The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran

Shahrough Akhavi

doi:10.1080/00210860802518301

The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022

Shahrough Akhavi

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Shahrough Akhavi*: Affiliation:
University of South Carolina
*: akhavi@sc.edu

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Abstract

Ayatollah Montazeri was a Khomeinist who came to regret being Khomeini's unabashed protegé. Though he has never abandoned the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, he has sought to reconceptualize it by furnishing it with democratic principles. In this, he has not been credible, although he has managed to portray himself as a reformer among some Iranian activists who themselves have credible reformist credentials, such as Akbar Ganji. But other reformists believe that the principles of the mandate of the jurist permit authoritarian abuses. And those among them who seek a mujtahid's support for overthrowing that doctrine would prefer to turn to the writings of Ayatollah Dr. Mehdi Ha'iri (d. 1999).

Type: Articles
Information: Iranian Studies , Volume 41 , Issue 5 , December 2008 , pp. 645 - 666

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00210860802518301 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2008

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References

¹ Welt am Sonntag, 3 July 2005, as cited from the Middle East Media Research Institute on line, 3 February 2004, http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP65404.

² In broad terms, this doctrine, variously translated into English as “the authority of the jurisconsult,” “the mandate of the jurist,” or “the rule of the supreme jurist,” has had three versions: (1) the pre-Khomeini version, which authorized jurists to tend to the affairs of those in society who were not able to make decisions for themselves because they were minors, orphans, mentally infirm, and the like. In this version, the jurist is not considered to possess political power or be authorized to rule; (2) the original Khomeini position, which argued that the clergy are entitled to rule in the absence of the Hidden Imam, with the assumption that such rule would be more in the form of supervision and oversight of affairs, also implying consultation; (3) the later Khomeini version, which insisted on the absolute authority of the jurist to rule based on his understanding of law and political affairs.

³ For example, on 8 January 1988 he declared: “If the supreme jurisconsult … issues a decree, it is incumbent upon all individuals, even other jurisconsults, to obey it,” https://www1.Columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/gulf/dataplug.pl?dir=wwws/data/cn/sipa/GULF2000/chronology/pat&ddfile=chron&display=p&hh=b&sp=13350&qw=montazeri.

⁴ Gulf2000 URL, https://www1.columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/gulf/dataplug.pl?dir=/wwws/data/cu/sipa/GULF2000/chronology/pat&ddfile=chron&display=p&hh=b&sp=727463&qw=montazeri.

⁵ This is further suggested by Montazeri's July 2005 comments in which he admitted his own role in contributing to “contradictions in the Constitution” related to the role of the faqih relative to provisions pertaining to the powers of the President and to the general concept of popular sovereignty. He acknowledges that the reason the drafters of the 1979 Constitution gave such powers to Khomeini were: (1) his great stature as the “marja‘ ‘amm” (i.e., the general marja’ al-taqlid of the Shi‘ites); (2) the belief that that stature would be the best shield against the recurrence of the abuses of power during the monarchy; (3) the lack of experience of the drafters of the Constitution in constitutional law. See Ravabit ‘Umumi, July 2005, http://mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=19510.

⁶ See Akhavi, Shahrough, “Contending Theories of Velayat-efaqih in Shi‘ite Law,” Iranian Studies, 29/3–4 (1996): 253–259.Google Scholar

⁷ Montazeri's criticisms of excesses antedate Khomeini's death and may be seen already in the early years of the revolution. However, they have been significantly more evident since Khomeini's death.

⁸ Citation from the Middle East Media Research Institute on line, 3 February 2004. URL is http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP65404.

⁹ Cited in Daily Times (Pakistan), on line, 3 July 2005. URL is http://www.dailytimes.com/pk/print.asp?page=story_9-11-2003_pg4_15&ndate=7/2/2005.

¹⁰ Kayhan (London), 4 December 1997, p. 4.

¹¹ Kayhan (London), 4 December 1997, p. 4.

¹² Ravabit -i ‘Umumi, October 2003, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=11736.

¹³ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, October 2003, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12019.

¹⁴ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, April 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=15158.

¹⁵ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, November 2003, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12651.

¹⁶ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, May 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=15383.

¹⁷ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, July 2005, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=19510.

¹⁸ See Shahrough, Akhavi, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle East Journal, 41.2 (Spring 1987): 197Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Ravabit-i Umumi, July 2005, 250–251.

²⁰ Gulf2000, https://www1.columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/gulf/dataplug.pl?dir=/wwws/data/cu/sipa/GULF2000/chronology/pat&ddfile=chron&display=p&hh=b&sp=801415&qw=montazeri.

²¹ Gulf2000, https://www1.columbia.edu/sec-cgi-bin/gulf/dataplug.pl?dir=/wwws/data/cu/sipa/GULF2000/chronology/pat&ddfile=chron&display=p&hh=b&sp=711023&qw=montazeri.

²² The text of the letter was published in the Iranian paper Abrar, 1 Azar 1376 HSh/22 November 1997. Among Khomeini's indictments of Montazeri were the latter's alleged intent to empower the “liberals” and the “hypocrites” (Mujahidin-i Khalq), abetting world “arrogance,” being naïve and gullible, and inflicting serious harm on Islam, hence, engaging in treason.

²³ Husayn, ‘Ali Montazeri, Khatirat-i Ayatollah Husayn ‘Ali Montazeri (Los Angeles, 1379 HSh/2001), 402Google Scholar.

²⁴ Montazeri, Khatirat, 247.

²⁵ Kayhan (London), 4 December 1997, p. 4.

²⁶ Montazeri, Khatirat, 361.

²⁷ Montazeri, Khatirat, 251–252, 258.

²⁸ For a discussion of this episode, see Akhavi, Shahrough, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle East Journal, 41/2 (Spring 1987): 194–198.Google Scholar

²⁹ Montazeri, Khatirat, 263–266. Indeed, Montazeri speculates on the reasons for the Council of Experts proceeding in this extra-constitutional manner and suggests obliquely that it was a way of provoking enmity and jealousy toward him on the part of those who opposed his role in the country's affairs. Since he has already mentioned that Rafsanjani and Khamenei had taken the lead in the affair, the conclusion must be that he reckoned them among his detractors. Incidentally, Montazeri himself says the deliberations in the Council of Experts on his candidacy to succeed Khomeini took place on 24 Tir 1364/15 July 1985.

³⁰ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, February 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13843.

³¹ Montazeri, Khatirat, 304–306.

³² Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, May 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=15280; Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, December 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=17783.

³³ Montazeri, Khatirat, 306–307, referring to Volume II, p. 965 and Volume III, p. 1762 of the published debates of the Council of Experts.

³⁴ Montazeri, Khatirat, 307.

³⁵ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, July 2005, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=19510.

³⁶ Kayhan (London), 4 December 1997, p. 4.

³⁷ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, January 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13564. Article 99 states: “The Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the elections of the Council of Experts for [electing the] Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to public opinion and referenda.” See also Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, February 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=13843.

³⁸ Idem.

³⁹ Ravabit-i ‘Umumi, April 2004, http://www.mehdis.com/tablu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=15158.

⁴⁰ Montazeri, Khatirat, 350–359; citation at 352.

⁴¹ Montazeri, Khatirat, 406–407.

⁴² Montazeri, Khatirat, 406–407, 603.

⁴³ Montazeri, Khatirat, 408–409.

⁴⁴ Montazeri, Khatirat, 490–492.

⁴⁵ Dirasat fi Wilayat al-faqih wa Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1409 HQ/1988).

⁴⁶ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 1–10.

⁴⁷ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 421.

⁴⁸ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 421.

⁴⁹ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 78.

⁵⁰ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 85–86, 205–208, 222–223.

⁵¹ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 493–494.

⁵² Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 494. Note that he does not demonstrate how such a verse warrants the election of leaders by the people.

⁵³ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 496–497.

⁵⁴ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 497.

⁵⁵ Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 497–499. Earlier on, he had written that any wali al-faqih who had lost the qualifications on the basis of which the people elected him may be dismissed by them. Montazeri, Dirasat, I: 416.

⁵⁶ Cf., for example, the position of ‘Izzatallah Najafabadi, Salihi, Velayat-eFaqih: Hukumat-i Salihan (Tehran, 1363 HSh/1984), 31–32Google Scholar and passim.