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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2014
The creation of the National Government of 1931 has been a theme of unending comment and controversy. Politicians and writers of the left, with their party suddenly decapitated and bereft of office, not surprisingly were bitter. Their tendency was to castigate anyone who had played an obvious role in the crisis. Therefore, Ramsay MacDonald, who presided over the change, has been branded a traitor by his former colleagues and by later generations of Labour supporters. Even for historians he has remained at the center of the controversy.
From a slightly wider perspective, it has been possible to suspect a “bankers' ramp,” and the king has been singled out for special abuse on the charge of misleading the prime minister. Although some of these elements have been dismissed as myths in Reginald Bassett's 1958 treatise, the controversy hardly has been brought closer to a solution. In his review of that polemical study, Richard Crossman contended that “no one has yet succeeded in writing about this crisis without violent partisanship” and that it remained “the kind of live political issue about which no one except a political eunuch can write dispassionately.” That the debate continues is evident from the recent biography of MacDonald by David Marquand, who, in an attempt to vindicate his subject, once more reverts to the king as the agent most responsible for the creation of a coalition. Amazingly, no writer has yet interpreted the formation of the National Government as a Conservative Party bid for power, despite the control manifested by that party in the ensuing general election and the eventual successions of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain to the premiership.
1 The most violent critic was Laski, Harold, in “Labour and the Constitution,” New Statesman & Nation, IV (Sept. 10, 1932), 276–78Google Scholar; The Crisis and the Constitution (London, 1932)Google Scholar; and Parliamentary Government in England (London, 1938)Google Scholar. See also Webb, Sidney, “What Happened in 1931,” Political Quarterly, III (Jan. 13, 1932), 1–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morrison, Herbert, Government and Parliament (London, 1954), pp. 77–80Google Scholar; and Stewart, M., “Labour and the Monarchy,” Fabian Journal VIII (1952), 17–22Google Scholar.
2 Crossman, R.H.S., “Myths of 1931,” New Statesman, LVI (July 5, 1958), 20–21Google Scholar, a review of Bassett, Reginald, Nineteen Thirty-One Political Crisis (London, 1958)Google Scholar. The most detached explanation of the crisis is that by Mowat, Charles Loch in Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London, 1955)Google Scholar. The most convincing defense of MacDonald, the bankers, the king, and his own role in the affair was written by Samuel, Lord, “The Constitutional Crisis of 1931: A Memorandum,” Catlin, G.E.G. (ed.) Western Political Quarterly, XII (Mar. 1959), 5–8Google Scholar.
3 Marquand, David, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977)Google Scholar. See also his chapter on MacDonald in Butler, David's recent book on Coalitions in British Politics (London, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The most concise criticism of the king from a constitutional viewpoint is by Moodie, Graeme C., “The Monarch and the Selection of a Prime Minister: A Re-Examination of the Crisis of 1931,” Political Studies, V (Feb. 1957), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Seaman, L.C.B., Post-Victorian Britain (London, 1966), pp. 221–29Google Scholar.
5 Mention should be made of Berkeley's, Humphry book, The Myth That Will Not Die, The Formation of the National Government 1931 (London, 1978)Google Scholar, which appeared just as this essay was being prepared. Although he has the advantage of recent sources and the testimony of Malcolm MacDonald, his account is inconclusive and appears to have been written chiefly as a defense of MacDonald.
6 Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, p. 632Google Scholar.
7 The most important analysis of the economic dilemma facing the second Labour government is Skidelsky's, RobertPoliticians and the Slump, The Labour Government of 1929-1931 (London, 1967)Google Scholar. Also see McKibbin, Ross, “The Economic Policy of the Second Labour Government, 1929-1931,” Past and Present, LXVIII (Aug. 1975), 95–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a wider view of the development of welfare policy, see Gilbert, Bentley B., British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (London, 1970)Google Scholar.
8 Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 3636/1930.
9 Butler, D.E., Electoral System in Britain, 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1953), pp. 58–83Google Scholar. In a fit of depression on March 1 MacDonald first recognized a “national Government” as an attractive option. “The nation needs Parliamentary cooperation, but who will join? Not the Labour Party. The folly of the Liberal members on the T U Bill committee has created a most awkward situation. If we fall on that we fall on stones.” Diaries, March 1, 1931, MacDonald Papers, Public Record Office, PRO 30/69/8/1. MacDonald's diaries are used in this study in accordance with his wish that they are “meant as notes to guide and revive memory as regards happenings and must on no account be published as they are.” I also wish to thank the Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald for allowing me to use his father's papers.
10 Diary, July 6, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham, NC 2/22. I am grateful to the university trustees for permission to use passages from the Chamberlain Papers.
11 5 Parliamentary Debates, CCXXIX (July 2, 1929), 64–65Google Scholar.
12 Skidelsky, , Politicians and the Slump, pp. 198–202, 220–27Google Scholar.
13 5 Parl. Debs., CCXLI (July 23, 1930), 2190Google Scholar, and CCXLIV (Oct. 29, 1930), 50-51, 57, 83, 168-69.
14 Ibid., CCXLVIII (Feb. 11, 1931), 443, 449.
15 Skidelsky's discussion about the likelihood of a Lib-Lab alliance at this time is largely specious and unsupported by sound evidence. Politicians and the Slump, pp. 329-33. Unfortunately, his lead was followed by John Campbell in his discussion of interparty relationships in Lloyd George, The Goat in the Wilderness, 1922-1931 (London, 1977), pp. 293–95Google Scholar.
16 See SirClay, Henry, Lord Norman (London, 1957)Google Scholar and Williams, David, “London and the 1931 Financial Crisis,” Economic History Review, XV (1962–1963), 513–28Google Scholar for further details on developments in international finance leading up to the 1931 crisis.
17 Diary, July 6, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., July 24, 1931.
20 N. Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain, ibid., NC 18/1/748.
21 See Clay, , Lord Norman, pp. 381–85Google Scholar.
22 Diary, July 24, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22. This portion of Chamberlain's diary is partially printed in Feiling, Keith, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1947), pp. 189–90Google Scholar.
23 N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, July 25, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/749. The Australian experience no doubt furnished the most available model for Britain at this time. See Copland, D.B., Australia in the World Crisis (Cambridge, 1934)Google Scholar.
24 This was the conclusion of a meeting between Chamberlain; his brother Austen; Hailsham; Hoare; and Philip Cunliffe-Lister, former Colonial Secretary; called specifically to discuss the possibility of a National Goverment. While the most logical course seemed to be for MacDonald to resign and for some members of the present regime to join an administration under Baldwin, they agreed that “the greatest difficulty in such an event would be S.B. himself as his defects are just those which would be most undesirable in a Coalition leader.” N. Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain, Aug. 2, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/750.
25 Ibid. This approach was also approved by the bankers with whom Chamberlain was in close communication.
26 5 Parl. Debs., CCLV (July 30, 1931), 2512–513Google Scholar.
27 Snowden, Philip Viscount, An Autobiography (2 vols, London, 1934), II, 929–31Google Scholar.
28 Parl. Paps., Cmd. 3920/1931.
29 Samuel to Snowden, July 29, 1931, Samuel Papers, House of Lords Record Office, A/78/3. Passages from the Samuel Papers are used with the permission of the present Lord Samuel.
30 N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, Aug. 9, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/751.
31 For a record of the bankers' communications with New York and Paris during this period see Clay, , Lord Norman, pp. 383–84Google Scholar.
32 “The First National Government,” Templewood Papers, Cambridge University Library, VII, 1. I am grateful to Paul Paget, CVO, FAS, FRIBA, for permission to use passages from the Templewood Papers.
33 Ibid. Memorandum by Duff, Aug. 28, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/5/ 182.
34 Diaries, Aug. 11, 1931, ibid., PRO 30/69/8/1.
35 Memorandum by Samuel, Aug. 13, 1931, Samuel Papers, A/78/3.
36 Diary, Aug. 22, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22.
37 Chamberlain to Cunliffe-Lister, Aug. 15, 1931, Swinton Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, SWIN I 2/1. Baldwin wrote to Chamberlain from Aix-les-Bains that “I never take a kindness as a matter of course and I am truly grateful to you for undertaking that work next week …. I think it is all to the good that the Govt. have to look after their own chickens as they come home to roost, and get a lot of the dirt cleared before we come in. To have the consequences of their finance exposed—and acknowledged before the world—within four months of their budget will be a wonderful lesson … I had a good journey back, and last night I went to bed at nine and slept and slept and slept!” Baldwin to Chamberlain, Aug. 15, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 7/11/24/1. I gratefully acknowledge the consent of the present Lord Baldwin of Bewdley to use this quotation and for being allowed to see the Baldwin manuscripts.
38 Diaries, Aug. 17, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1.
39 Graham Memorandum, para. 9, Lansbury Papers, quoted in Skidelsky, , Politicians and the Slump, p. 360Google Scholar.
40 Cabinet Paper 203(31), CAB 24/222.
41 Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 19, 1931, CAB 23/67/41(31).
42 Graham presumed that this figure accounted for additional millions that would be lost as a result of the Hoover moratorium on reparations, a further decline in revenue compared with estimates because of the worsening industrial depression, and a larger call for transitional benefits. Graham Memorandum, para. 4, quoted in Skidelsky, , Politicians and the Slump, p. 357Google Scholar. It could have been derived, however, from the May Committee's reckoning of a full year's indebtedness. See Taylor, A.J.P., English History 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1965), p. 288Google Scholar.
43 MacDonald to Wigram, Aug. 19, 1931, Royal Archives GV K. 2330(1). I acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to use documents under the Crown copyright.
44 “The Second Labour Government,” Templewood Papers, VI, 2. Maclean's account agrees substantially that the Liberals and Conservatives had been “standing firm & together on the economies.” D. Maclean to G. Maclean, Aug. 21, 1931, Maclean Papers, Bodleian Library, Dep. c.468/119.
45 Diary, Aug. 22, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22. Samuel concurred “that some reduction should be made in the scale of unemployment allowances in view of the increases made in recent years and the fall in the cost of living. We felt that the other classes who were to be called upon for heavy sacrifices would be indignant if no change was made there.” Memorandum by Samuel, Aug. 20-23, 1931, Samuel Papers, A/78/7.
46 N. Chamberlain to A. Chamberlain, Aug. 21, 1931, ibid., NC 1/26/446. Chamberlain further predicted that “one of two things may happen. Either R.M. may surrender to his malcontents & put forward inadequate proposals in which case I am told he will lose Snowden and the flight from the £ will set in. Or he will part with Henderson & others & open negotiations for a National Govt.”
47 Ibid.
48 Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 20, 1931, CAB 23/67/42(31).
49 Diaries, Aug. 21, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1.
50 Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 21, 1931, CAB 23/67/43(31).
51 Diaries, Aug. 22, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1.
52 Ibid.
53 Diary, Aug. 22, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22. At this interview, MacDonald “was again in an emotional mood,” recorded Chamberlain, “and said tomorrow I may join you.”
54 Ibid.
55 “The Second Labour Government,” Templewood Papers, VI, 2.
56 Diary, Aug. 22, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22.
57 Diaries, Aug. 22, 1931, Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, p. 627Google Scholar.
58 Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 22, 1931, CAB 23/67/44(31).
59 Diary, Aug. 22, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22. Significantly, at their interview with the prime minister on the previous day the opposition leaders had persuaded MacDonald not to make independent contact with Harrison.
60 N. Chamberlain to A. Chamberlain, Aug. 23, 1931, ibid., NC 1/26/447.
61 N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, Aug. 23, 1931, ibid., NC 18/1/753. Chamberlain concluded that he had “had a strenuous time these last few days but I have nothing to regret & no reason to be dissatisfied with the part I have played.”
62 N. Chamberlain to A. Chamberlain, Aug. 23, 1931, ibid., NC 1/26/447.
63 Davidson memoirs, Aug. 22, 1931, James, Robert Rhodes (ed.), Memoirs of a Conservative: J.C.C. Davidson's Memoirs and Papers, 1910-37 (London, 1969), pp. 367–68Google Scholar.
64 Memorandum by Dawson, on “Financial Crisis,” Wrench, John Evelyn, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times (London, 1955), pp. 291–92Google Scholar.
65 Memorandum by Sir Clive Wigram, Aug. 23, 1931, cited in Hearder, H., “King George V, the General Strike, and the 1931 Crisis,” Hearder, H. and Loyn, H.R., eds., British Government and Administration Studies Presented to S.B. Chrimes (Cardiff, 1974) p. 244Google Scholar. These portions of Wigram's memorandum were omitted in Harold Nicolson's transcription of it in King George V, His Life and Reign (London, 1967), pp. 592–600Google Scholar.
66 Diaries, Aug. 23, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1.
67 Memorandum by Wigram, Aug. 23, 1931, Nicolson, , King George V, pp. 597–98Google Scholar.
68 Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 23, 1931, CAB 23/67/46(31), with Appendix, “Message from Mr. Harrison.”
69 Although MacDonald recorded an eleven to eight vote in his diaries for Aug. 23, 1931, Berkeley's estimate of nine dissidents is probably correct in Myth that Will Not Die, p. 83.
70 Cabinet Minutes, Aug. 23, 1931, CAB 23/67/46(31).
71 Memorandum by Wigram, Aug. 23, 1931, Nicolson, , King George V, p. 464Google Scholar.
72 Diary, Aug. 23, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22.
73 James, , Davidson's Memoirs, p. 64Google Scholar.
74 Skidelsky, , Politicians and the Slump, pp. 278–80, 295Google Scholar.
75 Garvin to MacDonald, Aug. 24, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/5/180.
76 MacDonald to Garvin, Aug. 25, 1931, ibid.
77 For elucidation on whether Garvin could have contacted MacDonald before he left for the palace, I contacted Alfred Gollin and J.O. Stubbs, both authorities on Garvin. They informed me that the Observer did place a Rolls Royce car at his disposal driven by a chauffeur named Morrison and that it was quite possible for Garvin's letter to have reached MacDonald early in the morning. Stubbs also remarked that “Garvin certainly stayed up very late at night on occasion and certainly wrote letters far into the night.” Therefore his message could have been written before he retired for the night. The likelihood that it was delivered by regular post, even in 1931, seems out of the question. Gollin to Fair, Aug. 25, 1978, and Stubbs to Fair, Dec. 8, 1978.
78 Diaries, Aug. 24, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/8/1. Memorandum by Wigram, Aug. 24,1931, Nicolson, , King George V, pp. 465–66Google Scholar. According to Maclean, “When Baldwin and Samuel arrived at the Palace the Prime Minister told them [that] acting under great pressure from the King he had decided to try and form a National Government.” In his revised draft of this letter the more equivocal word “that” was added. In any case it suited MacDonald's purpose well enough that the King should appear responsible for his decision just as it had suited Chamberlain that the bankers should conceal his designs. D. Maclean to G. Maclean, Aug. 24, 1931, Maclean Papers, Dep. c.468/127, 128.
79 This is an observation of Beer, Samuel in British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York, 1969), p. 161Google Scholar. See also my article, “Politicians, Historians, and the War: A Reassessment of the Political Crisis of December 1916,” The Journal of Modern History, XLIX (Sept. 1977), D1329–43Google Scholar.
80 Templewood, Viscount, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), p. 17Google Scholar. In a recent character sketch of Chamberlain, Alan Beattie describes him as a man of “business” and “imagination” whose “clarity of mind and his willingness to take firm decisions in confused circumstances were qualities long recognized by many of his contemporaries.” See “Neville Chamberlain”, in British Prime Ministers in the Twentieth Century, Mackintosh, John P. (ed.), (2 vols, New York, 1977), I, 240Google Scholar.
