Consistent with institutions having an advantage over individuals, we find that newly public firms with the highest levels of institutional investment significantly outperform those with the lowest levels. While prior literature has attributed much of institutions’ higher returns around various corporate events to private information, we find that much of the difference simply reflects better interpretation of readily available public information. Individuals disproportionately invest in the types of firms that earn significantly lower abnormal returns over the long run. Individuals either disregard or misinterpret the relevance of readily available public information, and as a result, they bear the brunt of IPO underperformance.

Dynamic term structure models explain the yield curve variation well but perform poorly in pricing and hedging interest rate options. Most existing option pricing practices take the yield curve as given, thus having little to say about the fair valuation of the underlying interest rates. This paper proposes an m + n model structure that bridges the gap in the literature by successfully pricing both interest rates and interest rate options. The first m factors capture the yield curve variation, whereas the latter n factors capture the interest rate options movements that cannot be effectively identified from the yield curve. We propose a sequential estimation procedure that identifies the m yield curve factors from the LIBOR and swap rates in the first step and the n options factors from interest rate caps in the second step. The three yield curve factors explain over 99% of the variation in the yield curve but account for less than 50% of the implied volatility variation for the caps. Incorporating three additional options factors improves the explained variation in implied volatilities to over 99%.

Prior studies argue that investment by undervalued firms that require external equity is particularly sensitive to stock prices in irrational capital markets. We present a model in which investment can appear to be more sensitive to stock prices when capital markets are rational, but subject to imperfections such as debt overhang, information asymmetries, and financial distress costs. Our empirical tests support the rational (but imperfect) capital markets view. Specifically, investment–stock price sensitivity is related to firm leverage, financial slack, and probability of financial distress, but is not related to proxies for firm undervaluation. Because, in our model, stock prices reflect the net present values (NPVs) of investment opportunities, our results are consistent with rational capital markets improving the allocation of capital by channeling more funds to firms with positive NPV projects.

We analyze the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic agents by examining how media exposure of board ineffectiveness affects corporate governance, investor trading behavior, and security prices. Our focus on board quality is motivated by the strong media criticism to which corporate boards and corporate America, in general, have been recently subjected. The results indicate that media releases of (noisy) information have significant economic consequences. In particular, media exposure of board ineffectiveness forces the targeted agents to take corrective actions and enhances shareholder wealth. Individual investors appear to react negatively to the media exposure, whereas investment firms act as if they anticipate the targeted firms’ corrective actions.

This study shows that individual investors systematically shift their preferences across extreme style portfolios (small vs. large, value vs. growth). These preference shifts are influenced by past style returns and earnings differentials, and advice from investment newsletters, but are unaffected by innovations in macroeconomic variables or shifts in expectations about future cash flows. Furthermore, investors’ dynamic style preferences influence returns along multiple dimensions: i) the contemporaneous relation between style returns and style-level preference shifts is strong, ii) there is weak evidence of style return predictability, and iii) the correlations among stocks within a style increase when investors move into or out of the style with greater intensity. Overall, the results indicate that stock categorization influences investors’ portfolio decisions and stock returns.

What drives the compensation demanded by investors in risky bonds? Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) predict that one key factor is the time-varying negative correlation between interest rates and the yield spreads on corporate bonds. However, the effects of callability and taxes also need to be considered in empirical analyses. Canadian bonds have no tax effects, yet, after controlling for callability, the correlation between riskless interest rates and corporate bond spreads remains negligible. Our results provide support for reduced-form models that explicitly define a default hazard process and untie the relation between the firm’s asset value and default probability.

We read all news items that came out between 1996 and 2000 on 458 Internet initial public offerings (IPOs) and a matching sample of 458 non-Internet IPOs (a total of 171,488 news items) and classify each news item as good news, neutral news, or bad news. We first document that the media were more positive for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic rise in share prices and more negative for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic fall in share prices. We then document that media hype is unable to explain the Internet bubble: A 1,646% difference exists in returns between Internet stocks and non-Internet stocks from January 1, 1997, through March 24, 2000 (the market peak), and the media can explain only 2.9% of that.

Analysis of a worldwide sample of sudden deaths of politicians reveals a market-adjusted 1.7% decline in the value of companies headquartered in the politician's hometown. The decline in value is followed by a drop in the rate of growth in sales and access to credit. Our results are particularly pronounced for family firms, firms with high growth prospects, firms in industries over which the politician has jurisdiction, and firms headquartered in highly corrupt countries.

In 12 sessions conducted in a typical bubble-generating experimental environment, we design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior. The specific form of irrationality we investigate is the probability judgment error associated with low-probability, high-payoff outcomes. Independently, we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in multiperiod versus single-period markets. We establish that aggregate irrationality measured in one dimension (probability judgment error) is associated with aggregate irrationality measured in another (bubble formation).