Core elites, peripheral elites, and activity in authoritarian assemblies

In recent years, research has singled out nominally democratic institutions as cornerstones of dictatorships and highlighted the mechanisms through which they can prolong authoritarian rule (Magaloni Reference Magaloni2006; Gandhi Reference Gandhi2008; Svolik Reference Svolik2012). These approaches have highlighted that authoritarian institutions can help to coopt opposition forces and incorporate them into policy-making processes (Gandhi Reference Gandhi2008; Gandhi and Przeworski Reference Gandhi and Przeworski2007; Reuter and Robertson Reference Reuter and Robertson2015), facilitate power-sharing among the authoritarian elite (Svolik Reference Svolik2012; Gehlbach and Keefer Reference Gehlbach and Keefer2011), and collect information about elites’ and citizens’ preferences (Truex Reference Truex2016; Manion Reference Manion2015; Ong Reference Ong2015). Yet, the individual delegates within authoritarian assemblies equally deserve attention.

In order to explain delegates’ activity in authoritarian assemblies, scholars followed the theoretical premise of cooptation theory (Desposato Reference Desposato2001; Malesky and Schuler Reference Malesky and Schuler2010; Simison Reference Simison2020). Although it is primarily concerned with why dictators would establish institutions in the first place, cooptation theory also offers insights on how delegates might behave in assemblies. The establishment of legislatures is primarily aimed at opposition forces that previously had no opportunity to voice their demands (Gandhi and Przeworski Reference Gandhi and Przeworski2006; Gandhi Reference Gandhi2008). Thus, in assemblies that function as a forum for policymaking with eventual policy concessions, regime outsiders can be expected to make more use of the institutional mechanisms (Malesky and Schuler Reference Malesky and Schuler2010). Regime insiders, however, do not need the additional opportunities of assemblies since they are key decision-makers or have closer links with them to begin with. Prior studies that followed the cooptation approach focused often primarily on electoral cooptation mechanisms (Desposato Reference Desposato2001; Malesky and Schuler Reference Malesky and Schuler2010; Simison Reference Simison2020).

‘Closed regimes’ (Diamond Reference Diamond2002), however, are not open to any form of electoral competition and do not allow regime outsiders in their legislatures. Thus, recent research has dismissed cooptation theory as plausible explanation for delegates’ activism entirely (e.g., Truex Reference Truex2016, Lü, Liu, and Li Reference Lü, Liu and Li2020; Schuler Reference Schuler2021). Nevertheless, the distinction between regime insiders and outsiders are not always clear-cut there either. In fact, research in other areas has long highlighted how a wide range of actors can be coopted through mechanisms other than elections. Prominent cases include private entrepreneurs (Dickson Reference Dickson2003; Huang and Chen Reference Huang and Chen2019), religious actors (Payne Reference Payne2010), the media (Wiebrecht Reference Wiebrecht2018), lawyers (Liu and Stern Reference Liu and Stern2020), and civil society groups (Mattingly Reference Mattingly2019). Thus, cooptation theory may hold merit even in the absence of a formal opposition.

An alternative perspective sees institutions such as assemblies not as mechanisms for cooptation but rather as arenas for competition between different government agencies for state resources (Lust-Okar Reference Lust-Okar2006). Lü, Liu, and Li (Reference Lü, Liu and Li2020) for instance put forward the perspective that government departments actively encourage deputies in China's legislatures to submit proposals and build ‘policy coalitions.’ In consequence, they see intra-institutional processes as characterized by bureaucratic struggles over influence in policymaking rather than by conflicts between regime insiders and outsiders (Noble Reference Noble2020). This is an important perspective to understand dynamics in authoritarian assemblies, but it neglects the strict hierarchy of authoritarian regimes and legislatures (Schuler Reference Schuler2021). As some actors start from a much more powerful position to influence policymaking than others, not all of them need to compete for influence in legislatures equally (Wu Reference Wu2020).

In an effort to synthesize the aforementioned competing perspectives, I propose to further differentiate actors in authoritarian institutions. In contrast to aggregating delegates into categories of regime insiders and outsiders, I argue that it is primarily their position in the authoritarian regime and hierarchy that predicts their levels of activity in an authoritarian assembly. While even in authoritarian regimes actors have many competing and divergent preferences (Williamson and Magaloni Reference Williamson and Magaloni2020; Kim and Sudduth Reference Kim and Sudduth2021), their ability to ultimately influence policymaking varies. Just as in democracies (Cox and McCubbins Reference Cox and McCubbins2005; Gailmard and Jenkins Reference Gailmard and Jenkins2007), some actors in authoritarian regimes are more powerful than others regarding policymaking and agenda-setting and can bypass legislative bargaining more easily (Wu Reference Wu2020; Schuler Reference Schuler2021). They may prefer to advance their interests either through alternative decision-making organs such as party institutions (Svolik Reference Svolik2012; Gehlbach and Keefer Reference Gehlbach and Keefer2011; Malesky, Abrami, and Zheng Reference Malesky, Abrami and Zheng2011) or through informal connections (Jiang and Zhang Reference Jiang and Zhang2020). These agenda-setting elites are what I call core elites.

In contrast, authoritarian assemblies also accommodate several actors that lack any direct institutional access to decision-makers and for whom assemblies are the only formal channel through which they can transmit their demands. I call these actors peripheral elites because they are generally privileged and well-respected in authoritarian politics and society, but they are not ultimate decision-makers. They can be less advantaged in comparison to core elites in terms of their occupational, social, ethnic, or geographical background. They may be comparable to backbenchers in majority parties in democratic regimes as their influence on policymaking is also limited and their chances of success in parliament relatively low (Searing Reference Searing1993; Hasson Reference Hasson2010). In order to voice their preferences to the leaders of the authoritarian regime, they will have to make use of institutions and attempt to influence policymaking in assemblies.

Thus, my argument builds on the abovementioned cooptation approach but generalizes it to dictatorships in which regime insiders and outsiders are not easily identifiable. In addition, it complements the bureaucratic competition approach with an emphasis on the hierarchical structure. This argument can be extended to more competitive assemblies in which opposition forces would fall below peripheral elites in the authoritarian hierarchy. However, this argument comes with two qualifications. For one, as the legislative process may not guarantee them a high chance of success in influencing policymaking, peripheral elites are also susceptible to alternative channels. If they have access to alternative and more direct channels to decision-makers such as informal connections, they will prefer to use them. The second qualification concerns the role of private rents. If delegates are primarily interested in private financial gains rather than influencing policymaking, they will abstain from voicing too much criticism to retain their position (Reuter and Robertson Reference Reuter and Robertson2015).

I will begin by providing some background on the institutions before introducing the empirical strategy.

Background: The People's Political Consultative Conferences (PPCC)

The PPCCs have a long history, as the first institution of this kind was held in 1946 and attended by the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, and other political parties in China at the time. In the immediate aftermath of the Communist victory, the national PPCC was promoted as the main legislative institution, but it was later replaced in that function by the National People's Congress (Chen Reference Chen2015). Consequently, the institution did not possess state power and was relegated to the status of a consultative body. While it did not survive the Cultural Revolution, the political elite of the reform and opening-up period re-discovered the advantages of the system and revitalized the PPCCs from the early 1980s onwards (Yan Reference Yan2011). According to its charter, consultation is the principal function of the PPCCs (Article 3) with “assist[ing] state organs in carrying out structural and institution reform, improving work, raising efficiency, overcoming the practice of formalities for formalities’ sake, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance, and building a clean government” (Article 7) stated as some of the main objectives.

As one of the most inclusive political institutions in China, they are a key element in the party-state's system of coopting important sectors of society (e.g., Yan Reference Yan2011). Prior research has particularly focused on their ability to incorporate influential actors in society into the realm of the state, going as far as calling the institutions “rich people club” (Chen Reference Chen2015; Sagild and Ahlers Reference Sagild and Ahlers2019; Jeffreys Reference Jeffreys2016). While it was primarily concerned with coopting the minor political parties in China in the founding days of the People's Republic (Groot Reference Groot2004), more recently private entrepreneurs have become the center of its cooptation work (e.g., Yan Reference Yan2011; Chen Reference Chen2015; Heberer and Schubert Reference Heberer and Schubert2019; Huang and Chen Reference Huang and Chen2019). For the Chinese regime, the PPCCs with their diverse membership composition deliver welcome images illustrating how inclusive political institutions in China can be. The assemblies also offer a forum for interacting and maintaining patronage relationships with the government and prior research confirms that entrepreneurs benefit from their membership (e.g., Sun, Zhu, and Wu Reference Sun, Zhu and Wu2014).

The mechanisms of selecting PPCC delegates are non-transparent but recommendations from other delegates seem crucial (Sagild and Ahlers Reference Sagild and Ahlers2019). While political loyalty is a prerequisite to be considered as delegate, candidates’ social standing also appears crucial. For private entrepreneurs, for instance, business success and prior philanthropic engagement are key (Sagild Reference Sagild2019). Thus, delegates are generally elites in their respective fields that the regime considers valuable and important to establish formal connections with. Figure 1 highlights the share of the three largest groups of delegates in the two PPCCs selected for this study. These are government officials, academics, and private entrepreneurs that altogether constitute slightly above 70 percent of all delegates. The remaining delegates are professionals, state-owned enterprise executives, government-affiliated organization representatives, and military cadres. Statistics on members’ occupations have largely remained stable over time but can vary across provinces depending on regional characteristics. Province 2 for instance has a higher number of universities which is reflected in the higher share of academics in its PPCC.

Figure 1. Membership Composition of PPCCs in Provinces 1 and 2. Compiled by author

Although the institution is lacking formal authority to enact laws it does offer opportunities for delegates to make their voices heard. In addition to attending training sessions and participating in inspections and research tours, the delegates’ most important task is to submit formal policy proposals (ti'an) to which the relevant government departments are required to respond within a set period of time (Chen Reference Chen2019).Footnote ² The number of proposals has skyrocketed in recent decades (Lü, Liu, and Li Reference Lü, Liu and Li2020) and yet they have not been subject to comprehensive empirical studies. Past research has either focused on the proposals of a particular group, e.g., entrepreneurs (Chen Reference Chen2015), or on proposals centering around an individual issue such as education (Lü, Liu, and Li Reference Lü, Liu and Li2020).

Contrary to prior studies that have focused on the national (Lü, Liu, and Li Reference Lü, Liu and Li2020) and local (Sun, Zhu, and Wu Reference Sun, Zhu and Wu2014) levels, this study will draw on two provincial-level PPCCs for several reasons. First, similar to those on other administrative levels, provincial PPCCs have also been very active in writing proposals and experienced significant growth in activity in past decades.Footnote ³ Second, provinces have become places of active lawmaking in recent decades that are just as “fragmented” (Mertha Reference Mertha2009) as the national level but often more innovative and “progressive.” The central government often learns from provincial policy successes and failures (Xia Reference Xia2008). Delegates on the provincial level may therefore also be more confident in proposing pioneering policies. Third, provinces take a unique position in the Chinese administrative hierarchy in the center of vertical relationships between top-down orders and local demands. As Jaros and Tan (Reference Jaros and Tan2020) highlight, provinces function as “gatekeepers” between the affluent central state and the underprivileged local governments. Fourth, in comparison to the local PPCCs, which are likely to deal with more mundane issues such as a lack of parking spots in the respective city (Chen Reference Chen2015), proposals on the provincial level tend to be more substantive and policy oriented, for instance calling for the establishment of a province-wide traffic accident rescue fund.

Hypotheses

In this section, I lay out the theoretical expectations of PPCC delegates’ behavior in accordance with the argument highlighted above. The focus in this analysis will be on the delegates’ occupational backgrounds as these are most important in determining one's status within the authoritarian regime.

The membership composition of the PPCCs reveals that most delegates are indeed government officials. The view on authoritarian institutions as arenas for bureaucratic competition (Lü, Liu, and Li Reference Lü, Liu and Li2020; Noble Reference Noble2020) suggests that government agencies are competing for influence inside them and that government officials act as their “proxy fighters.” However, I suggest that not all government bodies and officials follow this pattern equally. Provincial government officials are by definition among the most authoritative actors on this level and therefore have alternative channels to influence policies according to their preferences. In particular, the elevated role of party organs for policymaking has been highlighted in prior research (Svolik Reference Svolik2012; Gehlbach and Keefer Reference Gehlbach and Keefer2011; Malesky, Abrami, and Zheng Reference Malesky, Abrami and Zheng2011). Consequently, in their position as core elites, they will invest fewer resources and effort in engaging in an assembly.

On the other hand, local government officials (i.e., prefecture or county-level) are peripheral for provincial-level decision-making processes. There are no institutionalized channels through which local governments can advance their interests vis-à-vis provincial actors other than PPCCs and People's Congresses (Manion Reference Manion2014). Missing alternative promising channels, local government officials will feel compelled to make use of the institutions. However, not only do local governments lack alternative channels to appeal to higher-level governments, but they also often compete for resources (Lü and Landry Reference Lü and Landry2014; Zhu Reference Zhu2014). Thus, local governments and their “proxy fighters” will appeal to provincial institutions more actively because the latter “have considerable control over the localities’ … economic and institutional resources” (Jaros and Tan Reference Jaros and Tan2020, 81). Thus, particularly on the provincial level, local government officials can be seen as peripheral elites.

The efforts to convince the provincial government of the need for additional resources are also visible in many submitted proposals. Local government officials often draw attention to local issues. A municipal department head in a prefecture-level city in Province 2, for instance, appealed to the provincial government to support the city in establishing copper futures delivery warehouses in 2018. In 2005 a municipal department head in a county-level city in Province 1 similarly urged the provincial authorities to open a wind power plant there as soon as possible. A number of additional examples from Province 2 in 2005 are provided in Table 12 in the Appendix. Thus, bureaucratic competition in institutions is to be expected primarily in the form of parochialism, that is, among local governments competing for resources allocated by the provincial government (Manion Reference Manion2014). However, the same cannot be expected for provincial-level agencies that can be classified as core elites.

Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b target the relationship between government officials on different levels and their activity in the PPCCs:

A second large group of delegates in the PPCCs is that of academics and professionals. Academics in particular, often function as policy entrepreneurs, irrespective of political regimes, characterized by their high degree of social acuity (Bakir and Jarvis Reference Bakir and Jarvis2017). On the other hand, in authoritarian regimes, they often lack institutionalized channels through which they can communicate their research and participate in the policymaking processes (Kaczmarska Reference Kaczmarska2019). This has also been recognized as an issue in China with many academics missing access to the governments’ administrative channels (Zhu Reference Zhu2016). With the PPCCs as one of few institutionalized mechanisms in which they can offer recommendations, academics are likely to be more active than other groups of delegates in the institution.

The institution provides academics, whether they are natural or social scientists, with the chance to relate their research to questions of governance. The proposals submitted to the PPCCs highlight that many of them follow precisely this approach. An economics professor from Province 2 for instance, in line with his research interests, proposed to improve the single window of international trade and to promote the integrated development of customs clearance in the region in 2020. In another case, familiar with the local infrastructure, a professor of sports sciences in Province 1 recommended the provincial government to accelerate the construction of additional sports facilities in the province in 2008. These examples are typical of the nature of academic engagement in the PPCCs.

The same can be said of professionals such as lawyers and medical professionals, who come across societal issues daily but do not have alternative institutionalized channels to inform the government. Professionals can often relay experiences from their work and submit proposals either directly related to their occupation or to issues they are aware of through their engagement with and in society. For instance, in 2020 a lawyer-delegate formulated recommendations regarding the provincial “Regulations on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights” that also fall into his professional expertise. In Province 1, a medical doctor authored the “Suggestions on Strengthening Hospital Policing Management and Protecting the Personal Safety of Medical Staff” and submitted them in 2014. A variety of exemplary proposals by academics as well as professionals from Province 1 in 2008 are included in Table 11 in the Appendix. Based on these proposals, this article's second hypothesis tests whether academics and professionals are in fact more active than other delegates:

A third notable group of delegates in PPCCs but also authoritarian institutions more broadly are private entrepreneurs as envoys of the economic sector. In fact, based on interviews conducted by other scholars, they are often said to be particularly active in authoritarian institutions (e.g., Hou Reference Hou2019; Chen Reference Chen2015). Private entrepreneurs also lack alternative formal channels in which they could voice their policy preferences, and thus, in line with the argument of this article, one might expect them to be very active. However, it appears that for private entrepreneurs, rather than through policy concessions, cooptation is primarily advanced through material rewards. In many cases, actors have been coopted primarily through financial remunerations or closer access to resources (Lust-Okar Reference Lust-Okar2006; Blaydes Reference Blaydes2011). In the Chinese context, these advantages have also been shown impressively in particular for private entrepreneurs (Sun, Zhu, and Wu Reference Sun, Zhu and Wu2014; Truex Reference Truex2014).

Yet, this material approach of cooptation may instead lead to the opposite outcome of stifling incentives for active participation in authoritarian institutions. Previous research has shown that attracting overt attention is not helpful for actors in public positions in authoritarian regimes (e.g., Gueorguiev and Schuler Reference Gueorguiev and Schuler2016). Recent high-profile cases such as Jack Ma, Xiao Jianhua, Ye Jianming, and Wu Xiaohui illustrate that voicing political concerns or getting involved in factional politics is still a risky and dangerous undertaking for private entrepreneurs in China. Since membership in the institution often leads to better-protected property rights (Hou Reference Hou2019), entrepreneurs may want to refrain from attracting attention by overly criticizing the regime. Instead, it is conceivable that private entrepreneurs can be ‘bought off’ through such benefits in order to abstain from voicing criticism (Lust-Okar Reference Lust-Okar2006; Reuter and Robertson Reference Reuter and Robertson2015; Blaydes Reference Blaydes2011). While other delegates also benefit from their membership in an authoritarian institution, these advantages tend to be more important for private entrepreneurs’ careers and businesses. Hypothesis 3 will test private entrepreneurs’ levels of participation.

Empirical Strategy

In order to analyze the individual levels of activity, this article utilizes an original dataset of proposals submitted to two PPCCs in China from 2005 to 2020.Footnote ⁵ While many provinces and municipalities make a selection of proposals available, the provinces analyzed here are the only ones to publish all proposals of this period online and visible to the public.Footnote ⁶ This article will be the first substantial analysis on the dynamics on the provincial level that despite strong centralization efforts under Xi Jinping continues to play an important role (Jaros and Tan Reference Jaros and Tan2020). The unit of analysis used in this article is the delegate-year for which the dataset includes a total of 14,236 observations. Table 4 in the Appendix highlights that both provinces are close to the mean and median values of all Chinese provinces for a variety of indicators. The only exception is that Province 1 is smaller in size than the average province and has a smaller population.

The analyses will use a count variable of how many proposals each delegate has submitted to every annual meeting as dependent variable taken from the PPCCs’ online platforms. Included in the analysis are all proposals written by individual delegates, either single-authored or jointly signed whereas group proposals for instance in the name of the minor parties and mass organizations have been excluded. The independent variables are based on the individual biographies of the delegates. The name lists of the delegates are taken from the PPCC websites. Further biographical information has been collected from Baidu Encyclopedia that has also been used for other studies (Jiang Reference Jiang2018; Truex Reference Truex2014) and university and company websites. As outlined above, the delegates’ occupations are the main variables of interest since they carry theoretical significance. Additional personal details such as delegates’ gender, education level, ethnicity, birthplace, party membership, and whether they are part of the institutional leadershipFootnote ⁷ function as control variables.

Prior research especially from democratic parliaments showed that some of these social characteristics are also important in predicting legislative activity. Female and ethnic minority legislators for instance tend to be more active as they are typically in an institutionally disadvantaged position (Akirav Reference Akirav2018; Salmond Reference Salmond2006; Becker and Saalfeld Reference Becker, Saalfeld, Doring and Hallerberg2004; Wängnerud Reference Wängnerud2009). In addition, experience within the institution has been highlighted as an important factor in parliaments since it allows MPs to understand institutional procedures better (Mayhew Reference Mayhew2000; Katz Reference Katz1999). The models in this article illustrate experience as a dichotomous variable of whether a delegate has been a member of the PPCC in a previous five-year session. The descriptive data (pre-and post-imputation) are available in the Appendix.

Delegates in provincial-level PPCCs are not particularly prominent public figures which is why it is difficult to collect some of their biographies. While records on government officials are relatively accessible and complete, personal details such as age and education are often unidentifiable for non-Party members. Therefore, to address the problem of missing data a data imputation approach has been applied in this study (King et al. Reference King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve2001). The results presented here are based on the mean values of 35 imputation runs on the original dataset. More details on how many observations are missing and were imputed are provided in the Appendix (Table 3). In this study, multiple imputation is particularly helpful since the auxiliary variables are mainly affected by missingness but not the variables of main interest (Arel-Bundock and Pelc Reference Arel-Bundock and Pelc2018). The empirical analysis has been conducted with a negative binomial regression (NBREG) model specification. Since the high number of delegates with zero submitted proposals leads to an over-dispersion in the data, NBREG is more appropriate in this case than the more commonly used Poisson models (Cameron and Trivedi Reference Cameron and Trivedi1998).