1 While engagement of armed actors may take place at any time and involve the strategies discussed below, the need to engage armed groups is more pressing in peace-building and state-building efforts, which form the focus of this article.

2 For case studies, see Ricigliano, Robert (ed.), Choosing to Engage Armed Groups and Peace Processes, Accord, No. 16, Conciliation Resources, London, 2005Google Scholar; McCartney, Clem, Engaging armed groups in peace processes: reflections for practice and policy from Colombia and the Philippines, Conciliation Resources Policy Paper, Conciliation Resources, London, 2006Google Scholar; Newman, Edward and Richmond, Oliver (eds), Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2006Google Scholar.

3 Kuperman, Alan, ‘The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: lessons from the Balkans’, in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, 2008, pp. 49–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Stedman, Stephen, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, in International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1997, pp. 5–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Grävingholt, Jörn, Hofmann, Claudia, and Klingebiel, Stephan, Development Cooperation and Non-state Armed Groups, German Development Institute, Bonn, 2007, p. 8Google Scholar: ‘The options open to development actors for engagement with NSAGs [non-state armed groups] can be roughly categorized as follows: avoidance of engagement: development policy consciously or unconsciously avoids countries, regions or situations in which NSAGs are involved. Disregard/observation/involuntary engagement: development policy is present in situations involving NSAGs, but takes no notice of them or tries not to become involved by resorting to “non-behaviour” or to behaviour geared solely to observation. Apolitical action/equidistance: development policy endeavours to make development-related and sometimes even conflict-related contributions, but they are deliberately kept apolitical. Exclusion: development policy supports the exclusion of NSAGs. Cooperation: development policy involves NSAGs directly in different ways. This may consist in direct account being taken of them in measures and dialogue fora or in their acting as cooperation partners.’

6 International relations theory looks at international relations from a theoretical, academic perspective. It aims at building a conceptual framework for analysing, conceptualizing, and structuring international relations. Realism specifically focuses on the importance of statism, survival, and self-help. Institutionalism believes instead in the power of institutions to shape actor preferences (by use of incentives and the redistribution of power, as well as cultural changes). Constructivism argues that international relations are socially constructed by their members and that these structures influence their members and their behaviour.

7 See also Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Dealing with armed non-state actors in state- and peace-building: types and strategies’, in Wolfgang Benedek, Christopher Daase, and Petrus Van Dyne (eds), Transnational Terrorism, Organised Crime and Peace-building, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2010, pp. 229–248; Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Fragile statehood, armed non-state actors and security governance’, in Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (eds), Private Actors and Security Governance, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2006, pp. 23–41.

8 On coercive diplomacy in general, see in particular Art, Robert J. and Cronin, Patrick M. (eds), United States and Coercive Diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2003Google Scholar; George, Alexander, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, United Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1991Google Scholar.

9 For instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued warrants of arrest against five leading members of the rebel-style Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, including its commander-in-chief, Joseph Kony, in 2005, as well as various warrants of arrest against leaders of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See ICC, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, ‘Warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8th July 2005 as amended on 27th September 2005’, 27 September 2005; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ‘Warrant of arrest (under seal)’, 10 February 2006; ICC, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ‘Warrant of arrest (under seal)’, 2 July 2007.

10 Goodhand, Jonathan and Sedra, Mark, ‘Bribes or bargains? Peace conditionalities and “post-conflict” reconstruction in Afghanistan’, in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, p. 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 On counter-insurgency, see in particular Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2006Google Scholar; Hoffman, Bruce, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2004Google Scholar; US Army & Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007Google Scholar.

12 Ricigliano, above note 2; Bercovitch, Jacob (ed.), Studies in International Mediation, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002Google Scholar.

13 Hartzell, Caroline A. and Hoddie, Matthew, Crafting Peace: Power-sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 2007Google Scholar; International Committee of the Red Cross, Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2003Google Scholar; Anna K. Jarstad, ‘Power-sharing: former enemies in joint government’, in Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 105–133; O'Flynn, Ian and Russel, David (eds), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Books, London, 2005Google Scholar.

14 Hofmann, Claudia, ‘Engaging Non-state armed groups in humanitarian action’, in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2006, pp. 396–409CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Bloomfield, David, Barns, Teresa, and Huyse, Luc (eds), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2003Google Scholar; Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Transitional Justice als Weg zu Frieden und Sicherheit: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 15, SFB 700, Berlin, 2008.

16 At the same time, in their actions and capabilities they often depend upon the political will and consent of their member states. This is particularly the case with the use of (military) force, since the UN and other multilateral organizations have to rely on decisions taken by the member states.

17 See UN Security Council, ‘The situation in Libya’, UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011.

18 See UN Security Council, ‘The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN Doc. S/RES/1596 (2005), 3 May 2005; UN Doc. S/RES/1896 (2009), 30 November 2009; UN Doc. S/RES/1952 (2010), 29 November 2010.

19 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, available at: http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf (last visited 18 December 2011).

20 Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200809151361.html (last visited 18 December 2011).

21 Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2008/0229/p25s01-woaf.html (last visited 18 December 2011).

22 Currently, 159 states are subject to the regulations of the Ottawa Treaty. Information available at: http://www.apminebanconvention.org/ (last visited 18 December 2011).

23 UN Security Council, ‘Women and peace and security’, UN Doc. S/RES/1820 (2008), 19 June 2008, and UN Doc. S/RES/1888 (2009), 30 September 2009.

24 See UN Security Council resolutions concerning the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, UN Doc. S/RES/1980(2011), 28 April 2011; Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/RES/1979(2011), 27 April 2011; and Sudan, UN Doc. S/RES/1978 (2011), 27 April 2011.

25 See, for example, the July 2006 cross-border raid by Hezbollah, kidnapping and murdering Israeli soldiers, leading up to the 2006 Lebanon War. The Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in a speech in July 2008 acknowledged that he had ordered the raid to pressure Israel to release numerous prisoners.

26 The Road Map for Peace, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989783.stm (last visited 18 December 2011).

27 Carter Center: http://www.cartercenter.org/index.html (last visited December 2011), and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue: http://www.hdcentre.org/ (last visited December 2011).

28 For ICRC's work in this particular field, see Mack, Michelle, Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-international Armed Conflicts, ICRC, 2008Google Scholar, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0923.htm (last visited 18 December 2011).

29 See also Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘NGOs and nonstate armed actors: improving compliance with international norms’, in United States Institute of Peace Special Report, No. 284, July 2011; Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Verhaltensänderung durch Normdiffusion? Ansätze von, DieIKRK und Geneva Call im Umgang mit bewaffneten Gruppen’, in Die Friedens-Warte (Journal of International Peace and Organization), Vol. 85, No. 4, 2010, pp. 73–98Google Scholar.

30 Julius Cavendish, ‘Luring fighters away from the Taliban: why an Afghan plan is floundering’, in Time World, 27 September 2011, available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2094897,00.html (last visited 18 December 2011).