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Does ‘Contextual Rationality’ Really Advance the Study of Rational Nomination Strategies under the Single Non-Transferable Vote?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 June 2003

TSUNG-WEI LIU
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, National Chung-Cheng University, 160 San-Hsing, Ming-Hsiung, Chia-Yi 621, Taiwan Tel: 886-5-2720411-32611 poltwl@ccu.edu.tw

Abstract

The concept of ‘contextual rationality’ proposed by Browne and Patterson seems to advance our understanding of rational nomination strategies under the Single Non-Transferable Vote. The plausibility of this concept hinges on the assumption of perfect information. However, perfect information not only cannot be obtained in practice, but is also impossible to obtain if we follow Browne and Patterson's approach. What their approach provides is a post hoc rationalization for parties' nomination strategies rather than a priori criterion against which whether parties make rational decisions can be judged. This approach therefore may be helpful to the study of whether parties are punished for inappropriate nomination strategies, but is far from providing the rationale for them.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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