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France and Fragmentation in West Africa: 1945–1960

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2009

Extract

The term ‘balkanization’, as applied to colonial policy in Africa, frequently suggests a European ‘divide and rule’ policy, intended to fragment pre-existing African unity. An examination of the policy of France towards the former federation of French West Africa indicates that the term is inaccurate to describe French policy.

The federation was created by the French for the French. It served to streamline French administration during the period of expansion, to help develop the component territories' economies, and to guarantee the security of French private investments. France conceived of the territories as the basic political units and hence modern political life was implanted there rather than in the federation. Post World War II French public investments flowed chiefly to the territories, common federal services were decentralized as territories acquired expertise and funds to run their own, and the quasi-federal Senate called the Grand Conseil was allowed to expire. Other aspects of French policy had unintended centrifugal effects, such as the metropolitan party structure and consequent dispersal of African representatives in Paris, and the influence of some French parties in Africa. Since 1956, France logically responded to African leaders' demands for more power and eventual autonomy in the territories, and left it to the Africans to decide whether or not to continue their federal relationship.

By 1956, the federation had outlived its usefulness to France. It is improbable that the metropole could have ‘saved’ it, because political territorial roots were too strong, the Africans were not agreed, and relations between France and Africa had already become mainly bilateral with the territories directly. Consequently it appears that the federation, a purely French creation, was simply permitted to fade away once its functions were no longer relevant to French needs. It is true that France preferred eight small, powerless states to a strong federation when national independence approached, but ‘powerless’ and ‘strong’ in this context are but relative terms. The story of the federation of French West Africa suggests that such political structures can survive the colonial period only if they are anchored in fundamental African needs; this was not the case with that federation.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1967

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References

1 Legum, Cohn, Pan-Africanism: A short Political Guide (New York: Praeger, 1965), 65.Google Scholar

2 See Newbury, Colin, ‘The formation of the Government-General of French West Africa’, Journal of African History, I (1960).Google Scholar

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18 Travaux préparasoires de la constitution—Avis et débats du Comité Consultatif Constitutionel (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1960), 133.Google Scholar

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20 The full extent of French pressures has not been made public. Governor Colombani, known for his strong tactics, was criticized severely by other African leaders for ‘interference’, and later developments in Niger led to a show of military force by French armed forces and Ivoirian gendarmerie, the dissolution of the legislature, and the ousting of Djibo Bakary from the Presidency of the Executive Council. Cf. Afrique Nouvelle, 10 September 10 and 17 October and 19 December 1959.Google Scholar