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Imposed institutions and preferences for redistribution§

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 April 2017

ALBERTO CHONG  and
MARK GRADSTEIN
ALBERTO CHONG*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA; Universidad del Pacifico, Lima, Peru
MARK GRADSTEIN
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel; CEPR; CESifo; IZA
*
*Email: achong6@gsu.edu
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Abstract

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and from an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an ‘experiment’ in institutional imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favour increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences.

Keywords

Institutionsmarkets versus stateredistributional preferences

JEL classification

D30: General I31: General Welfare, Well-Being D02: Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact P30: General P51: Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , February 2018 , pp. 127 - 156
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2017 

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Footnotes

§

We appreciate comments and suggestions from Gianmarco Leon, Vanessa Rios, two anonymous referees, and the editor. We are also grateful to seminar participants at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and University College London.

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