¹ For texts see: Israel-Egypt, UNTS, vol. 42, p. 251; Israel-Lebanon, Ibid., p. 287; Israel-Jordan, Ibid., p. 303; Israel-Syria, Ibid., p. 327.

² For an exhaustive treatment of the structure and functions of UNTSO and UNEF, see Higgins, R., United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946–1967, Documents and Commentary, vol. 1: The Middle East (1969) 5–529.Google Scholar

³ In the last resolution the Council called for “full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and the observers in implementing the cease-fire …”.

⁴ See Introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, A/6701/Add. 1 (1967) 6.

⁵ For further details and sources see Bar-Yaacov, N., The Handling of International Disputes by Means of Inquiry (1974) 263–266.Google Scholar

⁶ The establishment of observation posts in this sector was started in August 1967, in pursuance of a consensus reached by the Security Council on 10 July 1967 (S/8047, 10 July 1967).

⁷ S/7930/Add. 2141, 6 Oct. 1973; S/7930/Add. 2142, 6 Oct. 1973; S/7930/Add. 2143, 6 Oct. 1973; S/7930/Add. 2144, 6 Oct. 1973; S/7930/Add. 2145, 7 Oct. 1973.

⁸ S/11013, 8 Oct. 1973; S/7930/Add. 2161, 9 Oct. 1973; S/7930/Add. 2165, 9 Oct. 1973; S/l 1017, 10 Oct. 1973.

⁹ See Quandt, W. B., Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (1977) 176–178.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Israel and Syria immediately accepted the Security Council call for a cease-fire, whereupon hostilities between the two countries were terminated.

¹¹ See Herzog, Ch., The War of Atonement (1975) 246–250.Google Scholar

¹² 42 UNTSO observers were based in Cairo on 22 Oct. 1973. S/7930/Add. 2210, 22 Oct. 1973.

¹³ In November 1973, the two superpowers suggested to the Secretary-General that they provide observers for service with UNTSO. The Soviet Union, which had not supplied nationals to UNTSO, would provide 36 observers, while the United States, which had 8 observers already assigned to UNTSO, would provide 28 additional observers, so that both superpowers would be equally represented. In a letter of 6 Nov. 1973, the Secretary-General brought the offers to the knowledge of the Security Council and subsequently accepted the arrangement. See Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Working Group, Working File No. 3, 16 July 1979, para. 76.

According to Sydney Bailey, an advance party of 70 Soviet military officers arrived in Cairo, following President Sadat's appeal to the superpowers, in late October 1973 (see below) for help in maintaining the cease-fire. The Soviet government later suggested that it should supply the same number of observers to UNTSO as the largest national contingent, which at that time happened to be the Swedish one, and members of the Soviet advance party were incorporated in UNTSO. Subsequently, the number of United States officers was increased to match the size of the Soviet contingent. “Peacekeeping in the Middle East” (Nov. 1977) 77 Middle East International 12.

¹⁴ These complaints could not be confirmed by UN sources since, at the time of the alleged violations, the UN observers were not yet deployed. See S/7930/Add. 2219, 24 Oct. 1973.

¹⁵ Quandt, op. cit., at 196–198.

¹⁶ S/11049, 25 Oct. 1973.

¹⁷ S/11056, 28 Oct. 1973.

¹⁸ S/11057, 29 Oct. 1973.

¹⁹ S/11056, 28 Oct. 1973.

²⁰ S/11052, Rev. 1, 27 Oct. 1973.

²¹ For text of the Convention, see A/64, 1 July 1946, pp. 25–33.

²² S/PV 1752, 27 Oct. 1973.

²³ Res. 341 (1973). The mandate of UNEF was subsequently extended for the following periods: six months; six months; three months; three months; one year; one year; one year; and the last time for nine months — until 24 July 1979.

²⁴ S/11072, 2 Nov. 1973. No formal resolution was adopted. China dissociated itself from the above “agreement”.

²⁵ S/11056/Add. 3, 11 Nov. 1973.

²⁶ General Siilasvuo was Interim Commander of UNEF in October and November 1973, and Force Commander until August 1975. He was succeeded by Lt. General Liljestrand (Sweden), from August 1975 until November 1976, followed by Maj.-General Rais Abin (Indonesia), as Acting Commander during December 1976, and Force Commander from January 1977 to September 1979.

The following officers have been Chiefs of Staff of UNTSO since November 1973: Col. Richard W. Bunworth (Ireland) — Acting, from November 1973 to March 1974; Maj.-General Bengt Liljestrand (Sweden), from April 1974 to August 1975; Col. K. D. Howard (Australia) — Acting, from September to December 1975; Maj.-General Emmanuel Alexander Erskine (Ghana), from December 1975 to March 1978; Col. William Callaghan (Ireland) — Acting, from April 1978 to June 1979; Col. Olof Forsgren (Sweden), Officer-in-Charge, from June 1979 to January 1980; Maj.-General Erkki R. Kaira (Finland), since February 1980.

For the office of Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East, see infra n. 59.

²⁷ S/11091, 9 Nov. 1973.

²⁸ See text in S/11056/Add. 3, 11 Nov. 1973, Annex: Agreement regarding the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

²⁹ S/11056/Add. 5, 15 Nov. 1973.

³⁰ S/11056/Add. 7, 11 Jan. 1974.

³¹ Ibid.

³² For detailed reports from individual UNTSO patrols and from individual UNEF positions with regard to ground and air activities in their respective areas, see the series of addenda to UN document S/11057, 29 Oct. 1973, under the title: “Further Reports on the Status of the Cease-fire in the Middle East.” These reports include, as the case may be, complaints submitted by the parties, findings as to which party was responsible for a particular violation and arrangements for local cease-fires, made through UN personnel on duty in the immediate vicinity of the incident, e.g., S/11057/Add. 19, 4 Nov. 1973; Add. 189, 31 Dec. 1973; Add. 222, 11 Jan. 1974; Add. 283, 2 Feb. 1974; Add. 297, 8 Feb. 1974.

³³ These parties were not specified.

³⁴ The reference apparently was mainly to the Palestinian Arabs.

³⁵ S/11161, 18 Dec. 1973.

³⁶ S/11169, 24 Dec. 1973.

³⁷ See text of agreement under the title “Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference”, in S/11198, 18 Jan. 1974, Annex; also in Reshumot, K.A. (1978) vol. 25, No. 850.

³⁸ See map in S/11198/Add. 1, 23 Jan. 1974 and map reproduced below.

³⁹ For their general content, see Quandt, op. cit., at 228.

⁴⁰ The secret letters on the limitation of forces exchanged between the three leaders constituted part of the basic agreement on disengagement. See Kissinger's news conference of 22 January 1974 (Department of State Bulletin, 11 February 1974, p. 137) and The Jerusalem Post of 20 January 1974. According to The Jerusalem Post, Egypt and the United States had, in addition, agreed secretly that Egypt would prepare the Suez Canal for reopening and would restore civilian and commendai life in the canal-side cities. Egypt accepted thereby Israeli demands designed to abate tension in the canal zone (ibid.).

⁴¹ S/11056/Add. 9–13, 28 Jan. 1974 — 4 March 1974. UNEF headquarters were finally established in Ismailia.

⁴² S/11056/Add. 14, 16 March 1974.

⁴³ S/11758.

⁴⁴ S/11248, 1 April 1974.

⁴⁵ The distribution was as follows: Canada — 866, Finland — 500, Ghana — 449, Indonesia — 447, Poland — 785, Senegal — 402, and Sweden — 448. S/11849, 17 Oct. 1975.

⁴⁶ See map below.

⁴⁷ S/11056/Add. 14.

⁴⁸ See Quandt, op. cit., at 228, note. According to The Jerusalem Post of 23 March 1974, the issue was discussed the previous day between General Siilasvuo and the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, and was also “the focus of intensified contacts between the United States government and Cairo”. The matter was also the subject of discussion, on 28 March 1974, between General Siilasvuo and the Egyptian War Minister, General Ahmed Ismail. (The Jerusalem Post, 29 March 1974.) In the Knesset the opposition accused the government of not being firm enough on the issue. Divrei HaKnesset (1974) vol. 69, pp. 1072–1079.

⁴⁹ The Jerusalem Post, 2 Feb. 1975.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 28 July 1975.

⁵¹ This information was conveyed to me by Colonel (Res.) S. Levinson, who was Israeli delegate to the Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission in the years 1951–1961, and Chief Israeli Liaison Officer with the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in the years 1967–1979.

⁵² Quandt, op. cit., at 271–273.

⁵³ For analysis of the agreement see Thierry, H., “L'accord israélo-égyptien du 4 septembre 1975 et les nouvelles responsabilités des Etats-Unis et des Nations Unies au Moyen-Orient” (1975) A.F.D.I. 45–64.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See text in S/11818/Add. 1, 2 Sept. 1975; also in Reshumot, K.A. (1978) vol. 25, No. 852.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ See text and 5 maps in S/11818/Add. 5, 10 Oct. 1975. See text also in Reshumot, K.A. (1978) vol. 25, No. 852.

⁵⁸ See Early Warning System in Sinai. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94 Congress, First Session, on Memoranda of Agreements between the Governments of Israel and the United States, October 6 and 7, 1975 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975). See also texts in Reshumot, K.A. (1978) vol. 25, No. 852 and (1979) vol. 25, No. 852a.

⁵⁹ The post of the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East was established in August 1975 upon the proposal of the Secretary-General and with the approval of the Security Council. (S/11808, 19 August 1975.) The missions in question at that time were UNTSO, UNEF and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) set up by Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974, following the signing of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement on the same day. To these was added the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), established in pursuance of Resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978. General Siilasvuo held the post of Chief Co-ordinator from August 1975 to the end of December 1979. According to the UN Chronicle, March 1980 (at p. 31) “the post lapsed with the withdrawal of UNEF in July 1979”.

⁶⁰ See map below.

⁶¹ Regarding two small buffer zones in southern Sinai, see below.

⁶² The main conditions were: (a) the flights were to be carried out at a height of no less than 15,000 feet and on a straight course along the median line; (b) each flight was to be made by no more than 2 planes; (c) there were to be seven reconnaissance flights every week for each party; (d) each party was to have at its exclusive disposal periods of 24 hours beginning at 1215 until 1145 the following day; (e) notice was to be given to a representative of the Chief Co-ordinator of UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East not less than six hours before each flight.

⁶³ See below.

⁶⁴ Article II(2)(d).

⁶⁵ The second Memorandum of Agreement between Israel and the United States dealt with coordination of policies regarding the Geneva Conference; the question of the United States attitude towards the PLO; and the question of possible changes in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The additional letter of the United States government to Israel contained United States assurances concerning Israel's military and economic needs.

⁶⁶ S/12212, 18 Oct. 1976.

⁶⁷ The main difference between the two periods relates to UNEF's role in the early warning system. See below.

⁶⁸ The distribution was as follows: Australia — 46, Canada — 840, Finland — 637, Ghana — 595, Indonesia — 509, Poland — 917 and Sweden — 634. S/12897, 17 Oct. 1978.

⁶⁹ ibid. Sec map below.

⁷⁰ As far as humanitarian activities were concerned, UNEF continued to maintain close contact with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing facilities for family reunions and student exchanges which took place at an agreed site in Buffer Zone 1. (S/12897, 17 Oct. 1978.) The search for the bodies of soldiers fallen during the war was intensively pursued. Thus, during the period October 1976 to October 1977, the remains of 40 Egyptian soldiers found by UNEF in Buffer Zone 1 were returned to Egypt. During the same period UNEF, with the assistance of the ICRC, supervised the hand-over to the Israeli authorities of the bodies of 30 Israeli soldiers discovered in the course of widening the Suez Canal. (S/12416, 17 Oct. 1977.)

⁷¹ S/12416, 17 Oct. 1977.

⁷² See, for instance, S/12212, 18 Oct. 1976, para. 23; S/12416, 17 Oct. 1977, para. 21.

⁷³ E.g., S/12897, 17 Oct. 1978.

⁷⁴ Divrei HaKnesset (1976) vol. 77, pp. 4030–4039.

⁷⁵ The Jerusalem Post, 8 June 1977.

⁷⁶ HaAretz, 8 July 1977, and The Jerusalem Post, 8 July 1977. On 7 September 1977, the HaAretz military correspondent wrote that Egyptian promises given by President Sadat to President Carter, as well as by the Egyptian Minister of Defence to the Commander of the UN forces, scrupulously to observe the agreement, did not materialize. The Jerusalem Post asserted in its editorial of 11 September 1977, that while “the current illicit activities” by Egyptian forces in Sinai did not pose a military threat to Israel, they nevertheless placed in jeopardy the entire conception of gradual advance towards a peace settlement. Egypt had undermined the Sinai agreement and there was a constant erosion of Israeli confidence in the willingness — perhaps even the ability — of the Egyptians to abide by their commitments.

⁷⁷ See interview in Yediot Aharonot, 15 Nov. 1977.

⁷⁸ The Jerusalem Post, 20 August 1978.

⁷⁹ HaAretz, 8 June 1977.

⁸⁰ HaArctz, 5 January 1978.

⁸¹ The data and explanations concerning the problem of the battalions is based on an interview with Colonel (Res.) Levinson, as well as on documentation which he kindly supplied to the author.

⁸² See Middle East Agreements and the Early-Warning System in Sinai, Hearings of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session on the Middle East Agreements and Legislation to Implement the United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai, Sept. 8, 11, 18 and 25, 1975 (Washington, 1975).

⁸³ Ibid., at 3–7, and To Implement the United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai. Report of the Committee on International Relations together with Supplemental and Additional Views on House Joint Resolution 683, Oct. 6, 1975, 94th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 94–532 (Washington, 1975) 12, 13.

⁸⁴ Hearings, op. cit. supra n. 82, at 42.

⁸⁵ ibid., at 65.

⁸⁶ See Report of the Committee (supra n. 83) at 25. See to the same effect the joint “additional views” of representatives Zablocki and Paul Findley, ibid., at 30.

⁸⁷ Ibid., at 40.

⁸⁸ In Vietnam, they stated, the United States was present at the request of one side, while in the Middle East — at the request of both sides; in Vietnam the United States had military advisers, while in the Middle East — civilian technicians; in Vietnam the United States “advisers” (quotation marks in source) were to wage war, while in the Middle East — to preserve peace; in Vietnam the United States went to protect what were, at best, only marginal American interests, while in the Middle East the United States would go to protect the most vital national interests.

⁸⁹ Public Law 94–110, 94th Congress, H.J. 683, Oct. 13, 1975, 89 Stat. 572. See text, inter alia, in 1st report to Congress of the United States Sinai Support Mission dated 13 April 1976, Annex D.

⁹⁰ Sec p. 7 of report, supra n. 83.

⁹¹ Sec text of the order, inter alia, in 1st report to Congress of the United States Sinai Support Mission dated 13 April 1976, Annex G.

⁹² The Director of the mission was to serve also as chairman of the Sinai Interagency Board, composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Board was to meet at the invitation of the chairman in order to assist, coordinate and advise with regard to the activities of the mission.

⁹³ The examination that follows, of the structure and activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission, is based on the eight reports of the mission to the Congress of the United States, dated respectively, 13 April 1976, 13 Oct. 1976, 13 April 1977, 13 Oct. 1977, 13 April 1978, 13 Oct. 1978, 16 April 1979 and 17 Sept. 1979. I am grateful to the staff of the American Cultural Center in Jerusalem for providing me with the above reports, as well as for their assistance in the search for other sources.

⁹⁴ See 1st report, p. 2; 2nd report, p. 24; 3rd report, p. 14; 6th report, p. 23; 7th report, p. 15; and 8th report, p. 14. The recruitment by the Sinai Support Mission and its contractor, E. Systems, Inc., for the SFM, was governed at the outset by the following principles: (1) all members were to be United States citizens; (2) all were to be volunteers; (3) none had been employed by the Central Intelligence Agency or any other foreign intelligence-gathering agency at the time of the pertinent legislation or since; nor was any member operating under the control of the CIA or the Department of Defense. During 1977, the Sinai Support Mission changed its recruitment policy to preclude only the assignment of persons who had served on active military duty or had been employed by the Department of Defense or a United States foreign intelligence-gathering agency, within one year from the date of hire or selection. The explanation given for this change was that the continuation of the previous practice would exclude a growing number of Americans from prospective employment in Sinai. Although the contractor had no difficulty in recruiting qualified personnel as a result of the former restriction, most applicants for positions as sensor technicians or communicators tended to be former military personnel (1st report, p. 22 and 4th report, p. 13).

⁹⁵ See 4th report, p. 11 and 5th report, p. 9.

⁹⁶ 5th report, p. 7; 6th report, p. 7; 7th report, p. 7. Previous reports defined the first duty in broader terms as observing and reporting any unauthorized movement (e.g., 2nd report, p. 11). The change might be attributed to the impracticability of reporting insignificant intrusions, such as those of local Bedouin.

⁹⁷ See 1st report, p. 30; 3rd report, p. 6; 4th report, p. 5; 5th report, p. 7; and 6th report, pp. 7 and 20. The remotely-controlled television camera designed to permit visual monitoring of the Giddi West sensor field was installed in June 1978. The camera was controlled by an operator in the Giddi East station some 14 miles away. When a sensor in the Giddi West field sounded the alarm, the operator turned on the camera and focussed on the sensor or sensors which had been activated. Any activity could then be seen on TV monitors, both at the Giddi East watch station and at the SFM headquarters. The installation of the camera enabled, for the first time, the observation of Bedouin moving through the Giddi West sensor field at night (6th report, p. 9).

⁹⁸ 1st report, pp. 16, 26 and 28.

⁹⁹ 8th report, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰ 5th report, p. 8. A member of the SFM told me that the likelihood of Israeli overflight violations was increased by the fact that the Israeli airfield at Bir Gafgafa was located very close to the early warning area.

¹⁰¹ 4th report, pp. 7–8. The cooperation between UNEF and SFM in the field may be illustrated in their common efforts to clear the buffer zone of Bedouin. Sensors activated by Bedouin and their animals caused alarm necessitating numerous investigations. The presence of Bedouin also created a potential threat to security since their movements could mask entry of hostile elements into the buffer zone. Whenever SFM detected the presence of Bedouin or camels in the early warning area, the fact was reported to UNEF to take whatever action was required. On its part, UNEF increased its reconnaissance patrols and surveillance flights. Another sphere of cooperation related to the security arrangements in the area. A contingent of Ghanaian troops was assigned to guard the SFM base camp and Ghanaian units also guarded the three watch stations (6th report, p. 9; 7th report, p. 8; 3rd report, p. 8).

¹⁰² 2nd report, p. 18.

¹⁰³ 8th report, p. 12. For text of the order, see ibid., Annex G.

¹⁰⁴ For the general opinion among State Department officials and leading Senators and Representatives that the SFM mission was a “success story”, see “Americans in Sinai”, The Jerusalem Post, 2 Feb. 1977.

¹⁰⁵ 6th report, pp. 19–22. See, to the same effect, information supplied by the government of the United States to the UN Secretary-General for consideration by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/AC.121/30, 27 Aug. 1979.

¹⁰⁶ See text in United States Department of State, The Camp David Summit, September 1978 (1978).Google Scholar Texts in English and Hebrew have also been published in Reshumot, K.A. (1979) vol. 25, No. 857. The English version also appears infra p. 284.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ The agreement provided for “the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine”.

¹⁰⁹ A/33/PV 14, 29 Sept. 1978.

¹¹⁰ S/PV 2091, 23 Oct. 1978. On the same occasion the representative of the Soviet Union reaffirmed that, as in the past, his country would not participate in any additional expenditures for UNEF occasioned by the Egyptian-Israeli agreement of 4 Sept. 1975.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² For the English text of the Treaty, the Agreed Minutes and the accompanying letters, sec Department of State, Selected Documents, No. 11, April 1979, The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979. The texts of the following instruments have also been published in Hebrew, Arabic and English, in Reshumot, K.A. (1980) vol. 25Google Scholar: the treaty of peace — in No. 868; the Agreed Minutes and the letters from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin regarding violation of the treaty and the exchange of ambassadors — in No. 869; the joint letter regarding the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza — in No. 872. These texts also appear in this volume, infra p. 302.

¹¹³ The United States was prepared to sign a parallel memorandum with Egypt, but Egypt declined the offer.

¹¹⁴ The text of the two memoranda was published by the United States Government in April 1979 and was enclosed in a loose sheet with Document No. 11, referred to supra n. 112. See text also in Reshumot, K.A. (1980) vol. 25, Nos. 870, 871. Full text also appears infra p. 327.

¹¹⁵ In the Agreed Minutes, the parties stipulated that the review would be undertaken when requested by either party and that an amendment could be made only by mutual agreement.

¹¹⁶ In accordance with Article VII, disputes regarding the application or interpretation of the treaty are to be resolved by negotiations and, in case of failure, by conciliation or arbitration. Other provisions in the basic text deal with the establishment of normal relations between Egypt and Israel, the question of conflicting obligations with regard to other treaties, the establishment of a claims commission, and the matter of ratification.

¹¹⁷ In the Agreed Minutes to Annex I, it is stipulated that, if the parties do not agree on this issue, they would accept or support a United States proposal concerning the composition of the UN Force and observers.

¹¹⁸ See above, p. 218.

¹¹⁹ Indeed, Article I(3) of the Annex stipulates that the final withdrawal would be accomplished not later than three years from the date of exchange of ratifications, but in view of Israel's need to strengthen its defence capability during the withdrawal, particularly the building of airfields in the Negev, it may be assumed that, at the time of the signing of the treaty, the three year period was considered realistic in the light of all the relevant circumstances.

¹²⁰ See below, pp. 254–255.

¹²¹ Supplemental 1979 Middle East Aid Package for Israel and Egypt, Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st session, April 26, May 1, 2, 8 and 9, 1979 (Washington, 1979) 72 and 140.

¹²² Other clauses relate to United States military and economic assistance and to the continued effect of existing agreements and assurances between the two countries.

¹²³ See Middle East Peace Package. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 96th Congress, 1st session, April 11 and 25, 1979 (Washington, 1979) 11–19.

¹²⁴ Sec Hearings referred to in supra n. 121, at 134.

¹²⁵ See Israel Information Centre, The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, Speeches and Interviews (March 1979).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ In an interview published in The Jerusalem Post of 15 Feb. 1980, Moshe Dayan, no longer a member of the government, expressed the view that the United States' commitment to take part in the supervision of the execution of the treaty was the best guarantee for a durable peace, better than any UN or other international force.

¹²⁷ See “Moscow and the Sinai” by Reston, James, The New York Times, 6 April 1979.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ See (1979, July) UN Chronicle 87 and UN Press Release, SG/SM/2722, 24 May 1979.

¹²⁹ In the course of his comments on the Soviet attitude, the Secretary-General said: “I have stated in the past, and I repeat it now, that a change in the mandate of the peacekeeping forces in that area requires a decision of the Security Council”.

¹³⁰ S/13460. In the northern part of Buffer Zone 1, a detachment of Swedish troops, who until then assured the demilitarization of the zone, was overtaken by Egyptian troops who redeployed in that part of the zone, in accordance with the peace treaty. In a report published in The New York Times on IS July 1979, under the title “Swedes in U.N.'s Sinai Force Idled by Peace Treaty”, the paper's Cairo correspondent related that, in the absence of instructions from the Security Council on the redeployment of UNEF, General Siilasvuo flew to Cairo in May to work out a solution with Boutros Ghali, the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. As a result, the Swedish detachment was permitted to remain in place as “guests of the Egyptian government”.

¹³¹ See Map 3 of the peace treaty.

¹³² See S/13460, 19 July 1979.

¹³³ ibid.

¹³⁴ See above, pp. 207–208.

¹³⁵ The New York Times, 23 July 1979. According to UNTSO sources, American and Russian officers serving with UNTSO had left Sinai in the first half of July in order to help overcome Israel's objection to the use of UNTSO observers. See report of The New York Times, supra n. 161.

¹³⁶ State Department officials said that they “could not guarantee” that Mr. Dayan had seen the plan for the use of UNTSO before the week of 16–22 July, but they insisted that other Israeli officials, including the Minister of Defence, Mr. Weizman, had been familiar with it and had no objections (The New York Times, 28 July 1979).

¹³⁷ United States International Communication Agency (USICA), News Report, 24 July 1979.

¹³⁸ Cf. (1979, July-October) UN Chronicle 24.

¹³⁹ UN Press Release, SG/SM/2761; SC/4101, 24 July 1979.

¹⁴⁰ S/13468.24 July 1979.

¹⁴¹ S/13467, 24 July 1979.

¹⁴² The New York Times, 25 July 1979.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 26 July 1979.

¹⁴⁴ See the Memorandum of Agreement accompanying the second disengagement agreement, supra n. 65.

¹⁴⁵ See editorials of The New York Times, 25 July 1979 and of the Sacramento Bee, 28 July 1979. Cf. Reston's article, supra n. 127.

¹⁴⁶ E.g., Washington Siar, 26 July 1979; San Francisco Examiner, 26 July 1979; Los Angeles Times, 26 July 1979; Oregonian, 26 July 1979.

¹⁴⁷ The Jerusalem Post, 6 Sept. 1979. The question of joint Egyptian-Israeli supervision of Zone B was also discussed. According to one report, an agreement was reached setting-up joint Israeli-Egyptian teams composed of a small number of officers, but at later talks in Washington the scheme proved to be impracticable. HaAretz 3 Oct. 1979.

¹⁴⁸ The Jerusalem Post, 6 Sept. 1979.

¹⁴⁹ See above, p. 234.

¹⁵⁰ The Christian Science Monitor of 21 Sept. 1979, reported that, under the tentative agreement, regular reconnaissance flights by high-flying United States air force U-2 aircraft, from the British sovereign base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, were to continue to watch the military arrangements in Sinai.

¹⁵¹ USICA diplomatic correspondent, wireless file 181, 19 Sept. 1979, American Cultural Center, Jerusalem.

¹⁵² Ibid. and The Jerusalem Post, 20 Sept. 1979.

¹⁵³ The text of the memorandum was published in Hebrew translation, in HaAretz, 12 Oct. 1979.

¹⁵⁴ The Jerusalem Post, 9 Oct. 1979.

¹⁵⁵ ibid. and HaAretz, 8 and 9 Oct. 1979.

¹⁵⁶ To the best of my knowledge, the agreement has not been published. I am grateful to the Israeli military authorities for providing me with the text.

¹⁵⁷ The text is published in Hebrew by Uzi Benziman, in HaAreiz of 28 Jan. 1980.

¹⁵⁸ See Benziman, Uzi, “The History of a Firm Stand”, in HaAretz, 1 Feb. 1980.Google Scholar With reference to the provisions of the draft memorandum regarding UNTSO, the author of the article asserts that there is an understanding between Israel and the United States, according to which the position of the United States is the prevailing one and UNTSO observers will indeed take part in the supervisory activities, under the responsibility of the United States.

¹⁵⁹ HaAretz, 1 Feb. 1980.

¹⁶⁰ As stated by Egyptian Prime Minister, Dr. Mustafa Khalil, at the People's Assembly in Cairo on 15 Dec. 1979: “The implementation of the provisions of the peace treaty has proceeded normally without any problems worth mentioning. This is a notably positive phenomenon”. FBIS-MEA-79–244, 18 Dec. 1979.

¹⁶¹ See “Unarmed U.N. Truce Observers Take Over Sinai Posts From Peace Force”, by E. Tatro, The New York Times, 2 Aug. 1979. In accordance with Observer Group Sinai Jerusalem Operations Order No. 1, issued on 23 July 1979, UNTSO was “tasked to take control of the current Buffer Zone (BZ)”. OGS-J was to ensure compliance with the terms of the “Sinai II Agreement” by manning checkpoints and conducting patrols including helicopter reconnaissance patrols to control Line J and ensure that there is no unauthorized entry or exit to and from the buffer zone. One UNTSO position was charged with taking over the escort responsibilities of the Ghanaian battalion. (Information obtained from UNTSO headquarters, Jerusalem.)

¹⁶² See “Egyptian and Israeli Officers in Sinai Act like Old Friends” by Shipler, David K., The New York Times, 7 August 1979.Google Scholar The reporter observes, inter alia: “There is no UN presence here and the controversy over what kind of international monitoring will operate in Sinai seems remote.” See also “Muhammed and I Make Peace” by Lavi, Zvi, in Ma'ariv, supplement of 3 August 1979Google Scholar, and “Opening the Land Route” by Rath, Ari, The Jerusalem Post, supplement of 15 Jan. 1980.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ See Moore, J. N. (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict, vol. II: Readings, p. 735.Google Scholar