Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 March 2015
This Opinion Note continues the discussion started in Antonio Donini and Daniel Maxwell's “From Face-to-Face to Face-to-Screen: Remote Management, Effectiveness and Accountability of Humanitarian Action in Insecure Environments”, published previously in the Review, by exposing the realities of Médecins Sans Frontières' (MSF) struggle with the issue of remote management. By reviewing MSF's experience with remote management in Somalia and Afghanistan, the authors explore how operational compromise evolves over time, based on specific contextual factors, and highlight the challenges that this form of compromised action poses to MSF's identity and principles.
1 Donini, Antonio and Maxwell, Daniel, “From Face-to-Face to Face-to-Screen: Remote Management, Effectiveness and Accountability of Humanitarian Action in Insecure Environments”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 890, 2014, pp. 383–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 “The withdrawal of senior international or national humanitarian managers from the location of the provision of assistance or other humanitarian action which represents an adaptation to insecurity and a deviation from normal programming practice”: ibid., p. 384.
3 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Katherine Haver, “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations”, HPG Report No. 23, September 2006, p. 39.
4 MSF Charter and Principles, available at: www.msf.org/msf-charter-and-principles.
5 The Chantilly Principles, 1995, available at: http://association.msf.org/sites/default/files/rst_library_item/Principles%20Chantilly%20EN.pdf; the La Mancha Agreement, 2006, available at: http://association.msf.org/sites/default/files/rst_library_item/La%20Mancha%20Agreement%20EN.pdf.
6 From Note 2: Compromises to our Modus Operandi, MSF International General Assembly, Brussels 27–29 June, 2013.
7 Bradol, Jean-Harvé, “The Sacrificial International Order and Humanitarian Action”, in Weissman, Fabrice (ed.), In the Shadow of Just Wars, C.: Hurst & Co, London, 2004, p. 9Google Scholar.
8 François Jean, From Ethiopia to Chechnya: Reflections on Humanitarian Action, 1988–1999, MSF, 2008, pp. 164–165.
9 See “David Haines – Obituary”, The Telegraph, 14 September 2014, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/11095290/David-Haines-obituary.html.
10 Andrew Gilligan, “Is Foreign Aid Just Money Down the Drain?”, The Telegraph, 17 August 2013, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10248706/Is-foreign-aid-just-money-down-the-drain.html.
11 MSF, “Three MSF Aid Workers Killed in Fatal Incident in Kismayo”, press statement, 28 January 2008, available at: www.msf.org/article/three-msf-aid-workers-killed-fatal-incident-kismayo-somalia.
12 Bradbury, Mark, State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 2010, p. 8Google Scholar.
13 Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Jean S. Renouf, “Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote Management of Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas”, Humanitarian Outcomes, February 2010, p. 27.
14 A. Stoddard, A. Harmer and K. Haver, above note 3, p. 33.
15 A. Donini and D. Maxwell, above note 1, p. 399.
16 “Drought-Hit Somalia on Brink of Humanitarian Disaster, Warns UN Expert”, UN News Centre, 2 March 2011, available at: www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37660#.VBq4Y_mSy9o.
17 A. Stoddard, A. Harmer and K. Haver, above note 3, p. 33.
18 MSF, “MSF Forced to Close All Medical Programmes in Somalia”, press statement, 14 August 2013, available at: www.msf.org/article243/msf-forced-close-all-medical-programmes-somalia.
19 Ibid. To the surprise of many, this closure also affected Somaliland (where no incidents took place) and not Dadaab in Kenya (where the two Spanish staff were abducted). The rationale behind this was that the authorities accused (Al Shebab, TFG) were allowed to freely circulate in Somaliland, and not in Kenya. In practice, of course, they freely circulate in both places, hence the controversial nature of this decision.
20 MSF, “Five MSF Workers Killed in Serious Incident in Afghanistan”, press release, 2 June 2004, available at: www.msf.org/article/five-msf-workers-killed-serious-incident-afghanistan.
21 MSF, “MSF Pulls Out of Afghanistan”, press release, 28 June 2004, available at: www.msf.org/article/msf-pulls-out-afghanistan.
22 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Action Plan for Afghanistan, Geneva, 2009, p. 1.
23 Ministry of Public Health, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan, Kabul, January 2009, p. 10.
24 MSF, “Helmand – Lashkar Gah Assessment”, internal report, 2 May 2009.
25 The official name of the Taliban is “Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan”, which is the old name used during their rule in Kabul. From their point of view, they are the legitimate government of Afghanistan, currently in exile, driven out by foreign invaders. Following that logic, their man is the legitimate, not the “shadow”, minister of health. However, the term “shadow” was widely used to refer to members of their parallel administration.