Legislative scholars have debated what factors (e.g. divided government) account for the number of important laws a legislative body passes per year. This paper presents a monopoly model for explaining legislative production. It assumes that a legislature adjusts its law production so as to maximize its utility. The model predicts that socio-economic and political changes increase the marginal benefit of law production, whereas low negotiation costs and ample legislative resources decrease the marginal cost of law production. The model is tested in two ways. The first approach compares the legislatures of 42 developed and developing countries. The second analyzes Japanese lawmaking from 1949 to 1990, using an appropriate method for event count time series data. Both empirical investigations support the model's predictions for legislative production.

The Japanese government maintained protectionist agricultural policies for several decades after the end of World War II. However, it recently introduced a new policy that aims at promoting the export of agricultural products to overseas markets. Agricultural export promotion policy is fundamentally different from traditional agricultural trade policies, as it focuses primarily on the promotion of competitiveness of Japanese agriculture rather than protection of inefficient farmers. This paper tries to explain this intriguing development in Japanese agricultural trade policy by focusing on the impacts of the changes in legislators' incentives since the electoral reform of 1994. It argues that the post-reform electoral environment induced the introduction of the agricultural export promotion policy. It is because the reform made certain particularistic policies, such as the protection of the agricultural sector, less attractive to politicians that politicians must now appeal to a broader consituency.

We are pleased that starting with Volume 8 (2008), the journal is to be included in the Thomson/ISI Social Science Citation Index. This is a milestone for the journal which started in 2000 published by Cambridge University Press. We are most grateful to those who have helped us, especially Ken Firmalio Anno who has efficiently and often single-handedly run the editorial office, our contributors, and referees. Our deep gratitude also goes to those who, in their capacity as editors, associate editors, and advisors, have repeatedly rescued us with their spirit of academic solidarity of seeking truth, with disregard to differences of backgrounds and creeds, despite their geographical locations. On this occasion I would like to reiterate the journal's key characteristics: the journal covers all fields of the discipline, especially where these have a conceptual thrust, including political theory, comparative politics, political behaviour, political institutions, public policy and international institutions. At the same time, the journal seeks the best comparative articles featuring Japan or East Asia. The indexing began with Volume 8 Part 1 in April 2007 and JJPS is expected to receive its first impact factor in 2009.

SNTV engenders incentives to vote strategically not only against probable losers but also against candidates seen as possible runaway winners. This paper uses survey and election data from the 2004 Taiwanese legislative election to argue that excessive strategic voting against the strongest candidates was at the root of coordination failures. Further, I argue that strong personal votes play a role in mitigating these failures by constructing a stable foundation of votes that is not subject to the wild swings produced by strategic voting.

A vast body of literature emphasizes that successful political development relies on stable and united political parties that underpin clear and responsive policymaking. By this perspective, divided government and party volatility represent pathologies that imperil political accountability and development. Indeed, studies contend that divided government – where different parties control the executive and legislative branches of government – lead to policy deadlock while party volatility – characterized by frequent party splits, solo switches, mergers, dissolutions or the establishment of new parties – confounds representation and accountability. Clearly, each on its own is seen as a considerable threat to political performance and democratic development; the confluence of the two points virtually to an inevitable political doom.

This paper considers a monthly pattern in government spending. I have found that public spending increases at the end of the fiscal year for both the Japanese central government and the US federal government and that the effects are stronger in recent years than in the past. I then propose two hypotheses that would explain why public spending increases at the end of the fiscal year.

This study discusses the pattern of development of child-related policies, particularly in recent years. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lacks interest in public engagement in child-related issues, whereas Komeito, the recent coalition partner of the LDP, has been the driving force of recent developments. The study investigates the historical development of three child-related policies: namely, child allowance, childcare services, and the facilitation of work–life balance of employees, and discusses the role of Komeito in the recent coalition government. An analytical model is provided to explain why Komeito was active in the development of child allowance, but not other policies. On the whole, the participation of Komeito in the coalition government seems to give impetus to the development of child-related polices, but the scope of that party's behavior is constrained, due to its position as a minor partner in the coalition government.

In 1946 there were three democracies in the world with constitutions that, on the one hand, required the government to obtain the support of a legislative majority in order to come to and remain in power and, on the other hand, established a popularly elected president. In 2002, this number had grown to 25. Constitutions with this feature are often considered to be problematic, and, given the number of new democracies that have adopted them, have received considerable attention from political scientists. The primary concern has to do with the potential for conflict between the assembly supported government and the popularly elected president, which may lead to unstable governments, policy paralysis, and the eventual undermining of the democratic regime. Concern has also been raised regarding the negative role a popularly elected president may have on party development and the ‘chain of delegation’ that in a pure parliamentary democracy runs from voters to government through political parties. In this paper, we examine the effect the combination of assembly confidence with a popularly elected president has on government instability, accountability, legislative effectiveness, and democratic survival. We also examine the impact on these outcomes of different combinations of presidential powers. We find that the introduction of a popularly elected president in parliamentary constitutions is of little significant impact and that the preoccupation with the specific powers of the president is mostly overblown.

The attainment of good governance is the question of the day in Bangladesh. This paper discusses the ‘bedrock of good governance’, parliamentary accountability, and assesses the effectiveness of the Bangladesh Parliament in ensuring governmental accountability and promoting good governance since 1991 when the country re-entered into parliamentary democracy. Considerable discrepancies between the expected role and practical performances are identified and the study further identified a number of problems that severely hinder parliament's accountability function. This paper primarily argues that Bangladesh vested excessive powers in the hands of the executive branch; it, therefore, lacks the proper checks and balances a strong parliament could provide.

The trade–conflict model claims that one state, designated ‘actor’, is deterred from initiating conflict against a trading partner, designated ‘target’, for fear of losing the welfare gains associated with trade. This paper extends the trade–conflict model to garner implications concerning trade and conflict interactions where third-party blocs are involved. The theoretical propositions supported by proofs are: (1) if the actor increases trade with a third-party who is a friend of the target, then the actor will decrease conflict toward the target; (2) if the actor increases trade with a third-party who is a rival of the target, then the actor will increase conflict toward the target. A 30-country sample from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) is used and divided into three blocs, namely a Western bloc, a Middle Eastern bloc, and an Eastern bloc. The empirical analysis supports the hypotheses. A similar relationship is also discussed and tested for situations in which conflict increases or decreases between the actor and third-party bloc. In addition, the evidence shows that Western bloc countries play a central role in world political and economic relationships.

Are new democracies with divided government and volatile parties politically ill fated? The literature suggests so, but cases of emergent democracies such as Taiwan and Brazil that face both conditions defy the prediction. This paper explains why: party volatility follows from pursuing distinct executive and legislature agendas under divided government; the political ambition that underlies these conditions sustains democratic and even political performance. We evaluate the argument through government spending in Taiwan. The results corroborate our expectations: they show more parties composing the legislature as government spending favors an executive agenda and neglects a legislative welfare-spending agenda. The findings make three contributions to the literature: first, they reveal a political divide between executive and legislature rather than ideological parties to undercut concerns regarding performance. Second, they demonstrate that the strategic use of government spending to institutionalize party development along an executive agenda fuels party fragmentation. Third, they show that legislators split, switch, or create alternative routes to office in reaction to strategic spending to underscore that ambition underlies party volatility and divided government.

What explains the breakout of violence following the repression of moderateIslamist groups in some Muslim countries? Part of the answer can lie in thepolitical organization style of those groups, which can constrain or expandtheir long-term strategy choices in unpredicted ways. Using examples fromAlgeria, Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey, this study suggests that organizing as apolitical party can initially restrict the means of action otherwise availableto a moderate Islamist movement, while the loose framework of a political frontreduces its organizational costs and lends remarkable flexibility to attract awider range of followers. Later, paradoxically, the political party frameworkcan enable limited access of an Islamist group into the political systemotherwise completely inaccessible earlier, and help to enhance its power, whilepolitical fronts are exposed to attacks from both incumbent regimes and radicalIslamists groups alike.

There is a long-standing and widespread consensus that semi-presidentialism is bad for democratic performance. This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-presidentialism. Examining countries that are incompletely consolidated and yet are not autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the three main arguments against semi-presidentialism – the strength of the presidency, cohabitation, and divided minority government. We find that there is a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not have the negative consequences that the literature predicts.

In the 1980s, a wave of new–extremely clever and detailed–studies revolutionized the Japanese politics field. The empirical findings of this ‘new paradigm’ literature remain the conventional wisdom on Japanese policy-making patterns under the ‘1955 System’. In this paper, we offer a critical reinterpretation of the new paradigm literature. We do not offer new empirical analysis, but, rather, reconsider this conventional wisdom by putting a new spin on the evidence previous authors utilized to analyze the policy-making process in Japan under the 1955 System. Contrary to the conventional view of strong central bureaucratic power, we argue that in the 1960s policy making was quite fragmented. In contrast to literature suggesting substantial politician influence in the 1980s, we argue that there was a decline in the influence of politicians in general in policy making.

Around 1907, 1987, and 2007 Japan faced a crossroads in defining internationalism and Asianism, determining their relative priorities, and assessing their relevance for national identity. Similarities can be found in the far-reaching changes occurring in Japan's external environment in the three periods and in the importance of setting a new direction for strategic thinking. Misjudgments in the first two periods are reviewed in order to draw lessons for responding to today's challenges. A distorted outlook on internationalism led to rejection of shifts in US thinking welcomed elsewhere in the global community. Now as attention focuses on debates over the Six-Party Talks as a test of internationalization and over the East Asian Community and regionalism as a test of Asianism, it is possible that the riveting impact of the ‘abductions’ issue, as with the ‘Northern Territories’ issue 20 years earlier, will remain a symbol that trumps a strategic approach toward Asia at a moment of far-reaching regional reorganization. Shortcomings in dealing with the concepts internationalism and Asianism are connected; at the very time the Japanese struggle with one, they are also at an impasse over the other. The same set of factors may be at work: an absence of agreed principles on which to anchor foreign policy; fragmented strategic thinking that loses sight of interconnections and the big picture; and national identity that excessively separates Japan from global forces that transform politics and society and that narrowly compartmentalize the historical developments that shaped relations with Asian countries without capturing the fundamental regional dynamics.

Since 1993, coalition governments have replaced the 38-year-long, one-party dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) in Japan. Except for one year, from 1993 to 1994, the LDP has remained a key party in successive governing coalitions, but the dynamics of party competition has been completely transformed since the period of the LDP's dominance. Although the LDP has survived to form a variety of coalitions ranging from a minority to an over-sized majority, since 1998 the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has continued to counter the LDP governments. The transformation of party systems in Japan accompanies the party switching of legislators and the mergers, breakups, extinctions, and formations of parties. In this regard, the Japanese case provides an interesting example to show how parties attempt to change the dynamics of policy competition by switching and reorganizing. Parties also attempt to shift their policy positions to attract public support and to gain a competitive edge in government formation. Using expert survey data about the policy positions of parties, this study explicates the dynamics involved in the reorganization of parties and the formation of governments.

This article discusses what constituted Japan's conception of the world order, by analyzing political discourse of international order in modern Japan. It has been generally assumed that the Japanese vision of international order in the pre-World War II years was dominated by a belief in the supremacy of the sovereign state. Contrary to the conventional supposition, this paper will argue that modern Japan actually abounded in discourses of transnationalism, and that most of them cannot be seen as the product of liberal ideas but rather the result of an unstable image of the sovereign state system. Surveying the historical development of political discourse of sovereignty and colonial administration in modern Japan, the way in which the ambivalence of Japanese transnationalism had affected the theoretical construction of the international order will be elucidated. Keeping in mind that previous studies on the genealogy of international relations have focused exclusively on the paradigmatic debate over the League of Nations, this article will also pay more attentions to the fact that rearrangement of empire had occupied the significant place in building the image of the world order. Based on the historical considerations mentioned above, the conclusion will offer generalized consideration of what constituteｄ Japan's conception of the world order.

This paper examines the internal dynamics of Korean political parties to understand why the minority coalition government of Kim Dae-jung suffered from political stalemate or deadlocks in the legislature. It shows that a focus on the size of the government in terms of a majority status in the legislature does not offer a convincing explanation of why the Kim Dae-jung administration slid towards ungovernability. Instead better insights come from an analysis of party organization, an aspect of party politics rarely examined through in-depth analysis. The paper shows that in terms of the key dimensions of organization (leadership type, factionalism, funding, linkage role) Korean political parties fail to connect citizens to the political system.