It suffices to examine two of the most important texts which form the basis of France's constitutional system, the Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, and the Law of June 3, 1958, in order to become convinced that separation of powers is one of those immutable principles which imposes itself as self-evident on every liberal constituent body. Article 16 of the Declaration of 1789 proclaims that “any society in which the protection of rights is not ensured, nor the separation of powers established, has no constitution”. The constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, for its part, authorizes the government to establish a constitutional project, provided that five principles be respected; among these principles appears, immediately following the necessity of universal suffrage, the separation of powers.

Political agreements are an integral part of the political system in Israel. For various reasons — mainly the proportional representation electoral system and the existence of a “third bloc” of religious parties that do no fit into the centre-right and centre-left political alliances — no political party has ever enjoyed an absolute majority in the Knesset. The dominant parties have therefore always had to rely on coalition agreements with smaller parties in order to obtain, and subsequently maintain, the parliamentary majority required for a government to rule under Israel's parliamentary system. A similar situation exists in many municipal councils and in other elected bodies, such as the Bar Council.

I would first of all like to thank you very warmly for having given me the honour to be here today, in this wonderful and historical city of Jerusalem, to talk about the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In particular, it is an honour for me to share this significant moment of the ratification and entry into force of the Convention in Israel, where its voice is joining so many other countries committed to bringing a better future to all children of the world.

The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1989, after ten years of a long study and consideration by a working group of the Commission on Human Rights. The Convention reflects the spirit of consensus which prevailed during the drafting process, as well as the compromise reached by different legal systems, cultures and traditions with respect to the human rights universally recognized.

There is hardly any United Nations resolution which is quoted and referred to as often as 242. It has become the cornerstone for all stages in the settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, as, for example, the Camp David Frameworks (1978) and the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel (1979). In addition, it has been referred to by the conveners of the Madrid Conference (1991) as the basis for the negotiations which were started at that Conference and are going on as this article is being written.

According to the letter of invitation to the Madrid Conference, the parties are invited to achieve peace through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab States, and between Israel and the Palestinians. The latter are to be part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. With respect to the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, they are to be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements which should last five years.

The human rights of persons with mental disabilities represents a frontier area for legal protection. The content and means of enforcing their rights have become topics of both scholarly and popular concern. For two decades, the international community has grappled — somewhat fitfully — with the human rights norms that should guide nations in their care and treatment of these vulnerable groups. International concern has focused not only on problems of arbitrary detention and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, but on issues of institutionalization, sterilization, and a broad array of education, treatment and welfare services.

In many countries, obsolete legislation and service delivery models have hindered the realization of both negative and affirmative (“positive resource claims”) human rights.

The petitioner, a member of the Likud central committee, moved the High Court of Justice to set aside a coalition agreement of April 11, 1990, between the Likud and a Knesset faction known as the Movement for the Promotion of the Zionist Idea. The agreement, regulating the relationship between the two bodies in parliamentary elections and in the Knesset, also provides that the Likud will have no monetary claims against the faction, and that the future expenses of their joint list in the Knesset will be shared according to their respective strengths.

The petitioner contended that the agreement is illegal and against public policy.

The legal debate concerning political agreements has lately won renewed interest in Israel, following some disturbing incidents that took place just prior to the establishment of the present government. These events, which were referred to by Justice Elon as “a weakness of political culture” and even “political eclipse”, have forced the High Court of Justice to deal with a number of petitions concerning political agreements over the past year. The Legislature also has had to give this matter considerable attention; the Basic Law: The Knesset, Amendment no. 12, allows for amending and even preventing disruptive phenomena such as political defection which tend to occur alongside political agreements.

The competition rules of the European Community are set out in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. The first forbids, as incompatible with the common market, agreements that may affect trade between member states and restrict competition; the second the abuse of a dominant position. Articles 85 and 86 are the starting point of an intricate regulatory system which affects not only naked horizontal cartels and abusive behaviour by dominant undertakings but also distribution agreements, franchise agreements, the licensing and exercise of intellectual property rights, joint ventures and other forms of collaboration between undertakings.

This article attempts to denote the scope of the Community's jurisdiction in competition law matters as it is shaped and moulded in the judgments of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the “Court”) as well as to evaluate whether the scope of jurisdiction awarded by the traditional jurisdictional tests can be justified on grounds other than legal conservatism.

More than thirty-two years have passed since Supreme Court Justice Agranat's ruling that, even in the absence of alternative means to effect a lawful arrest, deadly force may be employed only where the arrest is pursuant to the commission of a felony. That ruling, in the case of Gold v. The Attorney General, stands unchallenged to this day. At the time that decision was handed down, Israeli case law provided a dearth of analytic tools for critical review. Thus, Gold was incorporated into Israeli law pristine and unencumbered by the entourage of learned comments that now regularly escorts Supreme Court decisions. It is not my intention to tarnish that purity of Gold by disclosing some undetected flaw in the ruling. Rather, I believe it is time that we take that ruling a step further on the course it set.

The recent ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the Israeli Government is part of a welcome effort to ratify multilateral conventions dealing with human rights, some of which Israel had signed long ago. In addition to this Convention, the Israeli Government ratified, during the summer of 1991, the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and the 1984 Convention Against Torture. On the occasion of the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, this article discusses the legal implications of the ratification of human rights conventions to the Israeli legal system and to the legal systems in the occupied territories.

The unanimous passage of the Income Tax Ordinance (Amendment No. 89) Law, 1992, by the Israeli Knesset fits in a series of amendments, which, during the last four decades, have gradually eroded the principle of aggregation of income of husband and wife introduced in 1941. It constitutes a further step towards a complete system of splitting the income of husband and wife for the purpose of calculating the amount of income tax; its primary purpose, however, is apparently to equalize the rights and duties of the married woman with those of the man as far as the procedural and administrative aspects of the assessment and collection of the tax on the wife's income is concerned.

The extension of the right to split the income of the married couple is fairly limited. The amendment for the first time entitles the married woman to opt for a separate computation of tax not only on her earned income but also on her income derived from property; provided, however, that such property was either owned by the wife at least a year before her marriage or acquired by her by way of inheritance. Thus, the tax burden on the married couple, which has basically remained the tax unit, has been alleviated to a limited extent only.

Religious education in Israel is inextricably linked with the more general aspects of the complex role of religion in Israel, which in turn cannot be understood without a basic understanding of Israel as a Jewish state, as well as that of the traditional status of religious-ethnic-national groups in the Middle East.

A comprehensive discussion of these complex issues would take us well beyond the confines of this paper. Thus, we will discuss them only briefly herein, thereby necessarily dealing in generalizations which may, at times, be overly simplistic.

A new creature has been welcomed into Israel's family of law. While some refer to it as a political agreement, and others a public agreement, I prefer to call it a political contract.

It was greeted with curiosity, suspicion, and even disapproval. And, although much has been written about it of late, its character has as yet to be determined. What distinguishes it from other agreements? Is it legally binding, or does it merely draw upon the force of public opinion? Is it justiciable? If binding, does it fall within the scope of private law or of public law? And what consequences attach to breach of the agreement?

In this article, I will examine the primary questions regarding political agreements, present the existing case law and opinions, and express my views on the subject.

A political agreement is an agreement among political parties, party factions, candidates for public office, or holders of public office in regard to governmental policy, its constituency, or exercise of public authority. Such agreements can be reached both proceeding and following elections. A coalition agreement is the conspicuous example of a political agreement. It is generally concluded following the elections, and it establishes the division of ministerial portfolios among the coalition partners, sets policy guidelines and rules for exercising executive authority (e.g., allocation of monies for certain purposes), and regulates legislation and parliamentary supervision of the executive (e.g., the manner in which party delegates will vote in the Knesset).

The following is a survey of major judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel published in (1990) 44 Piskei Din, volumes (i) and (ii), directly following upon our last digest which appeared in (1991) 25 Is. L. R. 219.

I. Constitutional and Administrative Law

Medianwest Herzliya Medical Centre Ltd. v. Director General of the Ministry of Health & the Minister of Health (1990) 44(i) P.D. 19

Commodities and Services (Control) Law, 1957 —parallel legislation — effects of policy — exercise of discretion

The petitioner, a company registered in Israel, was established by a group of private, foreign investors for the purpose of developing and operating a number of private medical centres, and providing medical services. The petition centred on the respondents' refusal to allow the petitioner to open a hospital in Haifa. According to the respondents, their refusal reflected a general policy to oppose the establishment of additional public or private hospitals.