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² “It has been calculated that there were twenty-seven Social-Democratic organizations in the army in 1905, while more than double that number of civilian party committees or groups disseminated propaganda among the troops.” — Keep, J.H.L., The Rise of Social Democrats in Russia (Oxford, 1963), p. 272.Google Scholar

³ Jacques, Julliard, “La C.G.T. devant Ia guerre (1900–1914)”, Le Mouvement Social, no 49 (1964).Google Scholar

⁴ Dick, Geary, “Identifying Militancy: the Assessment of Working-Class Attitudes towards State and Society”, in Richard, J.Evans (ed.), The German Working Class 1888–1933. The Politics of Everyday Life (London and Totowa, 1982).Google Scholar

⁵ Karl, W. Deutsch, “Integration and Autonomy: Some Concepts and Ideas”, Ekistics, no 179 (1970), p. 327.Google Scholar Almost the same definition is given by Robert, Cooley Angel: “Social integration is […] the fitting together of the parts of a social system to constitute a whole.” (“Social Integration”, in David, L. Sills (ed), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, VII (1968), p. 380).Google Scholar

⁶ Robert, L. Pfalzgraff, “Karl Deutsch and the Study of Political Science”, Political Science Reviewer, II (Fall 1972), pp. 105–106.Google Scholar

⁷ This is, for instance, very clear in Myron Weiner's well-known article “Political Integration and Political Development”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no 358 (03 1965), where forms of political integration are studied as “strategies pursued by governments”.Google Scholar

⁸ Victoria, E. Bonnell, “Trade Unions, Parties, and the State in Tsarist Russia: A Study of Labor Politics in St. Petersburg and Moscow”, Politics and Society, 9 (1980), p. 320.Google Scholar

⁹ Compare the following observation about France: “The attitude of the socialists (and anarchists) towards the army was to a large extent determined by the fact that the army had been employed to break strikes, by its being used as a weapon of social oppression. The anti-militarist tradition, therefore, was strong and particularly so among the trade unions. But this anti-militarism was not necessarily the same as internationalism. Hatred of the army and anti-militarism could well be combined with the idea of the defence of the nation through popular militias […]”— John, Schwarzmantel, “Nationalism and the French Working Class”, in Eric, Cahm and Jean, Claude Fišera (eds), Socialism and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (1848–1945), vol. 2 (Nottingham, 1979), pp. 75–76.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ashworth, W., “Industrialization and the Economic Integration of Nineteenth-Century Europe”, European Studies Review, 4 (1974), p. 292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ This transfer of loyalties is accompanied by a loss of emotion. “On évoque volontiers ‘l'amour de la patrie’ — mais jamais l'amour de la nation, on parle facilement de ‘ma patrie’ — mais qui dira: ‘ma nation’?” — Jean-Yves, Guiomar, L'idéologie nationale. Nation, Répresentation, Propriété (Paris, 1974), p. 31.Google Scholar

¹² Heinrich, Cunow, Die Marxsche Geschichts-, Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie. Grundzüge einer Marxschen Soziologie, Band II (Berlin, 1921), p. 31.Google Scholar See also Robert, Michels, “Vaterlandsliebe und Heimatgefühl”, Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie, 6 (1927).Google Scholar

¹³ Mancur, Olson, “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force”, Journal of Economic History, 23 (1963).Google Scholar

¹⁴ In the Italian case this not only meant the poor attitudinal integration of workers in the new manufactures and industries, but also the existence of a large group of people, displaced by modernization in agriculture, who were in fact not absorbed in the new industries. The result: “Trade unionism in other European countries was almost exclusively an urban industrial phenomenon. By contrast, the Italian labor movement was strongly rooted in both town and country, a development related to the fact that most uprooted workers remained in agriculture.” —Samuel, J. Surace, Ideology, Economic Change, and the Working Classes: The Case Italy (Berkeley and Los Angelos, 1966), p. 68.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Adam, Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge and Paris, 1985), pp. 138–139.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Socialist and Syndicalist workers have a second reason for preferring a quick accumulation capital: it increases the number of workers and in that way the potential of the anti-capitalist forces. Illustrative is Griffuelhes' complaint about the slackness of French capitalists: “Pour notre part, nous demandons que le patronat français ressemble au patronat américain, et qu'ainsi, notre activité industrielle et commerciale grandissant, il en résulte pour nous une sécurité, une certitude qui, en nous élevant matériellement, nous entraine pour la lutte, facilitée par le besoin de la main-d'oeuvre. Nous désirons un pays affairé, actif, bourdonnant, véritable ruche toujours en éveil. Notre force en sera accrue.” — Victor, Griffuethes, “L'infériorité des capitalistes français”, Mouvement Socialiste, no 226 (12 1910), p. 332.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Bonnell, , “Trade Unions, Parties, and the State”, pp. 318–319.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Detlev, Lehnert, “Zur politischen Transformation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Ein Interpretationsversuch für die Zeit des übergangs zum Organisierten Kapitalismus”, in Jürgen, Bergmannet al. (eds), Geschichte als politische Wissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 289.Google Scholar

¹⁹ This was the thesis advanced in Otto, Bauer, “Die Teuerung” [Report to the International Socialist Congress, Vienna, 23–29 08 1914],Google Scholar published in Georges, Haupt, Der Kongress fant nicht statt. Die Sozialistische Internationale 1914 (Vienna etc., 1967), pp. 227–256.Google Scholar

²⁰ Friedhelm, Boll, “Streikwellen im europäischen Vergleich”, in Wolfgang, J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard, Husung (eds), Auf dem Wege zur Massengewerkschaft. Die Eniwicklung der Gewerkschaften in Deutschland und Grossbritannien 1880–1914 (Stuttgart, 1984), p. 112, signals the following “high points of national strike waves” between 1910 and 1914: France 1910 and 1911, Britain 1910 and 1913, German Empire 1910 and 1912, Italy 1911, and Russia 1912 and 1914.Google Scholar

²¹ Victor, Kiernan, “Victorian London: unending purgatory”, New Left Review, no 76 (11–12 1972), p. 81.Google Scholar

²² An interesting example of this correlation between national prestige and “hegemonic impulse” has been given by Lorwin: “In the course of their national and international activities, the German socialists could not but become aware of the fact that their own successes were concomitant with the rise of the German Imperial State. […] To put it paradoxically, the prestige and success of German labor and of German socialism were intertwined with, and dependent on, the success and prestige of the German Empire.” —Lewis, L. Lorwin, Labor and Internationalism (New York, 1929), pp. 142–143.Google Scholar

²³ “If they [the workers] had strong feelings, one way or the other, they, unlike the loquacious educated classes, were silent about them.” — Victor, Kiernan, “Preface to the Penguin Edition”, in The Lords of Human Kind. European attitudes to the outside world (Harmondsworth, 1972), p. xxi.Google Scholar Also on this problem: Geoff, Eley, “Social Imperialism in Germany. Reformist Synthesis or Reactionary Sleight of Hand?”, in Radkau, Joachim and Imanuel, Geiss (eds), Imperialismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Gedenkschrift für George W.F. Hallgarten (Munich, 1976).Google Scholar A rare attempt to overcome the analytical difficulties is Richard, Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class. Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War 1899–1902 (London, 1972).Google Scholar

²⁴ Bédarida writes about “the superiority complex which they [the French workers] experienced in relation to those peoples considered as inferior and primitive.” — François, Bédarida, “The French Working-Class Movement and Colonial Expansion — A Reappraisal”, Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, no 19 (1969), p. 5.Google Scholar Some information on the attitudes of British workers toward colonialism is contained in Dave, Russell, Popular Music in England 1840–1914 (Manchester, 1987), pp. 112–130, 275–278.Google Scholar On Germany see Gottfried, Mergner, “Solidarität mit den ‘Wilden’? Das Verhältnis der deutschen Sozialdemokratie zu den afrikanischen Widerstandskämpfen in den ehemaligen deutschen Kolonien um die Jahrhundertwende”, in Frits, van Holthoon and Marcel, van der Linden (eds), Internationalism in the Labour Movement 1830–1940 (Leiden, 1988),Google Scholar vol. I. As is well-known, the national elites tried to use these colonialist sentiments in their social-imperialist policies. For instance, Disraeli at the time of the extension of the franchise in the Second Reform Act deliberately invoked these sentiments to distract attention from growing class conflicts in his own country. See Freda, Harcourt, “Disraeli's Imperialism, 1866–1868”, Historical Journal, 23 (1980). Similar things could be said about the Mexican adventure of Napoleon III or Bismarck's policies.Google Scholar

²⁵ Chamberlain, M. E., “Imperialism and Social Reform”, in Eldridge, C. C. (ed.), British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (London and Basingstoke, 1984), pp. 159–160.Google Scholar

²⁶ In 1909–10, Britain possessed an overseas area of 29,122,149 square kilometers with 351,268,761 inhabitants; France: 6,835,727 km² (39,659,758 inh.); Germany: 2,657,204 km² (10,801,200 inh.); and Italy: 454,650 km² (679,551 inh.). — Zöpfl, G., “Kolonien und Kolonialpolitik”, Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, vol. V (Jena, 1910), pp. 1026–1031. Russia, of course, had no overseas colonies.Google Scholar

²⁷ Eugen, Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France (Stanford, Cal., 1976), p. 206.Google Scholar

²⁸ The importance of this innovation has escaped the attention of most social historians. See, however, Weber, , Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 219–220,Google Scholar and especially David, Vincent, “Communication, Community and the State”, in Clive, Elmsley and James, Walvin (eds), Artisans, Peasants and Proletarians, 1760–1860. Essays presented to Gwyn A. Williams (London, 1985).Google Scholar

²⁹ Industrialization was a necessary condition for the introduction of generalized compulsory education because the withdrawal from the labour process during 5 to 7 years of all children and the maintenance of primary schools requires a high level of labour productivity. This explains why German attempts to realize compulsory education during the seventeenth and eighteenth century failed. — Joachim, Lohmann, “Die Entwicklung der Halb- und Ganztagsschule”, Paedagogica Hfstorica, VI (1967), pp. 133–134,Google Scholar and Karl-Heinz, Guntheret al.,Geschichte der Erziehung, 11th Ed. (Berlin, 1972), pp. 140–141.Google Scholar

³⁰ An analysis of causes in Peter, Flora, “Die Bildungsentwicklung im Prozess der Staaten- und Nationenbildung”, in Peter, Christian Ludz (ed.), Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte [= Sonderheft 16 of the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte], 1972.Google Scholar

³¹ All German states had an eight-year period of compulsory education (6 to 14 age group), except Bavaria and Württemberg (7 to 14 age group).

³² Peter, Flora, Indikatoren der Modernisierung. Ein historisches Datenhandbuch (Opladen, 1975), p. 73.Google Scholar

³³ Dina, Bertoni Jovine, Storia dell'educazione populare in Italia (Bari, 1965), pp. 148–167, 199–214.Google Scholar

³⁴ Michael, Kaser, “Education in Tsarist and Soviet Development”, in Abramsky, C. and Beryl, J. Williams (eds), Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr (London and Basingstoke, 1974), pp. 235–236.Google Scholar

³⁵ Marzio, Barbagli, Educating for Unemployment. Politics, Labor Markets, and the School System — Italy, 1859–1973. Translated by Robert, H. Ross (New York, 1982), p. 75.Google Scholar

³⁶ Florinsky, (1931), quoted in William, H.E. Johnson, Russia's Educational Heritage (Pittsburgh, 1950), p. 197.Google Scholar

³⁷ Pankratova, A.M., Istorija proletariata SSSR (Moscow, 1935), p. 168. Not all these literate workers will have learned reading in “normal” schools. Many of them probably got lessons in factory schools, with the clergy or in military service.Google Scholar

³⁸ The following two contradictory quotes, from the Italian debate about 1840, may be considered typical:

* Il vero amico del popolo, a periodical of the Papal state, wrote in 1843: “If likewise one diffused education in minute proportions, it would inevitably happen that the people would lose their primitive ingenuity and simplicity, they would become estranged from their traditions, and they would no longer love the force of authority above all else; it is of little use to teach the people to read and write, and it can bring grievous results.”

* A memorandum addressed to the Grand Duke of Tuscany declared in 1838: “Where there is more education for the masses, the People are better-mannered, they carry out the laws that civil society constitutes and preserves, appreciating their advantages and recognizing the necessity of constraint.” — Quotes from Barbagli, , Educating for Unemployment, pp. 51–52.Google Scholar

³⁹ See, for instance, Jacques, Ozouf and Mona, Ozouf, “Le thème du Patnotisme dans les manuels primaires”, Mouvement Social, no 49(1964);Google ScholarLemmermann, H., Kriegserziehung im Kaiserreich. Studien zur politischen Funktion von Schule und Schulmusik 1890–1918 (Lilienthal and Bremen, 1984).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ This can be seen in Italy: Simonetta, Soldani, “The Conflict between Church and State in Italy on Primary Education in the Period Following Unification”, in Willem, Frijhoff (ed.), L'Offre D'ecole (Paris, 1983).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See, for instance, Peter, Gstettner, Die Eroberung des Kindes durch die Wissenschaft. Aus der Geschichte der Disziplinierung (Reinbek, 1981), esp. pp. 43–89.Google Scholar

⁴² Hurt, J.S., “Drill, Discipline, and the Elementary School Ethos”, in Phillip, McCann (ed.), Popular Education and Socialization in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1977), p. 170.Google Scholar

⁴³ Booth, , Life and Labour, series 3, vol. 4, p. 202.Google Scholar Quoted in Gareth, Stedman Jones, Languages of Class. Studies in English working class history 1832–1982 (Cambridge, 1983), p.222. Jones in this connection refers to the demobilizing, “deadening effects of elementary education”.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Göran, Therborn, “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy”, New Left Review, no 103 (1977), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Moorhouse, H.F., “The Political Incorporation of the British Working Class: An Interpretation”, Sociology, 7 (1973), p. 346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁶ Naturally, I am fully aware of the fact that female suffrage was established much later. However, considering the fact that classes are structured along patriarchal family lines the extent of male suffrage might be considered as a first approximation of working-class in-volvement in parliamentary processes.

⁴⁷ Table 4 gives the Social Democratic vote as a percentage of the total electorate, and not (as is more usual) as a percentage of the valid votes. This is done because in my opinion the first percentage gives a better impression of socialist influence than the second.

⁴⁸ Referring to the collapse of the Second International Abendroth wrote: “Die sozialistischen Parteien, die noch nicht zu grossen, seit langem legalen Massenparteien geworden waren, blieben also im allgemeinen kriegsfeindlich, während die institutionalisierten Massenparteien sich nach dem Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges fast ausnahmslos der Kriegspolitik ihrer Regierungen unterwarfen.” — Wolfgang, Abendroth, Sozialgeschichte der europäischen Arbeirerbewegung, 7th Ed. (Frankfurt, 1970), p. 83.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ This distinction has been made in Morris, Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago and London, 1964), pp. 81–82. Janowitz reduces the second aspect to “the symbolic value of the armed forces for the population as a whole”. However, I will argue that other secondary influences might have been relevant as well.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Military sociologists differ in their opinion on the effects of military socialization, but all seem to agree that army life exerts a discernable influence. Compare the views in Hubert, Treiber, Wie man Soldaten macht. Sozialisation in kasernierter Vergesellschaftung (Düsseldorf, 1973),Google Scholar and Albrecht, Rothacher, “On the Effects and Noneffects of Military Socialization”, Armed Forces and Society, VI (1979–1980), pp. 332–334.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Some comparative observations on corporal punishment in the German, Austrian and Russian armies can be found in Anton, I. Denikin, The career of a tsarist officer. Memoirs, 1872–1916. An annotated translation from the Russian by Margaret, Patoski (Minneapolis, 1975), pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

⁵² Anton, I. Denikin, Staraja Armija (Paris, 1931), pp. 142–143.Google Scholar

⁵³ Hugh, Cunningham, The Volunteer Force. A Social and Political History 1859–1908 (London, 1975), pp. 103–126.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Victor, G. Kieman, “Conscription and Society in Europe before the War of 1914–1918”, in Foot, M.R.D. (ed.), War and Society. Historical Essays in Honour and Memory off. R. Western 1928–1971 (London, 1973), p. 156.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Brian, Bond, War and Society in Europe 1870–1970 (London, 1986), p. 66.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ One example. Gestrich shows in his monograph on the history of youth culture in the village of Ohmenhausen (Württemberg) how during the nineteenth century dislike of the army was replaced by enthusiasm. “Militärdienst wurde zur Ehrensache und in die gegenseitigen Abgrenzungsversuche der Jahrgänge eingebaut. Wer noch nicht Rekrut gewesen war, durfte auf der Strasse keine Soldatenlieder singen, ohne von den älteren ‘die Gosch voll’ zu kriegen.” — Andreas, Gestrich, Traditionelle Jugendkultur und Industrialisierung. Sozialgeschichte der Jugend in einer ländlichen Arbeitergemeinde Würuembergs 1800–1920 (Gōttingen, 1986), p. 124.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Allen, K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army. The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917) (Princeton, 1980), pp. 40–41.Google ScholarCompare, Bond, War and Society, p. 68: Russia “could hardly attempt to introduce the more idealistic “civic” aspects of the nation in arms when these principles had made such little headway in civil society.”Google Scholar

⁵⁸ John, Whittam, The Politics of the Italian Army 1861–1918 (London, 1977), p. 114,Google Scholar writes about a “large number of young men, especially in Sicily and the south, who evaded service.” For France see Roland, Andréani, “L'Antimilitarisme en Languedoc Méditerranéen avant la Première Guerre Mondiale”, Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 20 (1973).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The research in this area is not very well developed. But see e.g., Ferdinando, Cordova, Democrazia e repressione nell'Italia di fine secolo (Rome, 1983);Google ScholarDieter, Fricke, “Zur Rolle des Militarismus nach innen in Deutschland vor dem ersten Weltkrieg”, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 6(1958);Google ScholarRoger, Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1893 to 1985 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 16–25.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ “This sequence may tentatively be explained by the degree to which the introduction of each system represented a break with the liberal ideas concerning the assignment of guilt and responsibility among liberals, groups, and the state. […] The introduction of accident insurance or workmen's compensation constituted the least radical break with liberalism since it could be rationalized by redefining the old idea of liability for individually caused damages. […] Unemployment insurance was usually introduced last because the notion of state support for the ‘undeserving poor’ required the most radical break with liberal and patrimonial principles.” — Peter, Flora and Jens, Alber, “Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe”, in Peter, Flora and Arnold, J. Heidenheimer (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick and London, 1981), pp. 50–52.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Hatzfeld tried to explain the slowness of French insurance development by referring to the small economic growth rates, which implied that the unemployment problem never became as urgent as it was in the neighbouring countries. — Henri, Hatzfeld, Du paupérisme í la sécurité sociale 1850–1940. Essai sur les origines de la sécurité sociale en France (Paris, 1971), p. 47.Google Scholar

⁶² Bernice, Madison, “The Organization of Welfare Service”, in Cyril, E. Black (ed.), The Transformation of Russian Society. Aspects of Social Change since 1861 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 520–521.Google Scholar

⁶³ The concepts of the Heavy and Helping Hand approaches are explored more fully in Saundra, K. Schneider, “The Sequential Development of Social Programs in Eighteen Welfare States”, Comparative Social Research, 5 (1982).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Quoted from Tony, Cliff, Lenin, vol. I (London, 1975), p. 332. My emphasis — MvdL.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Gerhard, A. Ritter, Social Welfare in Germany and Britain. Origins and Development. Translated by Kim, Traynor (Leamington Spa and New York, 1986), pp. 180–181.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Hatzfeld, , Du Paupérisme, especially pp. 190–261;Google ScholarVolker, Sellin, Die Anfänge staatlicher Sozialreform im liberalen Italien (Stuttgart, 1971), pp. 138–154.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Gaston, V. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York, 1971), p. 336.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Thomas, Simons, “Einführung in das Recht der sozialen Sicherheit von Italien”, in Gerhard, Igi et al., Einführung in das Recht der sozialen Sicherheir von Frankreich, Gròssbritannien und Italien [ = Vierteljahresschrift für Sozialrecht, Beiheft 1] 1977, p. 353;Google ScholarSellin, , Anfänge, pp. 153–154.Google Scholar On the distrust of British workers: Henry, Pelling, “The Working C1ass and the Origins of the Welfare State”, in Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, 2nd ed. (London, 1979);Google Scholar on the distrust of French workers: Hatzfeld, , Du Paupérisme, pp. 185–261.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Solomon, M. Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet Union (New York, 1951), p. 338.Google Scholar See also Cliff, , Lenin, pp. 332–337.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ritter, , Social Welfare, p. 79.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Quote from 1889 in Ritter, , Social Welfare, p. 35.Google Scholar

⁷² A fact already pointed out in Annie, Kriegel, Le pain et les roses. Jalons pour une histoire des socialismes (Paris, 1968), p. 129.Google Scholar

⁷³ According to Ragin “a synthetic [comparative] strategy should embody as much of the strict comparative logic of experimental design as possible. This logic is a key feature of caseoriented comparative study. It is apparent in this strategy's concern for combinations of conditions and in its allowance for complex, conjunctural causation. According to the metatheory of this strategy, social causes often modify the effects of other causes, sometimes mutating and transforming their impact. Such causal complexity cannot be captured easily in statistical analyses, especially in additive models.” — Charles, C. Ragin, The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley etc., 1987), pp. 82–83.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ The concept was perhaps for the first time introduced in Dieter, Senghaas, Aufrüstung durch Rüstungskontrolle. über den symbolischen Gebrauch von Gewalt (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 81–86.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Guenther, Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany. A Study in Working-Class Isolation and National Integration (Totowa, 1963), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ These factors are mentioned in Leon, Trotsky, My Life. An Attempt at an Autobiography (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 240–241,Google Scholar and in Hans-Joachim, Bieber, Gewerkschaften in Krieg und Revolution. Arbeiterbewegung, Industrie, Staat und Militär in Deutschland 1914–1920, vol. I (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 81–82.Google Scholar