¹ A discourse can be understood as the combination of the various statements and practices that come from a certain position of enunciation, and in turn reflect it. A discourse is more than simply language, as it encompasses the written, oral, imaginary and practical dimensions that together express, assert and defend the interests, sets of values and ideas, frames of reality, that are shaped by the position of enunciation (or standpoint). Discourses compete in social reality. Some are dominant while others are marginal, but according to Michel Foucault, all discourses involve and produce power. (See e.g. Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1999, p. 59. A discourse produces subjects as well as a ‘legitimation of power’.) In contrast to languages, which are ‘groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations), […] [discourses are] practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.’ (Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, transl. A.M. Sheridan Smith, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 49, quoted in Edkins, ibid., p. 47.) Some of the work of the sociologist Michel Foucault has concentrated on understanding what the conditions of existence of dominant discourses are. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, transl. Alan Sheridan Smith, Penguin, Harmondsworth, UK, 1991; and Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, transl. Richard Howard, Routledge, London, 1989.

² Poststructuralist theories about the subject provide a useful perspective on identity formation. Each in turn, theorists like Saussure, Freud and Lacan participated in what is sometimes called ‘decentring the subject’, a move aimed at challenging the Enlightenment's Cartesian subject – conscious, rational – by questioning its sense of rationality and completeness. For Lacan, the subject is neither full nor the master creator of its identity; rather, it is always incomplete and subject to the meanings, structures and power relations existing within social reality. Social reality is understood as a symbolic realm that already exists when an individual enters it at birth. The discourses making social reality form the baby individual into a subject: giving it an identity (starting with a name), a gender, and a language structure carrying meanings and values. The subject is thus created through its confrontation with social reality. In turn, it identifies itself as ‘itself’ through this passage (Lacan's mirror stage), following the assertion by the external Other (parents, authority) that the reflected creature it gazes at (in a mirror or in external discourses) is none other but itself, a full, complete subject. Both the interpellation by the Other, and its validation of the subject's identification with itself are done through systems of signs, such as language. See namely Slavoy Żiżek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, London/New York, 1989, pp. 100–102 and 113, and Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, transl. Alan Sheridan, Routledge, London, 1980.

³ Ernesto Laclau, preface in Żiżek, above note 2, p. xiv.

⁴ President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, quoted in Syed Irfan Raza, ‘Indian misstep to hit war on terror, US told: US military chief meets Zardari, Gen Kayani’, Dawn Internet Edition, 4 December 2008, available at: http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/04/top1.htm (visited 18 March 2009).

⁵ See e.g. ‘La victoire des victimes’, Le Temps, No. 3261, 1 December 2008, p. 1; and Denis Masmejan, ‘Pédophiles: Justice sans pardon’, Le Temps, 1 December 2008, p. 2, on the Swiss people's vote in favour of the non-prescription of punishment for paedophiles: ‘… le scrutin […] met en relief la difficulté de combattre une revendication qui nourrit sa légitimité en prenant, directement ou indirectement, le parti des victimes. Celui-ci est politiquement une valeur sÛre.’

⁶ See e.g. Amitav Ghosh, ‘India's 9/11? Not exactly’, The New York Times Online, Op. Ed., 2 December 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/opinion/ (visited 4 December 2008). Ghosh writes: ‘Since the terrorist assaults began in Mumbai last week, the metaphor of the World Trade Center attacks has been repeatedly invoked. From New Delhi to New York, pundits and TV commentators have insisted that “this is India's 9/11” and should be treated as such. […] But […] [n]ot only were the casualties far greater on September 11, 2001, but the shock of the attack was also greatly magnified by having no real precedent in America's history. India's experience of terrorist attacks, on the other hand, far predates 2001…’

⁷ Quotes taken from three articles: ‘Deadly bombings strike Iraqi city’, BBC News Online, 4 December 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7764576.stm (visited 18 March 2009); ‘Car bomb kills several in Pakistan’, Al Jazeera News Online (Al Jazeera.Net), 1 December 2008, available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2008/12/200812164740256637.html (visited 18 March 2009); ‘Israel completes forcible evacuation of disputed Hebron house’, Haaretz News Online, available at: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1043612.html (visited 1 December 2008).

⁸ Herrmann, Irène, ‘La revanche des victimes’, Revue Suisse d'Histoire (RSH), Vol. 57, No. 1, 2007, Société suisse d'histoire, p. 5.Google Scholar Underlying this meeting was the hypothesis that the plights of the individuals and groups referred to in victim-discourses could potentially be levelled and thus minimized, because of the more and more common use of the word in many different discourses (pp. 5, 9–10). This hypothesis is certainly interesting when it is read in parallel to the arguments presented within the same debate about the ‘forgotten victims’, or how victims were visibly ‘forgotten’ in the recording of history until the late twentieth century. The tendency to read history as having forgotten about victims, in the sense of having neglected them as a social group, occulting them before finally recognizing them, is arguably based on the belief that ‘victims’ as a collective identity has always existed, but was ignored for some specific reasons. It is a different matter to argue that, because individuals or groups were not recognized as ‘victims’ in the discourses of the time, including in their own, they did not ‘exist’ as such (as subject-victims) in discursive reality and therefore in the social frame. The argument about the ‘forgotten victims’ seems to say that the plights of the individuals were being neglected, as reflected by the fact that their recognition as victims did not exist. The twin arguments thus appear to take the following shape: on the one hand, the plight of individuals was forgotten because they were not identified as ‘victims’ until now; while on the other hand, their plight now risks becoming minimized and forgotten because today too many people are identified as ‘victims’!

⁹ For this article a number of pieces of work were reviewed at the Library and Research Service of the ICRC in Geneva and the library of the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies (as an independent visiting researcher), as well as on the Internet. Without being exhaustive, the review provided a good basis to detect the direction(s) of current research about victims. For an overview, see all the essays in RSH, above note 8); Jean-Michel Chaumont, La Concurrence des Victimes, Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1997; Denis Salas (ed), Victimes de Guerre en quête de Justice: Faire entendre leur voix et les pérenniser dans l'Histoire, Editions L'Harmattan, Sciences Criminelles, Paris, 2004.

¹⁰ Cornelio Sommaruga, in Thürer, Daniel, ‘Dunant's pyramid: Thoughts on the “humanitarian space”’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, March 2007, pp. 47–61 and 57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ See ‘Editorial’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 851, September 2003, pp. 465–466.

¹² Ibid., p. 465. The International Committee of the Red Cross, like the other components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – the National Societies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies – must ensure that its work conforms at all times to the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, namely humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality.

¹³ Criteria laid down in the Geneva Conventions as to who, in case of need, can or should benefit from protection and assistance from the ICRC, include the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war whether they are members of the armed forces or other militias – medical personnel, chaplains and in general all civilians and other persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.

¹⁴ Several pieces of work consider how the position of the victim concept has changed in the discourse of international law and show how it has gained greater space, importance and centrality over the last few years, parallel to developments in those bodies of law. See e.g. Annie Deperchin, ‘Victimes du premier conflit mondial et justice’, in Salas, above note 9, p. 29. Deperchin writes: ‘La Grande Guerre constitue un précédent historique dans la mesure où elle voit apparaître l'idée de responsabilités liées à la guerre et cela suppose qu’émerge le concept même de victime de guerre. […] Cependant, les victimes civiles n'étaient pas assez nombreuses et n'avaient pas suffisamment conscience de l'être pour constituer le vecteur des progrès de la justice de guerre qu'elles deviendront par la suite.' Deperchin therefore argues that the self-perception of civilians as victims was crucial in constituting their discourse, whose power helped shape the legal discourse. Some research, by contrast, argues that it is the discourse of justice and its legal counterpart that shapes and validates the identity of victim. In Salas, above note 9, it is pointed out that: ‘C'est ainsi seulement au terme de ce travail de justice, qui débute avec l'enquête, et s'achève à l'heure du verdict, qu'elles seront reconnues pour telles et définitivement investies de leur statut de victimes’, Bénédicte Chesnelong, ‘Victimes et justice des crimes de guerre et contre l'humanité’, in Salas, above note 9, p. 31; ‘C'est avec la guerre en Bosnie que le viol en temps de guerre a été reconnu comme “acte de guerre”, et qualifié de crime, “crime contre l'humanité” par le Tribunal Pénal International pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (suivi en cela par le Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda). C'est donc la première fois que les femmes qui l'ont subi se voient reconnaître comme des victimes’, Gisèle Donnard, ‘Les victimes de viol 'arme de guerre’: Crime contre l'humanité', in Salas, above note 9, p. 111; ‘Si le mot “victime” avait un sens, ce terme s'appliquerait à juste titre aux Cambodgiens. Il faudrait avoir subi les pertes des êtres chers, dans des conditions injustes, atroces et tragiques qui vous marquent à vie, pour pouvoir comprendre vraiment la douleur qui vous ronge et qui vous brÛle. Chaque être, même un animal, a un besoin inné de justice. […] Nous les victimes insistons et demandons la création d'un tribunal pénal international …’, Billon Ung Boun Hor, ‘Les victimes du génocide des Khmers Rouges: Un cri contre l'oubli et pour la justice’, in Salas, above note 9, p. 164.

¹⁵ The original Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, of 22 August 1864, followed by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

¹⁶ See Annette Becker, ‘Les victimes entre oubli et mémoire’, in RSH, above note 8. As Becker writes: ‘ … toute victime est bonne à secourir […] du moment qu'elle rentre dans les mesures conventionnelles. Or, les civiles, nouvelles victimes à partir de 1914, n'avaient pu être placés sous la juridiction conventionnelle comme les prisonniers militaires et les blesses’ (p. 18).

¹⁷ For comments on this point, see e.g. Joanne Dover, ‘The impact of the Northern Ireland “trouble” on victims in Britain’, in Proceedings of the Study Days held in October 2005: Promotion of Resources for Victims of Terrorist Acts and Their Families, Eureste.org, European Resources Terrorism, Belgium Red Cross, European Union, 2005, available at http://www.eureste.org/userfiles/files/texteng/Joanne_DOVER_les_actes_ENG.pdf (visited 15 April 2009). Based on her work and research with people who experienced violence from acts of terrorism, the author observes that, ‘It is important also to remember the resilience of human beings. We have the ability to cope with the most demanding and horrendous circumstances, something I see in my work every day. People come through these experiences and come out the other side with a good quality of life, having integrated the experiences and losses into a new existence’ (p. 53).

¹⁸ For more on this subject, see e.g. Daniel Munoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations, ICRC, Geneva, October 2004, pp. 8, 9, 11; Jacques Sémelin, ‘Quand les bourreaux se présentent comme des victimes’ and Sophie Wahnich, ‘La confusion des victimes, des héros et des bourreaux: Un symptôme d'amoralité?’, both in RSH, above note 8.

¹⁹ ‘The ICRC's Mission Statement’, 19 June 2008, available at http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/icrc-mission-190608?opendocument (visited 5 December 2008).

²⁰ The principle of impartiality of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement reads: ‘It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.’ See ‘The Fundamental Principles: Extract from the XXVIth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent’, 1 January 1995, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jmft?opendocument (visited 27 April 2009).

²¹ See above note 12.

²² The principle of humanity states that: ‘The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.’ See ‘The Fundamental Principles’, above note 20.

²³ Walker, Peter, ‘Victims of natural disasters and the right to humanitarian assistance: A practitioner's view’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 325, December 1998, p. 615.Google Scholar

²⁴ ‘The ICRC's Mission Statement’, above note 19.

²⁵ Thürer, above note 10, p. 57.

²⁶ Art. 4(d): ‘The role of the ICRC shall be in particular […] to endeavour at all times […] to ensure the protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims of such events and of their direct results.’ Available at http://icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/statutes-movement-220506/$File/Statutes-EN-A5.pdf (visited 11 March 2009).

²⁷ See Thürer, above note 10, pp. 56–57: ‘Max Huber described humanity as the “unconditional recognition of the value of whatever has a human face, in particular where people are helpless, weak, sick, imprisoned, endangered, deprived of their rights and impoverished”.’

²⁸ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁹ See Harroff-Tavel, Marion, ‘Do wars ever end? The work of the International Committee of the Red Cross when the guns fall silent’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851, September 2003, pp. 471ff.Google Scholar The author explains this ambition clearly and defines in her own words the notion of dignity: ‘[T]he ICRC wants the victims of armed conflicts to feel that their dignity is respected. The essence of dignity is a universal notion that is rooted in cultures, religions, value systems, ideologies and education. Its content varies from one context to another. Everywhere in the world, however, certain attitudes are basic to meaningful dignity: respect for life and for every person's physical and spiritual integrity; protection against arbitrary acts, abuse of power and discrimination; recognition of others as people able to find solutions; support for people who have been so humiliated that they have lost their self-esteem and no longer trust in their own capacities. The ICRC's ultimate goal is to help people or communities affected by armed violence to live in conditions that they consider respectful of their dignity. To that end, their fundamental rights must be respected, the needs they deem essential, in their cultural context, to a dignified life must be met, and they must play an active part in the implementation of lasting solutions to their humanitarian problems as identified by them.’ Ibid., pp. 471–472.

³⁰ Another definition of human dignity is found in Thürer, above note 10, p. 57: ‘… The general principle of respect for human dignity […], the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law, [….] is intended to shield human beings from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by unlawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the honour, the self-respect or the mental well being of a person.'

³¹ For studies that discuss the importance of the inter-social act of recognition of a person's identity and its perception as an act acknowledging and respecting her humanity, see for example: Rona M. Fields, ‘Impunity versus healing’, Ko'aga Rone'eta, se.iii, v. 3, 1996, paper presented at the International Conference on ‘Impunity and its Effects on Democratic Processes’, Santiago de Chile, 14 December 1996, available at: http://www.derechos.org/koaga/xi/2/fields.html (visited 14 November 2008). From a psychological point of view, the author explains that: ‘The vindication and validation requisite to social and psychological wholeness, can only be provided through public acknowledgment. When the victim's suffering continues exacerbation by his/her pariah status vis à vis the social political system, torture is extended in perpetuity’, p. 5. See also Jean-Michel Chaumont, La Concurrence des Victimes, above note 9, pp. 36–37. An important point Chaumont touches on is that the gaze of the Other (external discourses, the public, the authority) in recognizing Jews who survived the Nazi concentration camps as ‘victims’, as opposed to other identities such as ‘survivors’, is the necessary condition for many of them to feel that they exist in social reality. To be denied recognition as a victim by the Other is described by those people as a second death.

³² See for example: ICRC, ‘Assistance: General Introduction’, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/assistance_general_intro (visited 24 April 2009).

³³ Pascal Daudin and Hernan Reyes, ‘ICRC action on behalf of prisoners’, in International Responses to Traumatic Stress, Yael Danieli, Nigel Rodley and Lars Weisaeth (eds), Baywood Publishers, United Nations, 1996, p. 16. This section was handed over to delegates during their integration course (2006).

³⁴ ‘Report on the Restoring Family Links Strategy (and Implementation Plan) for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (2008–2018)’, CD/07/4.1, prepared by the ICRC Central Tracing Agency, Geneva, October 2007, following the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Geneva, 23–24 November 2007, p. 4.

³⁵ See Forsythe, David P., ‘The ICRC: A unique humanitarian protagonist’, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, March 2007, pp. 63–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of the debate whether ‘… the ICRC, with its limited mandate, and tied as it is to states and the state system of international relations, can really do very much to protect human dignity’ (p. 64).

³⁶ ‘Working for the ICRC: Values and principles’, 5 September 2003, available at: http://icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5R4JLY (visited 5 December 2008).

³⁷ ‘Applying culturally appropriate solutions’, above note 33, p. 10.

³⁸ See e.g. ICRC Iraq Delegation ‘Women in war: The International Committee of the Red Cross in Iraq’ (newsletter), March 2009, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/iraq-women-newsletter-050309/$File/iraq-women-in-war-eng.pdf (visited 15 April 2009). ‘The voices of women affected by the war in Iraq, such as those we have collected here, need to be better heard.’ (p. 1)

³⁹ ‘Civilians increasingly at risk in Afghanistan’, press briefing, 2 March 2009, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/afghanistan-press-briefing-020309 (visited 4 March 2009).

⁴⁰ Harroff-Tavel, above note 29.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 467, note 2.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 470–471.

⁴³ Munoz-Rojas and Frésard, above note 18, pp. 8, 9.

⁴⁴ Women and War, ICRC, Geneva, February 2008, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0944/$File/ICRC_002_0944.PDF (visited 15 April 2009); see also the first study on this subject: Charlotte Lindsey, Women Facing War, ICRC, Geneva, 2001.

⁴⁵ See ‘ICRC Strategy 2007–2010: Committed to meeting new challenges through action’, 7 February 2007, available at http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/strategy-2007-2010?opendocument (visited 5 December 2008).

⁴⁶ See e.g. the practical guide relating to the ICRC study Women Facing War (2001): ‘Addressing the needs of women affected by armed conflict: an ICRC guidance document’, ICRC, Geneva, 2004. According to the executive summary, ‘[b]oth the study and the guidance document itself endeavour to show that while women may be placed at risk by the outbreak of hostilities, they are not necessarily and inevitably victims.’ (p.1, available at http://icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0840/$File/0840_002_Executive_summary.pdf, visited 27 April 2009).

⁴⁷ For a similar and very interesting argument, see Gilbert Holleufer, ‘Le sentiment d'humiliation dans les guerres contemporaines’, in Philippe Cotter et Gilbert Holleufer, La Vengeance des Humiliés: les révoltes du 21^e siècle, Editions Eclectica, Geneva, 2008. He writes about the need to ‘ … restituer la nature de l’impératif humanitaire et d'identifier un paradigme d'empathie qui permettrait d'inclure non seulement les victimes mais aussi les hommes ordinaires, détruits par la violence sans avenir des guerres infra-étatiques. Et, ainsi, de s'occuper des nouveaux besoins des communautés en conflit, qui, dans le long cheminement vers le retour à la normale, dépendent peut-être davantage de ressources psychologiques et morales que matérielles.' (p. 98)

⁴⁸ Luc Huyse, ‘Victims’, in David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse (eds), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, Handbook Series, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2003, pp. 54–66.

⁴⁹ Karen Fogg, preface in Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (eds), above note 48.

⁵⁰ James J. Orr, ‘Victims and perpetrators in national memory: Lessons from post-World War Two Japan’, in RSH, above note 8, pp. 55, 57.

⁵¹ Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (eds), above note 48, back page comments.

⁵² Walker, above note 23, p. 616.