This paper examines the relation between the performance and valuations of publicly traded subsidiaries in the United States and the ownership stake of their parent companies. Cross-sectional and time-series tests demonstrate that subsidiaries of parents that own a substantial minority stake exhibit negative peer-adjusted operating performance and are valued at a 23% median discount relative to peers. In contrast, majority-owned and fully divested subsidiaries show no abnormal performance or valuations. The results of our study indicate that the association between parent ownership and subsidiary performance is nonlinear and that some parents behave opportunistically toward their publicly traded subsidiaries.

We show that the abnormal returns on high default risk stocks documented by Vassalou and Xing (2004) are driven by short-term return reversals rather than systematic default risk. These abnormal returns occur only during the month after portfolio formation and are concentrated in a small subset of stocks that had recently experienced large negative returns. Empirical evidence supports the view that the short-term return reversal arises from a liquidity shock triggered by a clientele change.

I test for stock return predictability in the largest and most comprehensive data set analyzed so far, using four common forecasting variables: the dividend-price (DP) and earnings-price (EP) ratios, the short interest rate, and the term spread. The data contain over 20,000 monthly observations from 40 international markets, including 24 developed and 16 emerging economies. In addition, I develop new methods for predictive regressions with panel data. Inference based on the standard fixed effects estimator is shown to suffer from severe size distortions in the typical stock return regression, and an alternative robust estimator is proposed. The empirical results indicate that the short interest rate and the term spread are fairly robust predictors of stock returns in developed markets. In contrast, no strong or consistent evidence of predictability is found when considering the EP and DP ratios as predictors.

While the signaling hypothesis has played a prominent role as the economic rationale associated with the initial public offering (IPO) underpricing puzzle (Welch (1989)), the empirical evidence on it has been mixed at best (Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993), Michaely and Shaw (1994)). This paper revisits the issue from the vantage point of close to two decades of additional experience by examining a sample of foreign IPOs—firms from both financially integrated and segmented markets—in U.S. markets. The evidence indicates that signaling does matter in determining IPO underpricing, especially for firms domiciled in countries with segmented markets, which as a result face higher information asymmetry and lack access to external capital markets. We find a significant positive and robust relationship between the degree of IPO underpricing and segmented-market firms’ seasoned equity offering (SEO) activities. For firms from integrated markets, in contrast, the analyst-coverage purchase hypothesis appears to matter more in explaining IPO underpricing, and the aftermarket price appreciation explains these firms’ SEO activities. The evidence, therefore, clearly supports the notion that some firms are willing to leave money on the table voluntarily to get a more favorable price at seasoned offerings when they are substantially wealth constrained, a prediction embedded in the signaling hypothesis.

The paper explores the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds, using euro-area data. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. We propose a simple model with endogenous liquidity demand, where a bond’s liquidity premium depends both on its transaction cost and on investment opportunities. The model predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and risk, with an interaction term of the opposite sign. Testing these predictions on daily data, we find that the aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, liquidity differentials are priced for a subset of countries, and their interaction with the risk factor is in line with the model’s prediction and crucial to detect their effect.

We study the effects of investor protection on stock returns and portfolio allocation decisions. In our theoretical model, if investor protection is weak, wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders. In equilibrium, the stock price reflects the demand from both controlling shareholders and portfolio investors. Due to the high demand from controlling shareholders, the price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully discount the extraction of private benefits. Thus, stocks have lower expected returns when investor protection is weak. This has implications for domestic and foreign investors’ stockholdings. In particular, we show that portfolio investors’ participation in the domestic stock market and home equity bias are positively related to investor protection and provide original evidence in their support.

I test whether social influence affects individual investors’ trading and stock returns. In each of the 20 most active stocks in Finland over 9 years, the number of owners in a municipality multiplied by the number of investors who do not own a stock, a measure of the rate of transmission of diseases and rumors through social contact, predicts individual investor trading. I control for known determinants of trade, including daily news, and show that competing explanations for the relation are unlikely. Socially motivated trades predict stock returns, and the effects are not reversed, suggesting that individuals share useful information. Individuals’ susceptibility to social influence has declined during the period, but the opportunities for social influence have increased.

This paper compares downside risk measures that incorporate higher return moments with traditional risk measures such as standard deviation in predicting hedge fund failure. When controlling for investment strategies, performance, fund age, size, lockup, high-water mark, and leverage, we find that funds with larger downside risk have a higher hazard rate. However, standard deviation loses the explanatory power once the other explanatory variables are included in the hazard model. Further, we find that liquidation does not necessarily mean failure in the hedge fund industry. By reexamining the attrition rate, we show that the real failure rate of 3.1% is lower than the attrition rate of 8.7% on an annual basis during the period of 1995–2004.

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the impact of daily mutual fund flow volatility on fund performance. I document a significant negative relationship between the volatility of daily fund flows and cross-sectional differences in risk-adjusted performance. This relationship is driven by domestic equity funds, as well as small funds, well-performing funds, and funds that experience inflows over the sample period. My results are consistent with performance differences arising from the transaction costs of nondiscretionary trading driven by daily fund flows, but not with performance differences arising from the suboptimal cash holdings that arise from fund flows.

Do threats of pharmaceutical price regulation affect subsequent research and development (R&D) spending? This study uses the Clinton administration’s Health Security Act (HSA) of 1993 as a natural experiment to study this issue. We link events surrounding the HSA to pharmaceutical stock price changes and then examine the cross-sectional relation between firms’ stock price changes and their subsequent unexpected R&D spending changes. Results show that the HSA had significant negative effects on stock prices and firm-level R&D spending. Conservatively, the HSA reduced R&D spending by about $1 billion even though it never became law.