This article analyses the scope of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the Israeli settlement enterprise in the West Bank. The author has found that this scope differs fundamentally between acts of direct transfer and indirect transfer because of Israel's status as a non-member state of the Rome Statute of the ICC and the specific nature of Article 8(2)(b)(viii). Whereas procedural arguments relating to third party rights do not prove to be valid jurisdictional obstacles, the Court's temporal and territorial jurisdiction could nevertheless be limited to acts of direct population transfer committed after April 2015. In conclusion, the article argues that the most promising strategy for the Office of the Prosecutor would be to focus on recent large-scale instances of direct transfer.

It has long been recognised that ‘non-consent’ is a fundamental element of the law of occupation. Under modern international humanitarian law (IHL), the consensual presence of foreign military forces is generally not seen as belligerent occupation.

However, if we accept the principle that the application of IHL should rely on the objective situation on the ground and not on the subjective judgment of the situation of parties to the conflict, it may be natural to diminish the significance of consent by the territorial states in relation to the application of the law of occupation. It may be somewhat harmful to deny such protection based solely on the existence of the territorial states’ consent without considering the relationship, in reality, between the occupier and the population in the occupied area. According to a teleological interpretation of IHL, especially when it is obvious that the latter has no allegiance to the former, the tense relationship between them should be regulated by the law of occupation.

This article discusses whether and how state consent could be a humanitarian ground to negate the legal protection for its own people, and highlights situations where the local population needs protection by the law of occupation (or comparable rules) in consensual military occupations.

This article focuses on the adoption of temporary measures within the generally rigid constitutional sphere. Commentators frequently contemplate the extent to which temporary constitutional measures are adequate and necessary within a constitution that is meant to be perpetuated. Some writers are in favour of temporary constitutionalism, claiming that it allows flexibility and relieves the counter-majoritarian problem. Others emphasise the devastating impact of intense implementation of temporary measures on the status and legitimacy of the constitution.

The article contends that as beneficial as temporary constitutionalism may be in some circumstances, its use should be scrutinised with great suspicion, especially when it is employed in weak constitutional regimes. In outlining the history of temporary constitutionalism in the State of Israel, the article illustrates how temporary constitutional amendments can be harnessed to undermine the democratic order. The Israeli use of temporary constitutionalism since 2009 reveals a new under-explored manifestation of ‘abusive constitutionalism’, referred to here as ‘abusive temporary constitutionalism’. With abusive temporary constitutionalism, incumbents can entrench their power against their opponents while avoiding both public accountability and judicial review of their actions. Drawing on the Israeli experience, the article outlines several signifiers (i.e. distinctive markers) which will allow judges in the future to monitor and suppress the development of the abusive employment of temporary constitutional amendments.

Professor Yaël Ronen introduced the workshop as the fourth in a series of events on legal aspects of the Middle East conflict. The first two events concerned the Palestine Mandate of 1922. The third focused on the 1948 refugee issue. All these events have and are being held with the generous support of the Knapp Family Foundation and under the auspices of the International Law Forum of the Faculty of Law. Also, as part of the Shabtai Rosenne International Law Center Initiative, the first session was dedicated to the commemoration of the work of the late Shabtai Rosenne, whose scholarship spanned a host of international law issues but who is most renowned for his work on the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

In a report to the Security Council of the United Nations in August 2004 the UN Secretary General said that ‘the rule of law’ is a concept at the very heart of the UN's mission. In September 2015 the UN agreed a set of Sustainable Development Goals (STGs) for 2015–30, which came into force on 1 January 2016. Goal 16.3 of the SDGs enshrines a commitment by all UN members to ‘promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and to ensure equal access to justice for all’. In March 2016 the Council of Europe's Commission for Democracy through Law, known as the Venice Commission, published a report which said that the rule of law is a concept of universal validity. It observed that in an increasing number of cases states refer to the rule of law in their national constitutions. The rule of law is expressly mentioned in a United Kingdom statute: section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 says that the Act does not adversely affect the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law. The statute, however, does not contain any definition of the rule of law; nor does any other UK statute. There is no legally binding definition anywhere.

This review explores certain challenges related to the notion of customary international law. It seems that it was a long time ago when international law academics and practitioners ever thought that the nature of this source was a well-settled topic. Nowadays international lawmaking processes involve an extraordinary number of interactions, taking place both formally and informally. Such complex features are reflected by an exponential increase in the scholarly study of international legal sources. The legal nature, its applicability and principles regulating customary international law are addressed in the book under review (Brian D Lepard (ed), Reexamining Customary International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017)) through several topical essays. The chapters offer a comprehensive analysis of these lawmaking processes and the challenges they portray from various perspectives and in various fields, such as: What is customary international law and why is it law? Is it law because it reflects a ‘global legislative’ model? What is the current value of the persistent objector theory? Is the two-element definition of customary international law still applicable? By meticulously addressing these and other inquiries, the book presents novel arguments and represents a stimulating addition to the literature on sources of international law.