Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) and at the Political Economy Research Colloquium of the Department of Government, Cornell University. Helpful comments from Martin Dimitrov, Jing Tao, and two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. Charles Mehl and Tongroj Onchan of the Mekong Environment and Resource Institute helped facilitate field research in Thailand. The Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation in Stockholm and the Southeast Asia and International Political Economy programs of Cornell University provided financial support.Google Scholar

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