¹ See the article in this series by Atmore, Chirenje and Mudenge. The Sand River Convention of 1852 bound the British not to sell arms in the neighbourhood of the South African Republic.

² Most of my information for this section is drawn from a memo by the Hon. Guy Dawnay, who had extensive experience in South Africa in the decade 1870–80. He speaks with all the bitterness of a sportsman who suffered from regulations which were not imposed upon others. This document, dated 12 Dec. 1888, is enc. in Euan, Smith to Salisbury, . No. 372, 15 12 1888, F.O. 84/1911.Google Scholar

³ See Atmore, Chirenje and Mudenge.

⁴ See Dawnay memo, loc. cit.; de Kiewiet, C., The Imperial Factor in South Africa (Cambridge, 1937), 19;Google ScholarBrookes, E. H., The History of Native Policy in South Africa (Pretoria, 1927), 124.Google Scholar

⁵ Dawnay memo, loc. cit.

⁶ Africans sometimes obtained good quality arms, and the British Consul O'Neill noted a demand for breech-loaders in Delagoa Bay in 1879. On the whole, however, African purchasing power was limited and there was a large trade in cheap guns. In 1890 the arms manufacturers of Liège who did a flourishing trade in outdated remodelled weapons, two- thirds of which found their way to Africa, described these wares as shoddy (‘la pacotille’). At that time they had stocks of 300,000 to 400,000 guns costing some 5 or 6 francs (about 4 shillings) apiece and suitable only for unloading on the African market. They sent mainly percussion guns to Delagoa Bay and claimed that such better quality weapons as went there were destined for sale to Europeans; President du Syndicat des Fabrications d'Armes, à Liège to Baron, Whetnall, very confidential, 55 02 1890,Google Scholar no. 103 and Petition to Chimay, , 17 02 1890, no. 104, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Brussels, Correspondence et Documents, Afrique, Conférence Anti-Esclavagiste, vol. 3.Google Scholar

⁷ de Kiewiet, C., op. cit. 18–19.Google Scholar

⁸ This argument was accepted by the government—see Bulwer, to C.O., , 23 10 1885 enc. in C.O. to F.O., 02 1886, Colonial Office Confidential Print (henceforward COCP) African no. 381, C.O. 879/31—but it must be remembered that the profits were high on these goods and traders had every incentive to argue against restrictions.Google Scholar

⁹ Bulwer, to Hicks, Beach, 3 04 1879 (Secret) and enc. Report of the Attorney General, 5 Mar. 1879, COCP African no. 190 (C.O. 879/15).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See O'Neill, to Salisbury, , 5 08 1879, enc. in F.O. to C.O., 26 09 1879, COCP African no. 208 (C.O. 879/17); see also Mr Guy's paper on the arms trade to Zululand.Google Scholar

¹¹ F.O. to C.O., 2 Apr. 1879, COCP African no. 190 (C.O. 879/15).

¹² Lyons, to Salisbury, , 27 05 1879, enc. in F.O. to C.O. 31 05 1879, COCP African no. 208 (C.O. 879/17).Google Scholar

¹³ C.O. to F.O. 10 July 1879, COCP African no. 190 (C.O. 879/15).

¹⁴ Wolseley, to Hicks, Beach, 10 03 1880, COCP no. 222 (F.O. 123/252). Wolseley was Governor of Natal and Transvaal and High Commissioner for ‘native and foreign affairs’ from 1879–80, during the latter part of the Zulu War and just after it.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Secretary, London Chamber of Commerce, S. African Section, to Bulwer, , 17 02 1886,Google Scholar enc. in Bulwer, to C.O. 18 02 1886, COCP African no. 381, C.O. 879/31.Google Scholar

¹⁶ C.O. to F.O., 5 Mar. 1886, and enc. Bulwer, to C.O. 23 10 1885,Google ScholarIbid.

¹⁷ F.O. to C.O. 23 Mar. 1887, and F.O. to C.O. 1 June 1887. Ibid.

¹⁸ Salisbury probably genuinely felt that the liquor traffic was more damaging than the arms trade, restriction of which, he thought, would leave the African unprotected against slave raider and concession hunter. Also, arms were more portable than spirits and he may have thought them easier to smuggle. It must also be remembered, however, that the temperance movement was strong in Britain and the cheap spirits for the African market were not made in the country. No established British trade was, therefore, at stake.

¹⁹ Spirits were manufactured at the Cape as well as imported. While liquor for local consumption was heavily taxed and its sale regulated by licensing laws, spirits destined for sale beyond the frontiers paid only a nominal duty, and this branch of the trade was said to be flourishing.

²⁰ Robinson, to C.O., 18 10 1889, COCP, African no. 381, C.O. 879/31.Google Scholar

²¹ Germany's primary concern was to deny arms to the rebels in her East African protectorate, while the humanitarians believed that the arms traffic enabled the slave raiders to conduct their operations.

²² C.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889, COCP African no. 382, C.O. 879/31.

²³ Ibid. and Knutsford, to Loch, , 19 11 1889,Google ScholarIbid. For examples of adventurers procuring arms and powder (which was locally made) in the Transvaal, see Sillery, A., Founding a Protectorate (London, 1965), 1089.Google Scholar

²⁴ C.O. to F.O., 1 Mar. 1889, and Knutsford, to Loch, , 19 11 1889, COCP African no. 381, C.O. 879/31.Google Scholar

²⁵ Robinson said no permit was applied for but had an application reached him he would have granted it; Robinson, to C.O., 18 10 1889,Google ScholarIbid.

²⁶ The application was for 8,000 guns to arm the whole of Khama's people.

²⁷ Robinson, to C.O., 18 10 1889, COCP African no. 381, C.O. 879/31.Google Scholar

²⁸ C.O. to F.O. 2 Nov. 1889, Ibid.

²⁹ Their reasons were far from humanitarian. See my article in Louis, W. R. and Gifford, P. (eds.) Britain and Germany in Africa (Yale, 1967), chapter III and unpublished thesis, ‘Great Britain and the Brussels Anti-Slave trade Act of 1890’ (London, 1969), chapters V and VI. Salisbury himself had decided that the trade in precision arms should be limited in order to prevent the Arabs in East Africa arming against the Europeans. He still thought a complete prohibition of the trade impracticable as it could only be effective if it covered the entire continent, which was impossible. By this time, it should be noted that, owing to the rearming of European armies with magazine rifles, good quality arms were being unloaded on the market at a low price and were finding their way in increasing numbers to Africa.Google Scholar

³⁰ Billot, to Spuller, , 25 04 1890, no. 154, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondence Politique Portugal, 230.Google Scholar

³¹ Both Germany and Britain had accused each other of allowing arms to enter their respective colonies—see Rosebery, to Malet, , 27 03 1886, no. 97 Africa, F.O. 84/1757 and German note 30 11 1886,Google Scholar enc. in Malet, to Rosebery, , 1 05 1886,Google Scholar F.O. 84/1759. At the conference Germany complained that Britain was flooding her territories with cheap spirits and with arms. Greindl, to Lambermont, , 30 11 1890, no. 125, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Brussels, Correspondence et Documents, Afrique, Conférence Anti-Esclavagiste, vol. 3.Google Scholar

³² C.O. to F.O., 21 Feb. 1890, no. 118, F.O. 541/38 (Foreign Office Confidential Print 6197).

³³ F.O. to C.O., 28 Feb. 1890, F.O. 84/2076.

³⁴ Precision arms included rifled guns (fusils rayés), percussion guns (armes à percussion), magazine and breech-loaders (fusils à magasin or se chargeant par la culasse). Trade guns were defined as flintlocks without rifling (fusils à silex non rayés, or fusils à pierre). For the arms clauses of the Brussels Act, see Hertslet, E., The Map of Africa by Treaty, 11 (3rd ed., London, 1909), 494–7, Articles VIII to XIV.Google Scholar