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The legal scholarship of Prof. G. Tedeschi is broad and comprehensive, encompassing all areas of the civil law and reaching into the public law as well. At its base, there lies a solid jurisprudential foundation, in the context of which Prof. Tedeschi has devoted considerable thought to the various issues of the theory of precedent. In gratitude to Prof. Tedeschi, my venerable teacher and dear friend, to whom I owe the greatest of debts, and who for me serves as both model and symbol, I would take this opportunity to consider one aspect of the doctrine of precedent – that of overruling precedent.
Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel.
This article is based on a chapter in the author's forthcoming book Judicial Discretion (Tel Aviv, 1987, in Hebrew).
# See primarily: Tedeschi, G., “On the Principle of Stare Decisis”, in Studies in Israel Law (Jerusalem, 1960) 114 Google Scholar; Tedeschi, G., “Prospective Revision of Precedent” (1973) 8 Is.L.R. 173 Google Scholar.
1 Basic Law: Adjudication S.H. (1984) no. 1110, p. 78.
2 See Schick v. Minister of the Interior (1972) 26(ii) P.D. 33, at 42; Landau, M., “Case Law and Discretion in Adjudicating” (1965) 1 Mishpatim 292, at 296 Google Scholar: Ein Harod HaKibbutz HaMe'uhad Ltd. v. Lugasi (1959) 13 P.D. 1883.
3 Ohf Ha'Emek Agricultural Society v. Ramat Yishai Municipal Council (1986) 40 P.D. 113.
4 This expression is borrowed from Professor Dworkin: see Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA., 1978) 81 Google ScholarPubMed. Professor Dworkin is of the opinion that there are no “hard cases” in law. I do not accept that view in this article. On my position see A. Barak, Judicial Discretion.
5 In several decisions it has been stated that when a case can be argued either way, there should be no departure from precedent. See, for example, Schick, supra n. 2; also see R. v. National Insurance Comp. [1972] A.C. 944, at 996. In my opinion, it is precisely in those cases that “can be argued either way” that the question of whether or not to overrule precedent arises.
6 See Ohf Ha'Emek, supra n. 3, at 141.
7 See United States v. Southern Underwriters Ass., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), per Jackson and Stone JJ.; also see Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass., 450 U.S. 147, at 155 (1980), per Stevens J.
8 See Yadin, U., “True and Stable” (1979) 28 HaPraklit 152 Google Scholar.
9 See Yehoshua v. Appeals Committee Under the Invalids (Pension and Rehabilitation) Law, 5709–1949 (1955) 9 P.D. 617, per Witkon J.
10 See Schaefer, , “Precedent and Policy” (1966) 34 U. Chi. L.R. 3, at 22 Google Scholar.
11 See Katashvilli v. State of Israel (1981) 35(ii) P.D. 457, at 462, per Landau P.
12 See Wasserstrom, R., The Judicial Decision: Towards a Theory of Legal Justification (Stanford, 1961) 60 Google Scholar; Hart, H. and Sacks, A., The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Cambridge, 1958) 587 Google Scholar.
13 See Balan v. The Executors of the Estate of Litwinski (1961) 15 P.D. 71, at 76, per Silberg J.
14 See Sheddon v. Goodrich (1803) 32 E.R. 441, at 447, per Lord Elden: “It is better that the law should be certain than that every judge should speculate upon improvements of it”.
15 Per Silberg J. in Balan, supra n. 13, at 75.
16 See supra n. 3, at 145.
17 See Barak, A., “Case Law and Social Reality”, in Sefer Sussmann (Essays in Memory of Justice Yoel Sussmann) (Jerusalem, 1984, in Hebrew) 71 Google Scholar.
18 See Levontin, A.V., “Thoughts on Precedent” (1955) 17 Hok U'Mishpat 1 Google Scholar.
19 See Sprecher, , “The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should be Applied” (1945) 31 Am. Bar. Ass. 501, at 509 Google Scholar; Douglas, , “ Stare Decisis ” (1949) 49 Col. L.R. 735 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 See Kaufmann v. Margins (1952) 6 P.D. 1005, at 1034.
21 See Levontin, supra n. 18, at 1; also see Yehoshua, supra n. 9, per Witkon J.
22 See sec. 12 infra.
23 See Cardozo, , The Growth of the Law (New Haven, 1924) 146 Google Scholar.
24 See Cardozo, , The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven, 1921) 149 Google Scholar.
25 See Stevens, , “The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule” (1983) 58 N.Y.U.L.R. 1, at 2 Google Scholar; Cardozo, ibid., at 112.
26 See Christie, , “A Model of Judicial Review of Legislation” (1975) 48 S. Cal. L.R. 1306, at 1316 Google Scholar.
27 See Luke, , “The Common Law: Judicial Impartiality and Judge-Made Law” (1982) 98 L.Q.R. 29 Google Scholar.
28 See Devlin, P., The Judge (Oxford, 1979) 1 Google Scholar; Scarman, , “Law Reform by Legislative Techniques” (1967) 32 Sask. L.R. 217 Google Scholar.
29 As portrayed by Roberts J. in Smith v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649, at 669 (1944).
30 Kocourek, and Kovan, , “Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis ” (1935) 29 Ill. L.R. 971 Google Scholar.
31 See Douglas, supra n. 19, at 747.
32 Regarding the economic approach and the principle of precedent and deviation therefrom, see Landes, and Posner, , “Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis” (1976) 19 J. Law and Economics 249 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for the approach from the political science perspective, see Shapiro, , “Towards a Theory of Stare Decisis ” (1972) 1 J. Legal Studies 125 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 On the need for balance, see Cardozo, supra n. 24, at 113; also see Jackson, , “Decisional Law and Stare Decisis ” (1944) 30 Am. Bar. Ass. 334 Google Scholar.
34 Holmes, O. W., Collected Legal Papers (New York, 1921) 290 Google Scholar; Witkon, , “Some Reflections on Judicial Law-Making” (1967) 2 Is.L.R. 475, at 480 Google Scholar.
35 “Whether a precedent will be modified depends on whether the policies which underline the proposed rule are strong enough to outweigh both the policies which support the existing rule and the disadvantages of making a change”. Schaefer, supra n. 10, at 12.
36 See Pound, R., Interpretation of Legal History (Cambridge, 1923) 1 Google Scholar.
37 See Pollock, , “Judicial Caution and Valour” (1929) 45 L.Q.R. 239, at 295 Google Scholar.
38 See Washington v. W.C. Dawson and Co., 264 U.S. 219, at 238 (1934), per Brandeis J.
39 See Landau, supra n. 2, at 301; Weisraan, “Some Fundamental Concepts of Property Law: A Critical Survey” (infra, this issue, 529, at 538).
40 For an examination of the various theories, see Barnett, , “A Consent Theory of Contract” (1986) 86 Col. L.R. 296 Google Scholar.
41 See Keeton, R., Venturing to do Justice (Cambridge, 1969) 39 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 See Schwartz, , “New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law” (1983) 58 N.Y.U.L.R. 796 Google Scholar.
43 See Koenig v. Cohen (1982) 36(iii) P.D. 701, at 718.
44 See Hart and Sacks, supra n. 12, at 135; also see Weiler, , “Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making” (1970) 48 Can. Bar R. 1 Google Scholar.
45 See Rotenstreich v. A.G. (1953) 7 P.D. 58; A.G. v. Berkowitz (1960) 14 P.D. 266.
46 See Berstlinger v. Rubinstein (1964) 18(iii) P.D. 215; Gabbai v. State of Israel (1964) 18(iv) P.D. 582.
47 See Barak, , “Occupier's Liability Draft” (1970) 2 Mishpatim 129 Google Scholar.
48 See for example, Jerusalem Municipality v. Gordon (1985) 39(i) P.D. 113.
49 See Shehade v. Hilu (1966) 20(iv) P.D. 617; Vaknin v. Beit Shemesh Municipal Council (1983) 37(i) P.D. 113; Sultan v. Sultan (1984) 38(iii) P.D. 169.
50 See Segal, Z., Locus Standi in the High Court of Justice (Tel Aviv, 1986, in Hebrew) 227 Google Scholar.
51 See supra n. 11.
52 See Azoulai v. State of Israel (1983) 37(ii) P.D. 565.
53 See Cardozo, supra n. 23, at 122.
54 See Summers, , “Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common Law Justification” (1978) 63 Cornell L.R. 707 Google Scholar.
55 This is also expressed in the rhetoric employed by judges when trying to justify overruling precedent. This rhetoric is generally based on claims of “justice” or “efficiency”; see, for example, supra n. 9 and Port Authority v. Ararat Ltd. (1977) 31(i) P.D. 533, at 536.
56 See Berstlinger, supra n. 46, at 223.
57 See Ein Harod, supra n. 2, at 1892; Weismann v. Farzhi (1963) 17 P.D. 1527, at 1531; Davidson v. Davidson (1973) 27(ii) P.D. 20 at 23; Port Authority, supra n. 55, at 536.
58 See McLughlin v. Brain [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982, at 998, per Lord Scarman.
59 See Sussmann, , “When We Do Not Know What ‘Justice’ Is, We Should Prefer Order”, in The Importance of Procedure and the Protection of Justice (Jerusalem, 1966, in Hebrew) 9 Google Scholar.
60 See Landau, supra n. 2, at 300; and see Pound, , “The Theory of Judicial Decision” (1923) 36 Harv. L.R. 940 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
61 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 263 U.S. 219, at 238 (1924), per Brandeis J.: “The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it. The decisions are recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have not created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered”.
62 Tripman v. Victor (1964) 18(i) P.D. 366, at 368.
63 See Shalit v. Ministry of Interior (1969) 23(ii) P.D. 477; S.J. (Special Volume) 35.
64 See Kot v. Kot (1982) 36(i) P.D. 236; Kot v. Kot (1984) 38(iii) P.D. 197.
65 See Landau, supra n. 2, at 298; Stone, J., Social Dimensions ofLaw and Justice (Sydney, 1966) 662 Google Scholar.
66 See Sussmann, , “The Concept of Good Faith in the Law of Contracts in Israel – The Role of German Law” (1979) 6 Iyunei Mishpat 485 Google Scholar.
67 See Salmond, , Jurisprudence (London, 11th ed., 1957) 219 Google Scholar.
68 See supra n. 57.
69 See Landau, supra n. 2, at 301; Ein Harod, supra n. 2, at 1882; Davidson, supra n. 57, at 23.
70 See, for example, supra n. 11.
71 See, for example, David v. State of Israel (1983) 37(i) P.D. 622.
72 Cf. Tax Assessor for Tel Aviv v. Nechushtan (1985) 39(iii) P.D. 240.
73 See Goldstein, , “The Influence of Constitutional Principles on Civil Litigation in Israel” (1982) 17 Is.L.R. 467, at 481 Google Scholar.
74 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, at 409 (1932), per Brandeis J.
75 See, for example, Douglas, supra n. 19, at 739: “As constitutional law is concerned, stare decisis must give way before the dynamic component of history. Once it does, the cycle starts again”. Also see Wright, , “Precedent” (1943) 8 Camb. L. J. 118, at 135 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
76 See Pollack v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, at 632 (1894), per White J.
77 See Monaghan, , “Taking the Supreme Court Seriously” (1979) 39 Mod. L.R. 1, at 7 Google Scholar.
78 Barzilai v. State of Israel (1986) 40(iii) P.D. 505.
79 Disenchik v. A. G. (1963) 17 P.D. 169.
80 See Goldberg, A., Equal Justice (1971) 85 Google Scholar.
81 See Feller, S.Z., Elements of Criminal Law (Jerusalem, 1984, in Hebrew) vol. 1, pp. 1, 2 Google Scholar.
82 See Tedeschi, G., “Prospective Revision of Precedent” (1973) 8 Is.L.R. 173 Google Scholar; Currier, , “Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling” (1965) 51 Va.L.R. 201 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
83 See Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
84 11 L.S.I. 157.
85 See Tedeschi, supra n. 82.
86 See Kaplan, E., “Prospective Overruling of the Supreme Court's Precedents” (1979) 9 Mishpatim 221 Google Scholar.
87 For the various views in this matter, see Kaplan, ibid.; and see Nicol, , “Prospective Overruling: A New Device for English Courts?” (1976) 39 Mod. L.R. 542 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Note, “Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts” (1962) 71 Yale L.J. 907 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
88 See Kocourek and Kovan, supra n. 30; Jaffe, L., English and American Judges as Lawmakers (Oxford, 1969) 56 Google Scholar; Traynor, , “Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate Courts” (1980) Utah L.R. 255 Google Scholar.
89 See Wigmore, , “The Judicial Function”, in Science of Legal Method (1917) xxvii Google Scholar.
90 See Cardozo, , Selected Writings (New York, 1947) 35 Google Scholar.
91 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
92 See Mishkin, , “The High Court, The Great Writ, and Due Process of Time and Law” (1965/1966) 79 Harv. L.R. 56 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Freeman, , “Standards of Adjudication, Judicial Law Making and Prospective Overruling” (1973) 26 Current Legal Problems 166 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
93 See Birmingham City Co. v. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Ass, [1969] 3 All E.R. 172, at 180.
94 See Devlin, supra n. 28, at 12.
95 See Cross, R., Precedent in English Law (Oxford, 3rd ed., 1977) 230 Google Scholar.
96 See Fuller, L., Anatomy of the Law (New York, 1968) 99 Google Scholar.
97 See Friedmann, W., “Limits of the Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling” (1966) 29 Mod. L.R. 593 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
98 See Lloyd, D., Introduction to Jurisprudence (London, 5th ed., 1985)Google Scholar.
99 See Tedeschi, supra n. 82.
100 See Kaplan, supra n. 86.
101 See supra n. 11.
102 See Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] 1 All E.R. 145, per Lord Simon.
103 See Diplock, , The Courts as Legislators (1965) 17 Google Scholar.
104 See Freedman, , “Continuity and Change – A Task of Reconciliation” (1973) 8 U.B.C.L.R. 203 Google Scholar.
105 See Tedeschi, supra n. 82.
106 See Nicol, supra n. 87.
107 See Shapiro, , “Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decisions” (1968) 10 A.L.R. (3d) 1371 Google ScholarPubMed.
108 See Calabresi, G., A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, MA., 1982) 280 Google Scholar.
109 See Stone, supra n. 65, at 663.
110 See Hart and Sacks, supra n. 12, at 627; Stone, supra n. 65, at 664.
111 See Cross, supra n. 95, at 223.
112 See Freeman, supra n. 92, at 204; Devlin, supra n. 28, at 12.
113 As I stated in Ohf Ha'Emek, supra n 3, at 145: “The prior case law is not binding. The binding [by the present decision to the prior one] is not a result of an external requirement or the imposition of an ‘internal affinity’. The binding is the result of the existence of the prior case law, which gives weight to the alternative there selected and prefers it to the other alternative there rejected. Of course, various considerations may exist that serve to balance the picture and cause the latter alternative to be preferred nevertheless. It is possible that the alternative that was chosen is causing unforeseen difficulties. It is possible that there exist judicial policy considerations for preferring it. But in the absence of such considerations, my opinion is that between truth and truth – stability is preferable.”