¹ See Bengtson, , Gr. Gesch. ²319 f.Google Scholar There is a most useful mise au point by Walser, in Ét. Suisses d'Hist. Gén. 1956. 156 f.Google Scholar

² Arrian, , Anab. vii 4, 3Google Scholar; Curtius x 1, 39 f. Cf. Plut. Al. 42, 2.

³ Arr., loc. cit. (cf. vi 27, 5: Plut. Al. 68, 3; Diod. xvii 106, 2, Curt, x 1.

⁴ To be expected, e.g. in Tarn (Al. i 109); but found even in more critical accounts, like Schacher-meyr's (Al. 391 f.: ‘Die grosse Säuberung’—though the discussion is more critical than this heading suggests; e.g. (p. 395): ‘das Denunziantentum blühte’).

⁵ Alexanderreich i, facing p. 276: it does not include the strategia of Europe (Antipater), but does list every province outside Europe, which, for however short a time, had a governor imposed by Alexander (e.g. Nicanor's satrapy in India and even Armenia are included). Paraetacene (Oxathres) should perhaps be added, though it was somehow connected with Susiana (see text). However, this and other possible changes of detail do not matter for our present purpose.

⁶ The two not executed are special cases: Apollophanes had been killed in action, and Antipater's recall was, after (it seems) a period of negotiations, made void by Alexander's death. (On this, see discussion below.)

⁷ For the sake of completeness we might add the client prince Abisares. For all these men the sources are collected in Berve, , Alexanderreich iiGoogle Scholar (this volume will henceforth be cited by the author's name only), s.w. Μένων (519), Θόας, Βάλακρος (200), Φίλιππος (780), Ἀβισάρης. On Apollophanes, see CQ 1958, 148 f.

⁸ See Berve, s.vv. Ἄρχων and Φίλιππος (no. 785: the suggestion that Amyntas was killed in the settlers’ revolt in 325 and that Philip succeeded him in that year is a mere guess, no better than any other). On these provinces, and also on the interesting case of Lesser Phrygia, see further below. As we have no firm dates for any of these changes, it is best to assign them all to a period in which so many similar changes are in fact attested and political explanations for these particular ones obtrude themselves.

⁹ See Berve, 261 n. 2.

¹⁰ vii 6, 1.

¹¹ Though his popularity with his Persian subjects (A vi 30, fin.) may have gone far enough to make the King prefer to remove him from the province for a while. Cf. D xix 48, 5. It must be repeated that, on the whole, we can use the facts, but not the interpretations, of Court historiography.

¹² A iv 18, 2 (Autophradates).

¹³ Memnon, (FGrHist 434)Google Scholar, 12, 4. Reconstruction by Beloch, , GG iv ²2, 211 f.Google Scholar; cf. Jacoby's note ad loc. (iii b, Kommentar, Text, 276): ‘Die Zuverlässigkeit der zahlen … ist m.e. nicht über allen zweifel erhaben.’ An understatement, but welcome. On Calas, see Berve, s.v. Κάλας.

¹⁴ See Berve, s.vv. Φραδασμάνης and Σισίνης.

¹⁵ On Cleomenes, see the standard works (especially Berve, 210 f.). His status cannot be decided for certain; but it looks as though, if he had indeed arrogated his satrapal powers, this was confirmed (as it was certainly tolerated) by Alexander. On the famous letter to Cleomenes about honours for the dead Hephaestion (A vii 26, 3), see (against Tarn) Hamilton, , CQ 1953, 157Google Scholar, showing that it fits in well enough with the King's frame of mind at the time and that there are no grounds for rejecting its authenticity.

¹⁶ E.g. Cleander, hated by natives and soldiers alike (A vi 27, 4; C x 1, 5 f.), and Antipater, hated by the Greeks (see below).

¹⁷ A vii 4, 2 f.; P 68, 2. Cf. C x 1, 7.

¹⁸ A vi 27, 3; 29, 3; C ix 10, 19 f.

¹⁹ C ix 10, 21; x i, 39.

²⁰ A iv 18, 2; vi 29, 3.

²¹ On what follows, see CQ 1958, 148.

²² E.g. in the intrigue that destroyed Philotas and in the events that followed the death of Clitus (C viii 2, 12).

²³ Alexander (Ptolemy ap. A v 28, 4): it was this that was the official reason for his turning back, so that Alexander submitted to the gods and not to his men. The trophies he erected were to make it quite clear that this was no defeat. All this care to disguise the plain facts is worth noticing.

²⁴ A vi 2, 1; C ix 3, 20 (slightly differing in time and place, which do not matter much). Cf. Alexander's vindictive comment (C, loc. cit.): ‘propter paucos dies longam orationem eum exorsum, tamquam solus Macedoniam uisurus esset’. This, according to Berve (218), ‘trägt den Stempel der Unwahrheit’; but he fails to define this useful mark. Tarn, 's statement (Al. ii 287et al.)Google Scholar that Coenus could not have made the speech because he had been left behind on the Acesines (‘perhaps already a doomed man’) hardly needs refuting. He obviously followed Alexander later, like Porus (A v 24, 4), as Mr Brunt points out to me. Tarn characteristically notices that both A and C make Coenus the army's spokesman, but refuses to admit that this disproves his assertion that Coenus was not there (ibid. 290).

²⁵ On Coenus, the son of Polemocrates, and his family, see below.

²⁶ Tarn, Al. i 100.

²⁷ A vi 6, 5; 7, 5; 9, 3 f. (It is clear throughout that the infantry were not supporting him as they had been accustomed to and as he had come to expect.) For his threatened suicide (and its effect) after the death of Clitus, see C viii 2, 12, with Curtius’ comment: it was his success on this occasion that showed him that he could break the noble opposition.

²⁸ Tarn, , Al. i 106.Google Scholar

²⁹ Both these pleas were later put forward by his faithful friend Nearchus (A vi 24, 2 f.)—who thus enables us to see that other motives were commonly believed. It was, however, left to Tarn to assert that ‘there was nothing foolhardy about it’. See Schachermeyr's masterly analysis, Al. 382 f.

³⁰ A, loc. cit.; Strabo xv 2, 5.

³¹ But with his usual skill Alexander, once the hardships turned out so much worse than he had expected, refrained from enforcing relentless discipline and stressed the fact that he was bearing his fair share (A vi 23, 4 f.).

³² On what follows (especially Apollophanes), see CQ 1958, 148.

³³ Notably Atropates (Media), who brought with him the pretender Baryaxes (see above); yet he was only sent back from Susa. Phrataphernes (Parthia-Hyrcania) sent his sons, whom we may well regard as hostages (see above). Stasanor (Areia-Drangania), like the sons of Phrataphernes, came with large supplies for the depleted army and avoided disaster. He was still with Alexander just before the King's death, but seems to have retained his satrapy (at least nominally) all this time, as we find him confirmed in it after Alexander's death (D xviii 3, 3 et al.).

³⁴ See n. 8 (above), with text. On Harpalus, see further below.

³⁵ D xvii 106, 3.

³⁶ On Coenus and Cleander, the sons of Polemocrates, see Berve, s.w.—usefully marshalling the evidence, but with no recognition of what it adds up to. (Cf. his final summary on Coenus: ‘In anspruchsloser, soldatischer Pflichterfüllung … und nicht zuletzt in seiner aufrechten Männlichkeit …’).

³⁷ On the Philotas affair and those involved in it, see especially C vi 8, 17 f. On the reorganisation of the army before the Indian campaign, see Schachermeyr's attractive interpretation (Al. 404 f.—unfortunately the detailed treatment he promises at n. 250 has not yet appeared). On any interpretation the importance of the hipparchs is unquestioned; it is thus most interesting to see all the chief enemies of Philotas promoted to this supreme rank.

³⁸ This is stated by C (x 1, 1), but denied by Berve (168), on no good grounds. C often gives much fuller information than A, especially in matters of prosopography, and his statement on such a point must prevail over A's silence (iii 26, 3). For good measure, Heracon is mentioned by A as having been left behind under Parmenio together with Cleander and Sitalces (vi 27, 3).

³⁹ See Berve, 257 f. It is impossible to believe (with Berve) that these are the forces which, over four years earlier, he had been sent to Macedonia to collect—especially as the two men who had been sent with him on that occasion are not mentioned together with him in 323. That mission had surely long been completed, and (as in so many cases of commanders not with Alexander himself) we simply do not know Menidas' next assignment. The despicable Polydamas seems to have survived to be sent home with Craterus (Just. xii 12, 8): he was not a man of importance.

⁴⁰ On him see Berve, s.v. Ἅρπαλος.

⁴¹ Ath. xiii 557c.

⁴² Thus rightly Berve, s.v. Κοῖνος, itat.

⁴³ See Berve, 76.

⁴⁴ Evidence in Berve, loc. cit. (his judgment p. 78). On the ‘first flight’, see my Note in Historia 1960, 245 f.

⁴⁵ A vi 27, 3; C x 1, 1. Neither, unfortunately, tells us the exact time during that stay, which was quite prolonged.

⁴⁶ Chief discussion in Beloch, , GG iii ²2, 320 f.Google Scholar The march from Pattala to Susa took over 6 months. There is general agreement on the outlines:

Wilcken: departure from Pattala about end of August 325; departure from Pura about beginning of December 325; arrival at Pasargadae beginning of 324; arrival at Susa about February 324.

Tarn: march through the desert starting September 325; arrival at Susa spring 324.

Schachermeyr: departure from Pattala end of summer 325; departure from Pura end of November 325; arrival at Susa about March 324.

No one would insist on the details, especially in view of the inaccuracy of Arrian's summary of Nearchus (see FGrHist ii (Kommentar), no. 133, especially pp. 452 and 462).

⁴⁷ xvii 106, 3.

⁴⁸ Especially Theopompus, ap. Ath. xiii 586c and 595d.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Alexander's mastery of intrigue followed by the decisive coup should surely be more widely recognised than it is: not to mention Philotas and Parmenio (and other attested cases in the early period), we can watch it at work during the period here discussed in his action against Cleander and his group and in his treatment of Astaspes (C ix 10, 21 and 29).

⁵⁰ See n. 44 (above), with text.

⁵¹ Sources in Berve, s.v. Ἅρπαλος. Harpalus cannot have waited until the King's arrival at Susa.

⁵² On Calas, satrap of Lesser Phrygia (the key to the Straits), and on his supersession, and on the change of governor at Babylon, see above nn. 8, 13.

⁵³ On Antipater's fear for his life, see C x io, 14 f.; P 49 fin.; Just. xii 14, 5 (not to be rejected merely because it is linked with the rumour—whether true or false—that he had Alexander poisoned; indeed, the fact that this rumour found widespread belief shows that the motive was there). Whether the other satraps were in disgrace, and what was to be Menidas' fate, we simply do not know (see above). But Menidas, as we have seen, was involved in the murder of Parmenio, and this was ominous.

⁵⁴ See his carefully balanced arrangements there, with Arrian's comment (A iii 5, 7).

⁵⁵ Lycia-Pamphylia seems to have been added to his original satrapy of Phrygia by Alexander. On this and our other information, see Berve, s.v. Ἀντίγονος. It is possible (although not attested) that he had something to do with the mysterious change of satrap in the neighbouring province of Lesser Phrygia: some such hypothesis is certainly helpful in explaining his success. On the arrangements at Babylon after Alexander's death, see D xviii 3, 1 et al.

The friends of Eumenes might repay study. He was certainly Antigonus' friend, and another friend of his, the Greek Nearchus (a trusted friend of Alexander), later appears as Antigonus' loyal subordinate (RE, s.v. ‘Nearchos’, no. 3). As Crateras was also a friend of Eumenes, whose hatred of Hephaestion he shared, and is found collaborating with Antigonus after the King's death, we may here have a rare glimpse of one of the Court factions, especially powerful after the death of Hephaestion. (For Eumenes' friends, see Plutarch's Eumenes, passim: in addition to those mentioned above, we might note Peucestas and perhaps Leonnatus.) It is worth recalling that after Hephaestion's death the Greek Eumenes was promoted to the unprecedented rank of hipparch. His influence at Court, particularly at this time, must not be underestimated.

⁵⁶ Most of them are known, at most, as trierarchs of the Hydaspes fleet—a very mixed lot (see Arrian's detailed list, Ind. 18, 3 f.): thus Archon, Peucestas, Thoas (on all these men, see above). About the following nothing seems to be known before their appointment: Sibyrtius (Carmania, Gedrosia-Arachosia), Demarchus (Lesser Phrygia), Arcesilaus (Mesopotamia), Argaeus and Coenus (successively in Susiana). Only Tlepolemus appears earlier in a responsible position (A iii 22, 1). Peucestas owed his rapid promotion to his brave defence of the King's person (A vi 9 f. et al.). No one says that he was of outstanding rank or family. On Harpalus' successor, see Berve s.v. Ἀντιμένης.

⁵⁷ A i 16, 6.

⁵⁸ E.g. at Ephesus (A i 17, 9).

⁵⁹ Miletus (A i 19, 4 f.).

⁶⁰ A i 19, 6.

⁶¹ A i 20, 2 f.

⁶² A i 24, 4.

⁶³ A ii 13, 2 f.; C iv 1, 27 f.; D xvii 48, 2 f.

⁶⁴ Thus Parke, , Greek Merc. Soldiers, 199.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ A ii 13, 4 f.

⁶⁶ E.g. RE, s.v. ‘Tainaron’, coll. 2040 f.; Launey, , Recherches sur les Arm. hell. i 105Google Scholar, n. 1. See further below.

⁶⁷ A i 23, 5. Certainly until after Issus, as appears from ii 13.

⁶⁸ C iv 1, 39; D xvii 48, 1. We cannot tell where and how he picked them up; but the figure probably includes the 4,000 who had not gone to Egypt with Amyntas (see above): otherwise it would seem excessively large for scattered survivors.

⁶⁹ Chares surrendered Mytilene to Hegelochus in 332 (A iii 2, 6; C iv 5, 22) and sailed to Imbros (C, loc. cit.). We are not told how long he stayed there; but it is most unlikely that developments were so swift that Hyperides' speech is to be put before the battle of Megalopolis. If Chares took part in the Persian attack that captured Mytilene (A ii 1 f.)— as is very likely, since he was then left there to command the garrison— he will have met many of these men before. Here, as probably in the case of Leosthenes later (see below), personal connexions between leaders and men must be looked for.

⁷⁰ [Plut.] X or. 848e. We do not know whether Chares was at the time an Athenian strategus, or whether the force was in fact dissolved. The latter is very likely, as we hear no more about it.

⁷¹ See Hammond, , Hist. of Gr., 665.Google Scholar

⁷² See Parke, op. cit. 186 f.

⁷³ For a discussion of them, see Tarn, , Al. ii 232 f.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Tscherikower, , Philologus, Suppl. xix, 148 f.; 190 f.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ The story is told in C ix 7 and (very summarily) in D xvii 99.

⁷⁶ This (C, loc. cit.) must be accepted against D, who says that the men were massacred after Alexander's death. As it was their intention to go home, they can hardly have been in the Far East two and a half years later. D, in his abbreviated account, has simply confused this rebellion with the greater one after Alexander's death.

⁷⁷ i 25, 5; cf. viii 52, 5.

⁷⁸ His figure for the men concerned (50,000) cannot be taken seriously.

⁷⁹ In the Oropus dedication of (it seems) 324/3:23 (best discussed by Mathieu, , RPh 1929, 159 f.Google Scholar).

⁸⁰ See RE, Suppl. vi, coll. 1087 f.

⁸¹ See n. 47 and text (above).

⁸² xvii 111. 1.

⁸³ Hyp. Dem. col. 19 (however restored).

⁸⁴ A vii, 23, 1.

⁸⁵ xviii 8, 5.

⁸⁶ The census of Demetrius of Phalerum (a useful, since ancient, basis for comparison) gave 21,000 adult male Athenians (Ath. vi 272c). Cf. modern discussions of population figures, such as Jones, , Ath. Dem. 76 f.Google Scholar; Gomme, , JHS 1959, 61 f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁷ See Berve, op. cit. ii 48. [Dem.] xvii makes it clear that this was going on in Europe while Alexander, after the famous order to Alcimachus (A i 18, 1), was posing as the liberator of the Greeks in Asia. (Cf. also P 34, often mistranslated by modern commentators.)

⁸⁸ P 74, 2; Just. xii 14, 4 f. For complaints against Antipater and their encouragement by the King, see below.

⁸⁹ See Berve, s.vv. This is glimpsed in passing by Tarn (ii 370).

⁹⁰ See above. Cf. Wilcken, , Sitzungsber. preuss. Akad. Wiss. 1922, 112 f.Google Scholar, rightly insisting that the punishment of the mercenaries after Granicus must be based on a League decision. Alexander's later practice simply departed from this (as, no doubt, he could claim to be entitled to do by virtue of his position). It is worth noting that the leaders of the 8,000 mercenaries after Issus (see above) are called deserters in the official version (A ii 13, 2). For League action, cf. Tod, , GHI ii 192Google Scholar, ll. 10 f.

⁹¹ Tod, op. cit. 201–2.

⁹² See further discussion, below (nn. 98 f. and text, and next Section).

⁹³ The theory, which—despite opposition by great scholars like Wilcken—had a surprisingly long run (explicable only in terms of the psychology of many modern writers on Alexander), has now been finally killed (one may hope) by Balsdon, , Historia 1950, 363 f.Google Scholar A little earlier, it had been brilliantly restated by Tarn, (Al. i 111.Google Scholar; 138 f.; ii 370 f.).

⁹⁴ See n. 87 (above).

⁹⁵ D xviii 8, 6.

⁹⁶ See Section 1, above. The proclamation of Alexander's intention is fortunately dated for us to his stay at Susa (see Dittenberger, , Syll. i 312Google Scholar, with notes; cf. Wilcken's comments, op. cit. 115 f.). It seems clear that Athenian resistance, at any rate, was expected (see especially Ath. xii 538b).

⁹⁷ E.g. Wilcken, , Alexander d. Gr. 200Google Scholar (= 214 of English translation).

⁹⁸ Heuss, (Hermes 1938, 139 f.)Google Scholar, in what is probably the most valuable discussion of this question, rightly insists that, by giving up the puppet régimes in the cities, Alexander was taking a step diametrically opposed to his previous policy, unprecedented in Greek history (though we may perhaps compare, in a very different context, Athenian policy after the Sicilian disaster), and rather puzzling to the Greeks. But he too fails to find a proper explanation for this radical departure: that Alexander was strong enough to risk it was a necessary condition, but hardly a motive.

⁹⁹ xviii 8, 4. This wording, probably from Hieronymus, is generally accepted as authentic (see e.g. Wikken and Heuss, loc. cit.). It would be hard to imagine a reason why it should have been invented in this peculiar form.

¹⁰⁰

¹⁰¹ On this matter (which does not concern us here in detail) see Heuss, loc. cit., refuting Wilcken's fanciful reconstructions.

¹⁰² … (perhaps, as Mr Brunt points out to me, a veiled reference to Antipater).

¹⁰³ See A i 9, 9; D xvii 14.

¹⁰⁴ A i 10, 6.

¹⁰⁵ Hyp. Dem. 18. What the other instructions were is not at all clear, as there is a large gap in the papyrus at this point. But they concerned the Achaean, Arcadian and (it seems) Boeotian Leagues: Colin's reading τ]οι[ού]τω[ν for the usual Β]οι[ω]τῶ[ν makes no real sense. They must have contained some restriction or punishment, perhaps later re mitted as the result of embassies, and in any case soon cancelled by the King's death. On Harpalus in Athens, see bibliography in Bengtson, , G.G. ²346Google Scholar, n. 3.

¹⁰⁶ The sources are collected in Berve, s.v. Ἅρπαλος. They will be discussed here only where they seem to need renewed discussion. That the Athenians, at this stage, were anxious for their own safety in view of Harpalus' forces—and not, as is sometimes assumed, afraid of Alexander—is clear from the speeches at the trial (especially Din. iii).

¹⁰⁷ See n. 117 (below) and text, and—for the ships—n. 161 (below).

¹⁰⁸ Philoxenus' envoys reached Athens about the same time as Harpalus himself (Hyp. Dem. 8). We are not told when those of the others arrived (see D xvii 108, 7), but it will have been before long.

¹⁰⁹ plut. Phoc. 21, 3. Plutarch has obscured the point by his usual anecdotal treatment and lack of real comprehension. But the authenticity of the story, and its true interpretation, seems to be established by the accurate figure of 700 talents, which was the amount that Harpalus in fact had with him. His friendship with Phocion, in particular, is well known: it was Phocion who, with his son-in-law, looked after Harpalus' daughter by Pythionice (ibid. 22).

¹¹⁰ Though he continued unobtrusively to do his best for his friend (Plut., loc. cit.).

¹¹¹ See below.

¹¹² Din. ii 6.

¹¹³ Stratocles, Hyperides, Menesaechmus, Pytheas, Himeraeus, Patrocles (or Proeles). On these men, see Prosopographia Attica, s.w. The last name may be nothing more than a corruption of Stratocles, whom that particular source ([Plut.] X or. 846 c) omits.

¹¹⁴ This is why the usual oversimplifications have found their way into the textbooks—e.g. the odd statement that there was a coalition between ‘extreme pro-Macedonian’ and ‘extreme anti-Macedonian’ politicians against the ‘moderates’. On the value of such party labels, see the salutary remarks by Sealey, , JHS 1956, 80 f.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Despite repeated attempts to justify them (see especially the thorough investigation by Sachsenweger, , De Demosthenis Epistulis (1935)Google Scholar), the contradictions in ii and iii, which prima facie contain the most useful evidence, cannot be properly explained. See Bikerman, , RPh 1937, 52 f.Google Scholar—favourably inclined, but regretfully concluding that the question is still open.

¹¹⁶ For muddle, see n. 109 (above). A clear case of distortion is Phocion's virtuous repudiation of his guilty son-in-law Chancles (Phoc. 21, 5f.), with whom, after Harpalus' death, he nevertheless continued to share the guardianship of Harpalus' daughter and who was later involved in Phocion, 's downfall (Phoc. 33, 3 f.)Google Scholar. This case, fortunately clear, should warn us against taking Phocion's reported actions and sayings at their face value, where they cannot be checked.

¹¹⁷ Hyp. Dem. 8 f.; [Plut.] X or. 846 b (citing Philochorus). That Demosthenes had some official connexion with this is made clear by Hyperides' νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις, which confirms what would in any case be the obvious implication of the whole fuss: that it was his business to know of the dis crepancy. There is no reason to deny the possibility of such a special commission, in the special circumstances.

¹¹⁸ Hyp. Dem. 12. (Cf. [Plut.] loc. cit)

¹¹⁹ See Berve, loc. cit.

¹²⁰ For the justification of this chronology, see Appendix.

¹²¹ Din. i 81 f. (cf. 103). For Samos, see especially D xviii 8, 7, and compare Dittenberger, , Syll. i 312.Google Scholar It is very likely that Demosthenes also wanted an opportunity of talking to the envoys of the other Greek states.

¹²² The tone of the Olympic proclamation (D xviii 8, 4) precludes any possibility of negotiations; yet we know that embassies were sent about the matter (D xvii 113, 3; cf. A vii 19, 2), and Alexander may in the end even have decided to leave Samos in the Athenians' possession (P 28, 1 f.; cf. Hamilton, , CQ 1953, 153 f.Google Scholar, and Habicht, , AM 1959, 161Google Scholar—but it is not certain that the letter quoted by Plutarch, even if genuine, belongs to this late date: Plutarch himself certainly implies an earlier date). The incident of Demosthenes' attack on the orator Lamachus (see Berve, s.v.) can hardly be assigned to these Games: such conduct is inconceivable in the midst of these delicate and important negotiations, which we know were Demosthenes' main object in going to Olympia.

¹²³ See, e.g. Hamilton, loc. cit. Demosthenes' change of mind, with which his enemies later reproached him (Hyp. Dem. 31; Din. i 94), may have had something to do with the question of Samos (cf. Demades' comment about losing the earth (sources in Berve, 132)); though this whole business comes somewhat later in the year, when the Areopagus inquiry was already in progress (Hyp., loc. cit.). For the date of its beginning, see Appendix.

¹²⁴ On the chronology, see Appendix.

¹²⁵ Plut. Phoc. 21, fin.—22; Ath. viii 341 f.

¹²⁶ Modern accounts sometimes imply that the discrepancy was discovered immediately and Harpalus nevertheless made good his escape. This is quite inconceivable.

¹²⁷ See n. 118 (above).

¹²⁸ Ath., loc. cit.

¹²⁹ Din. i 4, 61, al; Hyp. Dem. 2, al. Demosthenes did not, at first, deny having received money from Harpalus, but claimed that he had spent it in the public interest. On this, see further below.

¹³⁰ Dem. xviii 132 f.; Din. i 62 f. (cf. 9 f.). See Sealey, , AJP 1958, 72 f.Google Scholar I should like to acknowledge Mr Sealey's help, particularly on Athenian matters; though I know he does not agree with many of my conclusions.

¹³¹ Hyp. Dem. 31.

¹³² Din. i 45.

¹³³ Hyp., loc. cit. The frequentative optative and the implication of dishonesty are no doubt a prosecutor's device; but we should certainly accept the coincidence itself (at least on one occasion) as fact. In what form Alexander's divinity was finally recognised (i.e. whether as a new god or, as a com promise, by identification with Dionysus—a view which, though not in favour at present, has some thing to commend it) is uncertain.

¹³⁴ See Berve, s.v. Ἀριστίων. The myth—implied or expressed in many modern accounts, but unknown to the sources—that Demosthenes was kept out of power and had little influence during this period should not need detailed refutation. Not to dwell on the affair of the Crown and earlier events, see, for the period with which we are immediately concerned, Din. i, passim (e.g. 11; 100 f. (his collaboration with Demades)); Hyp. Dem. 12 —amply borne out, as we have seen, by his initiative in the case of Harpalus and his negotiations with Nicanor. There is good reason to think that Demades, whom he never attacked (Din., loc. cit.; cf. Plut. Dem. 8, fin.—and all the facts we know) and who had saved his life after Alexander's accession, was a distant relative of his. The absence of any positive statement in the sources is no evidence to the contrary: nothing (except his enemies' stock abuse) is known about the family of Demades; and we need only remember the tenuous chance that has preserved the knowledge of Lycurgus' high descent in [Plut.] X or. The name ‘Demes’ (which is that of Demades' father, as of his son) recurs in Paeania in one other family, perhaps connected with the Bouzygae and certainly characterised by its use of Dem(o)- names; as it occurs twice in this family, twice in that of Demades (in which, in fact, only these two names are known), and nowhere else, there must surely be a close connexion. On the other hand, this family shares its use of Dem(o)- names with that of Demosthenes; and in each case we have an ample assortment of such names, including ‘Demosthenes’, which is common to both. And, in case we might think that this type of name is obvious and common, it is worth noting that in the massive surviving records of the deme Paeania, no other family before the third century uses any name of this type. The obvious prima facie conclusion is that the two families sharing (and monopolising) these names are related—we do not know how closely—and that the family of Demades (of which, as I have said, we know practically nothing at all) is related to both of them, and quite closely to that branch with which it shares the name ‘Demeas’. For information on these families, see Prosopographia Attica s.vv. This helps to explain the puzzle of the attested collaboration between Demades and Demosthenes.

¹³⁵ D xviii 48, 2 (cf. Plut. Phoc. 30, 2).

¹³⁶ Din. i 68.

¹³⁷ In October, according to Berve (173). There seems to be no precise date in the sources, but the campaign against the Cossaci, which Alexander undertook after a long time devoted to mourning (A vii 15, 1 f.), began in winter. The envoys whom he had sent to Aramon, presumably straight after his friend's death, returned not long before his own (A vii 23, 6): seven or eight months seems about right for their journey.

¹³⁸ Berve puts Craterus' departure about August. We know nothing about his movements. At the time of the King's death he was still in Cilicia, though we do not know of anything he had to do there (D xviii 4, 1; 12, 1). See next section for further discussion.

¹³⁹ P 74. Cassander's later hatred of Alexander's family is a fact of history.

¹⁴⁰ See n. 88 (above) and text.

¹⁴¹ We hear of six others involved: Philocles (see below); Cephisophon (Din. i 45)—we know of three politicians by that name at the time and have no idea which of them this was; Aristonicus (Dion. Hal. Din., p. 654); Hagnonides (ibid.—a certain emendation: cf. Hyp. Dem. 40); Charicles (Plut. Phoc. 21, fin.—22); Aristogiton (Din. ii). Polyeuctus (of Sphettus), a friend of Demosthenes, is often said to have been put on trial; that depends on the interpretation of Din. i 100, where he is apostrophised as not a genuine democrat: there is no specific evidence. Most of these men are more than mere names to us; yet we do not know enough about their associations to discern a pattern in the prosecutions. As we have seen, the names of the prosecutors are of no more use.

¹⁴² If the Demosthenic Letters are genuine, Philocles was also condemned. But there are serious difficulties about accepting them as genuine (see n. 115 (above)), and it is not easy—though possible—to believe in Philocles' conviction, since he was honoured at the end of his year of office (see Appendix).

¹⁴³ E.g. Berve, 123; CAH vi 453.

¹⁴⁴ Din. i 29 (cf. 104). The reference is clear, although the name is too obvious to be mentioned. Demosthenes and Demades are constantly thus coupled as the arch-villains in Dinarchus' speeches (e.g. i 7, 11, 45 (with Cephisophon), 89, 101 f.; ii 15); cf. Hyp. Dem. 25.

¹⁴⁵ Plut. Phoc. 22, 3.

¹⁴⁶ Demosthenes was charged with receiving a bribe of 20 talents and was fined 50 (see Berve, 140 f.)—much less than the tenfold fine permitted (Hyp. Dem. 24; Din. ii 17), not to mention the death penalty asked for (Din. i 18, 29; ii 20). Demades' bribe was alleged to be 6,000 gold staters (Din. i 89), which, at the accepted rate of 10: 1, is 120,000 drachmas or 20 talents. The context must be quoted: [Demosthenes] It seems almost inconceivable that Demades' sum should have been precisely the same as that of Demosthenes. The change (after 20 and 15 silver talents) to a less familiar denomination can only be explained, if the sum in question was in fact smaller than those that precede and the orator wanted to make it sound impressive. It is certainly quite inexplicable, if the total was exactly the same as the first mentioned. Moreover, since Dinarchus seems to put the total traced by the Areopagus at 64 talents (see apparatus ad loc.), this would hardly leave enough for all the others whom we know to have been named. It looks as though the mention of χρνσοῦ; is an orator's trick, and Demades' sum was in fact 6,000 silver staters (= didrachms; i.e. 2 tal.?). There is no evidence that stater, at this time, meant a tetradrachm: see RE, s.v. ‘stater’. As it happens, we can catch Dinarchus out in a precisely similar trick: cf. the use of χρυσίου in ss. 6, 45, 53: the εἴκοσι τάλαντα χρυσίου of Demosthenes are clearly impossible, in the literal meaning, since Harpalus' funds could not have stretched as far as that. If this is correct, Demades' bribe was only 2 talents, and the fine (especially if imposed on the same scale as that of Demosthenes) would seem trifling to him. Thus he might well pay it and return. That his flight had been due to panic and had preceded his trial is clear from the facts that Demosthenes' trial was the first to be held (Din. i 105) and that Demades was already abroad at the time.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. his relations with Perdiccas a little later (D xviii 48, 2).

¹⁴⁸ Paus. ii 33, 4 f.: Philoxenus. But he was summoned to Court before long (A vii 23, 1; 24, 1).

¹⁴⁹ See n. 138 (above) and text.

¹⁵⁰ See, most conveniently, Berve, s.v. Ἀντίπατρος (94).

¹⁵¹ D xvii 118, 1. Whatever we think of the story of the poisoning of Alexander by Antipater's youngest son (see Berve, s.v. Ἰόλαος (386)—it is impossible to decide, since, if true, it was bound to be denied or ignored, and if false, bound to be asserted), we have no reason to doubt Antipater's reaction to Alexander's measures against his old friends.

¹⁵² Berve, 47.

¹⁵³ A vii 12, 5 f. (unfortunately cut short by a major gap).

¹⁵⁴ D xvii 108, 6. Cf. above.

¹⁵⁵ It is significant that Demosthenes proposed to turn down Philoxenus' demand, yet asserted that the Athenians could avoid offending Alexander (Hyp. Dem. 8).

¹⁵⁶ Suid., s.v. Ἀντίπατρς. This again is often disbelieved a priori. Thus each piece of evidence is often individually ruled out of court and the pattern is not allowed to emerge.

¹⁵⁷ See n. 139 (above) and text.

¹⁵⁸ See n. 138 above and text. Compare the attempts by Greek cities to have the exiles decree revoked.

¹⁵⁹ P 49, fin. Plutarch appears to put the negotiations straight after Parmenio's death, where they certainly make little sense. That Parmenio's death had impressed Antipater and made him fear a similar fate in 324 is no doubt true: Plutarch has, as so often, presented a logical as a chronological connexion. Fortunately, the reference to Oeniadae, which we know (D xviii 8, 6) was the point at issue between Alexander and the League in 324, settles the chronology and redeems the unnamed source. In view of the Diodorus passage, it may well be Hieronymus. We have no right to reject such items of information on a priori grounds as ‘contrary to Antipater's character’ (thus, e.g. Berve, 50: ‘unbedingt königstreu’), thus begging the whole question and closing our eyes to the facts.

¹⁶⁰ Hyp. Dem. 19.

¹⁶¹ The ships appear in the navy lists (e.g. IG ii² 1631, 170 f.; 1632, 123); for the precarious retention of the money (no doubt the ships were equally precarious), see Din. i 68.

¹⁶² See the lists for 325/324 f. (IG ii² 1629, 808 f.; 1631, 172 f.).

¹⁶³ See Section 2 (above).

¹⁶⁴ This is the prima facie inference from the fact that he commanded the Athenian forces outside Attica in the Lamian War (cf. Ar. Ath. pol. 61, 1).

¹⁶⁵ D xvii 111; xviii 9.

¹⁶⁶ Hyp. Dem. 12–13.

¹⁶⁷ E.g. Berve, 140 (with bibliography). That Demosthenes, under pressure, hinted that the money had been used for the Theoric Fund—which (as Berve has no difficulty in pointing out) is most unlikely—is not really relevant to the problem, as he was bound to say something of the sort either if he was guilty or if the truth could not even be hinted at.

¹⁶⁸ See the Bude Hyperides (ed. Colin), pp. 228 ff. (with bibliography). Detailed earlier discussion (a little vague, but with many good points) in Bauer, , Demosth. u.d. Harpal. Process (Freiburg i. B., 1900).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ On the elder Leosthenes, see Sealey, , Historia 1956, 202.Google Scholar On Demosthenes' political beginnings, see Plut. Dem. 5 (his admiration for Callistratus' speech on Oropus), and his references to Callistratus (xviii 219; xix 297; xxiv 135—I owe these to a private communication by Mr Sealey).

¹⁷⁰ The details of the case are well beyond recovery. But the anger of a man like Hyperides (who will hardly have been ignorant of Leosthenes' activities) is significant. The charges of converting foreign subsidies to personal profit, so often repeated against Demosthenes on various occasions, did not necessarily lack all foundation: the picture that Aeschines and Hyperides and Dinarchus, from different points of view, paint of his avarice and political trimming is remarkably consistent; and the latter, at any rate, is obvious enough from the facts.

¹⁷¹ See n. 122 (above).

¹⁷² D xviii 3 (cf. Arr. succ. 3).

¹⁷³ Ibid. 12, 1. He also allied himself with Leonnatus, holder of the key satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. D xviii 16, 4.

¹⁷⁵ D xviii 9, 4 f. (especially 10, 2 f.).

¹⁷⁶ See Berve, s.v. Σεύθης.

¹⁷⁷ D xviii 14, 2 f.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 11, 1.

¹⁷⁹ See n. 174 (above).

¹⁸⁰ See especially [Dem.] lvi 7 f.

¹⁸¹ D xviii 14, 2.

¹⁸² For modem views of Alexander's personality and policy, see Walser, , Ét. Suisses d'Hist. Gén. 1956, 179 f.Google Scholar I should like to thank Mr R. Sealey and Mr P. A. Brunt for valuable comments and help. I am afraid they disagree with several of my interpretations and opinions; and though they have helped me to eliminate some errors, they are not, of course, responsible for those remaining. I am also obliged to Mr. J. R. Hamilton for help in the study of sources for the history of Alexander.