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The “Peace Ballot” and the “Rainbow” Controversy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2014

J.A. Thompson
J.A. Thompson*
Affiliation:
University of Kentucky
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Extract

Assessments of the famous “Peace Ballot,” officially “A National Declaration on the League of Nations and Armaments,” have undergone little change since its results were announced in June 1935. Like contemporary observers, historians are unclear on the origins of the ballot, are impressed by the public response, and are uncertain of the meaning of “the most remarkable popular referendum ever initiated and carried through by private enterprise.” Historians will probably never reach a consensus on the exact meaning of the ballot and are likely to go on echoing the diverse judgments of contemporaries. But the origins of the referendum are not obscure, and in The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933-1940 Maurice Cowling has offered a stimulating thesis that could embrace the ballot and suggest a new evaluation of the political controversy that surrounded the preparation and conduct of that much-heralded “National Declaration.”

Cowling has persuasively argued that foreign policy was the form party conflict took in Great Britain in the late 1930s. Politicians conducted it in the light of party considerations. Cowling selected 1935 as the year foreign policy first became “central,” when Abyssinia became the focus of all political discussions. And it was the issue through which Stanley Baldwin reestablished Conservative “centrality” in domestic politics after strong “swings” against the government in by-elections during 1933 and 1934.

According to the Cowling thesis, in the class-polarized politics of the 1930s, party leaders had to be especially sensitive to the opinion of the center, which, in 1935, meant presenting policy in terms that the League of Nations Union and its largely Liberal constituency would approve.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , Spring 1981 , pp. 150 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1981

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References

1 The basic source remains Livingstone, Dame Adelaide, The Peace Ballot: The Official History (London, 1935)Google Scholar, which Victor Gollancz hurried into print even before the final votes were tabulated.

2 The judgment of the New Statesman and Nation, June 29, 1935, p. 951Google Scholar.

3 Cowling, Maurice, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics And British Policy 1933-1940 (London, 1975), p. 93CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Livingstone, , The Peace Ballot, p. 12Google Scholar.

5 Existing financial records are fragmentary but apparently the union's income was £29,975 for 1933, down from £39,931 in 1932. Report of the Appeals Committee of the LNU, vol. 2, p. 162, London School of Economics. Paid-up subscriptions were 388,255 in 1932 and 373,912 in 1933. See Headway, June 1933, p. 123 and February 1935, p. 23.

6 In a 1934 letter to members who were in arrears with their subscriptions. Copy in British Library, Cecil Papers, 51168.

7 Paid-up subscriptions increased to 396,064 for 1934. See Headway, February 1935, p. 23.

8 The first mention of the canvass was in the January 1934 issue ot Headway. Cecil's letter was printed in the February issue, p. 24.

9 Editorial in the April 1934 Headway, p. 64.

10 Minutes of the executive committee of the LNU, Book 12, p. 388. On March 8 the committee resolved to consult with other national societies interested in peace and work out the details with them. Book 12, p. 390.

11 The results were sent to Cecil by F. Wood on February 8, 1934. Cecil Papers, 51168. Boorman wrote an article on the Ballot for the April 1934 issue of Headway, p. 74.

12 Cecil, , All The Way (London, 1949), p. 187Google Scholar.

13 The phrase of Salvador de Madariaga, taken from his essay, “Gilbert Murray and the League,” in Smith, Jean and Toynbee, Arnold (eds.), Gilbert Murray; an unfinished autobiography (London, 1940)Google Scholar.

14 University of Birmingham, Chamberlain to his sister Hilda, July 21, 1934, Austen Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/671 and Chamberlain to Murray, November 19, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/54.

15 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Murray to Cecil, August 23, 1934, Gilbert Murray Papers. The letter specifically mentions the Nottingham Ballot.

16 Headway, June 1934, p. 108.

17 The results of the entire poll are in the May 1934 issue of Headway.

18 The information in this paragraph is culled from the executive committee minutes of the LNU for March-May, 1934. The national committee also issued a forth-nightly, The Ballot Worker. The first issue appeared on February 12, 1935 and the last on July 1, 1935. For the most part it contained progress reports and exhortations to greater efforts.

19 Minutes of the executive committee of the LNU, Book 13, p. 32.

20 The committee worked in the spirit of cooperation, reported Dugdale, with only the pacifists unappeased. Dugdale to Chamberlain, November 9, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/49. Dugdale was a founding member of the LNU and a member of the executive committee. By temperament and upbringing a Conservative, she was sharply critical of the National Government.

21 In his English History 1914-1945 (London, 1965), p. 379Google Scholar, A.J.P. Taylor suggests that question 5 was “thrown in as an afterthought.” This clearly was not so. As the note suggests, the question was a compromise but one that did not entirely please anyone.

22 Chamberlain to his sister Hilda, July 21, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/671. It was only in November that he made the charge publicly: the National Committee was attempting to snatch a verdict on “these complicated issues.” 5 Hansard 293: 1346 (8 November 1934).

23 Austen Chamberlain to F.S. Oliver, August 3, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/5/84 and letter to his sister Ida, February 28, 1932, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/576.

24 See, for example, letter to Lord Tyrrell, February 13, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/5/12 and letters to his wife, June 12, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 6/1/915, and February 3, 1933, Chamberlain Papers, 6/1/935, and February 9, 1933, Chamberlain Papers, 6/1/952. Cecil was the only union officer unimpressed and unrestrained by Chamberlain's presence.

25 Chamberlain to his sister Ida, July 22, 1932, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/590.

26 Chamberlain to Gilbert Murray, November 19, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/55. Chamberlain's description of a delegation calling upon John Simon at the foreign office epitomizes his role in the union. Murray went to “ginger” Chamberlain up, and Chamberlain went to tone Murray down. Both went in order to keep the union from committing a folly and advocating a violent course. Chamberlain to his wife, January 30, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 6/1/929.

27 Everyone seems to have assumed that the two, both members of parliament, were keeping Chamberlain informed.

28 She had seen Stanley Baldwin and asked for the cooperation of the Conservative Central Office. She had written to Anthony Eden. But the central office had done nothing but throw cold water and the Conservatives on the executive committee had said nothing until the union was too far committed. Dugdale to Chamberlain, November 9, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/49.

29 Chamberlain, Cranborne, Percy, Loder, and Crookshank but the first three were the most active.

30 For this reason it was strangely obtuse of Cecil to maintain in his memoirs that he never understood why Chamberlain opposed the national declaration. And unfair of him to suggest that question 4 gave point to Chamberlain's hostility because the private manufacture of war weapons formed an important part of the industries of Birmingham. See A Great Experiment (London, 1941), p. 259Google Scholar and All The Way, p. 206.

31 Chamberlain to Hilda, July 21, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/671. Chamberlain had the greatest respect for Cecil's character, unselfishness, and devotion but thought his methods were wrong and his judgment wholly unreliable. See letter to his wife, March 22, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 6/1/983.

32 Cecil to Murray, March 23, 1933, and letter from Cecil to Murray of May 27, 1932, Cecil Papers, 51132.

33 Nansen to Philip Noel Baker, June 16, 1927. Copy in the Gilbert Murray Papers.

34 Chamberlain to Hilda, February 10, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/651. He says he does not envy her at Eastbourne. He does not like any wind and loathed a north or northeast wind. For Cecil, see All The Way, p. 81 for his description of his house, “Gale.”

35 Chamberlain to Cecil, December 1, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/5/134. Cecil had written a memo on disarmament in which he had urged a number of specific steps upon the government. See also Chamberlain to Murray, November 19, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/55.

36 Chamberlain to Lord Tyrrell, February 13, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/5/ 12.

37 Cecil to Wickham Steed, November 4, 1932, Cecil Papers, 51156.

38 Cecil to Chamberlain, April 10, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/5/27.

39 Murray to Cecil, letters of October 3 and 17, 1933, Gilbert Murray Papers.

40 Cecil to Chamberlain, April 10, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers; Cecil to Murray, April 3, 1933, Cecil Papers, 51132 and Murray to Chamberlain, November 17, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/54.

41 Chamberlain to Murray, November 19, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/55.

42 See, for example, Cecil's letter to The Times, November 13, 1934 in which he defended his assertion that the ballot was an issue of war and peace.

43 For a brief history of this issue in the union see Thompson, J. A., “Lord Cecil and the Pacifists in the League of Nations Union,” The Historical Journal, XX (1977), 949–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the LNU, Book 12, p. 68. See also Chamberlain to his sister Ida, April 1, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/613; Chamberlain to Murray, February 11, 1932, A. Chamberlain Papers, 39/5/17. The same argument and many of the same phrases were used by Chamberlain in rejecting the Geneva Protocol. See International Conciliation, 1925, p. 251Google Scholar. Ironically, Gilbert Murray encouraged the pacifists on the executive committee to support Chamberlain's objections from their viewpoint so that he would not be isolated in the union. See, for example, Murray to Cecil, November 26, 1934, Gilbert Murray Papers.

45 See Chamberlain's speech in 5 Hansard 258:360 (5 July 1933). In a number of public addresses in 1933 Chamberlain warned that before Britain disarmed or urged others to do so, the powers should see a Germany with its mind turned to peace.

46 Chamberlain to Gilbert Murray, October 5, 1933, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/5/91.

47 Amery, L.S., My Political Life (London, 1955), III, 158–59Google Scholar.

48 Chamberlain to his sister Hilda, November 11, 1935, A. Chamberlain Papers, 51/1/677.

49 The Times, November 12, 1934.

50 Chamberlain to his sister Ida, November 17, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 5/1/678.

51 Cranborne to Cecil, November 12, 1934, Cecil Papers, 51087.

52 Cranborne to Chamberlain, n.d., but obviously November 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/52.

53 Cecil to Cranborne, November 12, 1934, Cecil Papers, 51087. At Murray's request Chamberlain later publically expressed regret if his words implied a charge of bad faith against Cecil and the declaration committee. Murray to Chamberlain, November 14, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/38.

54 Cecil to Cranborne, November 12, 1934, Cecil Papers, 51087.

55 Dugdale to Chamberlain, November 9, 1934, A. Chamberlain Papers, 40/6/49.

56 Murray to Cecil, November 26, 1934, Gilbert Murray Papers.

57 The Times, November 15, 1934. A generous selection of these letters was printed.

58 The Manchester Guardian, November 10, 1934.

59 The Times, November 15, 1934.

60 See, for example, the comments of Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, The Times, November 17, 1934.

61 Reported in The Times, November 13, 1934.

62 The Times, November 16, 1934.

63 5 Hansard 293: 1315-16 (8 November 1934).

64 5 Hansard 293: 1325 (8 November 1934).

65 G. le M. Mander, who was also a member of the union's executive committee. The statement was made in 5 Hansard 293: 1369 (8 November 1934).

66 The New Statesman, November 17, 1934, p. 710.

67 The Economist, November 17, 1934, p. 910.

68 The Manchester Guardian, November 10, 1934.

69 The Daily Herald, November 10, 1934. The Herald ran an essay contest on “How I Shall Answer the Five Questions, and Why.” It reported thousands of entries and printed many of them during November and December.

70 The Times, November 27, 1934.

71 For a full discussion of this, see the early chapters of Naylor's, John F.Labour's International Policy (Boston, 1969)Google Scholar, especially chapter three.

72 See chapter 6 of Kyba's, J.P. “British Attitudes Toward Disarmament and Rearmament, 1932-1935”; (PhD thesis, University of London, 1967)Google Scholar. The Times and Conservative leaders were especially bitter about the use of “nauseous and lying” propaganda in the Putney by-election of late November 1934 in which the Labour Party attempted to associate Labour with peace and the government with the preparation for war. See The Times, November 28, 1934. In that by-election the Labour candidate failed but there was a pronounced anti-government “swing.” See The Times, November 30, 1934, and Cook, Chris and Ramsden, John (eds.), By-Elections in British Politics (London, 1973), p. 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Statement in 5 Hansard 293:1389 (8 November 1934).

74 Robert Boothby accused the Labour and Liberal Parties of conducting a peace campaign on purely political lines, 5 Hansard 295: 962 (28 November 1934). Baldwin referred to the “mischievous and dangerous” practice of dragging the question of peace and war into elections during the Putney by-election, The Times, November 23, 1934.

75 A full report of Baldwin's speech appeared in The Times, November 24, 1934.

76 5 Hansard 295:903 (28 November 1934).

77 5 Hansard 95:134, 145, and 147 (5 December 1934).

78 The Times, November 27, 1934.

79 See Cowling, Maurice, The Impact of Hitler, p. 22Google Scholar.

80 The Times, December 17, 1934.

81 Amery consistently and harshly attacked the ballot and its sponsors. At the onset he dismissed the ballot as a set of catch-questions so framed and so recommended as to make ordinary guileless people think that as lovers of peace they should naturally answer all in the affirmative. But with “Yes” they were committing themselves to “some extremely doubtful and dangerous propositions” while endorsing the official policy of the Socialist Party against the reasoned and practical conclusions of the government. See The Times, November 19, 1934. After the referendum, Amery claimed that not one voter in ten knew what he was committing himself to because the questions on the ballot were so misleading. See The Times, July 1, 1935. On July 7, 1935, while sharing a platform with Austen and Neville Chamberlain, Amery referred to “misguided pacifists” who believed in “some theoretical scheme of world peace” and had produced a ballot to show people supported them. He did not think Europe and the rest of the world were prepared or able to assist in any such scheme. See The Times, July 8, 1935.

82 The Times, January 7, 1935.

83 Cecil, , A Great Experiment, p. 259Google Scholar.

84 See the editorial, “The Press and the Ballot,” in the Manchester Guardian, June 29, 1935Google Scholar.

85 The Daily Herald, June 28, 1935.

86 The New Statesman, June 29, 1935, p. 951Google Scholar.

87 The Economist, June 29, 1935, p. 1477. The Manchester Guardian, June 28, 1935, argued that the ballot would profoundly strengthen the hands of any British govenment determined on maintaining the league and the collective security system. It would profoundly weaken any government that was prepared to do neither.

88 Quoted in the Manchester Guardian, June 29,1935.

89 The Times, June 28, 1935.

90 See the report in The Times, July 24, 1935.