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Politics and principles: The impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on principled humanitarian action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2021

Emma O'Leary
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Abstract

For some time, the impact of counterterrorism (CT) measures and sanctions on humanitarian action did not attract the attention that it merited. However, owing to a surge in awareness of this issue over the past two years, the fact that CT measures and sanctions can have negative consequences for principled humanitarian action is now widely accepted by a broad range of actors, and is supported by a strong body of research identifying and analyzing these impacts. This article adds to this existing work by examining recent developments related to this issue. It looks at the impact of growing risk aversion in relation to CT measures and sanctions among donors, humanitarian organizations and other actors on principled humanitarian action, and highlights recent efforts to address and mitigate these impacts. The central argument is that CT and sanctions risks cannot be eliminated from humanitarian action. As such, policy change is needed to protect principled humanitarian action from further detrimental impacts and to ensure that people can access the assistance they need, regardless of where they are located.

Keywords

principled humanitarian actioncounterterrorismsanctionsrisk
Type
Impact of sanctions and other counterterrorism measures on the humanitarian space
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 103 , Issue 916-917: Counterterrorism, sanctions and war , April 2021 , pp. 459 - 477
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC

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Footnotes

*

The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the Norwegian Refugee Council's institutional position.

References

1 See, for example, Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), July 2013; Jessica S. Burniske and Naz K. Modirzadeh, Pilot Empirical Survey Study on the Impact of Counterterrorism Measures on Humanitarian Action, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, March 2017; Emma O'Leary, Principles under Pressure: The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism on Principled Humanitarian Action, NRC, June 2018.

2 For more on the links between humanitarian action, IHL and the normative background to the humanitarian principles, see Kate Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law: Study 4, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Report No. 5, in Overseas Development Institute (ODI), The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice, London, March 2000; Labbé, Jérémie and Daudin, Pascal, “Applying the Humanitarian Principles: Reflecting on the Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2016Google Scholar.

3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement, Geneva, August 2015, available at: www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/4046-the_fundamental_principles_of_the_international_red_cross_and_red_crescent_movement.pdf (all internet references were accessed in August 2021).

4 J. Labbé and P. Daudin, above note 2, p. 186.

5 OCHA, “OCHA on Message: What are the Humanitarian Principles?”, June 2012, available at: www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf.

6 K. Mackintosh, above note 2, p. 13.

7 UNGA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991; UNGA Res. 58/114, 5 February 2004. See also ICRC and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief, Geneva, 1994Google Scholar; Sphere, The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, Geneva, 2018Google Scholar.

8 Katherine Haver and William Carter, What It Takes: Principled Pragmatism to Enable Access and Quality Humanitarian Aid in Insecure Environments, Secure Access in Volatile Environments Research Programme, Humanitarian Outcomes, November 2016, p. 37.

9 Nicholas Leader, The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice, HPG Report No. 2, ODI, London, March 2000, p. 4.

10 See, for example, K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 1; J. S. Burniske and N. K. Modirzadeh, above note 1; E. O'Leary, above note 1; Alice Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter: Safeguarding Humanitarian Action, International Peace Institute, December 2019; InterAction, Detrimental Impacts: How Counter-Terror Measures Impede Humanitarian Action, April 2021.

11 See UN Security Council, “Sanctions”, available at: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information.

12 UNSC Res. 2462, 28 March 2019; UNSC Res. 1373, 28 September 2001.

13 UNSC Res. 751, 24 April 1992.

14 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Chap. V, Art. 25.

15 See, for example, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Extraterritorial Sanctions on Trade and Investments and European Responses, requested by the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade, November 2020.

16 For an overview of these, see the EU Sanctions Map, available at: www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main.

17 EU, Council Regulation 2016/2137 Amending Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria, 6 December 2016; US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Administration Regulations, March 2020.

18 NRC, Toolkit for Principled Humanitarian Action: Managing Counterterrorism Risks, May 2020, available at: www.nrc.no/toolkit/principled-humanitarian-action-managing-counterterrorism-risks/.

19 An example of this can be found in grant agreements of the US Agency for International Development (USAID): USAID, Certifications, Assurances, Representations, and Other Statements of the Recipient: A Mandatory Reference for ADS Chapter 303, May 2018, pp. 4–5, available at: www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/303mav.pdf.

20 See International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Risk and Humanitarian Culture: An ICVA Briefing Paper, Geneva, January 2020, p. 6.

21 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Recommendations for Reducing Tensions in the Interplay between Sanctions, Counterterrorism Measures and Humanitarian Action, Chatham House, London, August 2017, p. 6.

22 Supreme Court of the United States, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. (2010), Nos 08-1498, 09-89, 21 June 2010; Marine Buissonniere, Sarah Woznick and Leonard Rubenstein, The Criminalization of Healthcare, Johns Hopkins, Safeguarding Health in Conflicts and University of Essex, June 2018.

23 E.-C. Gillard, above note 21, p. 2.

24 Jessica Alexander and Hannah Stoddard, “Then and Now: 25 Years of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse”, The New Humanitarian, 11 February 2021, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2021/2/11/25-years-of-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse; Philip Kleinfeld, “Congo Aid Scam Triggers Sector-Wide Alarm”, The New Humanitarian, 11 June 2020, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigation/2020/06/11/Congo-aid-fraud-corruption-Mercy-Corps.

25 Ben Parker, “UK Keeps Limits on Cash Aid in Syria Over Counter-Terror Fears”, The New Humanitarian, 16 May 2019, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/05/16/uk-keeps-limits-cash-aid-syria-over-counter-terror-fears.

26 Campbell MacDiarmid and Jack Dutton, “UK Cuts Cash Aid to Northeast Syria, Citing Fear of Funding ISIS”, The National, 22 April 2019, available at: www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/uk-cuts-cash-aid-to-northeast-syria-citing-fear-of-funding-isis-1.851970.

27 B. Parker, above note 25.

28 Department for International Development, Saving Lives, Building Resilience, Reforming the System: The UK Government's Humanitarian Reform Policy, London, September 2017.

29 For the full text of the clause, see Lindsay Hamsik, NGOs and Risk: Managing Uncertainty in Local-International Partnerships – Case Studies: Northeast Nigeria and South Sudan, InterAction, USAID and Humanitarian Outcomes, March 2019, p. 10.

30 United States Code, 2006 ed., Title 18, “Crimes and Criminal Procedure”, Chap. 113B, Sec. 2339B, “Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations”.

31 See, for example, Lydia Poole and Vance Culbert, Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, NRC and UN Development Programme, June 2019.

32 NRC, above note 18.

33 E. O'Leary, above note 1, p. 23.

34 Ibid., p. 21; L. Hamsik, above note 29.

35 International NGO Safety Organisation, “A Declaration of Global Intent”, The Hague, October 2012, p. 5.

36 Damascus-Based INGOs, Understanding the Operational Impacts of Sanctions on Syria II: Damascus-Based INGOs and Bank De-Risking, April 2021.

37 NRC, “Future of Aid Work at Risk in Iran Due to U.S. Sanctions”, 5 August 2019, available at: www.nrc.no/news/2019/august2/aid-work-in-iran-at-risk-due-to-u.s.-sanctions/.

38 UNSC Res. 751, 24 April 1992.

39 K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 1, pp. 73–75.

40 See, for example, K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, above note 1; E. O'Leary, above note 1; European Center for Non-Profit Law, A String of Successes in Changing Global Counter-Terrorism Policies that Impact Civil Space, Budapest, July 2016.

41 UNSC Res. 1535, 26 March 2004.

42 Information on the negotiations for Resolution 2462 can be found in UN Security Council, “Combatting the Financing of Terrorism Open Debate”, 27 March 2019, available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2019/03/combatting-financing-of-terrorism-open-debate.php.

43 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “The Massive Perils of the Latest U.N. Resolution on Terrorism”, Just Security, 8 July 2019, available at: www.justsecurity.org/64840/the-massive-perils-of-the-latest-u-n-resolution-on-terrorism/.

44 UNSC Res. 2462, 28 March 2019.

45 UNSC Res. 2482, 19 July 2019.

46 European Commission, Humanitarian Aid General Model Grant Agreement, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, June 2020, Art. 18, p. 76.

47 USAID, above note 19.

48 Ibid.

49 Charity & Security Network, “USAID Revises Grantee Documents Relating to Anti-Terrorism Requirements”, May 2020, available at: https://charityandsecurity.org/news/usaid-revises-grantee-documents-relating-to-anti-terrorism-requirements/.

50 Graduate Institute Geneva, “The Compliance Dialogue on Syria-Related Humanitarian Payments”, 29 May 2020, available at: www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/compliance-dialogue-syria-related-humanitarian-payments.

51 NRC, “Review Sanction Regimes to Facilitate Covid-19 Response”, April 2020, available at: www.nrc.no/news/2020/april/review-sanction-regimes-to-facilitate-covid-19-response/.

52 European Commission, Guidance Note on the Provision of Humanitarian Aid to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic in Certain Environments Subject to EU Restrictive Measures, C (2020) 3179 final, Brussels, 11 May 2020, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/200511-syria-humanitarian-aid-guidance-note_en.pdf.

53 European Commission, Guidance Note on the Provision of Humanitarian Aid to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic in Certain Environments Subject to EU Restrictive Measures, C (2020) 7983 final, Brussels, December 2020, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/201116-humanitarian-aid-guidance-note_en.pdf.

54 European Commission, above note 52, p. 9.

55 Ibid., p. 12.

56 Ibid., p. 10.

57 US Department of the Treasury, “Publication of a Fact Sheet on the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19”, 4 April 2020, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20200416.

58 US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Underscores Commitment to Global Flow of Humanitarian Aid in Face of COVID-19 Pandemic”, Washington, DC, 9 April 2019, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm969.

59 Peter Maurer, “Without Urgent Action to Protect Essential Services in Conflict Zones We Face Vast Humanitarian Disaster”, speech given to the UN Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population, 27 April 2021, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/without-urgent-action-protect-essential-services-conflict-zones-we-face-vast-humanitarian.

60 UK Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, c. 13, 2018, available at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/13/contents.

61 Simmons & Simmons, “Overview of UK Financial Sanctions Regime Post Brexit”, February 2020, available at: https://tinyurl.com/3vkxcsnn.

62 US Department of the Treasury, “Issuance of Counter Terrorism General Licenses and related FAQs; Counter Terrorism Designations; Venezuela-Related Designations; CAATSA – Russia-Related Designations; Yemen-Related Designations Updates”, January 2021, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210119.

63 See, for example, EU, above note 17.

64 European Commission, “EU-Level Contact Point for Humanitarian Aid in Environments Subject to EU Sanctions”, 2021, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/restrictive-measures-sanctions/eu-level-contact-point-humanitarian-aid-environments-subject-eu-sanctions_en.

65 UNSC Res. 2551, 12 November 2020; European Commission, Commission Frequently Asked Questions on EU Restrictive Measures in Syria, Brussels, September 2017, p. 7.

66 See, for example, Action Against Hunger et al., “Counter-Terrorism Frameworks and Safeguarding Humanitarian Space: Humanitarian Recommendations ahead of the UNGA High Level Side Event”, Reliefweb, 23 September 2019, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/counter-terrorism-frameworks-and-safeguarding-humanitarian-space-humanitarian; ICRC, “Counter-Terrorism Measures Must Not Restrict Impartial Humanitarian Organizations from Delivering Aid”, 12 January 2019, available online at: www.icrc.org/en/document/counter-terrorism-measures-must-not-restrict-impartial-humanitarian-organizations.

67 UK Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, c. 3, 2019, available at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/3/contents.

68 Karen McVeigh, “MPs Pass Counter-Terror Bill Amendments to Protect Aid Workers”, The Guardian, 23 January 2019, available at: www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jan/23/mps-pass-counter-terror-bill-amendments-to-protect-aid-workers.

69 Jan Egeland, “New Dutch Terror Bill Must Not Target Aid Workers”, EU Observer, 14 October 2019, available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/146230.

70 Republic of Chad, Law No. 003/PR/2020, available at: www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica/Loi_terrorisme_du_Tchad_2020.pdf.

71 Geneva Call, “An Exemption for Humanitarian Activities in the New Swiss Counter-Terrorism Law: A Much-Needed Safeguard and a Welcome Step Protecting the Humanitarian Space”, 6 October 2020, available at: www.genevacall.org/an-exemption-for-humanitarian-activities-in-the-new-swiss-counter-terrorism-law-a-much-needed-safeguard-and-a-welcome-step-protecting-the-humanitarian-space/.

72 “Conclusion by President Emmanuel Macron of the National Humanitarian Conference”, Éylseé, 17 December 2020, available at: www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/12/17/conclusion-par-le-president-emmanuel-macron-de-la-conference-nationale-humanitaire.

73 Damascus-Based INGOs, Understanding the Operational Implications of Sanctions on Syria: Insights from Damascus-Based INGOs, June 2020.

74 Katie King, Naz K. Modirzadeh and Dustin A. Lewis, Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: UN Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, April 2016, p. 8.

75 NRC, above note 18.