This paper was read at the meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March 28, 1961, at Chicago.

¹ The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā school, whose followers are called Mīmāṃsakas, has two important branches, one headed by Prābhākara (ca. 7th century, author of Brhatī) and known as the Prābhākara school, the other headed by Kumārila (ca. 7th century, author of Ślokavārttika), known as the Bhāṭṭa school.

² The Nyāya school of philosophy, whose members are called Naiyāyikas, is held to have been founded by Gautama, the (probably mythical) author of the Nyāyasūtras. The -sutras are commented upon by Vātsyāyana (4th century?) in his Nyāyabhā⊡ya, which is in turn commented upon by Uddyotakara (7th century) in his Nyāyavārttika. This last was in turn commented upon by Vācaspati Miśra with a sub-commentary by Udayana.

³ The Vaiśe⊡ika school is held to have been founded by Kaṇāda, the (probably mythical) author of the Vaíse⊡ikasūtras. The major work of early Vaíse⊡ika, however, is the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Prásastapāda (5th century), which has been commented upon by Śrīdhara (10th century) in his Nyāyakandalī.

⁴ Advaita Vedānta is die monistic system of Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṃkarācārya (8th century). Śaṃkara's commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtras is the chief work of the system, and on it many writers have written sub-commentaries. There are three chief branches of this system: (1) the Bhāmatī school, named after Vācaspati Miśra's sub-commentary on Śaṃkara's work, which owes much inspiration to Maṇḍana; (2) The Vivaraṇa school, named after the commentary of Prakāśātman on Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā. Padmapāda was one of Śaṃkara's two most famous pupils. Other members of this school are Vidyāranạ, author of Pañcadāśī, and later Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Madhusūdana Sarasvati; (3) the followers of Surésvara, author of Nai⊡karmyasiddhi and pupil of Śaṃkara. His followers include Sarvajñātman (9th century), author of Saṃk⊡epaśarīraka, Śrīhar⊡a (13th century), author of Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, and Prakāśānanda, (17th century), author of Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī.

Viśi⊡ṭādvaita Vedānta is the “qualified monism” of the important Vai⊡ṇavite reformer Rāmānuja (11th century; author of Śrībhā⊡ya). His followers include Lokācārya Pillai of the Tengalai sect, Vedānta Désika of the Vaḍagalai sect (both ca. 13th century) and Rāmānanda in the north (16th century).

Dvaita Vedānta is the philosophy of Madhva (14th century) which emphasized some five important and absolute distinctions within the universe. His followers included the logicians Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarājā, as well as the Bengali saint Caitanya (16th century).

Other Vedāntas include Vallabha's Śuddhādvaita (“pure non-dualism”) and the Dvaitādvaita or “dualistic non-dualism” of Nimbarka (12th century). The latter resembles Bhedābhedavāda in its tenets (see note 8).

⁵ Gauḍapāda is taken to be the author of the Māṇḍukyakārikās or Āgamaśāstra, comments on the Māṇḍukyopani⊡ad which contain strong suggestions both of Buddhism and of Advaita. Śaṃkara speaks of him with respect as an important influence. Scholars are uncertain, however, of his date and even of his historicity, speculating that the work may have been of multiple authorship and that the name “Gauḍapāda” may simply indicate the place of origin of the views, as “Gauḍa” suggests Bengal.

⁶ Outside of polemical references, we know of the Vaibhā⊡ika and Sautrāntika views only from the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu (4th century). The other two schools are morely easily identifiable. Yogācāra or Vijñāvāda is the school of Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu (dubiously identified with the author of Abhidharmakośa). Vasubandhu's Vijñāptimātratā, containing two short philosophical treatises in twenty and thirty verses respectively, the Dvimśika and Trimśika, is probably the clearest source for the subjective idealist views of the system. Also usually included within this group, though as argued in the text quite distinct from subjective idealism in various ways, are the so-called Buddhist logicians, Dignāga (4th century), Dharmakīrti (5th century) and their numerous followers down to Ratnakīrti (10th century). The Mādhyamika school, also known as śūnyavāda or the philosophy of the void, was founded by Nāgārjuna (2d century A.D.), sometimes called the father of Indian philosophy. His followers include Ārya Deva (3d century) and Candrakīrti (7th century).

⁷ The skeptical or “materialistic” Cārvākas, also called Lokāyatas, are practically unrepresented among materials which have come down to us at present. One of the few extant works is Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasiṃha (7th century), translated in A Source Book, in Indian Philosophy (ed. Radhakrishnan and Moore Princeton University Press, 1957). The Ājīvikas were an early heterodox sect of ascetics who flourished about the time of Buddha and Mahavira; cf. Basham, A. L., History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas, (London, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁸ Bhedābhedavāda is the name by which the philosophy of Bhartṛprapañca and Bhāskara is usually known. Bhartṛprapañca is counted by Advaitins as a precursor of Śaṃkara; his philosophy is admirably discussed by Hiriyanna, M. in Indian Philosophical Studies I (Mysore, 1957), pp. 79–94Google Scholar. Bhāskara, a contemporary of Śaṃkara, also wrote a commentary on the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

⁹ Literally “the view that seeing (dṛ⊡ṭi) precedes creating (sṛ⊡ṭi),” a position perhaps describable as “metaphysical solipsism”, inasmuch as it holds that there is only one jīva or individual soul, and that creation is a process of that jīva's ignorant consciousness.

¹⁰ Īśvarakṛ⊡ṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikās contain the clearest exposition of classical Sāṃkhya. He probably flourished in the 4th century A.D.

¹¹ Anirvācanīya is a technical term, probably coined by Maṇḍana Miśra among Advaitins, used to indicate the peculiar logical status of both empirical illusions and empirical truth. According to Advaita, all empirical knowledge, whether true or false from a worldly standpont, is False (anirvācanīya) when compared to Being (Brahman) and Negation (asat) which is nothing at all.

¹² The Naiyāyikas hold that when we entertain an erroneous judgment we perceive real entities in a place and time other than where or when they actually occur—i.e., we see things “otherwise” (anyathā). Kumārila's position is much the same; he gives it a different name mainly to record his dissent from the Naīyāyika's ontological thesis that inherence is a distinct entity.