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Collection and Evaluation of Evidence in Comparative Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

Albin Eser
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Extract

When comparing the structure of the criminal procedure in the civil and the common law systems, one is soon confronted with the wide-spread belief of deep differences between the “inquisitorial” tradition on the one hand, and the “adversary” on the other. Consequently, one would expect differences between the Israeli criminal procedure, as mainly based on common law tradition, and the German procedure, as an example of a continental civil law system. If one takes a closer look, however, it appears that those assumptions of deep differences, at least in view of the practical result, are to a great extent mistaken because of foregone prejudices.

Type
Research Article
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 31 , Issue 1-3 , Winter-Summer 1997 , pp. 429 - 438
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1997

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Footnotes

*

Dr. iur., Dr. h.c., M.C.J., Professor of Law, Universität Freiburg i.Br., Director, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law.

References

1 Kerper, H.B., Introduction to the Criminal Justice System (West Publishing Company, St. Paul Minn., 2nd ed., 1979) 202 Google Scholar; Vetter, H.J. & Simonsen, C.E., Criminal Justice in America (W.B. Saunders, Philadelphia/London/Toronto, 1976) 204 Google Scholar; Roxin, C., Strafverfahrensrecht, Ein Studienbuch, (Beck, München, 24th ed., 1995) 106f.Google Scholar; Perron, W., “Rechtsvergleichender Querschnitt und rechtspolitische Bewertung”, in Perron, W. (ed.), Die Beweisaufnahme im Strafverfahrensrecht des Auslands (edition iuscrim, Freiburg i. Br. 1995) 549–608 Google Scholar, at 578, 588f.

2 Up to this point, the defendant is considered innocent in accordance with the principle of in dubio pro reo (art. 6 II European Convention on Human Rights). For the German law on this point, see Roxin, supra n. 1, at 97ff.; Kleinknecht, Th. & Meyer-Goßner, L., Strafprozeßordnung, Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Nebengesetze und ergänzende Bestimmungen, (Beck, München, 42nd ed., 1995), § 261 margin no. 26, p. 837 Google Scholar; for the common law, see Card, R., Criminal Law (Butterworths, London/Dublin/Edinburgh, 12th ed., 1992) 89 Google Scholar; St. Thaman, “Country Report USA”, in W. Perron, supra n. 1, at 489-547 (506).

3 See H. B. Kerper, supra n. 1, at 201f.; Thaman, supra n. 2, at 503f.

4 For more on this point, see Allen, C., “Grundsätze und Methoden der Beweiserhebung im englischen Strafprozeß”, (1960) 72 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 650–676 Google Scholar (660ff.); Thaman, supra n. 2, at 509ff.

5 See Allen, supra n. 4, at 667f.

6 See e.g., Kerper, supra n. 1, at 202.

7 The German law on this point is codified at §261 Criminal Procedure Code (StPO).

8 See Roxin, supra n. 1, at 104ff.

9 In German law, this judicial duty, the so-called principle of ex-officio inquiries, arises from §§155 II, 244 II StPO.

10 See Eser, A., “Entwicklung des Strafverfahrensrechts in Europa, Orientierung an polizeilicher Effektivität oder an rechtsstaatlichen Grundsätzen?”, (1996) 108 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 86–127 Google Scholar (88f., 96f.) with additional references.

11 §§76 I, 122 I, 139 I Constitution of Courts Act (GVG).

12 The German law on this point is codified at §267 StPO.

13 §261 StPO, see Roxin, supra n. 1, at 335ff.; Kleinknecht & Meyer-Goßner, supra n. 2, at §261 margin no. 5, p. 831.

14 The practical significance of these issues is especially great when police undercover agents are involved, i.e., persons (be they undercover officials, other persons acting undercover or informers from the fringes of the criminal scene) who work together to prevent and to clear up criminal activity, primarily in matters of national security and in the areas of drug and gang crime. For more on these issues, see Roxin, supra n. 1, at 342f. and Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen (BGHSt) 17 (C. Heymanns, Köln/Berlin, 1962) 382–388 (386)Google Scholar; BGHSt 36 (1990), pp. 159-167 (166 f.).

15 For two German Federal Supreme Court decisions on point, see (1986) 6 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 519–520 Google Scholar and 14 (1994) 593.

16 The German law on this point is codified at §68 Criminal Procedure Code.

17 §§171 a, 171 b, 172 GVG.

18 A trial held before a judge sitting without a jury, see Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing Company, St. Paul/Minn., 6th ed., 1990) 156. The defendant (with the consent of the prosecutor) may waive his right to have the question of his guilt settled by a jury. If he does so, the trial is held before a single judge. See Perron, supra n. 1, at 503.

19 Nijboer, J. F., Een verkenning in het vergelijkend straf- en strafprocesrecht (Gouda Quint BV, Arnhem, 1994) 51 Google Scholar.

20 For more on this point, see Roxin, supra n. 1, at 163ff.

21 With regard to the last point, a comparison involving different kinds of sports suggests itself. On the one hand, it is characteristic of European soccer that the players seek out a path to the goal that is as direct as possible and that the flow of the game be held up by as few rules as possible. As a result, spectators are annoyed when referees interrupt the game on account of rule violations. In contrast, in American football, the setting up of and compliance with a complicated set of rules seems almost to be a central goal of the game. The impression created by the American criminal trial — with its complicated rules of evidence that lead to endless interruptions — when compared to the Continental-European system, in which the judge is hindered only by comparatively few rules from pursuing an investigation of the truth that is free from interruption, is not much different. William Pizzi was so fascinated by this comparison of European and American systems of criminal procedure and sports, which I voiced in a conversation with him in late 1993, that he has since subjected it to a closer analysis. See Pizzi, W.T., “Soccer, Football and Trial Systems”, (1995) 1 Colum. J. European L. 369–377 Google Scholar.