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Encouraging Small Donor Contributions: A Field Experiment Testing the Effects of Nonpartisan Messages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2015

Donald P. Green ,
Jonathan S. Krasno ,
Costas Panagopoulos ,
Benjamin Farrer  and
Michael Schwam-Baird
Donald P. Green
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA; e-mail: dpg2110@columbia.edu
Jonathan S. Krasno
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA
Costas Panagopoulos
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Fordham University, Bronx, NY, USA
Benjamin Farrer
Affiliation:
Department of Environmental Studies, Knox College, Galesburg, IL, USA
Michael Schwam-Baird
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA; e-mail: dpg2110@columbia.edu
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Abstract

We report the results of a field experiment conducted in New York City during the 2013 election cycle, examining the impact of nonpartisan messages on donations from small contributors. Using information from voter registration and campaign finance records, we built a forecasting model to identify voters with an above-average probability of donating. A random sample of these voters received one of four messages asking them to donate to a candidate of their choice. Half of these treatments reminded voters that New York City's campaign finance program matches small donations with public funds. Candidates’ financial disclosures to the city's Campaign Finance Board reveal that only the message mentioning policy (in generic terms) increased donations. Surprisingly, reminding voters that matching funds multiplied the value of their contribution had no effect. Our experiment sheds light on the motivations of donors and represents the first attempt to assess nonpartisan appeals to contribute.

Keywords

Campaign financepolitical participationfield experimentsdonationselectoral politics
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , Winter 2015 , pp. 183 - 191
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2015 

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