1 Colenbrander, H.T. ed., Jan Pietersz. Coen: Besdieiden omtrent Zijn Bedrijf in Indië I (The Hague 1919–1934) 650: 16 November 1621.Google Scholar

2 Steensgaard, Niels, ‘The Dutch East India Company as an Institutional Innovation’ in: Aymard, Maurice ed., Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism (Cambridge 1982) 247–250.Google Scholar

3 The agreements were arranged by Admirals Wolpert Hermanszoon (1602), Van der Hagen (1605), and Pieterszoon Verhoeven (1609). In each case, at least a partial representation of the orang kaya signed the contracts which granted the Dutch exclusive rights to the spices in the Moluccas. In return, the Dutch promised to provide them protection against their enemies among whom were the Portuguese. However, by 1609, some of the Bandanese were very unhappy with the situation that had developed with the Dutch to the point that they ambushed and killed Verhoeven. This did not stop the Dutch from exercising what they saw as their contractual right to the spices. Finally, in 1617, Governor-General Laurens Reael was again successful in convincing the orang kaya to sign another agreement reiterating the terms of the three previous contracts.

4 Meilink-Roelofsz, M.A.P., Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague 1962).Google Scholar

5 Despite the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621) the Dutch had concluded with Spain in 1609, Dutch attacks and plunderings of Iberian ships and fortifications continued practically unabated in Asia.

6 ‘[…] sysouden d'Engelschen ende d'andere Europische natien, die noch souden moogen coomen, selfs door ontsach nut deese haere landen (volgens contract) wel houden […]’: Colenbrander, Coen VI, 468: 1 January 1614.

7 ‘Daerop repliceere, dat men de vryheit alsoo can limiteeren, dat se de Compaingnie niet seer en hindere.’ Ibid., 471: 1 January 1614. This restriction was only enforceable in lands where the rulers were weak. Aside from the Spice Islands, the Dutch generally adapted to the laws of the particular land. In fact, on many occasions when they were asked to take sides in a local dispute, they flatly refused which often angered their trading partners. From their experience in the Moluccas, the directors realized how unprofitable political intervention was and the infeasibility of attempting more than one monopsony.

8 Steensgaard, ‘Institutional Innovation’, 252.

9 A few examples can be seen in Coen's ‘Discours’ of 1614 and other letters to various Dutch factors. Colenbrander, Coen VI, 465–470: 1 January 1614; Ibid. I, 804–806: 20 June 1623; Ibid. IV, 595–596: 21 September 1623. The connection between the welfare of the Dutch state, the defeat of the Spanish Empire, and the VOC is also evidenced in letters that Coen jointly signed. Ibid. I, 698: 21 January 1622; Ibid., 712–713: 26 March 1622; Ibid., 748–749: 6 September 1622.

10 In fact, Coen believed it was impossible to conduct trade in Asia without the use of arms. ‘Per experientie behoorden de heeren wel bekent te wesen, dat in Indien den handle gedreven ende gemainteneert moet worden onder beschuttinge ende faveur van U eygene wapenen, ende dat de wapenen gevoert moeten werden van de proffyten, die met den handel zijn genietende, in voegen dat den handel sonder d'oorloge, noch d'oorloge sonder den handel nyet gemainteneert connen werden.’ Ibid. 1, 97–98: 27 December 1614.

11 ‘By gebreck van dese plantinge […] d'oncosten sullen daermede verminderen ende 't cappitael alsoo niet consummeeren.’ Ibid. VI, 470: 1 January 1614.

12 ‘Magnifique resolutie’, Ibid., 452 and 465: 1 January 1614.

13 ‘Doch de personen, die harrewarts werden ghesonden, dienen pacificq ende ervaeren te sijn ende geen plompe onbesneeden idiooten, ghelijck de voorlesers mestendeel sijn, daerdoor haere gemeynen naeme in verachtinge ende bycans een spot geworden is.’ Ibid., 474: 1 January 1614.

14 For a nice summary of the Dutch early colonial policy, see Blusseé, J.L., Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Leiden 1986)Google Scholar chapter seven: ‘The Caryatids of 17th Century Batavia: The Production, Religion and Acculturation under the VOC, 156–171.

15 ‘Met deese victorie sal niet alleen verovert werden een seer grooten schat, maer oock den rijcken Chineesen handel, naer welcker goederen ende rijckdommen de gheheele wereldt [begerig is]. Hiermede sullen de quoi vercrygen om rijcke retouren in ‘t vaderlandt te brenghen, omme te handelen over de gantsche cust van Malabar, Coromandel, Japan, ja tot in West-Indien toe.’ Colenbrander, Coen VI, 468: 1 January 1614.

16 Boyajian, James C., Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580–1640 (Baltimore 1993) 128 and 162.Google Scholar

17 Ibid., 115–116. Boyajian has brought out some interesting points concerning the Portuguese traders in Asia. He shows that they were much more resilient than previously thought by historians. However, he attributes the Iberian's ‘loss of naval supremacy’ as the reason for the decline of the Portuguese hegemony (241). This loss of ‘supremacy’ seems more appropriately labeled a ‘result’ rather than a ‘cause’. The VOC was successful, he suggests, because it ‘supplemented its income by preying upon the wealth of the Portuguese and Portuguese-licensed native trade in Asia’; Ibid., 150–151. While it is true that the Dutch captured many richly laden vessels, the military and predatory policies of the VOC were generally not very profitable. One only needs to look at the failure of the ‘Fleet of Defense’ (1620–1622) to realize that this was a very costly affair for the VOC. In fact, it was so costly that the English, who were responsible for half the expense of the Fleet, were forced to abandon the project in 1622. The Dutch were able to support a large fleet because of the success of their trade, and not the other way around. Guns brought stability and opportunities that were not previously enjoyed by the VOC, but competitiveness brought profits.

18 For a nice beginning-to-end summary of Fort Zeelandia's operations see van Veen, Ernst, ‘How the Dutch Ran a Seventeenth-Century Colony: The Occupation and Loss of Formosa 1624–1662’, Itinerario 20 (1996) 59–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 There is much doubt among scholars whether Batavia ever really understood the situation in Taiwan or the Company's relationship with China even fifty years later, but my point (as will be explained later in the text) is that extensive and effective market integration within East and Southeast Asia and between the Indian Ocean and China Seas was impossible under the structure and practices in which the Company was operating in the mid-1620s.

20 There is actually much more involved than merely the incident with the Japanese traders in Taiwan. Iemitsu was trying to break the hold the Europeans and samurai had on trade and politics in Japan. He placed an embargo on Portuguese trade from 1628 to 1630 and began limiting the Chinese trade as well. Innes, Robert, ‘The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980)Google Scholar chapter 3: ‘The Regulation of Imports and the Constituencies that Shaped It’, 244–375.

21 Colenbrander, Coen V, 170: 18 March 1629.

22 Ibid., 529: 25 May 1629.

23 The governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans (1629–1636), was issued his orders on 24 April 1629. Ibid., 508: 24 April 1629.

24 This system is what Steensgaard refers to in passing as ‘an efficient communication network’ that ‘in the seventeenth century […] hardly had its equal’. Steensgaard, ‘Institutional Innovation’, 238. He suggests that it was already up and running in the 1620s. However, it is evident from the problems that arose in Taiwan and Japan in the late 1620s that it was not effective, at least in East Asia, until later. After the opening of the Siam factory in 1633, we see that the flows of goods and information along VOC channels of communication were much better organized than in the 1620s.

25 Smith, George Vinal, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thailand (Northern Illinois University 1977) 81Google Scholar. Skinner mentions the privileges enjoyed by the Chinese in Siam: Skinner, G. William, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (New York 1957) 6–12.Google Scholar

26 Blussé, J.L., van Opstall, M.E., and Yung-ho, Ts'ao eds, De Dagregisters van het Kasteel Zeelandia, Taiwan. 1629–1662 I (The Hague 1986) passim.Google Scholar

27 Smith, Thailand, 57–62, 81, and 93.

28 Ibid., 60.

29 Blusse etc., Zeelandia I, passim.

30 Ibid.

31 This is especially evident in the correspondence between Siam and the other VOC factories.

32 Coolhaas, W.Ph., Generale Missiven van Govemeurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oost-Indisdie Compagnie, 1610–17291 (The Hague 1960) 703: 22 December 1638.Google Scholar

33 Ibid., 738: 30 December 1638.

34 Ibid. II, 42: 18 December 1639.

35 Ibid. II, 83: 18 December 1639.