distinguishes between “dominion” and “hegemony” (in which domestic control is and is not exercised, respectively); see his The Evolution of International Society, p. 15. We agree there is a difference but think it more of degree than kind.

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63. Ulbricht's influence on Soviet policy “actually increased as the stability of the… regime weakened,” concludes Harrison, Hope M., “Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis,” working paper 5, CWIHP, 05 1993, p. 20Google Scholar.

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71. Ten SED Poliburo members, “Brief an Breschnew” (letter to Brezhnev), 21 January 1971, in ibid.

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