¹ The best available accounts of the election of 1960 in Chicago are DeMaris, Ovid, Captive City: Chicago in Chains (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1969), pp. 193–99Google Scholar and Royko, Mike, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971), pp. 119–20Google Scholar. See also O'Connor, Len, Clout: Mayor Daley and His City (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1975), pp. 154–62Google Scholar for a novel interpretation of events. General accounts of the presidential election of 1960 are all badly deficient on the Chicago controversy.

² See Rakove, Milton L., Don't Make No Waves – Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 158–59Google Scholar.

³ See “ Straw Poll in Stretch; Kennedy Maintains His Lead,” Chicago Sun-Times, 3 11,1960, p. 18Google Scholar, “ Kennedy Lead Cut, Straw Poll Heading for Close Finish,” Chicago Sun-Times, 5 11 1960, p. 14Google Scholar, and “ Kennedy Holds Slim Illinois Edge,” Chicago Sun-Times, 7 11 1960, pp. 1, 20Google Scholar.

⁴ For indications of this attitude, see Albright, Robert C., “ Morton Steps Up Probe of Vote ‘ Irregularities,’” Washington Post, 2 12 1960, pp. A1, A11Google Scholar, and Petacque, Art, “ GOP Has '62 Issue: Vote Charges,” Chicago Sun-Times, 28 11 1960, p. 4Google Scholar. Interviews with Benjamin S. Adamowski and other Republicans in 1974–1975 confirmed this conclusion.

⁵ “ Deny 10,000 Right to Vote Thru ‘Error,’” Chicago Tribune, 9 11 1960, 11, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁶ Mazo, Earl and Hess, Stephen, Nixon: A Political Portrait (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 249Google Scholar.

⁷ O'Brien, Lawrence F., No Final Victories: A Life in Politics — From John F. Kennedy to Watergate (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 96–97Google Scholar.

⁸ The following analysis is based on a comparison between the November canvass (i.e., the official returns proclaimed by the Cook County Canvassing Board) and the two recounts in the 634 paper ballot precincts of Chicago and 229 paper ballot precincts in six county towns outside Chicago but in the jurisdiction of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

The figures for the official canvass and the recounts come from the election records in the Chicago Municipal Reference Library and from the files of Elroy Sandquist who was Benjamin Adamowski's chief counsel. Attempts were made to check Sandquist's figures against similar tallies from the Board of Election Commissioners and from lawyers who represented the Democratic Party and Daniel P. Ward. Unfortunately, I have been unable to unearth any other set of comparable figures. The Board of Election Commissioners profess to have no such records. Lawyers who represented Ward and the Democrats failed to respond to my enquiries.

I have checked Sandquist's totals for the November canvass against those in the Municipal Reference Library. In the case of conflict I have used those from the MRL. I have also been able to check a portion of the total for the first (discovery) recount against the figures cited in the report made by special prosecutor Morris Wexler who investigated election irregularities and cited the worst miscounts precinct by precinct. In the great majority of cases Wesler's and Sandquist's totals agreed. Where they did not, I chose to use Wexler's figures or to omit the particular case except where it was clear that Wexler was in error.

It is my conclusion that Sandquist's figures are generally accurate. Mistakes do exist in his totals as well as in those of Wexler. There are almost certainly some contained in my own figures. It is clear, though, that by far the greatest amount of error exists in the original November canvass.

⁹ The responsibility for tallying votes was that of the judges of election. These election judges in Chicago were appointed by the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners. Each precinct had five election judges. In half the precincts three election judges were supposed to be Democrats and two Republicans. In the other half, two were supposed to be Democrats and three Republicans. In theory, the election judges were empowered to conduct all phases of the election. In fact, they were for the most part housewives who were often subservient to the interests of the dominant political party in the precinct which usually determined who became election judges. In heavily Democratic precincts the supposed “ Republican ” judges were often Democrats.

¹⁰ The twenty-eight precincts in which the first recount showed a gain of fifty or more votes for Adamowski were the following with the number of the ward preceding that of the precinct: 8/88; 13/104; 13/108; 15/48; 19/139; 23/70; 26/3; 26/15; 27/1; 27/12; 28/16; 28/38; 29/7; 29/23; 29/41; 30/12; 30/65; 31/8; 31/57; 38/74; 38/84; 38/85; 38/99; 41/70; 47/34; 50/55; 50/99; 50/112.

The eleven precincts in which Nixon gained fifty or more votes in the discovery recount were the following: 23/70; 27/12; 28/16; 28/38; 29/7; 29/23; 31/8; 31/57; 36/74; 42/41; 47/34.

¹¹ Contrary to the expectations of the reformers and believers in progress through technology, the voting machine was not immune to tampering. Votes could be rung up before the polls opened. The machine could be rigged in ways to favor certain candidates. There was, in fact, a distinct advantage to cheating in voting machine precincts because there was less evidence after the deed was done. In paper ballot precincts investigators had not only the applications for ballots but also the ballots themselves. In voting machine precincts all that was left were the applications and the totals recorded on the machine. Of all the ways of manipulating the voting machine the least likely choice of a vote thief would be to alter the totals on the machine. This was the one form of manipulation that could easily be detected.

¹² This figure was arrived at by multiplying the demonstrated gain in the discovery recount by 1·399, the factor that reflected the increase in the gain from the discovery recount to the official recount in the State's Attorney's race.

¹³ This figure was reached by multiplying the adjusted estimated gain per paper ballot precinct by 634 (the number of paper ballot precincts in Chicago).

¹⁴ This figure was arrived at by calculating the proportion of the irregularity in the paper ballot precincts deemed to be intentional and therefore attributable also to the voting machine precincts. This intentional part of the total paper ballot gain was estimated by adding the total net gains and losses in six groups: those from one to four; those from five to nine; those from ten to nineteen; those from twenty to twenty-nine; those from thirty to forty-nine; and those of fifty or more. Those in the first category were discounted as being entirely unintentional. Those in the second category were multiplied by ·1; those in the third by ·2; those in the fourth by ·4; those in the fifth by ·6; and those in the sixth by ·9. The total of these six categories was then divided by the number of paper ballot precincts for which there were reliable figures in the discovery recount and a gain per precinct calculated. This figure, an approximation of intentional error per precinct in the discovery recount, was then multiplied by 1·383 (the factor that is the estimated increase in the amount of intentional irregularity from the figures of the discovery recount to the official recount in the contest for State's attorney). This figure represents the estimated voting machine gain per precinct.

¹⁵ This figure was reached by multiplying the estimated gain per voting machine precinct by 3,137 (the number of voting machine precincts in Chicago).