¹ The principal documents are the Charter, especially the Preamble, articles 1 and 55; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A (HI) of 10 December 1948; and the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.

References to UN documents follow the standard form here, except that 1) single references are generally included in the body of the text and 2) the remarks of delegates usually are identified by placing the name of the representative's country in parentheses after the document number. Most of the references are to documents of the Commission on Human Rights (beginning with E/CN.4) and the Third Committee of the General Assembly (beginning with A/C.3). “SR.[number]” indicates the summary record of the numbered meeting. Verbatim records are maintained for neither the Commission nor the Third Committee.

² See, for example, Dyke, Vernon Van, Human Rights, the United States and the World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970)Google Scholar, and United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights (ST/HR/2: Sales number E.74.XIV.2).

³ See General Assembly resolutions 2081 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2217 C (XXI) of 17 December 1966, and 2339 (XXII) of 18 December 1967. During the Conference about equal attention was given to the issues of racism and colonialism (considered in the Conference's First Committee) and other and more general issues (considered in the Second Committee), a division of attention that reflects the priorities of that time and, to a certain extent, current priorities as well.

⁴ See A/CONF.32/C.2/SR.12, 13.

⁵ For example, the question of the realization of economic, social and cultural rights was not placed on the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights until 1968 (see Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Forty-Fourth Session, Supplement 4 [E/CN.4/972], chap. V), while the study of special problems of developing countries, although included on the Commission's agenda in 1965, was postponed annually until 1969 (see Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Forty-Second Session, Supplement 6 [E/CN.4/940], chap. IX).

⁶ As far as I am aware, the only major published piece, in English at least, that gives due prominence to resolution 32/130 is Moskowitz, Moses, Implementing Human Rights: Present Status and Future Prospects, in Ramcharan, B. G., ed., Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 109–130Google Scholar.

⁷ See, for example, General Assembly resolutions 24, 26, 27, 28, 41, 42, 44, 70, 90, 93, 94, 95, 174, 176, and 179 of the thirty-fourth session, and the succession of earlier decisions cited therein. Likewise, in the Commission on Human Rights's 1979 session, Israel, Chile or South Africa were discussed in 23 of 33 public sessions devoted to substantive issues. Of the remaining 10 meetings, 5 were devoted to human rights violations in colonial or dependent countries or territories and 1 to economic, social and cultural rights.

⁸ See General Assembly resolution 2027 (XX) of 18 November 1965. As this resolution repeated a request first made in resolution 1776 (XVII) of 7 December 1962, it should not be thought that the failure to consider such issues of general principles and strategies began only after 1966. However, the problems presented by this failure only became crucial once the overriding task of formulating the Covenants had been completed.

⁹ See Commission on Human Rights resolution 14 (XXV), confirmed by ECOSOC resolution 1421 (XLVI)of 6 June 1969.

¹⁰ This delay eventually came to cause considerable annoyance to several delegates, suggesting the emergence of pressure to begin moving in a new direction. See Economic and Social Council Official Records, Fifty-Second Session, Supplement 7 (E/CN.4/1097), para. 73, and E/CN.4/SR.1163, 1164.

¹¹ The Widening Gap: A Study of the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/CN.4/1108 and Add. 1–10). The study underwent minor revisions, especially in its conclusions and recommendations, and was reissued as The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Problems, Policies and Progress (E/CN.4/1108/Rev. 1 and E/CN.4/1131/Rev. 1, also issued as Sales Number E. 75.XIV).

¹² E/CN.4/SR. 1227 (Chile). See also E/CN.4/SR. 1267 (Romania).

¹⁵ SeeE/CN.4/1108/Add.6, Part II, paras. 26–33 and Part III, para. 1.

¹⁴ See E/CN.4/SR. 1225, 1227, 1228, 1230.

¹⁵ See E/CN.4/SR.1228 (USSR), 1230 (Egypt), 1226 (Ecuador), 1268 (India), and 1269 (Senegal).

¹⁶ E/CN.4/SR.1341. Note the rather denigrating reference to civil rights as “psychological.”

¹⁷ See E/CN.4/SR. 1326, 1364, 1368.

¹⁸ See E/CN.4/SR. 1448 (Sweden) and A/C.3/33/SR.55 (France). Perhaps the best expression of this position in recent UN debates came from the delegate of Costa Rica, Piza Escalante, speaking in right of reply in A/C.3/33/SR.54.

¹⁹ See, for example, E/CN.4/SR.1338 (Egypt), where the problems of developing countries are listed as being external (the result of colonialism), the result of an unjust international economic system, and, only thirdly, internal; and E/CN.4/SR.1396 (Iran), where one of the guiding principles advanced is the duty of the international community to remove obstacles faced by the developing countries.

¹⁰ Although included on the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session in 1976 as a result of resolution 34S1 (XXX) of 9 December 1975, it did not appear on the final agenda of that session.

¹¹ The resolution was adopted by overwhelming majorities both in the Third Committee (126–0–11) and by the General Assembly as a whole (123–0–15). This partially explains the speed with which the resolution was acted on. However, numerous UN resolutions of far less significance have been held up for further study even when backed by majorities of such a size, especially when, as we shall see, it was clear that there was substantial opposition or at least resistance on the part of the major western powers. The countries abstaining in committee were Austria, Belgium, France, FRG, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.A., joined in plenary by Chad, Israel, Ivory Coast, and Paraguay.

²² This certainly does not follow from c, although it might be argued that it follows from b. Subparagraph c in fact was an amendment in committee but the wording of d was not corrected, indicating the inordinate haste with which the resolution was moved through the UN.

²³ See, for example, the reference to 32/130 in resolution 34/46 of 23 November 1979 (the draft of this resolution, A/C.3/34/L.15, is especially interesting, listing 32/130 in the preambulatory paragraphs after only the Charter) and resolution 34/47. During the Commission on Human Rights's 1979 session, important references to 32/130 can be found at, e.g., E/CN.4/SR.1488 (Australia), 1489 (FRG, Jordan), 1490 (USSR), 1491 (Belgium), and 1492 (Cuba, GDR). Such references are important because they indicate the diffusion of the principles of 32/130 beyond the general topic of alternative approaches and ways and means. In this regard, see also resolution 34/175 of 17 December 1979 and the use of 32/130 as a justification for concentrating on Israel, South Africa, and Chile in the Commission on Human Rights [E/CN.4/SR.1453 (USSR, Jordan)]. Perhaps the clearest indication of the new approach can be seen in the Soviet delegate's comment that the resolution gives “a clear indication of the basis on which human rights questions should be solved” [A/C.3/34/SR.27 (USSR)].

²⁴ A/C.3/32/SR.49 (Egypt). Compare A/C.3/32/SR.51 (Ireland) and A/C.3/34/SR.26 (GDR).

²⁵ See, for example, A/C.3/32/SR.49 (Norway), A/C.3/34/SR.26 (Australia), 36 (Sweden). As mentioned in note 21, only 11 western countries finally abstained on resolution 32/130. However, the debate indicates more widespread objections, even if they proved not to be intense enough to merit an abstention.

²⁶ See especially A/C.3/33/SR.54. Compare also A/C.3/32/SR.54 (Uruguay), 55 (Senegal), and E/CN.4/1393 (Uruguay). Chad, Ivory Coast, and Paraguay even voted with “the west” on 32/130.

²⁷ A/32/PV. 16 (Gambia). See also A/C.3/32/SR.51 (Poland and Hungary).

²⁸ It is ironic that those countries which most stress the contrast between economic dependence and interdependence are precisely the ones that interpret the interdependence of human rights in terms of simple dependence.

²⁹ These trends are part of the broader tendency in the UN to subordinate almost everything to rapid development, an understandable if not entirely defensible position, given the organization's makeup. Additional impetus will in all likelihood be given to this process by the recent recognition and increasing prominence of a human right to development. See, for example, Commission on Human Rights resolutions 4 (XXXV) and 5 (XXXV) of 2 March 1979 and GA resolution 34/46 of 23 November 1979. The Secretary-General's report to the Commission on Human Rights on this topic (E/CN.4/1334) is perhaps the most important single document on the issue. See also Theodoor van Boven (director of the Division of Human Rights), “Recent Events Mark Link between Human Rights and the New International Economic Order,” UN Monthly Chronicle 17, 7 (August 1980), pp. 75–76f, and ST/HR/SER.A/8, paras. 59–95.

³⁰ See, for example, A/C.3/32/SR.51 (Poland, Ukraine, and GDR).

³¹ A/C.3/32/SR.51 (India). Again, though, exception is made for the pariah regimes and, in the case of the Indian representative's speech, this renunciation is followed almost immediately by a most strenuous condemnation of South Africa.

³² The proposal for a High Commissioner has been around in something like its present form since the mid sixties. However, whenever possible even the discussion of the topic has been blocked (see, for example, A/32/423 paras. 11–17) by a group led by the Soviet bloc and most Arab countries. While the major arguments against a High Commissioner have focused on lack of consensus, the alleged inability of any single individual or office to represent the full range of views contained within the UN, the costs of such proposals, and their alleged superfluity, the constant defeat or deferral of such proposals raises questions of the UN commitment to implement human rights. This is also suggested by resolution 32/130's reference to the importance of continued standard-setting, rather than procedures for implementation, and such claims as that of the Czech delegate that ratification of the Covenants was a major precondition to the enjoyment of human rights (A/C.3/32/SR.49), a claim revealing an almost entirely formalistic approach to the issue. Despite the claims that existing institutions are “satisfactory and sufficient” [A/33/PV.10 (Hungary)] and that standard-setting is the key to success, experience has shown that the UN has had little or no effect on the actual implementation of human rights and, as is suggested below, the majority of the members oppose any such role.

³³ See also E/CN.4\SR. 1442 (Iran).

³⁴ See, for example, E/CN.4/SR.1341 (Iran). For an enlightening study of the Soviet position see Bergesen, Helge Ole, “Human Rights—The Property of the Nation State or a Concern of the International Community?” Cooperation and Conflict 14 (1979): 239–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ I shall not discuss the New International Economic Order here, for in human rights terms it amounts to but another way of granting priority to economic and social rights in developing countries and further obliterates the uniqueness of human rights issues by incorporating them into ongoing economic concerns. For statements of the importance of the NIEO to the realization of human rights, see in particular ST/HR/SER.A/8 and, inter alia, E/CN.4/SR.1339 (Senegal), 1393 (Yugoslavia and India), 1442 (Iran), 1449 (Romania); A/C.3/32/SR.43 (Cuba), 50 (Mali), 52 (Iraq), 53 (Pakistan); A/32/PV.9 (Ecuador and Iran); and A/C.3/34/SR.24 (Mr. van Boven, Secretariat), 25 (Madagascar), 36 (Romania).

³⁶ See A/C.3/32/SR.43 (Finland), 49 (Belgium), 51 (Panama), 52 (Honduras), 54 (Ireland), 55 (Senegal). Senegal went so far as to withdraw its sponsorship as a result of this.

³⁷ Recall that the resolution does not grant priority to all mass and flagrant violations, but rather reads “affected by situations such as…” This permits possible expansion, but only of the most limited sort. The obvious reason for such a restrictive approach to mass and flagrant violations is that granting priority to all such violations would be likely to prove embarrassing to other than the international pariahs of Chile, Israel, and South Africa or the convenient whipping boy of western neocolonialism.