¹ Shinoda, T. (2006), ‘Japan's top-down policy process to dispatch the SDF to Iraq’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 7 (1): 71–91 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shinoda, T. (2007), Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defence Affairs, Seattle: University of Washington Press;Google Scholar Shinoda, T. (2013), Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Change and Power Shifts, New York: Columbia University Press;Google Scholar Krauss, E.S. and Nyblade, B. (2005), ‘“Presidentialization” in Japan? The prime minister, media and election in Japan’, British Journal of Political Science, 35: 357–68;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Pekkanen, R. and Krauss, E.S. (2005), ‘Japan's ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on security policies’, Orbis, 49 (3): 429–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Green, M. J. (2003), Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, New York: Palgrave and Council on Foreign Relations;Google Scholar Hughes, C.W. (2004), Japan Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS);Google Scholar Hughes, C.W. (2009), Japan's Remilitarisation, Abingdon: Routledge for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Google Scholar; Samuels, R.J. (2007), Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press Google Scholar.

³ Lieberman, R.C. (2002), ‘Ideas, institutions, and political order: explaining political change’, American Political Science Review, 96 (4): 697 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Legro, J.W. (2009), ‘The plasticity of identity under anarchy’, European Journal of International Relations, 15 (1): 37–65 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ For ‘symbolic boundaries and images’, see Chai, S.-K. (1997), ‘Entrenching the Yoshida defence doctrine: three techniques for institutionalization’, International Organization, 51 (3): 389–412;CrossRefGoogle Scholar for social and legal norms, see Katzenstein, P.J. and Okawara, N. (1993), ‘Japan's national security: structures, norms and policies’, International Security, 17 (4): 265–99;CrossRefGoogle Scholar for political culture, see Berger, T.U. (1998), Cultures of Anti-militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press Google Scholar 1998; and for ideology, see Babb, J. (2013), ‘The new generation of conservatives politicians’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 14 (3): 355–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Oros, A.L. (2008), Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press and NUS Press.Google Scholar

⁷ Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y.M., Johnston, A.I., and McDermott, R. (2006), ‘Identity as a variable’, Perspectives on Politics, 4 (4): 695–711 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Legro, ‘The plasticity of identity under anarchy’.

⁹ Banchoff, T. (1999), ‘German identity and European integration’, European Journal of International Relations, 5 (3): 259–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wendt, A. (1992), ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’, International Organisation, 46 (2): 391–425 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wendt, A. (1994), ‘Collective identity formation and the international state’, American Political Science Review, 88 (2): 384–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Abdelal et al., ‘Identity as a variable’; Chafetz, G., Spirtas, M., and Frankel, B. (1998/9), ‘Introduction: tracing the influence of identity on foreign policy’, Security Studies, 8 (2/3): vii–xxii;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) (1996), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press;Google Scholar Legro, ‘The plasticity of identity under anarchy’; Smith, R.M. (2004), ‘Identities, interests, and the future of political science’, Perspectives on Politics, 2 (2): 301–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O. (1993), ‘Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework’, in Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 6 Google Scholar (italics from original).

¹² Oros, Normalizing Japan; Singh, B. (2013), Japan's Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State, Abingdon and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar

¹³ Oros, Normalizing Japan, 9.

¹⁴ Oros, Normalizing Japan, 9.

¹⁵ Oros, Normalizing Japan, 9–10; Bukovansky, M. (2002), Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For an extensive discussion on both identities, see Singh, Japan's Security Identity, 52–67.

¹⁷ For a good example of how Japan's peace-based and international objectives overlap in the context of peace-building diplomacy, see Lam, P. E. (2009), Japan's Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role, New York and London: Routledge.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Dower, J.W. (1999), Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II, London: Allen Lane Google Scholar 1999; Welfield, J. (1988), An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System – A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, London: Athlone Press.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The peace clause of the Constitution, Article 9, reads as follows: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputesIn order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.’

²⁰ See Samuels, Securing Japan, 34–6.

²¹ Katzenstein, and Okawara, ‘Japan's national security’. For Japan's internationalization in areas other than security, see Hook, G.D. and Weiner, M. (eds.) (1992), Internationalization of Japan, London and New York: Routledge Google Scholar.

²² Edstrōm, B. (1999), Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa, London: Macmillan Press, p. 120.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Pyle, K.E. (1992), The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, Washington, DC: AEI Press, p. 89;Google Scholar Pyle, K.E. (1987), ‘In pursuit of a grand design: Nakasone betwixt the past and the future’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 13:2, 254–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Pyle, K.E. (2007), Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, New York: Public Affairs (A Century Foundation Book).Google Scholar; Pyle, ‘In pursuit of a grand design’, 266–8.

²⁶ Many competing identities emerged for Japan in the post-Cold War period, such as ‘global civilian power’, ‘normal’ state’ and ‘ordinary’ state. However, the international-state term is preferred as it corresponds to Japan's official security discourse that frequently expressed the need for Japan to adopt international responsibilities in the areas of economics and military-strategic affairs. See Maull, H. (1990), ‘The new civilian powers: Germany and Japan’, Foreign Affairs, 69 (5): 91–106;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Funabashi, Y. (1991/92), ‘Japan and the New World Order’, Foreign Affairs, 70 (5): 58–74;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hughes, Japan Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power; Ozawa, I. (1994), Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, Tokyo: Kodansha International;Google Scholar and Inoguchi, T. and Bacon, P. (2006), ‘Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 6 (1): 1–21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ Acharya, A. (1997), ‘Ideas, identity, and institution-building: from the “ASEAN way” to the “Asia-Pacific Way”’, The Pacific Review, 10 (3): 319–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Risse-Kappen, T. (1996), ‘Collective identity in a democratic community: the case of NATO’, in Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security, 357–99.

²⁸ Barnett, M. (1999), ‘Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo’, European Journal of International Relations, 5 (1): 5–36;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Berger, T.U. (1996), ‘Norms, identity and national security in Germany and Japan’, in Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security, pp. 317–56; Herman, R.G. (1996), ‘Identity, norms, and national security: the Soviet foreign policy revolution and the end of the Cold War’, in Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security, pp. 271–316; Hopf, T. (2002), Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, Ithaca: Cornell University Press Google Scholar.

²⁹ Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (1998), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Mattern, J. B. (2001), ‘The power politics of identity’, European Journal of International Relations, 7 (3): 349–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁰ Barnett, ‘Culture, strategy and foreign policy change’, 16.

³¹ See Boyd, J.P. and Samuels, R.J. (2005), ‘Nine lives?: the politics of constitutional reform in Japan’, Policy Studies, 19, Washington, DC: East West Centre Google Scholar. What is referred to as revisionist here is normal nationalist for Samuels, military realist for Mochizuki and Tamamoto, and the assertive conservative right for Togo ( Mochizuki, M.M. (1983/84), ‘Japan's search for strategy’, International Security, 8 (3): 152–79;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Samuels, Securing Japan; Tamamoto, M. (1990), ‘Japan's search for a world role’, World Policy Journal, 7 (3): 493–520;Google Scholar Togo, K. (2010), ‘The assertive conservative right in Japan: their formation and perspective’, SAIS Review, 30 (1): 77–89 CrossRefGoogle Scholar). For a detailed discussion on the historical background, policies, position on security issues and members of this group, see Samuels, Securing Japan, 18–36; and Togo, ‘The assertive conservative right in Japan’.

³² Berger, ‘Norms, identity and national security in Germany and Japan’, 336–7.

³³ Samuels, Securing Japan, 32–33; Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine lives?’, 26; Berger, Cultures of Anti-militarism, 104

³⁴ Inoguchi and Bacon, ‘Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power’, 2.

³⁵ Samuels, Securing Japan, 30; Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine Lives?’, 3.

³⁶ Hook, G.D. (1996), Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, London: Routledge, pp. 27–37 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Samuels, Securing Japan, 30; Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine lives?’, 19; Pyle, The Japanese Question, 44–5.

³⁷ Inoguchi and Bacon, ‘Japan's emerging role as a global ordinary power’, 2; Hook (1996), Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, 27–37; Samuels, Securing Japan, 30; Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine lives?’, 2005, 19; Pyle, The Japanese Question, 44–5. As will be discussed later, the views of the revisionists and the progressives evolved during the later years of the Cold War and the post-Cold War.

³⁸ Campbell, J.C. (1989), ‘Democracy and bureaucracy in Japan’, in Ishida, T. and Krauss, E. (eds.), Democracy in Japan, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1989;Google Scholar Rix, A. et al. (1988), ‘Bureaucracy and political change in Japan’, in Stockwin, J. A. A. (ed.), Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press;Google Scholar Fukui, H. (1977), ‘Policy-making in the Japanese foreign ministry’, in Scalapino, R. A. (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1977)Google Scholar; Baerwald, H.H. (1977), ‘The Diet and foreign policy’, in Scalapino (ed.) The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan.

³⁹ Miyashita, A. (1999), ‘ Gaiatsu and Japan's foreign aid: rethinking the reactive-proactive debate’, International Studies Quarterly, 43: 695–732.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ Hellman, D.C. (1977), ‘Japanese security and postwar Japanese foreign policy’, in Scalapino, R.A. (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 329.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Inoguchi, T. and Jain, P. (eds.) (2000), Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader, New York: Palgrave Google Scholar.

⁴² Ibid, xv. It is important to note that Japanese prime ministers, members of the LDP, and the bureaucracy were not only supportive of the close bilateral security relationship but also welcome US pressure at times, as this allowed them to avoid domestic responsibilities in implementing controversial policies by citing the breakdown of the US–Japan relationship as a potential consequence ( Angel, R.C. (1988/9), ‘Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan: recent changes in personal style and administrative organization’, Pacific Affairs, 61 (4): 588 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁴³ To be sure, there are other external factors apart from US pressure, such as China's strategic rise and North Korea's belligerency, that arguably impact the security policy debates in post-Cold War Japan. However, the focus of this paper is on domestic politics. The US pressure is included due to its strong institutional presence and influence since the onset of the post-war period stemming from the US–Japan security treaty.

⁴⁴ This normative structure has been described in the literature as organizational or institutional culture. Legro defines this as “collectively held assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure” ( Legro, J. (1996), ‘Culture and preferences in the international cooperation two-step’, American Political Science Review, 90 (1): 121 CrossRefGoogle Scholar). It has also been referred to as an ‘episteme’ – defined by Legro, as a ‘collectively held belief characterizing a particular group about the appropriate or effective corporate behaviour’ ( Legro, J. (2000), ‘Whence American internationalism’, International Organization, 54 (2): 255 CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Whatever the appropriate reference, the important point to note is the normative element that results in an overarching ideational structure in influencing the dominant interests and preferred security behavior within the regime. Also see Kier, E.K. (1995), ‘Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars’, International Security, 19 (4): 65–93 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Drezner, D.W. (2000), ‘Ideas, bureaucratic politics, and the crafting of foreign policy’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (4): 733–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁵ Lieberman, ‘Ideas, institutions, and political order: explaining political change’, 699.

⁴⁶ Thies, C.G. (2001), ‘A historical institutionalist approach to the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiation,’ Comparative Political Studies, 34 (4): 405 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁷ Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine lives?’, 26

⁴⁸ Kohno, M. (2007), ‘The domestic foundations of Japan's international contribution’, in Berger, T.U., Mochizuki, M.M., and Tsuchiyama, J. (eds.), Japan in International Politics: The Policies of an Adaptive State, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 32 Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Berger, Cultures of Anti-militarism, 50.

⁵⁰ Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 106; Katzenstein and Okawara, ‘Japan's national security’, 93.

⁵¹ Berger, Cultures of Anti-militarism, 104. The SDF saw a widened role in security policymaking in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This was due to its superior technical knowledge in military matters and its close links with the US military gained through consultations and negotiations on building greater cooperation in defence matters, joint studies, and joint military exercises. The Japanese military became an important focus of US demands, requests, and expectations of Japan's defence roles and missions that occurred more behind the scenes of the security policymaking process ( Katahara, E. (2001), ‘Japan: from containment to normalization’, in Alagappa, M. (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 77 Google Scholar 79.

⁵² George, M.A. (2003), ‘Japan's ‘Un-Westminster’ system: impediments to reform in a crisis economy’, Government and Opposition, 38 (1): 73–91;Google Scholar Katahara, ‘Japan: from containment to normalization’, 77.

⁵³ Samuels, Securing Japan, 49. The CLB provided legal advice on all critical aspects of Japanese security policy, including the SDF's constitutionality and its limitations, interpretations of collective self-defence operations, SDF's overseas deployment and the definition of the use of force. During the Cold War, the CLB was made up of officials from the various civilian ministries but no defence agency official was assigned to the bureau. All proposed legislation, speeches and regulations were vetted by the officials at the CLB. The interpretations of the CLB became the official interpretations adopted by the politicians and bureaucracy. Yoshida and his followers relied on the CLB's interpretations to deflect pressure from the US and those within Japan that pushed for an expanded security role in external security affairs. This facilitated the maintenance of a narrow security policy as captured by the peace-state identity conception (See Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 49–52). Also see Samuels, R.J. (2004), ‘Politics, security policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau: who elected these guys, anyway?’, JPRI Working Article No. 99, http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingarticles/wp99.html (accessed 29 February 2012).

⁵⁴ Estévez-Abe, M. (2006), ‘Japan's shift toward a Westminster system’, Asian Survey, 46 (4): 632–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ Berger, Cultures of Anti-militarism, 83.

⁵⁶ Katzenstein, P.J. (1996), Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 104 Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Oros, Normalizing Japan, 61; Samuels, Securing Japan, 52.

⁵⁸ Samuels, Securing Japan, 52–53.

⁵⁹ Katzenstein and Okawara, ‘Japan's national security’, 95–7; Hughes, Japan's Remilitarisation, 55.

⁶⁰ Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 19, 25.

⁶¹ Katzenstein and Okawara, ‘Japan's national security’, 93.

⁶² Hosoya, C. (1974), ‘Characteristics of the foreign policy decision-making system in Japan’, World Politics, 26 (3): 368 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Also see Angel, ‘Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan’.

⁶³ See Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy; Angel, ‘Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan’.

⁶⁴ Examples include: Nakasone's use of personal advisors to circumvent the bureaucracy to strengthen Japan's relations with South Korea in 1983, which led to his successful visit to South Korea in January 1983; Nakasone's show of direct support to the US missile deployment in Europe during the Williamsburg Summit in January 1983; the revision of the 1967 three principles of arms exports to allow the export of military technology to the US; and strengthening the authority of the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) for crises management (Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 28–37).

⁶⁵ Katzenstein and Okawara, ‘Japan's national security’, 93–5. An example to illustrate this constraint was the finance and foreign affairs ministries and even the defence agency assigning lower ranking officials (instead of the administrative vice-ministers) to serve at the Cabinet Secretariat. This allowed the ministries to retain influence over these officials and weakened the role of the Cabinet Secretariat (Angel, ‘Prime Ministerial leadership in Japan’, 599–600).

⁶⁶ Grimes, W. (2003), ‘Institutionalized inertia: Japanese foreign policy in the Post-Cold War’, in Ikenberry, G. J. and Mastanduno, M. (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ On Japan as a ‘reactive’ state, see Calder, K.E. (1988), ‘Japanese foreign economic policy formation: explaining the reactive state’, World Politics, 40 (4): 517–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁸ Hellman, ‘Japanese security and postwar Japanese foreign policy’, 332.

⁶⁹ Okawara, Y. (1990), To Avoid Isolation: An Ambassador's View of US/Japanese Relations, Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, p. 121 Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ MOD, Japan, ‘Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation’, 27 November 1978, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19781127.html.

⁷¹ Green, M.J. and Murata, K. (1998), ‘The 1978 Guidelines for the US–Japan Defence Cooperation Process and the historical impact’, George Washington University Working Paper No. 17, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/GreenMurataWP.htm (accessed 25 November 2009), p. 2.

⁷² Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine lives?’, 27–41.

⁷³ Pekkanen, R. and Krauss, E.S. (2005), ‘Japan's “Coalition of the Willing” on security policies’, Orbis, 49 (3): 437 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁴ Kohno, ‘The domestic foundations of Japan's international contribution’, 40.

⁷⁵ Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 63.

⁷⁶ George, ‘Japan's ‘Un-Westminster’ system’, 89; Estévez-Abe, ‘Japan's shift toward a Westminster system’, 645.

⁷⁷ Boyd and Samuels, ‘Nine lives?’, 38; Calder, K.E. (2009), Pacific Alliance: Reviving US–Japan Relations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 150.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ George, ‘Japan's ‘Un-Westminster’ system’, 87–89.

⁷⁹ Krauss, E.S. and Nyblade, B. (2005), ‘“Presidentialization” in Japan? The prime minister, media and election in Japan’, British Journal of Political Science, 35: 357–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 64,

⁸¹ George, ‘Japan's ‘Un-Westminster’ system’, 88.

⁸² Hughes, Japan's Remilitarisation, 55; Katahara, ‘Japan: from containment to normalization’, 82.

⁸³ Nagashima, 1998, cited in Katahara, ‘Japan: from containment to normalization’, 82.

⁸⁴ See Hughes, Japan's Remilitarisation, 53–65.

⁸⁵ Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 58–59.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 62.

⁸⁷ Japan Times, 4 May 1996.

⁸⁸ Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 93–6.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 93. Parenthesis added.

⁹⁰ There were instances of Japan accommodating US pressure at the expense of its foreign policy objectives early in the post-Cold War period. Examples include Japan's rejection of membership in Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal and its suspension of loan aid to Iran for a hydroelectric power in 1995 (Miyashita, ‘Gaiatsu and Japan's foreign aid’, 703–4). However, it is important to note that the focus here is on US pressure in the area of Japan's contribution to external security affairs in military terms, which weakened over the course of the post-Cold War period.

⁹¹ In response to North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006, Abe Shinzo, Koizumi's successor, adopted a quick response that included the imposition of sanctions against North Korea (a decision taken before even the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC's) resolution was passed), the closing of all Japanese ports to North Korean ships and cargo, and the ban of all visits by North Koreans to Japan ( Hughes, C.W. and Krauss, E.S. (2007), ‘Japan's new security agenda’, Survival, 49 (2): 164 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁹² See INSS Special Report (2000), ‘The United States and Japan: advancing towards a mature partnership’, http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibei-anpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf (accessed 16 July 2012).

⁹³ Midford, P. (2003) ‘Japan's response to terror: dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea’, Asian Survey, 43 (2): 335–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁴ Mainichi Daily News, 18 September 2001.

⁹⁵ Emphasis added. Nikkei Weekly, 24 September 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan, (2001) ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’, 153rd Session of the Diet, 27 September, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/state0927.html (accessed 28 March 2005).

⁹⁶ Midford, ‘Japan's response to terror’.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 335–6.

⁹⁸ Shinoda, T. (2002), ‘Japan's response to terrorism and the implications for the Taiwan Strait issue’, Japan–Taiwan Research Forum, 22 Google Scholar January, http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/2002/JTRF-Shinoda-0102.htm (accessed 27 June 2005).

⁹⁹ Hughes, Japan Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power, 15.

¹⁰⁰ ‘SDF role in South Sudan to expand in May under new security laws’, The Japan Times, 22 September 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/22/national/politics-diplomacy/sdf-role-south-sudan-expand-may-new-security-laws/; ‘Expanding SDF's role in South Sudan likely to wait until late 2016’, The Japan Times, 22 October 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/19/national/politics-diplomacy/expanding-sdfs-south-sudan-peacekeeping-role-likely-delayed-late-2016/#.V7-Vu650CC4.

¹⁰¹ S. Abe, ‘Peace and security in Asia, for evermore, Japan for the rule of law, Asia for the rule of law, and the rule of law for all of us’, Keynote speech delivered at the 13th Asian Security Summit, Singapore, 30 May 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html. Also see Oros, A.L. (2015), ‘International and domestic challenges to Japan's post-war security identity: “norm constructivism” and Japan's new “proactive pacifism”’, The Pacific Review, 1 (28): 139–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰² Singh, B. (2015), “The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-term Defensive Strategy,” Asia Policy, 19: 49–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar