Using a demographics-based proxy for smartness, we show that the portfolio distortions of “smart” investors reflect an informational advantage, while the distortions of “dumb” investors reflect psychological biases. Specifically, smart investors outperform dumb investors by about 3% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. Furthermore, among investors with high portfolio distortions, smart investors outperform passive benchmarks by 2%, and the smart-dumb performance differential is 5%. At the stock level, a portfolio of stocks with smart investor clientele outperforms the dumb clientele portfolio by 3.50% annually. These findings suggest that behavioral and information-based explanations for portfolio distortions apply to distinct subsets of investors.

We test the implications of anchoring bias associated with forecast earnings per share (FEPS) for forecast errors, earnings surprises, stock returns, and stock splits. We find that analysts make optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts when a firm’s FEPS is lower (higher) than the industry median. Further, firms with FEPS greater (lower) than the industry median experience abnormally high (low) future stock returns, particularly around subsequent earnings announcement dates. These firms are also more likely to engage in stock splits. Finally, split firms experience more positive forecast revisions, more negative forecast errors, and more negative earnings surprises after stock splits.

We compare investment policies across public and private firms in different institutional settings. Using a large cross-country data set, we find that public listed firms are better positioned to take advantage of growth opportunities than private firms. Specifically, public listed firms exhibit higher investment sensitivity to growth opportunities than private firms. This differential, however, only exists in countries with well-developed stock markets. Furthermore, the relative advantage public firms have at allocating capital depends on the degree of agency costs and reliance on external equity.

We study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relationship between corporate governance and company performance. We consider 5 measures of corporate governance during the period 1998–2007. We find a significant negative relationship between board independence and operating performance during the pre-2002 period, but a positive and significant relationship during the post-2002 period. Our most important contribution is a proposal of a governance measure, namely, dollar ownership of the board members, that is simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement error, and not subject to the problem of weighting a multitude of governance provisions in constructing a governance index.

This study examines the role that chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence plays in an explanation of international mergers and acquisitions during the period 2000–2006. Using a sample of CEOs of Fortune Global 500 firms over our sample period, we find that CEO overconfidence is related to a number of critical aspects of international merger activity. Overconfidence helps to explain the number of offers made by a CEO, the frequencies of nondiversifying and diversifying acquisitions, and the use of cash to finance a merger deal. Although overconfidence is an international phenomenon, it is most extensively observed in individuals heading firms headquartered in Christian countries that encourage individualism while de-emphasizing long-term orientation in their national cultures.

We show that contractual risk-taking incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) increased at large U.S. commercial banks around 2000, when industry deregulation expanded these banks’ growth opportunities. Our econometric models indicate that CEOs responded positively to these incentives, especially at the larger banks best able to take advantage of these opportunities. Our results also suggest that bank boards responded to higher-than-average levels of risk by moderating CEO risk-taking incentives; however, this feedback effect is absent at the very largest banks with strong growth opportunities and a history of highly aggressive risk-taking incentives.

We examine the effects of nonmonetary benefits on overall executive compensation from the perspective of the living environment at the firm headquarters. Companies in polluted, high crime rate, or otherwise unpleasant locations pay higher compensation to their chief executive officers (CEOs) than companies located in more livable locations. This premium in pay for quality of life is stronger when firms face tougher competition in the managerial labor market, when the CEO is hired from outside, and when the CEO has short-term career concerns. Overall, the geographic desirability of the corporate headquarters is an effective substitute for CEO monetary pay.

This article analyzes the effect of liquidity risk on the performance of equity hedge fund portfolios. Similarly to Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), (2011), we observe that, before accounting for the effect of liquidity risk, hedge fund portfolios that incorporate predictability in managerial skills generate superior performance. This outperformance disappears or weakens substantially for most emerging markets, event-driven, and long/short hedge fund portfolios once we account for liquidity risk. Moreover, we show that the equity market-neutral and long/short hedge fund portfolios’ “alphas” also entail rents for their service as liquidity providers. These results hold under various robustness tests.

We consider whether sentiment affects the profitability of momentum strategies. We hypothesize that news that contradicts investors’ sentiment causes cognitive dissonance, slowing the diffusion of such news. Thus, losers (winners) become underpriced under optimism (pessimism). Short-selling constraints may impede arbitraging of losers and thus strengthen momentum during optimistic periods. Supporting this notion, we empirically show that momentum profits arise only under optimism. An analysis of net order flows from small and large trades indicates that small investors are slow to sell losers during optimistic periods. Momentum-based hedge portfolios formed during optimistic periods experience long-run reversals.

This paper describes estimation methods, based on the generalized method of moments (GMM), applicable in settings where time series have different starting or ending dates. We introduce two estimators that are more efficient asymptotically than standard GMM. We apply these to estimating predictive regressions in international data and show that the use of the full sample affects inference for assets with data available over the full period as well as for assets with data available for a subset of the period. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate that reductions hold for small-sample standard errors as well as asymptotic ones.

The large deviation of the actual return of a leveraged exchange-traded fund (LETF) from the leveraged multiple of the underlying index return has drawn considerable attention from investors, regulators, and the financial media. Despite this attention, the sources and fundamental determinants of the LETF return deviation remain unidentified. This study constructs a clear, unified, objective, and executable framework that addresses the behaviors, sources, and determinants of the LETF compounding and noncompounding deviations. Our theoretical predictions and empirical results hold the promise of guiding investors, regulators, financial advisors, and portfolio managers toward a thorough understanding of the return behavior of LETFs.