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The People as Law-Makers: Custom, Practice, and Public Opinion as Sources of Law in Africa and England

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Extract

This essay is an attempt to investigate, assess and compare the role of the “people” as makers of law in a variety of customary societies in black Africa on the one hand, and in England on the other. The studies that may have been made of this sort of question by lawyers, constitutional experts, sociologists, political scientists and the like have rarely, if ever, contrasted the law-making function of the people in the two types of society. Where such a contrast has been made, it has tended to be limited to the proposition that things are quite different in the two types of society. It will be one of the arguments of this essay that, although the procedures and mechanisms of the law may fundamentally differ if one compares a highly developed, industrialised, literate society such as England with a simpler subsistence pre-literate society such as anciently those of the Ashanti and the Sotho, yet in each society, whatever the forms in which power is exercised or however absolute the authority possessed by those in power, yet the people participate constantly and in a variety of ways in a continuing process of law-making. It will be the task of this paper to isolate, describe and compare those ways.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 1977

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References

1 The term “England” is used advisedly, and not in any overt nationalistic way. Where reference has to be made to the constitution of the United Kingdom as a whole, the term “United Kingdom” is employed; but since the law of England and Wales is different from that of Scotland, the study of the legal system is confined to England and English law, and the rules and observations relating to English law may not be applicable in Scotland.

2 Cf. H. L. A. Hart, The concept of law, 1961, 59.

page 2 note 1 So that the volonté générale of Rousseau and the Volksgeist of Savigny must all remain uncommented on here, as must the vestigial legal theory of Marx (to whom, however, law would only express the popular will when the “people”, which for him meant “the working class”, had achieved domination in a society).

page 3 note 1 Cf. H. E. Lambert, Kikuyu social and political institutions, 1956, 131.

page 4 note 1 1971, 39.

page 4 note 2 One of the saddest memorials of this kind of misplaced effort is a collection in Italian in three volumes of the constitutions of 38 African states. Whatever the legal value of the constitutions in their original languages of French or English, it must be further reduced when they are rendered into Italian.

page 6 note 1 “The sources of law in Tswana tribal courts: legislation and precedent”, [1957] J.A.L. 150, at p. 151.

page 7 note 1 See Gluckman passim, but more esp. The ideas in Barotse jurisprudence, 1965, 35–44.

page 7 note 2 M. J. Field, Akim Kotoku, 1948, 23–25.

page 7 note 3 K. A. Busia, The position of the chief in the modem political system of Ashanti, 1951, 9–11.

page 7 note 4 R. S. Rattray, Ashanti law and constitution, 1929, 407.

page 8 note 1 Lambert, op. cit. 131–144, esp. at p. 137.

page 8 note 2 P. 138.

page 8 note 3 C. K. Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe, 1937, 247–251, esp. at p. 249.

page 9 note 1 See pp. 11 ff.

page 10 note 1 P. Bohannan, Justice and judgment among the Tiv, 1957, 55, denies that the Tiv recognized legislation. “Wa tindi is the Tiv way of discussing what we should call legislation… The whole idea of legislation is, however, of European origin.“Nevertheless, Tiv law recognizes many clear-cut prohibitions which have a legislated flavour about them.

page 10 note 2 Cf. W. Goldschmidt, Sebei law, 1967, 256–7, and his description of the ntarastit ceremony, at which all the adult men of the pororyet take an oath together to outlaw certain forms of wrongdoing (e.g. homicide, theft).

page 10 note 3 See pp. 11 ff.

page 10 note 4 This political quality is well brought out by P. H. Gulliver in discussing dispute settlement among the Arusha of present-day Tanzania: cf. his Social control in an African Society, 1963, esp. at p. 299. (Incidentally, neither “law” nor “legislation” finds any mention in the index to this book.)

page 10 note 5 So that Gulliver, op. cit. 241, can tell us for these same Arusha that “among the Arusha there are … commonly enunciated and accepted norms of behaviour”. “These norms themselves were invariably quoted during dispute discussions.”

page 10 note 6 Cf. F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English law, 1911,1, 47.

page 10 note 7 Cf. P. P. Howell, A manual of Nuer law, 1954,69.

page 11 note 1 Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance, 1944, s. 2; my italics.

page 11 note 2 Interpretation Act, 1960, s. 18 (1); my italics.

page 15 note 1 (1975) 3 All E.R. 1030, C.A.

page 17 note 1 The ideas in Barotse jurisprudence, op. cit., 171.

page 19 note 1 Howell, op. cit., 29.

page 19 note 2 Bohannan, op. cit., 19.

page 19 note 3 Gulliver, op. cit., 55.

page 19 note 4 Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana law and custom, 2nd ed., 1955, 289. The procedure is similar in the chief's court; see p. 293.

page 20 note 1 This statement must now be qualified to take account of the possibility of majority verdicts in certain cases.

page 21 note 1 [1972] 1 All E.R. 749, H.L.

page 22 note 1 At p. 760.

page 22 note 2 At pp. 776–7 and 778.

page 22 note 3 At pp. 794 and 795–6.

page 23 note 1 See p. 15.