The Land Use Act, 1978, is a product of the inherent contradictions of the colonial and neo-colonial dependent, pseudo-capitalist economic structures established in Nigeria since colonial times. By the 1970s these contradictions became so seŕious that they threatened to become a clog on the growth of the capitalist economy. If such contradictions were allowed to reach a nodal point, conditions for the self-negation of the existing socio-economic and legal order would have ensued. The legislature, it would seem, narrowly identified the problem with private ownership of lands from its own class perspective, that is without a scientific conception of the problems in terms of ownership in the theory of social relations. A scientific conception of the problems would have revealed the essence of the difficulties as relating, not merely to the procedural aspects of private ownership of the lands, such as certainty of title, registration of title, etc., but concerning the institution of private ownership as an economic and legal category around which the exploitation of man by man is organised in class-divided societies.

Such a scientific perception of the problems would have demanded a lasting solution that not only abolished private ownership rights in land but also abolished private ownership of other means of production. The socialisation of all means of production would have amounted to a holistic approach to the solution of the problems in the interest of the nation as a whole.

The law relating to the adoption of children in Tanzania has, since its inception, remained obscure. It has neither received judicial interpretation comparable to other branches of family law nor has it been a subject of academic discourse. This is so despite the fact that the first adoption legislation was introduced in colonial Tanganyika as early as 1942, was repealed and re-enacted in 1953 and has remained in force ever since.

Some statistical information regarding how this legislation has been utilised by the population would assist in further elaboration of the above contention. During the first 18 years of the operation of the Ordinance, i.e. from 1944 to the end of the British colonial era in 1961, the High Court of Tanganyika, which under the Ordinance had exclusive jurisdiction to hear adoption applications, made a total of 130 adoption orders. This works out to an average of seven adoption orders per year. With regard to the cultural background of the applicants, so far as this could be ascertained, Europeans formed the majority accounting for about two thirds while members of the Asiatic communities accounted for about one third of the total number of adoption orders granted by the High Court. The number of African applicants was comparatively insignificant.

After independence, the picture changed considerably, both in terms of volume of adoption applications and the cultural background of the leading applicants.

Many Nigerian decisions in tax cases have firmly established the possibility of raising the defence of lack of jurisdiction in the assessment in an action for recovery of tax. This development has resulted from decisions of the courts and has led to a significant shift from the practice in the U.K. There— aside from the possibility of applying in rather exceptional cases for judicial review—the consideration of any issues, whether of fact or of law, as to the merits of an assessment is confined to appeals before the Commissioners with further appeal to the High Court on points of law. This apparently technical difference has had great practical importance. Recourse to the courts for the purpose of tax recovery has become more difficult for the Revenue and this has encouraged the development of extra-judicial methods of tax collection.

A study of those Nigerian decisions that have established, extended and applied this doctrine, and of its consequences, should be of interest in other anglophone African countries. The income tax statutes of many such countries are basically similar due to their common descent from a “Model Ordinance” prepared in the U.K. in 1922. Decisions of the Nigerian Courts on the construction of provisions of the Nigerian tax statutes are of persuasive authority in other Commonwealth countries with similar provisions in their own tax enactments.

This paper first provides a broad outline of the Nigerian legislation on tax assessments, appeals and collection in order to facilitate the understanding of the points discussed later.

Although the judiciary is the weakest branch of the government and must depend on the executive branch to enforce its judgments, it is not the integrity, or prestige of the judiciary that is at stake when the executive fails to comply, or to comply satisfactorily with court orders and judgments. In such situations, the authority of the state is called into question.

Clearly, where private persons are unable to concretise their remedies by enforcement, the relevance of the whole judicial process is called into question. In this regard one may say that the existing rules of enforcement are sufficiently geared to prevent that anomaly.

In actions involving private parties the judiciary is an impartial arbiter and it is up to the party aggrieved to pursue his claim to the logical conclusion. The Sheriffs and Civil Process Laws are designed to facilitate this. Not only are officers of state placed at his disposal but he has the ultimate weapons, in an action for committal of an irresponsible judgment debtor. Yet, the formalities appurtenant to the issuance and execution of the various writs have appropriately built in devices, that allow the respondent to comply at any stage and thus save himself financial loss, or loss of his liberty.

In the field of enforcement of non-money judgments the ultimate weapon is an action for committal initiated at the suit of the plaintiff. The same safety devices are available. In particular, where possible, the Court will employ another means of enforcing the judgment, or order.

Although, there is provision for the appointment of commissioners (eg. in sequestration proceedings) and referees (in enquiries) there is little resort to these provisions, not only because sequestration proceedings are extremely rare but probably also because there is seldom need for the appointment of referees in our courts.

It is in the enforcement of judgments against the state and government functionaries that rapid changes have occurred. Although, injunctions and mandamus will still not lie against government, it can now be sued and indirectly be made to obey court orders through actions directed against state functionaries. There is increasing willingness on the part of the courts to subject judicial, or quasi-judicial actions of government to judicial review. The problem remains as usual that of giving teeth to such orders since the very executive against which orders are made, is depended on to enforce such orders. Hence the judiciary has developed safety valves in actions for judicial review to prevent collision with the executive. Utmost discretion is exercised by judges in granting orders for review and they will generally do so only as a last resort

The case of Gwao bin Kilimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti decided by the colonial courts of the then Tanganyika has always held a certain fascination for those interested in the process of law under colonial rule. This is for a variety of reasons. The case seems to put into sharp focus the conflict between the imposed common law system and the indigenous customary law. This in turn stimulates questions as to the social values that lay, and probably still lie, behind the two systems and the extent to which those values reflect actual differences between the societies in which they developed. Since the conflict arose in a colonial context, the case also raises the question of the rôle of law in such a society and therefore, to some extent, the rôle of law in relation to ideology and political economy in this and in other contexts also. What is less well known is that the case was the subject of comment by colonial administrative officers at the time, comments which point up many of the issues involved and provide some insight into the different perceptions of African society on the part of administrative officers on the one hand and the judiciary on the other.

In 1981, after nearly three years of drafting and deliberations, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) at its 18th Session adopted a regional human rights instrument— The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Recent documentation indicate that an adequate number of ratifications have been received to bring the Charter into force. There has so far however not been any test of its provisions. Nevertheless this article will be devoted to a legal examination and in other ways to a speculative analysis of an aspect of one of the human and/or peoples' rights sought to be guaranteed in the Charter—the right to political self determination. This of course means that the very narrow scope of this paper will hardly touch on the economic aspects of self determination, which is also provided for in the Charter.

The period covering the first seven years of Malawi's independence (1964–1971) stands out as one of the most controversial in the country's postcolonial legislative history. It was during this period, for example, that the local or “Native” Courts of the colonial era were transformed into the now controversial Traditional Courts and given an existence separate from and independent of the High Court, as well as extensive criminal jurisdiction encompassing offences like murder and manslaughter and, subsequently, treason and sedition which were hitherto the preserve of the High Court. At the same time, the participation of lawyers in traditional court processes and the right of legal representation were curtailed under the pretext of ensuring that the course of justice would not be subverted by the frequent invocation of “technicalities” which lawyers are wont to invoke because of the alien and esoteric nature of their training. This paper is not concerned with the “law” of the Traditional Courts in Malawi which, elsewhere, continues to excite appropriate scholarly interest, but with another equally controversial law of the same period whose formulation was buttressed by similar antipathy towards the legal profession. This law introduced a special and rigorous regime for the prosecution and punishment of thefts in the public service.

Provocation is dead! It died at the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The funeral oration was read by Kazeem J.S.C., while the funeral dirge was chorused by four other judges of the same court. The case was Ganiyu Olatokunbo Oladiran v. State The facts of the case were as follows. The appellant was a secretary of Design Group Ltd., a firm of chartered architects based in Ibadan. His marriage with the deceased came to be as a result of a pregnancy presented to him by the deceased. Their matrimonial history was one of intermittent quarrels, accusations and counter-accusations of infidelity against the appellant and insubordination against the deceased. The deceased had always accused the appellant of showing interest in their maid, a girl of about 13 or 14 years of age. The appellant had on the other hand accused the deceased of smoking cigarettes which he disliked.

The climax to their matrimonial squabble came, to a head on the 21 September, 1982. On that day, there was as usual a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased. There was an abortive attempt at settlement by the deceased's parents. Later that day the deceased refused to cook for the appellant and told him to ask his “second wife” (the house-maid) to cook for him. She also abused him. Thereafter the appellant got a knife and stabbed the deceased to death. The appellant subsequently made an abortive attempt at committing suicide.

The functioning of society is considerably aided by legal rules and social norms. The extent, scope and complexity of such laws and norms are determined in the final analysis by the level of socio-economic activity, growth and development. Corresponding economic and social institutions of an administrative nature tend to evolve and become intertwined with such developments. In order to cope with increasing responsibilities, a government may establish statutory bodies to deal with certain aspects of governmental activity of a quasi-judicial nature.

In developing countries such as Ghana, therefore, one often finds in the Statute books enactments conferring certain powers on quasi-judicial bodies. In Ghana, powers are conferred on such bodies to carry out investigations and make findings of fact concerning such matters as chieftaincy disputes, the determination of boundaries between two communities, the settlement of trade disputes, etc. Perhaps, recognising the limitations of such bodies, the decisions based on the facts found by such bodies do not usually become binding on the persons or the institutions to be affected in die same way as die decisions of the regular courts do. To become binding, the law usually provides that two conditions are satisfied:

(i) The findings or decisions must be confirmed by the executive or the minister acting in that behalf; and

(ii) they must be published in an official gazette, bulletin or in any such official publication.

The problem of indeterminacy in law has been the subject of interesting debate for many years now. Pitched against each other in the controversy are Hart, Dworkin, Benditt, American Realist jurisprudence and recent exponents of Critical Legal Studies (C.L.S.). Interesting as the controversy is, it is not as ordinary as our most casual statements seem to suggest, especially if the implications and outcomes necessitated by the existence of legal indeterminacy are examined rather than the concentration on ideologies and perspectives. To consider these implications and outcomes in detail, it is important to develop a generalised overview within which more detailed inquiries may find their context. Thus, in this paper, I shall first, examine indeterminacy as a concept per se. I shall then examine a selection of general arguments for and against legal indeterminacy and elucidate what is critically involved in these claims and in their denials. I do hope, at least, to give an idea of the difficulties we meet when we try to get our ideas clear on it and to show how any solution of the problem (if it is soluble at all) is closely connected with other problems in language and politics.

The topic of this paper is indeterminacy in law.

The main object of the National Office of Industrial Property (NOIP) Act 1979, is the regulation of all contracts and agreements for the transfer of technology to Nigeria. It attempts to achieve this by requiring all such contracts and agreements to be registered with the NOIP and for their terms to be predicated upon state or judicial consent.

In Beecham's case, the Court of Appeal decided that failure to register relevant contracts or agreements with the NOIP does not affect their validity. It is the submission of this note that the decision of the Court of Appeal was wrong: such contracts or agreements become tainted with illegality and, therefore, should be null and void.

Although this was an action for infringement of the plaintiff's (Beecham Group Ltd), registered trade mark “Lucozade”, this note will concentrate on the point of law (raised for the first time at the appeal), that non-registration of the transaction whereby the proprietorship of the mark was transferred to the plaintiff, rendered the transaction void. The defendant's argument was that the plaintiff had no locus standi to institute the action or use the trade mark, because it had failed to register a transaction that was registrable within the context of section 4(d) of the NOIP Act.

The Court of Appeal disagreed: