1 PBS, “Thirty Years of America's Drug War: A Chronology”, available at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron (all internet references were accessed in March 2023).

2 Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel and Mark P. Sullivan, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 12 May 2011, pp. 9–10, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf.

3 Claire Suddath, “A Brief History of The War on Drugs”, Time, 25 May 2009, available at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html.

4 C. R. Seelke et al., above note 2, pp. 9–10.

5 Ibid., pp. 9–10.

6 Paoli, Letizia, “What Is the Link between Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking?”, Rausch, Vol. 6, No. 4-2017, 2018Google Scholar. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime defines an organized crime group as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences … in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, 2004, Art. 2.

7 Jonathan D. Rosen and Roberto Zepeda, Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico: The Transition from Felipe Calderón to Enrique Peña Nieto, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2016.

8 See, for instance, Michael Shifter, “Plan Colombia: A Retrospective”, Americas Quarterly, 18 July 2012, available at: www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/plan-colombia-a-retrospective/.

9 See, for instance, Ocampomi, “The Merida Initiative”, US Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, 7 September 2021, available at: https://mx.usembassy.gov/the-merida-initiative/.

10 IHRL applies to law enforcement situations, while IHL applies to armed conflict. Even though military forces are often involved in law enforcement, the principal actor in law enforcement is the police (who are civilians). The concrete difference is the regulation of the use of force: the principles of necessity, proportionality and precaution are conceived differently. For instance, “under the conduct of hostilities paradigm, the principle of precaution requires belligerents to take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. On the contrary, under the law enforcement paradigm, all precautions must be taken to avoid, as far as possible, the use of force as such, and not merely incidental civilian death or injury or damage to civilian objects.” Gaggioli, Gloria, “Legal Basis and Distinguishing Features of the Two Paradigms”, in Gaggioli, Gloria (ed), Expert Meeting: The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms, Geneva, 2013, p. 9Google Scholar.

11 June S. Beittel, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2022, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf.

12 On the one side, the relationship between Mexican traffickers was cooperative during the 1980s. It can be described as a Pax Padrino or “Peace of the Godfather”: see Nathan P. Jones, “The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience”, PhD diss., University of California Irvine, 2013.

13 “Mexico Troops Sent to Fight Drugs”, BBC News, 12 December 2006, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6170981.stm.

14 On US–Mexican cooperation, see Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, U.S.–Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2017, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf. On the escalation of violence, see, for example, Human Right Watch (HRW), Neither Rights nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico's “War on Drugs”, 2011, available at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf.

15 David A. Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 60, March 2011, available at: www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/03/Mexico_CSR60.pdf. See also Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context, Mexico and the United States: Confronting the Twenty-First Century Working Paper Series, 2010, available at: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8j647429.

16 C. R. Seelke et al., above note 2, pp. 9–10.

17 Council on Foreign Relations, “Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels”, 7 September 2022, available at: www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels.

18 Steven Scott Whitworth, “The Untold Story of Mexico's Rise and Eventual Monopoly of Methamphetamine Trade”, master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2008. See also US Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, Springfield, VA, 2013, available at: www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DIR-017-13%20NDTA%20Summary%20final.pdf; US Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, 2011, available at: www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf.

19 Council on Foreign Relations, above note 17.

20 “Mexico Troops Sent to Fight Drugs”, above note 13.

21 Guillermo Valdés, former director of Mexico's National Intelligence and Security Center, said in an interview that the military option was the only option available to fight against DTOs in Mexico. Juan Diego Quesada, “El Chapo es un genio de los negocios”, El País, 11 December 2013, available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/12/11/actualidad/1386718386_361181.html. On police corruption, see Colleen W. Cook, Mexico's Drug Cartels, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 16 October 2007, p. 10, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf.

22 D. A. Shirk, above note 15, p. 10.

23 Darinka Rodriguez, “El Ejército desplaza a Hacienda y se hace cargo de las aduanas mediante una nueva agencia nacional”, El País, 15 July 2021, available at: https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-07-15/el-ejercito-desplaza-a-hacienda-y-se-hace-cargo-de-las-aduanas-mediante-una-nueva-agencia-nacional.html. On the administration of Peña Nieto (2012–18), see, for instance, Patrick Corcoran, “Mexico Security Under Enrique Peña Nieto, 1 Year Review”, InSight Crime, 4 December 2013, available at: www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-security-under-enrique-pena-nieto-one-year-in.

24 J. S. Beittel, above note 11, p. 7.

25 HRW, above note 14, p. 4.

26 Karina Suárez, “México alcanza un nuevo récord de asesinatos”, El País, 22 June 2018, available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/06/22/mexico/1529620697_155674.html#?rel=mas.

27 Ioan Grillo, “Reporting on the Front Lines of Mexico's Drug War”, interview with National Public Radio, 24 October 2011.

28 Daniel Tovrov, “Mexico's President Calderon to Keep Fighting Drug War”, International Business Times, 5 December 2011, available at: www.ibtimes.com/mexicos-president-calderon-keep-fighting-drug-war-378914.

29 Ibid.

30 For a list of massacres of civilians, see “Factbox: Worst Atrocities in Mexico's drug war”, Reuters, 13 August 2012, available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-drugs-idUSBRE87C06820120813.

31 Including the AK-47 (and its variant known as the cuerno de chivo), as well as modified AR-15s and M-16s. John P. Sullivan and Samuel Logan, “Los Zetas: Massacres, Assassinations and Infantry Tactics,” The Counter Terrorist, 24 November 2010, available at: www.police1.com/terrorism/articles/los-zetas-massacres-assassinations-and-infantry-tactics-P55C81YakRLYCYk5/.

32 Out of the total number of guns that are recovered in crimes in Mexico and traced, 90% are traced back to the United States. N. P. Jones, above note 12, p. 160.

33 John P. Sullivan, “From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America: Implications for Global Security”, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme Working Paper Series No. 9, April 2012, p. 5, available at: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/69/40/83/PDF/FMSH-WP-2012-09_Sullivan.pdf.

34 “CJNG usa drones con explosivos C4 y balines como forma de ataque”, El Universal, 18 August 2020, available at: www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/cjng-usa-drones-con-explosivos-c4-y-balines-como-forma-de-ataque.

35 Dalia Martínez and Marcos Muedano, “Saldo de 22 muertos en emboscadas contra PF”, El Universal, 24 July 2013, available at: www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2013/impreso/saldo-de-22-muertos-en-emboscadas-contra-pf-91788.html.

36 “El Chapo: Mexican Police Free Drug Lord's Son as Culiacán Battle Erupts”, BBC News, 18 October 2019, available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50092641.

37 J. P. Sullivan and S. Logan, above note 31.

38 See, for instance, Transform Drug Policy Foundations, The War on Drugs: Undermining Human Rights, Bristol, 1 June 2015, available at: https://transformdrugs.org/assets/files/PDFs/count-the-costs-human-rights.pdf.

39 HRW, above note 14, p. 5.

40 Ibid., p. 5.

41 Ibid., p. 6.

42 Ibid., p. 7.

43 Ibid., p. 5.

44 J. S. Beittel, above note 11, p. 12.

45 P. Corcoran, above note 23.

46 See, for instance, Stuart Casey-Maslen (ed.), The War Report 2012, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 4; Antoine Perret, “The Role of the Inter-American System of Human Rights in the Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in Latin America”, doctoral thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2014, available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33870/2014_Perret.pdf; Redaelli, Chiara, “La guerra contra las drogas: Desafíos para el derecho internacional humanitario”, Anuario Iberoamericao sobre Derecho Internacional Humanitario, Vol. 2, 2021Google Scholar, available at: https://tinyurl.com/ynr2dw9e.

47 G. Gaggioli, above note 10.

48 It also important to note that “many rules previously applicable in international armed conflicts are now binding as a matter of customary law in non-international armed conflicts as well”, including the principle of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, and the duty to take precautions in attack. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 2003, p. 4, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/ihlcontemp_armedconflicts_final_ang.pdf.

49 G. Gaggioli, above note 10, p. 9.

50 International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 7 May 1997, para. 562; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and Isak Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 30 November 2005, paras 84–92. See also Vité, Sylvain, “Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 873, 2009, pp. 69–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 S. Vité, above note 50.

52 ICTY, Tadić, above note 50, para. 60.

53 Almost 30,000 violent deaths were reported in 2018: see K. Suárez, above note 26. The level of violence is not new and has lasted for more than ten years: the Mexican newspaper Reforma put the figure at 9,577 organized-crime-style homicides in 2012, while Milenio reported 12,390 for that year. See Cory Molzahn, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira and David A. Shirk, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis through 2012”, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, 2013, available at: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf; Ioan Grillo, above note 27.

54 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has characterized a thirty-hour-long confrontation as an armed conflict. See IACHR, Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case No. 11.137, 13 April 1998.

55 “Sinaloa Cartel Profile”, InSight Crime, 4 May 2021, available at: https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/.

56 Patrick Radden Keefe, “Cocaine Incorporated”, New York Times Magazine, 15 June 2012, available at: www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-billions.html.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 For a history of the CJNG, see “Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG)”, InSight Crime, 8 July 2020, available at: https://insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/jalisco-cartel-new-generation/.

62 Wilson Center, “Sinaloa OCG/Organización del Pacifco [sic]”, available at: www.wilsoncenter.org/sinaloa-ocgorganizaci%C3%B3n-del-pacifco.

63 Ibid.

64 Ed Vulliamy, “Has ‘El Chapo’ Turned the World's Former Most Dangerous Place into a Calm City?”, The Guardian, 19 July 2015, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/mexico-drugs-cartel-joaquin-guzman.

65 As explained by Malcolm Beith, “[t]here is a level-headedness about the [Sinaloa] leadership that the other groups lack[.] … To the authorities, first priority always has to be quelling violence. When other groups throw grenades into a crowd of innocents or behead people, it's obvious what needs to be done. Sinaloa has perpetrated its share of violence, but by and large it did not cause disruption to the general well-being of the population.” Quoted in “How the Sinaloa Cartel Won Mexico's Drug War”, GlobalPost, 28 February 2013, available at: www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/130227/sinaloa-cartel-mexico-drug-war-US-global-economy-conflict-zones.

66 Samuel Logan, “Tracking the Sinaloa Federation's International Presence”, InSight Crime, 30 April 2013, available at: https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracking-the-sinaloa-federation-s-international-presence/. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/tracking-the-sinaloa-federations-international-presence

67 Beith, Malcolm, “The Current State of Mexico's Many Drug Cartels”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 9, 2013Google Scholar, available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-current-state-of-mexicos-many-drug-cartels/.

68 See Marguerite Cawley, “4 of Mexico's Cartels Operate in Panama: Officials”, InSight Crime, 17 September 2013, available at: www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/four-mexican-cartels-operate-in-panama-officials.

69 See Héctor Silva Ávalos, “UN Confirms Links between El Salvador's Perrones and Pacific Cartel”, InSight Crime, 19 August 2013, available at: www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/unodc-study-confirms-links-between-perrones-and-pacific-cartel.

70 See, for instance, Marguerite Cawley, “Colombia Seizes FARC Cocaine Destined for Sinaloa Cartel: Army”, InSight Crime, 18 August 2013, available at: www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/colombian-authorities-seize-farc-cocaine-destined-for-sinaloa-cartel; Marguerite Cawley, “Sinaloa Cartel May Have Presence in Southwest Colombia: Santos”, InSight Crime, 15 February 2013, available at: www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/sinaloa-cartel-presence-colombia-santos.

71 See C. W. Cook, above note 21, pp. 5–6, 8.

72 See Elyssa Pachico, “Court Docs Describe Sinaloa Cartel Expansion in Australia”, InSight Crime, 11 February 2013, available at: https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/court-docs-describe-sinaloa-cartel-expansion-in-australia/.

73 M. Beith, above note 67.

74 P. R. Keefe, above note 56.

75 Ibid.

76 Several authors have discussed the application of IHL to Mexico: see, for instance, A. Perret, above note 46; C. Redaelli, above note 46. The Geneva Academy's Rule of Law in Armed Conflict (RULAC) portal has previously defined the situation as an armed conflict but recently changed its assessment, explaining that it is now difficult to attribute the ongoing violence and clashes to any particular party. Geneva Academy, “Mexico: Declassification of the Three Armed Conflicts Involving Drug Cartels on RULAC”, RULAC, 12 December 2022, available at: www.rulac.org/news/mexico-declassification-of-the-three-armed-conflicts-involving-drug-cartels.

77 Marco Sassòli, “The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts”, in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 19.

78 See, for example, Navia, Rafael Nieto, “¿Hay o no hay conflicto armado en Colombia?”, Anuario Colombiano de Derecho Internacional, Vol. 1, 2008Google Scholar.

79 National Government of Colombia and FARC, Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera, 2016, available at: www.jep.gov.co/Normativa/Paginas/Acuerdo-Final.aspx.

80 Padilla, Angélica and Bermudez, Ángela, “Normalizar el conflicto y des-normalizar la violencia: Retos y posibilidades de la enseñanza crítica de la historia del conflicto armado colombiano”, Revista Colombiana de Educación, No. 71, 2016, pp. 201–202Google Scholar, available at: https://revistas.pedagogica.edu.co/index.php/RCE/article/view/4087/3481.

81 Catalina Oquendo, “‘Hay cinco conflictos armados hoy en Colombia’”, El País, 21 July 2019, available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/07/20/colombia/1563649226_997490.html.

82 US Department of State, Report to Congress on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia, 2010.

83 R. Nieto Navia, above note 78.

84 Ferraro, Tristan, “The ICRC's Legal Position on the Notion of Armed Conflict involving Foreign Intervention and on Determining the IHL Applicable to this Type of Conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 900, 2015, p. 1229CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

85 Ibid.

86 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986.

87 Ibid.

88 Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2019, para. 6.10. See also ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2016, paras 257–264.

89 Éric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 5th ed., Bruylant, Brussels, 2012.

90 US law limits the outsourcing of inherently governmental functions; combat is one of these functions. See US Office of Management and Budget, “Circular No. A-76: Performance of Commercial Activities”, revised 2003. See also a detailed study on US law in Kristine A. Huskey and Scott M. Sullivan, The American Way: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Law after 9/11, PRIV-WAR National Reports Series No. 02/08, 30 April 2009.

91 Antoine Perret, “Las compañías militares y de seguridad privadas en Colombia: ¿Una nueva forma de mercenarismo?”, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, 2009.

92 US Department of State, above note 82.

93 US General Accounting Office, “Drug Control: U.S. Non Military Assistance to Colombia is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are not Readily Sustainable” Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-726, 2004, p. 9, available at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d04726.pdf.

94 “Mercenarios”, Semana, 13 August 2001, available at: www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/mercenarios/46935-3.

95 US General Accounting Office, above note 93, p. 1.

96 Andrés Bermúdez Liévano, “Dos meses sin fumigacón de coca”, La Silla Vacía, 15 December 2013, available at: www.lasillavacia.com/historias/silla-nacional/dos-meses-sin-fumigacion-de-coca/. See also Chris Kraul, “Anti-Coca Spraying Halted in Colombia after 2 U.S. Pilots Shot Down”, Los Angeles Times, 16 December 2013, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/16/world/la-fg-colombia-us-planes-20131217.

97 “Mercenarios”, above note 94.

98 Employee of PMSC, Bogotá, September 2008, quoted in A. Perret, above note 91.

99 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 2001 (ARSIWA), Art. 4.

100 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007.

101 Ibid., para. 392.

102 ARSIWA, above note 99, Art. 8.

103 ICTY, Tadić, above note 50, paras 116–119.

104 Overall control is defined as “control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of … forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of … military operations”. Ibid., paras 131, 145.

105 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 86, paras 116, 123.

106 Employee of the US embassy, Bogotá, 2007, quoted in A. Perret, above note 91.

107 Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the US Senate, New Information about Counternarcotics Contracts in Latin America: Majority Staff Analysis, 2011, p. 11.

108 Tigroudja, Hélène, “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law”, in Kolb, Robert and Gaggioli, Gloria (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013Google Scholar.

109 Steiner, Henry J., Alston, Philip and Goodman, Ryan, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 869Google Scholar.

110 See, for instance, IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, 28 August 2002.

111 IACtHR, “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, 24 September 1982, p. 12, para. 52.

112 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 21 July 1989, para. 28.

113 LLixinski, ucas, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also H. Tigroudja, above note 108.

114 The IACHR declared that Argentina had violated common Article 3. IACHR, Abella, above note 54.

115 IACtHR, Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 25 November 2000, paras 208–209.

116 IACtHR, Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 4 February 2000, para. 33.

117 Ibid., para. 33; American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 (ACHR), Art. 29. Restrictions regarding interpretation: “No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: … restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.”

118 IACtHR, Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 15 September 2005, para. 114.

119 IACtHR, Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 1 July 2006, paras 201–235 (freedom of movement), 169–200 (property and private and family life). See also IACtHR, Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 20 November 2013, paras 221, 349, 352, 353.

120 Judge Cançado Trinidade himself stated: “I feel grateful because the Court has adopted my reasoning, which today is an acquis, a conquest of its jurisprudence constante on the matter. Now that my time as Incumbent Judge of this Court expires, a Court which has assumed a vanguard position among the contemporary international courts regarding to this matter in particular, I feel entirely free to point out that this is an advance that admits no stepping back. I insist (considering that very soon, on January 1, 2007, the time to silence sic in my present office shall come) that this Court cannot let itself stop or regress its own jurisprudence regarding imperative law (jus cogens) within this scope of protection of the human being, regarding both substantive and procedural law.” IACtHR, La Cantuta v. Peru, Separate Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, 29 November 2006, para. 61. On the influence of Judge Cançado Trinidade on the jurisprudence of the Court, see Elise Hansbury, Le juge interaméricain et le jus cogens, eCahiers de l'Institut No. 11, 2011, Chap. 3.

121 IACtHR, Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits), Joint Separate Opinion of Judges A. A. Cançado Trindade and M. Pacheco Gómez, 6 December 2001, paras 7–8. See also IACtHR, Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Dissenting Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, 1 March 2005, para. 40.

122 See also IACtHR, Serrano-Cruz, Dissenting Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, above note 121, para. 45.

123 H. Tigroudja, above note 108, p. 473.

124 Ibid., p. 473.

125 Alexandra V. Huneeus, “International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, No. 1, 2013.

126 Ibid., p. 31.

127 Ibid., p. 9.

128 For a comparative analysis of the existing regional systems of human rights, see Huneeus, Alexandra V. and Madsen, Mikael Rask, “Between Universalism and Regional Law and Politics: A Comparative History of the American, European, and African Human Rights Systems”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2018CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129 Clapham, Andrew, “Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Metaphors, Maxims, and the Move to Interoperability”, Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018, p. 9Google Scholar.

130 The relation between IHL and IHRL has been analyzed by many scholars and is aptly summarized as “concurrent, coexisting, consistent, convergent, coterminous, congruent, confluent, corresponding, cumulative, complementary, compatible, cross-fertilizing, contradictory, competitive, or even in conflict. Our contribution to the debate is best summarized as follows: ‘It's contextual and it's complicated.’” Clapham, Andrew, “The Complex Relationship between the Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights Law”, in Clapham, Andrew, Gaeta, Paola and Sassòli, Marco (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 735Google Scholar.

131 Sarah McCosker, “The Limitations of Legal Reasoning: Negotiating the Relationships between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Detention Situations”, in Gregory Rose and Bruce Oswald (eds), Detention of Non-State Actors Engaged in Hostilities, Brill, Leiden, 2016. See also Hampson, Françoise J., “Direct Participation in Hostilities and the Interoperability of the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law,” International Law Studies, Vol. 87, 2011Google Scholar.

132 Watkin, Kenneth, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Chap. 5.

133 S. McCosker, above note 131, p. 58.

134 Daragh Murray, Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, ed. Dapo Akande, Charles Garraway, Françoise J. Hampson, Noam Lubell and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, quoted in A. Clapham, above note 129, pp. 21–22.

135 A. Clapham, above note 129, p. 22. For example: “In non-international armed conflict the ‘active hostilities’ framework regulates the use of force in (a) situations of high intensity fighting involving sustained and concerted military operations and (b) situations where a State does not exercise effective territorial control. The ‘security operations’ framework regulates all other situations, including situations of low-intensity fighting.” A. Clapham, above note 129, p. 22, quoting D. Murray, above note 134.

136 Note that Colombia has repeatedly objected to the IACtHR's position, arguing the Court does not have a direct competence to apply IHL based on Articles 33 and 62.3 of the ACHR.

137 A. Clapham, above note 129, p. 19.

138 IACHR, Abella, above note 54.