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What is Legal Logic?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

Ch. Perelman
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That the question what is legal logic should still arise today appears paradoxical, for law is after all one of the oldest of human disciplines and logic has in the twentieth century become one of the most developed of the disciplines of contemporary philosophy. Yet comparison of a number of recent works dealing with the subject, all of which, not being without merit, have enjoyed a measure of success, is enough to show that the problem exists and is even strongly disputed.

Of four such works, two—those by E. Levi and K. Engisch—do not use the word “logic” in their titles, though they deal with legal reasoning and legal thought. The other two, on the contrary, expressly purport to deal with legal logic. Strangely enough, however, their authors explicitly deny the specific existence of such a discipline, whereas Levi and Engisch underscore, without any hesitation, the specific nature of legal reasoning and the existence of a particular logic, legal logic.

Thus in the first paragraph of his work, where Klug attempts to define the concept of legal logic, he states that it comprises the study of the rules of formal logic as used in the judicial application of rules of law (p. 6); that legal logic is therefore practical logic, consisting of the application to law of the rules of pure or theoretical logic which is general logic (p. 7).

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Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , January 1968 , pp. 1 - 6
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1968

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References

1 Levi, Edward H., An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1961 ed.)Google Scholar, Engisch, Karl, Einführung in das Juristische Denken (3rd ed. 1964)Google Scholar, Klug, Ulrich, Juristische Logik (3rd. ed. 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Kalinowski, Georges, Introduction à la logique juridique (1965)Google Scholar.

2 Kalinowski, G., “Y a-t-il une logique juridique?” (1959) Logique et Analyse 53Google Scholar.

3 Introduction à la logique juridique 3.

4 Ibid. 7.

5 Cf. Perelman, Ch., “Logique formelle, logique juridique” (1960) Logique et Analyse 226–30Google Scholar.

6 E. Levi, op. cit. 104.

7 Ibid. 1–2.

8 K. Engisch, op. cit. 5.

9 Cf. Viehweg, Theodor, Topik und Jurisprudenz (3rd ed.) 1965Google Scholar.

10 Cf. U. Klug, op. cit. 97–141.

11 G. Kalinowski, op. cit. 162–71.

12 Giuliani, A., “La logique juridique comme théorie de la controverse” (1966); Archives de philosophie du Droit 87–113Google Scholar, and La controversia (1966).

13 See my “Judicial Reasoning” (1966) 1 Is. L.R. 373 at 376–77 for examples. For a profound study of the question cf. Le Fait et le Droit, Travaux du Centre National de Recherches de Logique (1961).

14 See “The Rule of Justice” in Perelman, Ch., The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument (1963) 79–87Google Scholar.

15 Cf. Cahn, Georg, Existentialism and Legal Science (tr. Dendal, George H.) (1967) 115–20Google Scholar.